

SCHOOLS OF SAIVISM

JADUNATH SINHA

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SCHOOLS OF SAVISM • SINHA

SCHOOLS OF ŚAIVISM

(PART OF HISTORY OF INDIAN
PHILOSOPHY, VOL. III.)

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Printed & Published by A. K. Sinha, by the Printing Section of
Sinha Publishing House Private Limited,
39, S. R. Das Road, Calcutta-26.

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SINHA PUBLISHING HOUSE (P) LTD.

DISTRIBUTORS :
FIRMA K. L. MUKHOPADHYAY
CALCUTTA-700012.

Price Rupees Fifty Only

P R E F A C E

S This book contains six chapters of my forthcoming book "A History of Indian Philosophy", Vol III. It deals with the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism incorporating in it, the philosophy of the Pāśupata, the Śaiva Siddhānta, Viśiṣṭādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha, and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vira Śaivism of Śrīpati Paṇḍita. A general account of fundamental problems of philosophy and religion based on the original sources is given here. Criticisms of the rival schools by each system are given for clear comprehension of it. A detailed study of each problem in each system is not possible in such an Objective presentation free from subjective bias is scrupulously aimed at. Detailed Sanskrit texts are given and Sanskrit texts are profusely quoted to stimulate the readers to study original texts and form their own opinions of the different systems. It also contains a study of Bhāskara.

(PART PHILC) In the different schools of Śaivism discuss the same categories, their fundamental philosophical standpoints are different. The spiritual disciplines also prescribed by them are different, for the continuous and arduous practice of them is an indispensable prerequisite for the realisation of the deep spiritual truths propounded by them. They should not be neglected by the modern generation of intellectuals. There are different kinds and stages of experience. Different kinds of truths are comprehended and experienced at different stages of knowledge and experience. Spiritual truths are not empirically verifiable.

Śaivism in the Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas is treated of in my "History of Indian Philosophy", Vol. I. My own criticisms of the different systems and differences with other authors in their interpretations are scrupulously avoided to keep the book within proper limits.

Śākta monism has great resemblance to Pratyabhijñā and Spanda Schools of Śaivism in their theoretical teachings and practical disciplines. They are allied systems as Utpaldeva distinctly mentions in his "Śivadrṣṭivṛtti." It is briefly discussed in this book. My brochure "Śākta Monism" will help the reader understand this interesting subject.

I acknowledge my indebtedness to Prof. S. N. Das Gupta, Prof. Surya Narayan Sastri, Prof. K. C. Pandey, Prof. Roma Choudhury and Mr. J. C. Chatterjee whose works helped me in writing this book.

39, S. R. Das Road,
Calcutta-26,
March 3, 1975.

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 IPK. Īśvarapratyabhiñākārikā (Utpaladeva), , , .
 IPKV. Vṛtti on ĪPK. (,) , , .
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CHAPTER I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BHĀSKARA

INTRODUCTION.—Bhāskara flourished in 900 A.D. after Śaṅkara. He criticises Śaṅkara's views of knowledge only as the means of liberation, of the world as a false appearance due tonescience, of an individual self as an unreal reflection of the Brahman in nescience or in an internal organ, its product, of an effect as an unreal appearance of a real cause, of an individual self as identical with the Brahman, and of the Brahman as indeterminate and unqualified. He does not criticise Somānada and Utpaladeva's (1000 A. D.) Śaiva monism. Nor does he criticise Rāmānuja's view (1200 A. D.). His view is criticised by Jdayana (1000 A. D.) in his 'Nyāyakusumāñjali' as pointed out by the editor of Bhāskara's 'nasūtrabhāṣya'. Vardhamāna explains 'Bhāskara' as an expounder of the Tridaṇḍin's who wrote a commentary on the 'Brahmasūtra' in his 'Nyāyakusumāñjaliprakāśa.' Jdayana wrote 'Lakṣaṇāvalī' in (984 A. D.). Hence it is certain that Bhāskara flourished in 900 A. D. He refers to Śaṅkara as a crypto-Buddhist. Many other Vedāntists follow him in branding Śaṅkara as a disguised Mahāyāna Buddhist. Bhāskara's commentary is in conformity with Tridaṇḍi Vedānta.¹

Bhāskara regards the Brahman as nondifferent as the cause of the world, and as different as the effect or the manifest world. He thinks of the world as a modification of the Brahman or as unfoldment of His powers (brahm-pariṇāmavāda). He considers an individual self to be a real part of the Brahman, different and nondifferent from Him, its difference being conditional and nondifference being essential (bhedābhedavādā). He regards the Brahman as the qualified, omniscient, omnipotent Lord of the world. He thinks works combined with knowledge as the means of liberation (jñānakarmasamuccayavāda). After Śaṅkara he strikes out a new way of interpreting the 'Brahmasūtra' and propounding the doctrine of difference and nondifference or identity (bhedābhedavāda) which is adopted and modified by Nimbārka, Vallabha, and Jīva Gosvāmī as will be shown later. This doctrine is old and mentioned and criticised by Śaṅkara in his commentary. But Bhāskara is the first pre-eminent expounder of this doctrine and interprets the 'Brahmasūtra' in the light of it.

BRAHMAN IS PROVED BY THE VEDAS ALONE.—Bhāskara holds that Brahman can be proved by the scripture or Vedas. The Mīmāṃsakas urge that the Vedas prescribe our duties (kārya) which ought to be done by us. Dharma is characterised by an imperative (codanā) or command. Brahman is an eternally accomplished reality. There can be no injunction or imperative about Him since it is relative to Ought which is to be accomplished.² Bhāskara rejects this view and holds that the Vedas lay down imperatives also relating to the knowledge of Brahman. Such an imperative is as follows : 'The Brahman is to be heard, reflected on, sought for, and enquired into.' All sentences in the Vedas are directly or indirectly related

to the determination of the nature of Brahman. The Vedas convey the knowledge of Brahman and do not merely enunciate our duties. For example, the scriptural sentences about creation explain the nature of Brahman as the cause of the world. If they are explained as injunctions about our duties, it will be a misinterpretation. The scripture is authoritative not only in regard to our duties, but also in regard to the nature of Brahman. It is authoritative for it is not a human creation but a revelation of Brahman. The Mīmāṃsakas may argue that scriptural sentences relating to sacrifices are authoritative because they determine the nature of our duties. This argument is wrong for they are authoritative in that they are not utterances of human beings but of Brahman. They are impersonal and independent of other means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and, therefore, authoritative. Brahman can be proved by the scripture only. An attempt to prove His existence by inference as the cause of the world is fruitless. He cannot be proved by inference.³

THE NATURE OF BRAHMAN : QUALIFIED GOD : CAUSE AND EFFECT : NON-DIFFERENT AND DIFFERENT.—The Brahman is the omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent Lord. He is the creator, maintainer, and destroyer of the universe. He is the Providence and Moral Governor. He is transcendent and immanent. He is the Supreme Self, the Inner Controller (*antaryāmin*), dwelling in all creatures. He is the nondifferent cause and different effects. He is nondifferent as cause, and different as effects. He is the material cause of the universe. He is the creator of names and forms and their destroyer. He is the source of all individual souls. He is immanent in them as their Inner Controller, and transcendent of them as their Knower and Controller. He is the impeller of all souls in their free actions in conformity with their merits and demerits. He is the cause of their bondage and release. He afflicts them with nescience and destroys their nescience. He is the giver of boons. He is the object of their worship and meditation. He sustains all life, sense-organs and internal organs. He is cosmic life, intelligence, bliss, undecaying, and immortal. 'He is truth, knowledge, infinite.' 'He is bliss, immortality, and self-luminous consciousness.' He illumines the universe (*bhāmanī*). He is of the nature of being, knowledge, bliss, and infinitude. He is the all-comprehending unifying spiritual principle. He is the governor of all physical phenomena and guide of the laws of nature and moral laws. He is the Highest Good and attainable by all individual souls. He is the consumer of all sins. He is the giver of fruits of actions to all souls. He is the imperishable *akṣara*, the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthinkable thinker, the unknown knower. He is not the experiencer of the fruits of the souls' actions. He is blissful and gives bliss to them. As blissful He transcends them all.⁴

Śaṅkara distinguishes between the unqualified Brahman or the Supreme Brahman and the lower or qualified Brahman or God, and regards the former as an ontological reality and the latter as a phenomenal appearance due to nescience (*avidyā*). He opines that God is imagined for the purpose of an individual soul's worship of Him. The Brahman is unqualified, but said to be qualified for the sake of worship or meditation.⁵ Bhāskara refutes Śaṅkara's view by observing that the difference between the higher Brahman (*parabrahma*) and the lower Brahman (*aparabrahma*) is not due to the difference between the unqualified Brahman and the qualified Brahman, respectively.⁶ The Brahman is always qualified. He is never

unqualified. He is always the omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, infinite, eternal, blissful, adorable, pure, holy Lord. He is called Para Brahman because He is the Supreme Self worthy of worship. He is called Apra Brahman when His particular aspect is worshipped. Both unqualified and qualified, formless and formed Brahman should not be worshipped. Only the formless Brahman as pure cause should be worshipped.⁷ He as the formed mutable world should not be worshipped. Only His luminous, spiritual, immortal form should be worshipped. Bhāskara identifies the Brahman with the Lord (īśvara).

THE BRAHMAN IS THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF THE WORLD.—The world is produced by the omniscient, omnipotent Lord, the First Cause ; He modifies Himself into names and forms, physical objects, for the experience and knowledge of the individual souls, with an inconceivable arrangement of parts, maintains and dissolves them. The Vaiśeṣikas prove that God is the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) of the world thus : the world is composed of parts because of its being an effect, like a jar ; therefore, it has an intelligent cause. Bhāskara refutes this argument on the following grounds. 1. This argument is false because the relation between the Lord and the world is not perceived. God is supersensible ; His relation to the world has never been perceived before. So He cannot be inferred to be the efficient cause of the world. 2. That an effect is produced by an intelligent agent is already known. Proving it is proving the already proven. Embodied life is due to merits and demerits (karman). They are due to voluntary actions of individual souls that are intelligent agents. 3. A potter, a weaver, etc., are not omniscient, and are endowed with bodies and sense-organs and tainted with love and hatred. If God is inferred to be the efficient cause of the world, then He is not omniscient, is embodied and tainted with love and hatred, and ceases to be the Lord. His omniscience, omnipotence, bodilessness and perfection cannot be proved if He be the efficient cause of the world. 4. God is inferred to be the efficient cause of the world because it is composed of parts, like a jar. The reason (hetu) is irregular since a sprout grows out of a seed without any intelligent efficient cause. The subtle elements of earth, water, etc., are not composed of parts. Only the gross elements are composed of parts. So being composed of parts is a fallacious reason (hetvābhāsa). Hence God cannot be inferred to be the efficient cause of the world. The aphorism 'from Whom the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of the world take place' is not intended to show that God is the efficient cause of the world. It shows that He is the material cause of the world. The Śruti says : 'From the Brahman these creatures are born, by Him they are maintained, and in Him they are dissolved.'⁸

THE DOCTRINE OF THE BRAHMAN'S MODIFICATION INTO THE WORLD.(brahmapariṇāma-vāda).—According to Bhāskara the Brahman of Himself is modified into the world by His nature, as milk is modified into curd, or as water is modified into ice. Milk has the natural power of being modified into curd, but water cannot be modified into it. A potter can make pots with pre-existing material (e.g., clay). A carpenter can make furniture with pre-existing material (e.g., wood). They are not omnipotent, and so require pre-existing material. But the Brahman is omniscient and omnipotent, and so can modify Himself into the world. The Śruti says : 'The Brahman is all-knower and all-experencer. He has various powers'. Great sages and gods are said to produce various kinds of effects without any external means

and material through their supernatural powers. God modifies Himself or His powers into the world as a spider spins a cobweb out of its body. It is objected that if the entire Brahman is modified into the world, no Brahman remains to be meditated on, and He ceases to be partless. Either the entire Brahman is modified into the world or parts of Him endowed with parts are modified into it. He cannot be partly modified into the world because He is partless as the Śruti says, 'The Supreme Person is supramundane, incorporeal, partless, inactive, immutable, and flawless.' 'He is neither large nor minute, nor short'. He has no magnitude. The words 'part' and 'whole' are inapplicable to Him, but applicable to entities composed of parts.⁹ Some object that the aphorism applies to the prakṛti, that the application of the words 'whole' and 'parts' is not considered here, that the Brahman is devoid of any dimension, and that He is neither composed of parts nor partless. To this objection Bhāskara replies that the Brahman modifies Himself into the world without losing His nature, that modification is transformation of His powers, that His power of experiencing is modified into the conscious individual souls which experience insentient objects, and that His power of being experienced is modified into the insentient elements and gross objects. He creates the conscious souls and the unconscious objects by expanding His powers and then withdraws them into Himself. His creation is the expansion of His powers, and dissolution is the withdrawal of them. In the world we do not find a partless and bodiless being create an effect by indefinable māyā. Hence Śāṅkara's view of the Brahman's creating the false world-appearance by indefinable māyā is wrong. Bhāskara refutes Śāṅkara's doctrine without mentioning his name. God's powers must be admitted which can be modified into the multi-form world. It is not inconceivable. Various dreams are experienced by individual souls. They are created in the souls by God through His powers. The Śāṅkhya view also suffers from the aforesaid difficulty, because, in his view, the entire partless prakṛti constituted by sattva, rajas and tamas, which are not its parts, is modified into the world. The Vaiśeṣika view also suffers from the same difficulty because, in his view, partless atoms are wholly modified into the world. So Bhāskara's view of the Brahman's modification into the world is more reasonable and in harmony with the Vedic testimony than the Śāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Advaita Vedānta views.¹⁰

The Śruti says, 'The Brahman modified Himself into the world'. God is the efficient cause and the material cause of the world. He modifies Himself into the world—the effect. The modification of Him is the unfoldment of His powers. His powers are infinite and inconceivable. He manifests His powers at the time of creation, sustains their expression during maintenance, and withdraws them at the time of dissolution, as the sun expands its rays in the day and withdraws them in the evening. The Śruti says, 'God has neither a cause nor an effect, neither an equal nor a superior; His powers are supreme and various and natural or spontaneous. His powers of knowledge, strength and action are essential to him, and not adventitious to His nature'. The Śruti distinctly declares that names and forms (nāmārūpa) or physical entities are modifications (vikāra) of the Brahman. But Śāṅkara following non-Vedic Mahāyāna Buddhists interprets modifications as false appearances (vivarta) of the Brahman and confuses the people. He and his followers propound the doctrine of the Mahāyāna Buddhists and regard the physical effects as false appearances due to māyā or avidyā. They are crypto-Buddhists and preach

the false doctrine of māyā. They take the word 'modification' apart from the context and misinterpret it. The Śruti says : 'The Lord, the efficient cause of the world, is its root or material cause also'. Hence neither prakṛti nor atoms nor māyā can be the material cause of the world.

THE FORMLESS BRAHMAN SHOULD BE WORSHIPPED.—The Brahman is of the nature of difference and nondifference. Is the Brahman of the nature of difference to be worshipped ? Or, is the Brahman of the nature of nondifference to be worshipped ? The opponent argues that the Brahman both as formless and formed should be worshipped, because the Brahman as formless is the cause of the world, and because the Brahman as invested with forms is the world of physical events, and because the formless and formed Brahman is the real Brahman. Bhāskara urges that both formless and formed Brahman should not be worshipped—formless as the cause and formed as the effect or the world, but only the formless Brahman as the cause of the world should be worshipped, because the Śruti declares Him to be nonphysical. 'He is neither large nor minute, nor short'. All physical forms and qualities are denied of Him. The Brahman in Himself as a cause is immutable, eternal, one and secondless, and then becomes an occasional effect. The opponent may argue that the Brahman as cause is mutable, that He will lose His nature as a cause if He abandons His mutable nature, and that therefore the Brahman invested with the forms of earth and other elements should be worshipped. Bhāskara refutes this argument by observing that the Brahman in Himself is nondifferent, that the world is His adventitious form, that the world of physical things is of the nature of Him, but that He is not of the nature of the world of names and forms. All Upaniṣads declare that the Brahman devoid of the physical world should be worshipped. 'He is devoid of sound, touch, and colour ; He is infinite'. 'He is not this, not this'. He is devoid of physical elements and their modifications. There are no diverse effects in the cause. Names and forms are transitory but not nonexistent.¹¹

THE NATURE OF BRAHMAN TO BE WORSHIPPED.—Bhāskara avers that the Brahman of the nature of being and knowledge, free of the forms of physical things and souls should be meditated on. God free of corporeal, incorporeal, and physical forms is the object of worship. Earth, water and fire are corporeal. Air and ether are incorporeal. Potencies of desire are psysical. So God transcendent of physical objects and individual souls, and unlimited by limited forms should be worshipped. The Brahman as truth, knowledge, and infinite is not limited by the forms of physical objects and of individual souls. His existence is the substratum, and consciousness or knowledge is the attribute. A nonbeing cannot have an attribute. His existence and consciousness are inseparable. His consciousness is His distinctive character. He is infinite and unlimited by nature, and not limited by space and time. There is no difference between a substratum and an attribute within His nature. There is no substance without attributes, and there are no attributes without a substance. He is extremely subtle and knowable with great difficulty. He can neither be grasped by the sense-organs nor described by speech. But He can be intuited by devotion, meditation and worship. He can be known through the Śruti and the Smṛtis. The mind is purified by clarity of knowledge ; He can be intuited

through meditation by the purified mind. It is objected that if the Brahman is supersensible and knowable through meditation, then an individual soul is different from Him. To this objection Bhāskara replies that an individual soul is nondifferent from the Brahman, and that it knows its nondifference from Him in trance through repeated meditation on Him. Its identity with Him is manifested by repeated meditation. Those who think themselves to be identical with Him without trance through meditation are puffed up with false conceit. Bhāskara refers here to Śaṅkara and his followers.¹² The opponent argues that the Brahman in His real nature both as formless and formed, as cause and effect, should be worshipped. But Bhāskara avers that the Brahman as formless, pure, and cause, should be worshipped. His nature as an effect is His adventitious form. The Supreme Self is the inmost Spirit residing within all physical elements and conscious souls. So the opponent argues that the Brahman in the form of experients or souls and experienced objects should be worshipped because there is no difference between Him and the souls and the world. This argument is wrong since He is stated in the Śruti not to be identical with each soul and physical element. He is stated to be the luminous, immortal Person dwelling in each soul and element, and worthy of worship. He is the transcendent Spirit dwelling in each of them. Hence the Brahman in the form of individual souls and physical elements should not be worshipped. The individual souls are experients ; the physical objects are experienced ; the Inner Controller (antaryāmin) is their regulator ; they constitute the outer manifestation of Brahman. They are of the nature of Brahman in their essential nature of His conscious and unconscious manifestations. His formlessness is His principal nature. 'He is the creator of names and forms.' 'He is incorporeal, eternal, without outside and inside, before and after'. 'He is the experiencer of all'. So the Brahman with the world should not be worshipped. Some opine that the Brahman as being(sat) should be worshipped. But the Śruti declares Him to be of the nature of knowledge or consciousness. He is not only being but knowledge or consciousness also. He is consciousness only, and devoid of any other form. 'This Ātman, Supreme self, is a mass of knowledge (vijñānaghana), a mass of intuitive consciousness (prajñānghana)' 'All shine by His light'. All are manifested by His consciousness. Yājñavalkya says, 'He should be meditated on as a light in the heart-ether, withdrawing the sense-organs, the manas, and the buddhi from all other objects'.¹³

THE INDIVIDUAL SELF(JIVA).—An individual self is neither born nor does it die. Its so-called birth or death is that of its body. The Śruti says, 'This self is said to be born when its body is born, and it is said to die when it departs from its body'. It also says, 'All souls emanate from God as sparks emanate from a fire'. It shows that souls are not generated. They are eternal and so cannot be produced. We have such experience as 'I perceived this in the past'. Such recognition proves that an individual self is permanent ; it perceived an object in the past, retained its residual impression, and remembers it at present. The Śruti declares it to be eternal. The 'Bhagavad Gītā' says, 'The individual self is unborn, eternal, immutable, ancient, and indestructible'. The individual souls are said to emanate from God. Emanation implies the absence of origination, and does not imply modification. It implies difference of a soul from God due to a limiting adjunct.

The Vaiśeṣikas hold that consciousness is not the essence of a soul but its adventitious

attribute which it acquires in connection with its body and manas. But Bhāskara holds that an individual self is a knower by nature, and that consciousness is its essential nature. The Śruti says, 'This self is self-luminous'. 'The knowledge of the self never lapses'. 'The self is a mass of consciousness'. 'The Brahman is knowledge and bliss'. 'The Brahman is truth, knowledge, and infinite'. These texts show that the essential nature of an individual self is the nature of the Brahman, and that its conditional nature is its inessential nature. Its consciousness is perceived by its self since its nature as a knower is always perceptible. It perceives external objects and internal cognitions, and itself as a knower. So it is no mere knowledge.¹⁴

The self (jīva) is atomic in dimension because the Śruti speaks of its departure from a body, movement, and return. After death of its body it moves to higher spheres of existence, and returns and enters into another body. If the self were not atomic or monadic, it would not be capable of departure, movement, and return. It is objected that the self is not atomic because the Śruti says, 'This self is great and eternal'. To this objection Bhāskara replies that the text applies to the Supreme Self, and that it implies the essential nature of an individual self as distinguished from its inessential nature. The magnitude of an individual self is asserted by the following scriptural texts : 'This self is atomic and to be known by the (illuminated) manas'. 'The individual self is to be known as the hundredth part of the hundredth part of a hair'. It is situated in the heart, but feels sensations in all parts of its body, as a drop of sandal paste on one part of the skin soothes the entire body. The consciousness of the self pervades its body as the light of a lamp pervades a whole room. The opponent objects that knowledge cannot leave the self and spread out to the whole body for an attribute cannot leave its substrate. To this objection Bhāskara replies, that the self is atomic in the state of bondage, but that minuteness is not its essential nature because the Śruti says, 'That thou art'. The manas being atomic, the atomic dimension of the self is not permanent. So long as the self is in bondage it is united with its subtle body which is liable to contraction and expansion. It is freed of its subtle body when it is liberated. So long as it is embodied due to the knowledge of duality or difference, it is connected with its limiting adjuncts,—buddhi and the like. Knowledge exists in the self so long as it exists. It can never be divested of its essence of knowledge. Sometimes knowledge is manifested and sometimes it is not manifested. In the waking state it is manifested while in deep sleep and swoon it is not manifested. The internal organ should be admitted to be the limiting adjunct of an individual self because otherwise when the self is in proximity to a sense-organ and an object, it should not always perceive an object, or it should either perceive it always or it should not perceive it always.¹⁵

The self is a doer, because the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions are meaningful, and because an individual self is under moral obligation to perform the enjoined duties and not to commit the prohibited actions. The Sāṃkhya wrongly holds that the self is the experiencer of joys and miseries while the buddhi is the doer. The self is the experiencer of the fruits of its right and wrong actions in the form of joys and miseries. The buddhi is its organ of action. It has no power, but the self has power. The self is the doer, and the buddhi is its instrument of action. If the self were not a doer, it would

not be capable of meditation on God and absorption in Him and abiding in its essential nature of identity with Him. Trance is not possible without stopping the instinctive tendencies of *manas* towards enjoyment of external objects. This depends upon an intense activity of the self. But its activity is not its essential nature because if it were so, it would never be liberated. If activity were its essential nature, it would always do actions, and experience pleasure and pain. But it does not act in deep sleep. Further, the nature of the self which is of the nature of consciousness cannot change. Nor is its conditional agency unreal. When a piece of iron is heated in fire, its heat is perceived and real, although it is adventitious and conditional. Likewise, when the self becomes active through the *buddhi*—its limiting adjunct and organ of action, its agency is real, although it is adventitious and conditional. Just as a carpenter is an agent when he uses his implements, and as he is not an agent when he does not use them, so the self is an agent when it uses its internal organ, and it is not an agent when it does not use the organ or when its organ is destroyed in release. The conditional agency of the self is not absolutely free but controlled by the will of God who impels it to act in accordance with its merits and demerits, as the clouds are the general causes of the germination of the various kinds of seeds.¹⁶ The self is endowed with limited freedom, and is, consequently, under moral obligation to do right or wrong actions. But its freedom is limited by its own merits and demerits acquired by it in the past births by its free actions. God limits its freedom by impelling it to do those actions which make it experience the fruits of its merits and demerits. If it has no freedom, scriptural injunctions and prohibitions are meaningless. If it is absolutely free and not under the necessity of experiencing the consequences of its actions, the demands of the Moral Law of Karma are not fulfilled. So its freedom is limited by the will of God who makes it suffer the consequences of its actions in accordance with the Law of Karma.

BHĀSKARA'S CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST'S VIEW OF THE WORLD.—The Buddhists hold that the self is a series of momentary cognitions. Bhāskara offers the same criticisms as the other orthodox schools of Indian philosophy against the Buddhist view. He urges that this view makes recollection and all practical actions which depend upon it impossible. All have such an experience as 'I perceived the object yesterday and remember and recognise it to-day.' Such recollection implies the permanence of the self. The Buddhist should be ashamed of himself in an assembly of learned persons when he denies the existence of the permanent self. He who denies the existence of the permanent self does not deny the existence of his own permanent self. The cognition of the existence or the nonexistence of entities other than the self are possible. But a self cannot have a cognition of its own nonexistence. An object perceived by one self cannot be remembered by another self. Hence the same permanent self is the subject of the perception and recollection of the same object. The Buddhist may argue that the cognition which perceived an object and the cognition which remembers it belong to the same series, that their belonging to the same series accounts for recollection. Bhāskara refutes this argument by pointing out that a series of cognitions is not different from the cognitions which are its members. In a series the momentary cognitions are different from one another. So an object perceived in the morning cannot be remembered at noon. Further, if the self is a series of momentary cognitions, it cannot have transmigration and future life.

There is no proof for the existence of an intermediate body through which the same series of cognitions may transmigrate to another body in future life. The last momentary cognition cannot jump over to the first momentary cognition in future life because it is incorporeal. There is no other entity that urges the last momentary cognition in this life to jump over to the first momentary cognition in future life. Merits and demerits (karman) cannot do so for there is no proof for their doing so. If the omniscient Buddha's preaching so be said to be its proof, his omniscience is not proven. Hence the self's transmigration or future life is not possible. Therefore the Buddhist view of the self as a series of cognitions (vijñānasantāna) is wrong.¹⁷

THE INDIVIDUAL SELF AND BRAHMAN.—One self-luminous Supreme Self becomes many individual souls through different limiting adjuncts (e. g., internal organs), as one luminous sun becomes many reflections of it in different vessels of water. It is objected that the sun is in the sky, and is reflected in water situated in a different place, but that the incorporeal, ubiquitous Brahman cannot have limiting adjuncts in different places in which He may be reflected. To this objection Bhāskara replies that the Brahman is not affected by increase or decrease of the limiting adjuncts as the sun is not affected by increase or decrease of the reflecting media, vessels of water, but that the different souls are affected by changing states of the limiting adjuncts as the reflections of the sun are affected by the changing states of the reflecting media. The Brahman dwells in His greatness as the common Self in the different souls without being affected by the attributes of the limiting adjuncts. The souls are parts of the Brahman. An individual soul's nondifference from the Brahman is natural or essential, and so it realises its identity with Him by destroying its nescience. The Śruti states both difference and nondifference or identity between an individual soul and the Brahman. 'A Yogin sees Him through meditation'. 'That thou art'. The former Śruti states difference while the latter states identity between them. The Brahman and an individual soul are like a serpent and its coiled state. The Brahman is the essential state of an individual soul while the state of an individual soul is its conditional state. A ray of light is both different and nondifferent from the sun. So an individual soul is both different and nondifferent from the Brahman. They have the common nature of consciousness and knowledge as a ray of light and the sun have the common nature of light¹⁸. It is objected that an individual soul is different from the Brahman because the Śruti speaks of the Brahman as a bridge, of His limited dimension, of His being related to, and of His being different from, other entities. 'The Brahman is a bridge'. 'He has sixteen parts'. 'An individual soul becomes accomplished by uniting with Him'. 'He is seen as the golden Person within the sun'. So Brahman is not unlimited. This objection is groundless because although He is one and unlimited, He is said to be like limited entities to show His resemblance to them to a certain extent. He is like a bridge because He unites all worlds with one another. He is stated to be like a limited entity for the convenience of meditating on Him. There is no other entity than the Brahman. The existence of any other entity is denied. He is omnipresent, unlimited, and all-pervasive. The individual souls receive the fruits of their actions from God. He gives them fruits in proper time and place when their merits and demerits mature. The Śruti says, 'The Supreme Self is the giver of the fruits

of actions'. Jaimini says, 'Dharma is the cause of the fruits of actions.' Bādarāyaṇa says, 'God is the cause of the fruits of actions.' The Śruti says, 'God makes a soul do prescribed actions whom He desires to elevate'. He is the regulator (niyantr) of the souls' actions in accordance with their deserts. So there is no inconsistency between Jaimini's view and Bādarāyaṇa's view. Some think that the action of the Inner Controller (antaryāmin) in the form of a moral imperative (niyoga) is the cause of the fruits of actions. This view is wrong, because His action is eternal and common to all souls, and because an eternal entity cannot be accomplished. God alone can impel individual souls to act according to their deserts and receive the fruits of their actions.¹⁹

BHĀSKARA'S CRITICISM OF ŚAṂKARA'S VIEWS OF AN INDIVIDUAL SELF AND NESCIENCE.—Some Māyāvādins (e.g., Śaṁkara) hold that God Himself becomes bound, that His part called an individual self does not exist as an ontological reality, and that it is an empirical reality imagined by nescience, which is its limiting adjunct, and said to be different from Him. Bhāskara refutes this view by pointing out that the Brahman being of the nature of eternal knowledge and supreme bliss cannot have nescience, and so cannot be bound. He is omniscient and omnipotent and free of nescience, and cannot, therefore, make Himself bound to embodied life. He who is dependent can be fettered to bondage. An individual self, a part of God, is bound due to its nescience, and has desire for sentient pleasure and action. In the state of bondage its real divine nature is veiled by nescience, but when it is released its divine nature is manifested. It is not fulfilled in its adventitious nature as an individual self. God is the cause of its bondage and release.

Śaṁkara holds that the Brahman directly enters into a body and becomes a bound soul, that there is no individual soul different from Him, and that He becomes limited by names and forms—mind-body-complex—due to nescience (avidyā). Bhāskara offers the following criticism of Śaṁkara's view of nescience. To whom does nescience belong? It cannot belong to an individual self (jīva) because Śaṁkara does not admit it to be an ontological reality. Nor does it belong to God because He is of the nature of eternal knowledge and manifestation contradictory to nescience. He is devoid of pleasure, pain and delusion, and so cannot be bound for being bound consists in being subject to them. Being bound and being eternally free from bondage, being infected with nescience and being omniscient, and being subject to pleasure, pain and delusion and being supremely blissful, cannot exist in God since they are contradictory to each other. God is stainless, and so free of nescience which exists in individual souls in the physical world. Hence He must be admitted to be different from them, which are His parts, and which are bound to embodied life. Further, is there one nescience in all individual souls? Or, are there many cases of nescience in them? If there are many, they become like objects, and are neither real nor unreal but indefinable, and, consequently, inadmissible. If there is one nescience in them, one individual soul being liberated by the destruction of its nescience, all individual souls are liberated—which is not admitted by Śaṁkara. Hence Śaṁkara's doctrine of nescience is groundless.²⁰

THE INDIVIDUAL SELF'S CONDITIONAL DIFFERENCE AND ESSENTIAL NONDIFFERENCE FROM BRAHMAN.—An individual self is a part of Brahman, although He is partless. The Śruti speaks of the individual souls as like sparks of fire. As ubiquitous ether is limited by

the ear-hole, so an individual self is a limitation of the Brahman by an internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa), which is the limiting adjunct (upādhi). As five kinds of vital air are parts of air, and different and nondifferent from it, as desire, aversion, volition, etc., are modes of the manas, and different and nondifferent from it, so an individual self is a part of the Brahman or God, and different and nondifferent from Him. Its nondifference from Him is natural or essential, and its difference is conditional. An individual self is bound and transmigrates because of the strength of its limiting adjunct, viz., an internal organ, and because of the eclipse of its identity with the Brahman. When it realises its identity with Him, it is liberated. When a jar is destroyed, the ether enclosed in it becomes ubiquitous ether; so when the limiting adjunct, the mind-body-complex, is destroyed, an individual soul becomes one all-pervading self or God. There is natural nondifference between an individual self and the Supreme Self or God as well as conditional difference between them due to a limiting condition. When the limiting condition is destroyed, the conditional difference between them is destroyed.

Although an individual self is essentially identical with the Brahman, He is not affected by its joys and griefs. An individual self experiences joys and griefs because of its merits and demerits, but the Brahman does not experience them because He is devoid of merits and demerits. He is eternal, devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas, and is not affected by happiness and misery—the fruits of merits and demerits. But an individual self (karmātman) is bound by merits and demerits and subject to bondage and release. If individual souls were completely identical with the Supreme Self, who would be enjoined to perform the prescribed actions and refrain from committing the prohibited actions? The individual souls alone, the parts of the Brahman, are the agents of the enjoined and the forbidden actions, as connected with their bodies. The Brahman is eternally pure and liberated, and cannot be under moral obligation to perform the enjoined actions and not to commit the prohibited actions. It is objected that if the individual souls were identical with the Brahman, then their actions would be intermixed with one another. To this objection Bhāskara replies that, in his view, there would be no intermixture of their actions because they are atomic and separated from one another. An individual self is not ubiquitous and does not pervade all bodies, but does actions with its own body. So its actions cannot be shared by the other souls. In the state of bondage its bodies in different births undergo change, growth, and decay. But in the state of liberation it is divested of its internal organ and physical body. So the actions of the individual souls cannot be intermixed. In fact, the liberated souls have no bodily actions. Those who admit the individual souls to be ubiquitous may encounter the difficulty of intermixture of their actions. Some hold that individual souls are reflections of the Supreme Self in nescience (avidyā), or in the internal organs produced by it, limited in dimension, bound to embodied existence, and discontinuous with one another, and that therefore their actions are not intermixed. Bhāskara urges that this view is wrong for a reflection is admitted to be unreal, like a hare's horn, and unconscious, and that, consequently, it cannot be bound or released, nor be under moral obligation. Nor is the Supreme Self bound or released.

An individual soul's bondage and release are due to the will of God. Bondage is

transmigration from one body to another and experiencing joys and miseries of embodied life due to nescience (*ajñāna*). Liberation is the absolute extinction of embodied existence, and of its attendant happiness and misery due to right knowledge of one's identity with God. The Śruti says, 'On knowing the Lord there is the absolute destruction of all fetters of bondage; when they are destroyed, birth and death are destroyed.' The individual souls' essential identity with God is eclipsed by His volition, and its inessential difference from Him is destroyed by His volition, or its essential identity with Him is manifested by His volition. Let there be absolute difference between it and Him if its essential identity with Him is eclipsed by its relation to a body due to His will. What is the use of admitting its identity with Him? Bhāskara replies that the Śruti 'That thou art' declares an individual soul's natural and eternal identity with Him and its conditional difference from Him due to a limiting adjunct which endures during bondage.²¹

SATKĀRYAVĀDA : REALITY OF THE WORLD.—The Vaiśeṣikas hold that a cause and an effect are absolutely different from each other, and that a cause produces a new effect which was nonexistent in its cause. A lump of earth is the cause; a jar is its effect. An effect is perceived as different from its cause. A jar can contain water, but a lump of earth cannot do so. In order to refute this view Bādarāyaṇa says, "They are nondifferent from each other". The Śruti says: 'O gentle one! as one lump of earth being known, all earthen products are known, so one Brahman being known, all beings are known. A modification is a name; earth alone is real'. Bhāskara explains the text as follows: the cause alone is modified into its effect; earth alone is modified into a jar; a jar is not distinct from earth; it is perceived as a modification of earth. An effect is dependent on its cause in the past, the present, and the future. An effect is a state of its cause, and is not perceived as different from its cause in space and time. It is real like its cause, and becomes unmanifest in its cause when it is destroyed. The world is real, and its cause, the Supreme Self, is real. An effect is both different and nondifferent from its cause. It is nondifferent from its cause in its essential nature, but different from the latter in its form and function. The world is nondifferent from its cause—the Brahman—in its essence, but different from Him in its physical form and in being experienced by individual souls.

Some Advaita Vedāntists called by Bhāskara Māyāvādins hold that a cause is real, that an effect is an unreal appearance of its cause due to beginningless nescience, and that an effect has no ontological reality, because the Śruti says, 'Earth alone is real'. The partless Brahman cannot be modified; so the manifest world is mere māyā. Bhāskara offers the following criticisms of Śaṅkara's view. 1. If the manifest world is false, then earth, etc., also are false because they are parts of the experienced world. How are earth, etc., known to be false? They are known by perception and inference, and not contradicted by the knowledge of defects in the causes (*kāraṇadoṣa*) of their knowledge or by a sublating knowledge (*bādhakapratyaya*). They are perceived by all persons. So they are real, and their difference is real. All worldly transactions follow from the perception of these real things. 2. If the knowledge of difference belonging to persons infected with nescience (*avidyā*) is false, then their knowledge of the nondual Brahman by inference also is certainly false in the absence

of a sublating knowledge. If a sublating knowledge contradicts the false knowledge of the reality of empirical things, then the person having the knowledge is not infected with nescience. The Māyāvādin does not state the cause of the truth of the inference of the Brahman. So all knowledge is false, and nothing can be stated as the truth. 3. The knowledge of the Brahman is false, because it is knowledge, like the knowledge of empirical things, as the dreams of a person overcome by sleep are false because they are produced by defects in their causes and because they are not contradicted by a sublating knowledge during dream. There is no example to show that an unreal entity is perceived as a real entity. A hair's horn is not perceived by any body as a real entity. The argument that the empirical world is unreal like dreams is false, because dreams are recollections of real things perceived in the past. 4. The argument that the falsity of the empirical world is proved by testimony is wrong, because verbal knowledge or knowledge produced by the auditory organ is false. The sentence 'That thou art' consists of letters which do not exist at the same time. So a scriptural sentence cannot be perceived by the auditory organ. The Māyāvādin avers that the falsity of the empirical world is known from the Śruti 'There is no plurality in the Brahman'. Bhāskara interprets it thus : there is no plurality in the causal state of the Brahman ; but there is plurality of effects in His effected state ; hence there is no contradiction in this. He interprets the Śruti 'Ātman is not this, not this' as follows : the self is different from the mind-body-complex which is not-self. 'The Brahman devoid of difference appears to be different'. This text means that in the causal state of the Brahman there is no difference or plurality, but that it does not deny the existence of plurality altogether, because appearance is an appearance of what is known to be real. 5. Śaṅkara attributes the false knowledge of plurality to beginningless nescience (avidyā). Bhāskara asks whether nescience is real or unreal or neither real nor unreal but indescribable. Śaṅkara asserts its nature to be neither real nor unreal but indescribable (anirivacanīya). If it is so, then it gives rise to many undersirable contingencies. It is absurd to speak of nescience as indescribable whose effects are all empirical things which are objects of our practical actions. If nescience is indescribable, a teacher cannot explain its nature to a pupil, and a pupil cannot learn its nature from a teacher. Further, is nescience with origin or without origin ? If it is without origin, it is eternal, and cannot be annulled, and, consequently, there can be no release. If the Brahman be said to be its cause, that is not possible because He is of the nature of eternal knowledge and because eternal knowledge and nescience are contradictory to each other and cannot coexist in the same subject. If the nature of the self is the cause of nescience, then it being eternal, nescience, its effect, is eternal, and so there can be no release. Further, is nescience real or unreal ? It cannot be real and unreal at the same time as it is self-contradictory ; nor can it be known to be real and unreal at the same time for the same reason. If the unmanifest (avyākṛta) or ether (ākāśa) be said to be nescience, then it is a real entity since it is produced like a sprout. Nor is nescience nonapprehension for nonapprehension being the absence of apprehension is a nonentity, and cannot be the cause of bondage. If nonapprehension is a nonentity and yet the cause of bondage, then it is not a nonentity since a nonentity cannot cause bondage. So nescience is describable. Nescience (avidyā) is different from right knowledge (vidyā). It is the false knowledge of the mind-body-complex as the self ; it is the cause of the nonapprehension of the nature of the Brahman. If nescience be said to be names and forms (nāmārūpa), then it is

describable. The different physical objects are names and forms. The perception of difference is not false knowledge. The world of different physical objects is a state of the Brahman ; it is a real entity because it exists. So nescience is not the perception of difference. The Māyāvādin asks how the partless Brahman can be modified into the world. He can be modified because of His nature as modifiable, like milk ; He is omniscient and omnipotent and modifies Himself of His will. It may be argued that milk composed of parts is modified into curd. The argument is wrong because being composed of parts is not the cause of modification. If it were so, water would be modified into curd. So being composed of parts is not the cause of modification of milk into curd. If milk is modified into curd because of its nature of modifiability, is a power of milk composed of parts the cause of its modification ? Or is the power of its parts the cause of its modification ? The Māyāvādin does not admit a liquid to be a composite whole distinct from its parts. So power of the parts is the cause of modification of a thing composed of parts. The parts are devoid of parts. If they had parts, they could be modified due to their being composed of parts. Are the parts of parts modified or not ? If they were not modified, milk would be found in curd. So all parts should be thought to be modified. If the parts of parts are assumed, it will lead to infinite regress because parts are infinite. Hence a thing devoid of parts is modified. Therefore the Brahman devoid of parts is modified into the world. Modification is the unfoldment of powers of a being that does not lose its nature thereby, as threads are modified into a cloth without losing their nature. Creation is expansion of causal power. Destruction is withdrawal of causal power. The conscious, omniscient, omnipotent, absolutely free Lord modifies Himself into the world of His will for the good of all according to His powers. He knows the manifest world consisting of the individual souls and physical things as different from one another at the time of creation, and does not know them to be different from one another at the time of dissolution because they are merged in Him. The Śruti says : 'He is the cause, the Lord of causes, but He has no cause or Lord'. It is wrong to argue that a being devoid of parts cannot be modified for the manas devoid of parts is modified into lust, anger, greed, delusion and the like, which are different from one another, without losing its nature. Śaṅkara argues that the scriptural sentences about creation do not prove its ontological reality, since there is no purpose of creation and since difference is disproved by other scriptural sentences, but that the scriptural sentences about the existence of the nondual Brahman have ontological validity. It is wrong to hold that the scriptural sentences about creation have empirical validity, and that those about the nondual Brahman have ontological validity. Creation is for the purpose of enjoyment and suffering as well as knowledge of the individual souls. Their enjoyment and knowledge depend upon the reality of their bodies and sense-organs. Enjoined works depend upon agents, actions, and fruits which are different from one another. Hence the individual souls, their bodies and sense-organs, and the physical things are real. Śaṅkara infers the oneness of Brahman from the nondifference of an effect from its cause. The reason (hetu) of the inference is unproven. If creation is not admitted, then the physical elements and the world are eternal as the Mīmāṃsakas hold. Śaṅkara argues that the scriptural injunctions about works are unreal appearances, and that those about the reality of the nondual Brahman are ontologically valid. This argument is irrational because difference is proved by an equally strong pramāṇa and because it is proved by perception. Śaṅkara argues that works are enjoined

by the Vedas assuming the reality of difference admitted by common people, but that the Vedas do not admit the ontological reality of difference. Bhāskara refutes the argument by pointing out that nondifference or identity also is perceived by common people through the notion of community (sāmānya) among all objects. Community is higher and lower. The genus of cows is a lower community. Beinghood (sattā) is the highest community. Thus nondifference or identity also is perceived and empirical, and not dependent on scriptural testimony only. Further, beinghood is not perceived by anybody, abstracting it from existing particular objects. So it is wrong to hold that beinghood alone is real, and that particular existents are unreal. The objects are different from one another in their nature. Their plurality called difference is well-known. The form of a jar does not exist in a piece of cloth ; the form of a piece of cloth does not exist in a jar. The nonexistence of each in the other in another part of space is called mutual nonexistence. Further, the beinghood of particular objects is perceived by all sense-organs. So there will be intermixture of perceptions through the different sense-organs ; a blind person would see colours, and a deaf person would hear sounds. It may be argued that there is no intermixture of different kinds of perception through the different sense-organs because they perceive their appropriate objects—sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell. Bhāskara urges that, in that case, beinghood is not perceived by the different sense-organs, that as beinghood—the highest community—is proved by the perception of community, so inferior communities (e.g., genus of cow, etc.) also are proved by the perception of them, and that the substrata of these generalities are proved by the perception of difference among them. Hence an object of the nature of community and individuality is real. Further, is beinghood known as distinct or nondistinct from these substances ? If it is known as distinct from them, then duality or difference is real, and it will lead to infinite regress. If beinghood is known as distinct from a particular substance, then the beinghood of the knowledge of distinctness is known as distinct from beinghood, and so on to infinity. If beinghood is known as nondistinct from a particular substance, then beinghood is not known through any sense-organ. So knowable beinghood is not proved. If beinghood is said to be perceived by God, then Śaṅkara's thesis that beinghood is perceived by common people is disproved. Further, for the Advaitavādin, neither manas, nor a sense-organ, nor knowledge, nor a knowable object exists ; all become nonexistent or void. How, then, can he know beinghood ? And how can he make others comprehend it ? Furthermore, the scriptures prescribe meditation on the mystic symbol 'Om', and on cosmic life, etc., which are symbols of the Brahman. These acts of meditation can be performed by the individual souls if difference is real. They cannot realise the Brahman through these means if difference is not real. The Śruti says : 'I shall divide the elements into three parts and combine them in particular ways.' How, then, can plurality or difference be said to be a mere unreal appearance ? If plurality be a false appearance, the scriptural texts regarding the creation of the elements are false. In fact, they are true. The elements created by the Brahman are real. Only the Śruti forbids the worship of the Brahman in the form of His manifestations as the physical elements and gross objects, and inculcates the worship of the formless, transcendent Brahman. The Śruti says, 'Prakṛti is to be known as māyā'. Śaṅkara interprets māyā as unreal appearance. This interpretation

is wrong. Prakṛti is real and composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. It is called 'prakṛti' because it produces modifications. The 'Bhagavad Gītā' speaks of prakṛti as a real entity. It is called māyā because through it all are known. Māyā is not an unreal appearance as Śaṅkara wrongly thinks. Thus Bhāskara refutes Śaṅkara's doctrine of an effect being an unreal appearance (vivarta) of a real cause.

He regards both a cause and an effect as real entities, and an effect as a modification of its cause. He believes in the pre-existence of an effect in its cause (satkāryavāda). When a cause exists, an effect is produced. A cloth is produced out of threads wherein it pre-exists. A jar is produced out of earth wherein it pre-exists. A cloth is not perceived where and when threads are not perceived. A jar is not perceived where and when earth is not perceived. So an effect pre-exists in its cause. The Śruti says, 'O gentle one! this was being alone in the beginning'. It means that the world (this) pre-existed in the Brahman (being) as its cause before creation. The Śruti says, 'This was nonbeing in the beginning.' It means that the world was unmanifest in the Brahman—its cause—before creation. The common people think an extremely subtle entity incapable of being used to be nonexistent, although it is not really nonexistent. A jar is produced out of earth, but curd or a hare's horn is not produced out of it. If a nonexistent jar were produced out of earth, then curd or a hare's horn would be produced out of it because they are equally nonexistent. So an effect pre-exists in its cause. If a nonexistent effect be said to be produced by the power of its cause, then what regulates the power of a cause to produce a particular effect? The effects being nonexistent in their causes, particular causes cannot produce particular effects. If effects pre-exist in their causes, then only a power of a particular cause can produce a particular effect. Hence the pre-existence of an effect in its cause must be admitted. It may be objected that if an effect is pre-existent in its cause, the causal operation of a cause becomes useless to produce it. It may be argued that causal activity of a cause simply manifests an effect pre-existing in its cause. Then is manifestation of the effect existent or nonexistent in the cause? If it is existent, then the activity of a potter or any other efficient cause is needless. If it is nonexistent, then a cause produces an effect which is nonexistent in its cause. Bhāskara replies to this objection by stating his view. A cause and an effect are two states of the same entity. A state and an entity are not absolutely different from each other. An attribute and a substance are not absolutely different from each other. They are the same entity. There is no substance devoid of an attribute; and there is no attribute apart from a substance. The one being perceived, the other is perceived. They are different and nondifferent from each other. A cause and its effect also are different and nondifferent from each other. Their difference and nondifference are perceived. An effect is unmanifest in its cause as a cloth is enfolded in a roll. An effect is the manifest condition of its cause. The world is the manifest condition of the Brahman.²²

Bhāskara criticises the Buddhist realist's view that an entity is produced out of a nonentity (asatkāryavāda). A sprout is not found to be produced out of a nonentity (e. g., a hare's horn). If a nonentity were a cause of an entity, any effect would be produced out of any cause. There can be nothing to regulate the production of a particular effect out of a particular cause. All nonentities being alike, any effect can be produced out of any cause. But a sprout is not found to be produced out of

anything other than a seed. A seed alone is modified into the state of a sprout. An entity is perceived to be produced out of an entity. This fact of perception cannot be controverted. Further, if an entity were produced out of a nonentity, then a person could produce a desired object without any effort or activity. But this is not found. Hence the Buddhist doctrine is irrational²³.

According to the Buddhist Vijñānavādin many momentary cognitions are real ; external objects are unreal ; all are soulless or essenceless ; all are cognitions. The cognitions are invested with the forms of yellow, blue, and the like. Cognitions invested with forms alone are manifested and perceived. They are self-manifest and perceived. They are subjects, objects, and manifestation of objects. One and the same cognition appears to be the knowing subject, the known object, and knowledge. Its apprehended form is the object of knowledge ; the apprehending form is the means of knowledge ; self-apprehension is knowledge ; they exist in the same momentary cognition. So an external object does not exist. Nor does a permanent self exist apart from a series of cognitions. Blue and cognition of blue are perceived together, and, therefore, identical with each other. A cognition is produced without an external object, like a dream-cognition. Bhāskara offers the following criticisms of the doctrine. 1. External objects are not nonexistent for they are perceived. They are perceived as existing in outer space like a fire, a hill, earth, water, etc. Cognitions are produced by them in the self. Cognitions and objects are perceived as inward and outward, and so cannot be identical with each other. The cognition of a jar, the cognition of a cloth, etc., are apprehended with the forms of cognised objects. So the objects are real. 2. The Vijñānavādin argues that a cognition and an object are perceived together, and that therefore they are identical. What is the meaning of being perceived together? It means either being perceived in the same space or being perceived at the same time. In either case a cognition and an object are different from each other. So they cannot be proved to be identical with each other. 3. Further, there is no example to show that an apprehender is identical with the apprehended. A double moon is not an example since in the perception of it there is a difference between the knower and the known. 4. External objects are not nonexistent because they are like dreams, since the waking perceptions of objects are not similar to dream-cognitions. Dreams are vitiated by the defect of sleep and contradicted by perceptions on waking. 5. The argument that the cognitions of external objects are false because they are cognitions, like dream-cognitions, is false for 'being cognitions' is not the reason for their falsity. The falsity of dream-cognitions is unproven, for the sublatting waking perceptions also are false according to the Vijñānavādin. Therefore dream-cognitions cannot serve as an example for the inference. The falsity of the waking perceptions cannot be proved by inference because perception is stronger than inference. 6. The Vijñānavādin argues that the variety of cognitions is due to the variety of residual impressions (vāsanā). The impressions do not exist because they are not perceived. There is no proof for their existence. The Vijñānavādin argues that the ālayavijñāna called ego-cognitions (ahaiṇpratyaya) is the substratum of the residual impressions of the cognitions of the so-called external objects, and that these impressions and object-cognitions are related to each other as causes and effects. This argument is wrong because the ego-cognitions are momentary and cannot be the substratum of residual

impressions, and because the impressions distinct from cognitions are not possible according to Vijñānavāda. Further, impressions are produced by perceptions, and are causes of recollections; they cannot produce variety of perceptions. Hence Vijñānavāda is unjustifiable. The world of external objects is real.

Bādarāyaṇa refutes the doctrine of the Māyāvādins also by refuting the doctrine of the Buddhist Vijñānavādins. If Bādarāyaṇa does not admit the reality of external objects, why does he try to disprove the nonexistence of external objects? Waking perceptions cannot be proved to be false by inference since perception is stronger than inference as already shown.²⁴

REFUTATION OF ŚAṂKARA'S DOCTRINE OF FALSITY OF THE WORLD-APPEARANCE.—Śaṁkara holds that the world that is perceived is a false appearance due to nescience (avidyā) which is without an origin. Bhāskara condemns it as irrational on the following grounds. 1. The world is an effect or modification of the Brahman. An effect is always perceived to be permeated by its cause. An earthen jar is perceived to be permeated by earth. A gold ear-ring is perceived to be permeated by gold. An effect being produced by its cause subsists in it. An effect is as real as its cause, and is not perceived as separate from its cause in space and time and as destroying or overcoming the nature of its cause. So an effect is not a false appearance. 2. Truth or falsity of the world does not depend upon persons. Śaṁkara holds that the world is true for those who are not desirous of release, and that it is false for those who are desirous of release. This view is not reasonable for it cannot be said that colour is false for the blind, and that it is true for others. The existents are not dependent on persons so that they may be true for some and false for others. The existence and nonexistence of the objects do not depend upon persons. The world is true and false at the same time—which is self-contradictory—if it be true for the undesirous of release and if it be false for the desirous of release. The existence of the world is true for both the undesirous of release and the desirous of release, the ignorant and the wise. It cannot be false or unreal for the ignorant. It is wrong to say that the double moon existed at first and then became nonexistent. 3. If knowledge derived from perception and the other pramaṇas is proved to be false by scriptural testimony, then it is always false like the illusion of the double moon. The perception of the world is not vitiated by defects in its cause, as the perception of the double moon is so vitiated. So it is not false. The Brahman is both different and nondifferent from the world. He is nondifferent as the cause, and different as the effect, as gold is nondifferent as a cause and different as an effect. 4. Śaṁkara holds that the false world-appearance is due to nescience (avidyā). Bhāskara refutes his view of nescience and establishes his own view of it. If the knowledge of a person infected with nescience be false, then his knowledge of the Brahman also is false, because there is no distinction between the two kinds of knowledge, both being infected with nescience. A person infected with nescience is eligible for hearing the scriptural text 'That thou art'. If he has no nescience, then the scriptural injunction about his hearing of, and reflection and meditation on, the text would be needless. But the injunction is necessary. So the person is infected with nescience, and his knowledge of the Brahman is false. 5. Bhāskara asks what Śaṁkara means by nescience. It is either the perception of difference or the perception of

nondifference. If it is the perception of difference, why is it so? Is it so, because it is different from knowledge (vidyā)? Or, is it so, because it is the absence of knowledge? It is not the absence of knowledge because the perception of difference is experienced. But there is a difference between higher knowledge (parā vidyā) and lower knowledge (aparā vidyā). But nescience cannot be the absence of knowledge. The knowledge of difference is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor an action. So it is not different from knowledge. Vidyā is knowledge. The knowledge of difference also is knowledge. If nescience is the opposite of knowledge, or false knowledge, then is it eternal or noneternal? If it is eternal, it cannot be destroyed, and there cannot be release. If it is noneternal or produced, then it is an effect and so a real entity, and Śaṅkara's thesis that nescience is unreal is abandoned. A nonentity, like a hare's horn, is not produced. Where does nescience abide? It cannot abide in the Brahman because He is of the nature of pure knowledge and supreme bliss. Nor can it abide in an individual self (jīva) since Śaṅkara does not admit its ontological reality as distinct from the Brahman. A jīva is a reflection of the Brahman in nescience or an internal organ produced by nescience and so a nonentity. Nescience without a substratum is a real entity. So the knowledge of difference is not nescience. Nescience does not belong to God. Hence it is a real individual soul's false knowledge of body and the like, which are not-self, as self, and ignorance of the nature of the Brahman. It is both false apprehension and non-apprehension. It is destroyed by the knowledge produced by the hearing of the text 'That thou art.' The knowledge of the world of difference is not nescience because it is an effect of the Brahman. It is real as its cause is. He is real as cause and effect. He is nondifferent as cause and different as effect. The knowledge of the Brahman cannot be false. The opponent may ask how there can be release if the known world is real. Bhāskara asks Śaṅkara how he can account for release, who thinks the world to be a false appearance. As dreams contradicted by waking perception are produced again and again, so the false appearance of the world will be produced again and again in a released person. As in the states of deep sleep and dissolution nescience persists in the form of darkness and produces the false world appearance, so nescience is partially destroyed by the unsteady flame of the knowledge (vidyā) of the Brahman, and again reappears and produces the false world-appearance. It may be objected that nescience being completely destroyed by the knowledge of the Brahman cannot reappear. To this objection Bhāskara replies that the knowledge of the Brahman also being a false appearance (prapañca), cannot completely destroy nescience, which is a false appearance, since they are endowed with equal powers. It may be objected that the Brahman or Ātman always exists, that therefore the knowledge of Him destroys nescience completely as light destroys darkness, and that the false world-appearance cannot emerge again. To this objection Bhāskara replies that if the false world-appearance cannot emerge again, then all persons will be released. But this is an undesirable contingency. Hence bondage and release should be ascertained by scriptural testimony, and not by reasoning which is endless, and which can never get at the truth in regard to supersensible entities. Therefore the world is not a false appearance.²⁵

WORKS AND KNOWLEDGE COMBINED ARE THE MEANS TO LIBERATION (JÑĀNAKARMA-SAMUCCAYAVĀDA).—Bhāskara thinks works (karma) and knowledge (jñāna) combined as

the means to liberation. He is opposed to Śaṅkara's view that knowledge alone is the means to release, and that knowledge and works, like light and darkness, cannot be combined with each other. Śaṅkara traces actions to nescience or ignorance. Nescience (avidyā) of the nature of the Self is the cause of desire (kāma). Desire is the cause of action (karma). Hence works are products of nescience, and so cannot be combined with knowledge. Nescience is ignorance of the nature of the Self (ātman) or Brahman. Knowledge is the knowledge of the Self or Brahman. Bhāskara refutes Śaṅkara's view. Works are of four kinds: (1) some produce effects; (2) some get at something; (3) some modify an entity; (4) others purify an entity. Śaṅkara argues that release of the nature of the Brahman cannot be produced, since if He were produced He would be noneternal. So works (eg., Agnihotra) cannot produce release. Nor can they get at the Brahman since He is omnipresent. Nor can they modify Him since in that case He would be noneternal. Nor can they purify Him since no refinement can be produced in Him in that He is eternal. So works cannot produce release. Bhāskara refutes this argument of Śaṅkara. He agrees with Śaṅkara that works cannot produce, modify, or purify the Brahman. But Bhāskara admits that works combined with knowledge can lead to the attainment of the nature of the Brahman, as Śaṅkara admits that it can be attained by knowledge through the annulment of nescience. If release were an accomplished fact and always attained, as Śaṅkara holds, all would be released without any effort. Śaṅkara defends his position by arguing that release can be attained by knowledge through the annulment of nescience, and that nescience can be annulled by knowledge since they are contradictory to each other. This defence is unavailing since nescience or the knowledge of difference cannot cease so long as embodied life continues inasmuch as the body, the sense-organs, and the objects are its causes. Further, the wheel of nescience, desire and action always revolves in embodied life, which are the causes of each other. So the intuitive knowledge of the non-different Brahman is obstructed by the empirical knowledge of difference because the latter is stronger. Hence there can be no release so long as embodied life continues. So long as the body, the sense-organs, and the objects are present, the knowledge of difference is bound to reappear and obstruct the knowledge of nondifference. That the knowledge of difference is completely destroyed by the knowledge of nondifference in embodied life is contradicted by experience. Nescience cannot be said to have a trace since it is unreal according to Śaṅkara. A hare's horn cannot be said to have a trace left behind or not to have a trace left behind because it is unreal. If the knowledge of difference were completely destroyed by the knowledge of nondifference, there would be no difference between Śaṅkara (advaitavādin) and his opponent. But Manu, Vyāsa, Yājñavalkya and others who realised their nondifference from the Brahman instructed others. So their knowledge of difference persisted, although they were released. Further, if release is a state of mere knowledge without bliss, it is not a covetable end. Hence Śaṅkara's view of knowledge of nondifference alone being the means of release is not tenable. Bhāskara does not deny the existence of nescience in a bound individual soul. He regards nescience as false knowledge of not-self—mind-body-complex—as self, and destruction of nescience as the destruction of this false knowledge. When a person's false knowledge is destroyed, he becomes omniscient, omnipotent, supremely blissful, and released. Besides, potencies of actions—merits and demerits—acquired in numerous births, which have not yet begun to bear fruits, and which have begun to do so, cannot be

destroyed by the knowledge of the Brahman, since they are not contradictory to knowledge. If they are said to be destroyed by the knowledge of the Brahman, because they are the cause of bondage, how are they known to be the cause of bondage? If they are said to be known to be so from scriptural testimony, then Śaṅkara comes over to Bhāskara's view. Śaṅkara does not admit the ontological reality of external objects which he regards as mere nescience. Actions are different from nescience. They depend upon the knowledge of difference, which cannot be destroyed in embodied life. So Bhāskara holds that bondage in the form of nescience, desire and action is destroyed by the knowledge of the self combined with the performance of the daily obligatory duties prescribed by the scriptures. According to him, Bādarāyaṇa upholds the doctrine of knowledge combined with works as the means to the attainment of liberation.

Śaṅkara argues that works attain perishable ends, and that knowledge attains the eternal Brahman or release. The Śruti says: 'Heaven attained by merits due to right actions is perishable, but the knower of the Brahman attains the supreme Brahman'. So enquiry about the Brahman should be made after Dharma is known. Hence knowledge cannot be combined with works. Prudential duties for the attainment of empirical ends (kāmyakarma) and prohibited actions (niṣiddha karma) should not be done and combined with knowledge. But daily obligatory duties (nitya karma) should be done and combined with knowledge. Desire to know the Brahman arises after performance of sacrifices, charity, and austerities. Sense-control, mind-control, withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects, endurance of pleasure and pain, and faith in the Brahman should be cultivated. Then the Self should be known in the self. The Self is extremely difficult to be known by the manas tainted with love and hatred. The self is identical with the Brahman in its essence. The Brahman should be heard, reflected on, meditated on, and sought to be known. Works should be combined with meditation or worship. The knowledge of nondifference being repeatedly practised uproots the potencies of nescience and the potencies of love and hatred. Nescience is the cause of love and hate; they are the causes of desires; desires are the causes of actions. So when potencies of nescience are destroyed, potencies of actions are destroyed. So after Dharma is known, enquiry about the Brahman is appropriate. Works uncombined with knowledge lead to the knowledge of Dharma, which ends in exaltation or the attainment of heaven. But Śaṅkara's argument that works lead to the attainment of perishable ends, but that knowledge leads to the attainment of the Brahman is wrong, because works unaccompanied with knowledge are perishable, but because works accompanied with knowledge lead to the realisation of one's identity with the Brahman. The Śruti says, 'The works of a person who meditates on the Brahman do not perish.' Works are perishable in themselves, but they are not so when they are combined with knowledge. Works combined with knowledge are the cause of the attainment of the highest good. Works combined with the knowledge of the Brahman lead to liberation which is imperishable. If they cannot yield liberation, an ascetic's knowledge of the Brahman also cannot do so because he performs the unavoidable bodily, vocal and mental acts for the preservation of his life. Works uncombined with knowledge lead to the attainment of heaven. But works combined with knowledge lead to the attainment of liberation. The renunciation of all works is a vain pursuit. Offering all

works to God is true renunciation of works, and brings about the realisation of Him. Works should not be renounced because they have conflict with knowledge. Śaṅkara holds that knowledge leads to liberation by destroying nescience which is the knowledge of difference. Bhāskara urges that nescience is not the knowledge of difference, and that the latter cannot be destroyed in embodied life as shown elsewhere. The knowledge of duality or difference cannot be entirely destroyed by the knowledge derived from the scriptural text 'That thou art'. The body continues to experience the fruits of one's merits and demerits which have begun to bear fruits. Further, if the knowledge of difference is false, God's omniscience is not possible, and all secular and spiritual actions of released persons become impossible. During embodied existence both works and knowledge, which are the means of liberation, should be practised, since there is no embodied release.

Some hold that house-holders should perform prudential duties and offer them to God. Bhāskara holds that they should not perform these duties if they desire to attain liberation. If they perform these duties for the acquisition of worldly happiness and heavenly happiness, they cannot acquire the saving knowledge thereby. The works which produce the desire to know the Brahman assist knowledge, and such works should be performed for they are a means to liberation. Those who are outside the sphere of duties relating to the four stages of life acquire knowledge by performing noninjury, truthfulness, uttering God's name, fasting, meditation on Him, and the like. The performance of the specific duties pertaining to one's stage of life is an aid to the acquisition of knowledge. After firm knowledge is acquired, yoga should be practised in order to strengthen it. Silence should be observed to assimilate the knowledge. Meditation is the common duty of persons in all stages of life. Works cannot be abandoned completely in any stage of life. Works and knowledge both lead to liberation which is uniform. There are defects and excellence of the means, but the end is one and identical.

LIBERATION.—Bhāskara regards liberation as abiding in the state of the Brahman or Supreme Self. The Vaiśeṣika holds that release is a state of unconsciousness when an individual soul's specific qualities of knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression (saṃskāra), merit and demerit are destroyed. He argues that if it has bliss in release, it has attachment (rāga) to pleasure, that attachment is a cause of bondage, that when the body, the sense-organs, and the manas are destroyed, knowledge cannot be produced, and that in the absence of knowledge, it becomes unconscious like a stone. Bhāskara urges that attachment to the objects of pleasure alone is a cause of bondage, but that attachment to God is a cause of liberation. A released soul attains the nature of the causal Brahman, and becomes the omniscient, omnipotent Self of all creatures, like Him. This is the view of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa according to Bhāskara. A released soul experiences its own bliss. The Brahman is of the nature of supreme bliss. Release is a state of nondifference from Him, and so replete with bliss. Bliss is not mere absence of pain as the Vaiśeṣika wrongly thinks. His view of release as a state of unconsciousness is repugnant to the teaching of the Upaniṣads and so heterodox and unacceptable. The atheistic Sāṃkhya holds that liberation is a state of pure consciousness devoid of bliss or a soul's abiding in its essential nature attainable by superconscious trance. Release without bliss is not a covetable end of a conscious soul. Bliss is not

painlessness. If consciousness itself is bliss, then there is bliss even in the state of pain. Hence a released soul's experience of its innate bliss should be admitted. The theistic Sāṃkhya holds that a liberated soul remains separately from God. The Śruti says, 'A released soul attains to God.' There is a relation of a substratum and a content, realised and what is to be realised, an object and an agent, between God and a soul. Bhāskara holds that a soul remains nondifferent from God in release. There is natural or essential nondifference or identity between a soul and God, but there is a conditional difference between them due to a limiting adjunct. When the limiting adjunct is destroyed, a soul becomes nondifferent from God.

Is an individual soul fulfilled in an adventitious form of consciousness or its own nature as soul? Some hold that it is fulfilled in an adventitious form since liberation also has a fruit. This view is wrong because liberation is experienced by a soul in its own form as heavenly happiness is enjoyed by a bound soul in a supramundane form. In dream and deep sleep a soul is tainted with nescience, but in release it is fulfilled as the pure Supreme Self. The Śruti says, 'A released soul becomes supreme light.' Here 'supreme light' means the Supreme Self or Brahman of the nature of self-manifest, infinite consciousness. According to Jaimini, liberation is a state of consciousness, sinlessness, true resolve, omniscience, omnipotence and the like. According to Audulomi liberation is a state of being and consciousness alone devoid of the knowledge of objects like deep sleep. Bādarāyaṇa holds that liberation is a state of consciousness and lordship, there being no conflict between them. A liberated soul's sinfulness and other adventitious qualities are destroyed, and it enjoys the lordship of God. Bhāskara interprets the views of Jaimini, Audulomi and Bādarāyaṇa in the aforesaid manner.²⁸

A released person sees his departed father and the like at his mere will without any effort. He can see all objects of the empirical world at his mere will. He becomes free and autonomous, and has no other Lord. He can go to any world of supramundane beings at his will. According to Bādari a released soul has no body and sense-organs since it does every action through mere will. According to Jaimini a released soul has a body and sense-organs since it takes various forms. According to Bādarāyaṇa a released soul has both a body and the sense-organs since it is omnipotent and can create a body at its will with or without any material. In the absence of a body and the sense-organs a released soul can enjoy various objects with its manas only as a bound soul does so in dream. In the presence of a body and the sense-organs a released soul enjoys various objects with them.

No thoughtful person makes an endeavour to attain release of the nature of unconsciousness or the absence of the knowledge of objects. There are degrees of joy in the worlds of gods enjoyed by a bound soul. But a released soul has not dim consciousness as in deep sleep since it is equivalent to unconsciousness. A released soul cannot have consciousness without the knowledge of other objects. But the Advaita Vedāntin does not admit the existence of any other experience. If he admits it, then his nondualism or monism is contradicted. Hence the Māyāvādin's view of release as dim consciousness devoid of the knowledge of objects is not right. But if release be admitted to be a state of consciousness, a released soul can be both different and nondifferent from the Brahman, become omniscient and omnipotent like Him, and of the nature of being and consciousness, and enjoy various kinds of objects. A released soul is ubiquitous, but a bound soul is atomic owing to its limiting adjunct—an internal organ—and capable of departure and movement. Its ubiquity is natural while its minuteness is conditional.

In deep sleep and death a soul is unconscious. But in release it has special knowledge of all objects. It has also general knowledge of them due to its capacity for knowledge and action. Those released souls which are united with the Brahman can enjoy His lordship without any limit including creation, maintenance, and dissolution of the world. But those who are not united with Him enjoy His lordship except control over the world. Their lordship is always in conformity with God's lordship, and never surpasses it. They enjoy freedom or autonomy subject to God's freedom, and supernatural powers such as minuteness and the like, but can never create, maintain, or dissolve the world. God's lordship is eternally accomplished in His supramundane greatness and also manifested in the mundane modifications of the physical world. The released souls enjoy those objects which are enjoyed by God. They never return again to embodied life.

Bhāskara rejects Śaṅkara's doctrine of embodied release. So long as the body and the sense-organs are present, the knowledge of difference which is called nescience by Śaṅkara continues, hunger and thirst afflict the body, and actions for the maintenance of the body persist. The body is conducive to the experience of joys and griefs due to merits and demerits which have begun to bear fruits. They and their potencies cannot be destroyed by the knowledge of the nondifferent Brahman. They are bound to reappear during embodied existence. Hence Bhāskara denies the possibility of embodied release.²⁷

¹ BBS., pp. 85, 124.

² Ibid, i, 1, 3.

³ Ibid, i, 1, 4 & 2.

⁴ BBS., i, 1, 2, 11-12, 14, 22-24, 28-31 ; i, 2, 1, 4-15, 24 ; i, 3, 10-12 & 16.

⁵ SBS., i 2, 14. HIP., Vol. II, p. 504-08.

⁶ BBS., i, 3, 13.

⁷ Ibid, iii, 2, 11-12.

⁸ BS., BBS., i, 1, 2.

⁹ Ibid, ii, 1, 24 ; ii, 2, 26.

¹⁰ Ibid, ii, 1, 26-29 ; i, 4, 25.

¹¹ Ibid, iii, 2, 11.

¹² Ibid, iii ; 2, 23-25.

¹³ Ibid, iii, 2, 11-17.

¹⁴ Ibid, ii, 3, 17-18.

¹⁵ Ibid, ii, 3, 21, 29-32.

¹⁶ Ibid, ii, 3, 33, 36-37, 40-42.

¹⁷ Ibid, ii, 2, 25.

¹⁸ Ibid, iii, 2, 19-22 & 28.

¹⁹ Ibid, iii, 2, 28-41.

²⁰ Ibid, i, 2, 6 ; i, 3, 19 ; iv, 4, 7 ; i, 4, 21 & 25.

²¹ Ibid, ii, 3, 43, 46-50 ; iii, 2, 5-6.

²² Ibid, ii, 1, 14-19.

²³ Ibid, ii, 2, 16-17. HIP ; Vol. II, p. 542-44.

²⁴ Ibid, ii, 2, 28-30.

²⁵ Ibid, i, 1, 4.

²⁶ Ibid, iii, 4, 20, 26, 38-39, 45, 50 ; iv, 4, 1-2, 4-5.

²⁷ Ibid, iii, 4, 26 ; i, 1, 4 ; iv, 4, 1-2 & 5, 7-22.

CHAPTER II

THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ SCHOOL OF ŚAIVISM

INTRODUCTION.—Vasugupta (800 A. D.) wrote 'Śivasūtra' and 'Spandakārikā.' Kallaṭa (900 A.D.) wrote a commentary on the latter. Somānanda (900 A. D.) wrote 'Śivadr̥ṣṭi'. Utpaladeva (1000 A. D.) wrote a commentary on it. He wrote also 'Aṣṭapramāṭṛṣiddhi', 'Īśvarasiddhi', 'Sambandhasiddhi', 'Īśvarapratyabhijñānākārikā' and a commentary on it. He was a disciple of Somānanda. Abhinavagupta (1000 A. D.) wrote 'Īśvarapratyabhijñānāvimarśinī', 'Śivadr̥ṣṭyālocana' not available at present, 'Tantrāloka', 'Tantrasāra', 'Paramārthasāra', 'Parātrimśikāvivarāṇa', a commentary on the 'Bhagavad Gītā', 'Mālinīvijayavārttika' and other works. Yogirāja wrote a commentary on 'Paramārthasāra'. Kṣemarāja (1000 A. D.), a pupil of Abhinavagupta, wrote 'Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya', a digest of the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism, 'Spandasandoha', 'Śivaśūtravimarśinī', 'Tattvasandoha', and other works. Utpaladeva wrote 'Spandapradīpikā'. Bhāskara wrote 'Śivasūtravārttika', and Varadarāja also wrote another 'Śivasūtravārttika'. Śaṅkara refutes the Pāśupata doctrine but not the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism. Vasugupta might be a contemporary of Śaṅkara. There is great similarity between Pratyabhijñā Śaivism and Śākta monism, the former laying stress on Śiva and the latter laying stress on Śakti, though they are inseparable from each other according to both.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE LORD.—Utpaladeva gives the following arguments for the existence of the Absolute Knower. The insentient objects cannot exist without being known or manifested by a knower. Their manifestations through cognitions rest in a conscious knower. All objects of the universe cannot be known by limited knowers, who wrongly identify themselves with their subtle bodies, who have limited knowledge and limited agency, and who are devoid of perfect 'I'-consciousness. Hence all objects of the universe are known by the Absolute Knower, Who is omniscient, omnipotent, absolutely free, unlimited by adjuncts, and endowed with manifestation and perfect 'I'-consciousness. He is the Lord. His lordship consists in creating or manifesting the world of different objects full of the nonapprehension of nondifference due to His power of māyā, which is nondifferent from Him, and yet which conceals His nature. His power of māyā is the cause of the nonapprehension of nondifference. He is the creator of the world or the manifester of different objects. He is the unlimited Knower of different objects, because He distinguishes them from one another, and because He synthesises them with one another by His consciousness. The manifestations of all objects in the form of His cognitions rest in Him, Who is their eternal unlimited Knower. They rest in His universal self-aware consciousness and perfect 'I'-consciousness. He can create, manifest and know all objects. He is all-pervasive, and can unite them with one another, and make them a 'universe'. 'I'-consciousness, all-knowledge, all-pervasiveness, and unity of apperception are not possible in an insentient entity. All differences are manifested by the one unlimited Knower (amita-pramāṭṛ).¹

Utpaladeva gives the following argument for the existence of the Lord (īśvara). Bodies and worlds have a particular arrangement of parts adapted to particular ends. Therefore they are created by the intelligent Lord Who creates them without any material to realise His purpose. He has knowledge of the variety of existents, and power of creating them by His mere volition. He cannot be a knower of limited knowledge and agency. He is the omniscient and omnipotent Lord. There is no evidence to prove that many agents have the power of creating the universe. Hence one omniscient and omnipotent Agent creates it. It can be created by the intelligent Lord alone. The entire universe with an arrangement of parts adapted to one another and to particular ends can be created by the Lord. He is the creator of the variety of objects in the universe. Many individual souls with limited knowledge and agency cannot know and create it. One Lord different from many individual souls can know and create it. The inference of one intelligent Lord as the creator of the universe because of its arrangement of parts adapted to one another is flawless and unvitiated by false reasons. The Lord is not a fiction of the imagination, but is recognisable by the individual souls as their Supreme Self, internal Knower and Agent. The last is the psychological argument for the existence of the Lord. He can be intuited by a long course of spiritual discipline prescribed by the Śaiva monists. The cosmological argument involves the teleological argument also because it considers the adaptation of the different objects to particular ends and their harmony, order and unity.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika infers the existence of the intelligent Lord as the creator of the universe with an arrangement of parts as external to it out of the pre-existent eternal atoms. But the Śaiva monists prove the existence of the intelligent Lord as the creator of the universe by His mere volition without any pre-existing material. The former regards the Lord as the efficient cause (nimitta kāraṇa) of the universe, while the latter regards Him as the efficient cause, the inherent cause, and the noninherent cause of the universe. He creates it by His mere volition, and is, consequently, its efficient cause. His power of māyā is modified into unmanifest prakṛti and the manifest universe, and so He is its material cause. He creates the conjunction of the parts of the universe by His mere volition, and is therefore its noninherent cause. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a Deist while the Śaiva monists are Theists. The former regards God as transcendent of the universe while the latter regard God as both transcendent of, and immanent in, the universe².

CRITICISM OF THE SĀMĀKHYA ATHEISM.—The Sāṃkhya holds that the insentient prakṛti composed of sattva, rajas and tamas is modified into the universe in order to realise the ends of the individual souls (puruṣa), viz., their experience of joys and sorrows (bhoga) and liberation (mokṣa). It does not require the guidance of the intelligent Lord to realise the ends of the individual souls. He does not create the universe. The guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas—are its material cause. The ends of the individual souls are its efficient cause. Prakṛti is unconscious, but individual souls are conscious and intelligent. Their proximity and transcendental influence throw the guṇas into disequilibrium, and start the evolution of prakṛti. Particular individual souls' complete isolation (kaivalya) from prakṛti, or complete detachment from it, stops its evolution for them, but it goes on for the experience of the other individual souls. Hence one intelligent Lord is not necessary for the

creation of the universe and its adaptation to the individual souls' ends. He is neither its material cause nor efficient cause.

Utpaladeva offers the following criticisms of the Sāṃkhya atheism. If prakṛti is the material cause of the world with an arrangement of parts and diverse effects, if the effects are objects of the individual soul's joys and sorrows, if their ends are their efficient causes, and if the world does not require God as its material cause and efficient cause, then a potter is not necessary for the production of a jar. A lump of earth modifies itself into a jar for the use of an individual person by its nature. Earth is its material cause, and the end of a person is its efficient cause. It should not require a potter to shape earth into a jar as its efficient cause, and a wheel and a staff as its auxiliary causes. If the Sāṃkhya argues that earth, a modification of prakṛti, has a particular nature so that it requires an intelligent agent (e. g., a potter), and a wheel and a staff as auxiliary causes to be modified into a jar of a particular shape for the use of an individual person, then it may be equally argued that prakṛti is of such a nature that it requires the intelligent Lord to produce bodies and the like for the ends of the individual souls. If invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is known in some places at some times, then it must exist elsewhere between another instance of visible smoke and an invisible fire. Hence an intelligent agent, the omniscient and omnipotent Lord, can be inferred from the arrangement of parts in the world, because invariable concomitance between an arrangement of parts is an effect and an intelligent agent is known in all other instances. The Lord is necessary for the creation of the world, as a potter is necessary for the production of a jar. A particular arrangement of parts cannot be produced without an intelligent agent's activity entering into the parts with the aid of the auxiliary causes. Various arrangements of the parts in different effects cannot be produced without prior knowledge of them and volition to produce them. Variety of construction is intelligently designed and executed in a methodical manner, and cannot be produced accidentally, because it is intelligently adapted to definite ends of individual souls. If jars are produced by prakṛti with the assistance of a potter, bodies and the like also are produced by prakṛti with the assistance of the Lord. Their particular arrangements are adapted to particular ends, and the infinite variety of arrangements can be produced by the omniscient and omnipotent Lord. Prakṛti is insentient, and cannot have knowledge and volition, and cannot realise the ends of the individual souls. They do not know prakṛti, and cannot adapt prakṛti to their ends. Further, they are inactive, and so cannot act upon it. The buddhis of the individual souls have knowledge and volition according to the Sāṃkhya; but they are ignorant of prakṛti, and, consequently, cannot adapt it to the ends of the individual souls. If all individual souls together are omniscient, then each of them is omniscient. If each of them is omniscient, then the cognitions and volitions of the souls will come into conflict with one another, and cannot adapt prakṛti to their particular ends. Hence prakṛti is known by one Lord from whom all individual souls are nondifferent, and who is omniscient and omnipotent. He is the intelligent agent of the world. The insentient prakṛti cannot be the efficient cause of the world; nor can the individual souls be its efficient cause.

Utpaladeva avers that the Lord does not require any proof to prove His existence, since He is self-existent and self-proved, and since He cannot be proved or disproved by any

individual soul. He is the foundation of all proofs of the objects of valid knowledge. He is self-manifest and of the nature of the only Supreme Knower. His knowledge and agency are proved by self-awareness. No individual soul can prove or disprove His existence. But He can only be recognised by an individual soul as its essential nature when it ceases to be overcome by His power of *māyā*. It can have immediate experience or intuition of the Lord, *Ātman*, or universal consciousness as its inmost essence. This is called the psychological proof for His existence.³

ŚIVA AND ŚAKTI.—Somānanda says : “Śiva is never devoid of Śakti or divine power, and Śakti or divine power can never exist apart from Śiva. Śiva is endowed with divine power, and desires to create entities by His volition. Śaivism does not recognise difference between the Lord and His divine power.” Śaivism never recognises difference between Śiva, the Supreme Lord, and His divine power. Śāktaism also recognises this truth. Both believe in Śiva-Śakti as the supreme reality. So Utpaladeva designates the Śāktas as belonging to the cult of Śaivism or allied to it (*svayūthya*) because they regard Śiva as the unconditioned form of Śakti whom they worship, and does not criticise Śāktaism.⁴ If Śakti be assumed to be an independent entity with various capacities to manifest various kinds of objects, then an infinite number of such capacities have to be assumed. If Śakti independently produces various kinds of existents, She does so either as endowed with power or as devoid of power. If She did so as devoid of power, then even void would produce all kinds of existents. If She does so as endowed with power, then Śiva endowed with power creates different kinds of existents. This is the doctrine of monistic Śaivism. If divine power be assumed to be endowed with some other power to create various kinds of existents, it will lead to infinite regress. Does divine power create various kinds of existents? Or, does Śiva endowed with divine power create them? Somānanda replies that Śiva endowed with divine power creates them because He is the agent and because His power is the instrument of action. If divine power were independently the agent of the various kinds of existents, then they would not be of the nature of Śiva, and this would contradict the Śaiva doctrine. But the Śāktas do not contradict this Śaiva doctrine. Power is an attribute of a powerful entity. Heat is not different from fire. So all kinds of existents being of the nature of Śiva endowed with divine power should be known. They are not of the nature of divine power independent of Śiva. Independent divine power is not their agent. Śiva endowed with the power of will, the power of knowledge, and the power of action creates all kinds of existents and exists in them. The powers of all entities are the power of the Supreme Lord. There is nondifference between power and a powerful entity.

Somānanda describes five powers of Śiva—power of consciousness (*cit*), power of bliss (*ānanda*), power of volition (*icchā*), power of knowledge (*jñāna*), and power of action (*kriyā*). The last three powers exist in a very subtle state in Him as nondifferent from Him. He is the Supreme Lord endowed with infinite consciousness and bliss, Who is one, nondifferent and indivisible. Śiva is of this nature before creation. His consciousness (*cit*) is infinite, self-complete, and independent of objects of knowledge. His bliss is infinite, perfect and independent of objects knowledge. He experiences His infinite consciousness and bliss, and does not experience any external objects. He is the Self, *Ātman*, or absolutely free ‘I’ in all

existents. He is of the nature of manifestation (prakāśa) and 'I'-consciousness (vimarśa). There being no objects before creation, His manifestation is confined to Him, and is of the nature of innate meditation in the form of 'I am'. His powers of volition, knowledge and action exist in a very subtle state in Him before creation. They are distinctly manifested in relation to other objects when they are created. In the highest state His nature is manifested as 'I am perfect'; this manifestation is of the nature of knowledge. His act of shining is of the nature of action. It depends upon His volition to shine. But His powers of volition, knowledge and action are very subtle because they cannot be imagined separately from one another, and because there are no other existents at the time. They exist in Śiva or Ātman as nondifferent from Him of the nature of infinite consciousness and bliss, and are manifested by His infinite consciousness. Utpaladeva avers that this is the indivisible state of Śiva in the highest state (parāvasthā). Even after creation of the mixed and impure existents Śiva exists as the Supreme Knower untainted by the distinction of knowledge and objects of knowledge. Before the production of all cognitions and after their cessation He exists as the self-manifest Self (ātman). He knows the cognitions before their production and after their cessation; so they rest in Him. He creates the objects, knows them, and makes them rest in Him. Without resting in Him they cannot be known at all. In all states He is endowed with power of consciousness and power of bliss. His powers of volition, knowledge and action are said to be distinct from one another in relation to objects of volition, knowledge and action. But He, the Absolute Knower, is never devoid of these powers.⁵

Kṣemarāja avers that Śiva is of the nature of manifestation (prakāśa) and 'I'-consciousness (vimarśa). 'I'-consciousness is the transcendental delight in the experience of supreme 'I' (pūrṇāhantā-camatkāra) in creating, maintaining and dissolving the universe. If He were without 'I'-consciousness, He would cease to be the Lord and become insentient. The Supreme Lord is of the nature of self-manifest supreme 'I' with the created principles manifested in all existents. He manifests Himself in the variety of the universe through His power of 'I'-consciousness. Ādyanātha avers that Śiva is of the nature of manifestation (prakāśa) and supreme 'I'-consciousness nondifferent from Himself. Abhinavagupta mentions the five powers of consciousness, bliss, volition, knowledge and action which exist in Parama Śiva as nondifferent from Him. He manifests Himself as Śivatattva, Śaktitattva, Sadāśivatattva, Īśvaratattva and Śuddhavidyātattva according as these powers are predominant respectively. He manifests Himself as appearances of external objects. He is absolutely free, manifests and merges the empirical world in Himself as the basis, and makes it appear as different from Him, although it is really nondifferent from Him. Somāṇḍa avers that the Ātman, the Supreme Self, manifesting Himself in all existents is Śiva of the nature of universal consciousness and bliss and endowed with irresistible will and all-pervasive knowledge and action. He is the Supreme Self in all existents. His consciousness, bliss, volition, knowledge and action are manifested in the creation of all objects.

The universe is the expression of Śiva's æsthetic experience of His delight and creative 'I'-consciousness. His being intent on creating the manifold universe is the first stage of His volition. His consciousness is due to introversion because of its being independent of other objects. His creation of the manifold universe is the construction of various objects due to

nonapprehension of nondifference consequent on *māyā* by the empirical knowers. There is no distinction of time before the creation of *māyātattva*. All His powers are in a mixed state before creation. It is objected that Śiva's intentness on creating the universe of a variety of ugly effects full of nonapprehension of His nature due to *māyāśakti* by the bound souls is unreasonable because He rests in His bliss and because He experiences His delight in unfolding His nature in the universe. How can the beautiful Lord be intent on creating an ugly universe? Śomānanda replies that Śiva performs the fivefold acts of creation, maintenance, dissolution, veiling the individual souls' knowledge, and granting them grace. There are no other causes of these acts. Utpaladeva explains it thus. When Śiva assumes the state of *Sadāśiva* and *Īśvara*, He knows the universe as 'I am the universe'. At the stage of impure creation also He knows in the form 'I know this jar' or the like. The knowledge of duality is manifested by Śiva of the nature of consciousness. It would not be known if it were not manifested by Him. But there is nonapprehension of nondifference due to the power of *māyā*. Hence the unfolding of His nature in the creation of the pure, mixed and impure existents is not ugly. The nonapprehension of nondifference is of the nature of error and ugliness. But this ugliness is insignificant because it consists in mere nonapprehension. There is no unfolding of what was nonexistent. Śiva of the nature of consciousness assumes the nature of the universe, even as a mirror assumes a variety of reflections of objects. All existents with the principles (*tattva*) exist in transparent universal consciousness or Śiva as reflections. So He does not become impure or ugly by his intentness on creating them. The motive of His creation is not compassion for human souls as the *Nyāya* holds. His fivefold acts of creation, etc., are the expression of His nature with five powers. Creation means the unfolding of the principles.

Śiva's intentness on creation (*aunmukhya*), Śomānanda avers, is His knowledge of the construction of the universe and unfoldment of His effort for its accomplishment. His knowledge abides in Himself. The first manifestation of His knowledge in regard to the creation of the universe in the form of initiation of volition is called intentness. It is a little swollen or manifest state of His volition to create the universe. His volition is directed towards an effect to be produced on account of which He is said to be endowed with a volition. The outward extension of intentness is called volition, although it is not yet expressed in an effect. But Śiva never becomes gross (*sthūla*) because of His intentness.⁶ Volition is the later part of intentness, which is capable of producing an effect. Śiva does not become gross when He exerts His volition to create the universe.

When Śiva wills to know or act, His volition is an action. The prior and posterior parts of a volition are assumed because it consists of subtle parts which are distinguishable. A volition to act also is an action. A volition, a cognition, and an action are involved in one another. Hence, in reality one power exists in Śiva endowed with power. His mere delight undetermined by any condition is His power of bliss. His delight determined by an object of action is intentness. Intentness attains its completion when the intended act is accomplished. It is an expression of an effort of consciousness.

Śiva's power of knowledge consists in His power of manifesting the knowledge of the universe to be created by Him because of which unknown objects are manifested to the

minds of the empirical knowers. His power of action consists in the effort to create gross effects which are known by all empirical knowers. The effort is the object of His volition in His power of action which produces gross effects of empirical use. Thus the entire universe comes into existence. In the act of creating the universe His power of consciousness, power of bliss, power of volition, power of knowledge, and power of action are involved. These five powers, especially the last three, are involved in the act of creating each object of the universe. Neither the three powers nor intentness to create nor delight cease. Delight here means Śiva's assumption of the five powers, Who is of the nature of infinite consciousness. In the absence of any of these powers no effect can be produced. If one of the complement of causal conditions is absent, an effect cannot be produced. So Śiva's five powers must co-operate with one another in the creation of all effects. Śivatattva consisting of all principles must be present in the production of all effects. One indivisible Śiva with His powers must be present in each of them.

Śiva endowed with all these powers is present in the apprehension of all effects. When a jar is known, the act of knowing is an action. The act of knowing yields knowledge. Knowledge involves volition since a knower devoid of volition cannot know an object. When an object is known, there is a prior volition to know it. One does not know an object if one does not will to know it. One knows an object with one's power of consciousness. When a desired object is known the self feels delight. Hence the power of volition, the power of knowledge, the power of action, the power of consciousness, and the power of delight are involved in the act of knowing an object.

It is objected by the Sāṃkhya that there can be no knowledge in Śiva because it is a modification of prakṛti which is regarded by Śaivism to be an impure creation produced later. To this objection Somānanda replies that Śiva's knowledge is essential to His nature and unlimited by time and space. Utpaladeva avers that Śiva's knowledge is natural to His essence and not due to buddhi which is an insentient effect of prakṛti, that it is not limited by space and time, and that it is not an object of any other knower's knowledge. Only the knowledge of the empirical knowers who identify their selves with their subtle bodies is due to buddhi due to their nonapprehension of nondifference. But Śiva's knowledge is mere universal consciousness. When the empirical knowers have knowledge due to their buddhis, it cannot be manifested without Śiva's light of consciousness which is self-manifest and natural to Him. Hence the Sāṃkhya objection is baseless.⁷

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika object that the Śaiva view is identical with their view since they hold knowledge to be a quality of the self (ātman) and since Śiva (ātman) has knowledge according to the Śaiva. They hold that knowledge inheres in the self. The Śaivas hold that Śiva is the Self or Ātman endowed with knowledge. Somānanda and Utpaladeva refute this objection thus. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika really take knowledge in the sense of knowledge produced by buddhi, a modification of insentient prakṛti, which they consider to be a quality of an individual self because they hold that it acquires knowledge in conjunction with manas or buddhi. But the Śaivas hold that knowledge is Śiva's essential nature, Who does not acquire it in conjunction with manas or buddhi which is a modification of prakṛti at the stage of māyāśakti. There is no trace of māyāśakti in Śiva's knowledge. Similarly, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika hold that volition is a quality of the self, which it acquires in

connection with *manas* or *buddhi*, and argue that Śiva conceived by the Śaivas is the Self, that volition inheres in Him, that therefore the Śaiva view is identical with their view, and that volition cannot be the essence of Śiva. Somānanda and Utpaladeva rejoin that volition constitutes Śiva's essence, and that it is not His adventitious quality acquired in conjunction with *manas* or *buddhi*. An individual self has the quality of volition at the stage of empirical difference. So the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika contention is not valid.

Śiva assumes some forms through His power of volition. He assumes some forms through His power of knowledge. He assumes some forms through His power of action. He assumes some forms by veiling Himself in the form of appearances. In this manner He assumes the forms of thirty six principles (*tattva*). Gross matter appears to be insentient. Śiva with His power of consciousness and power of bliss, which constitute His essence, is endowed with the powers of volition, knowledge and action. He becomes intent on creation through His powers of consciousness and bliss not related to any objects. He is unfolded in the pure, mixed and impure creations. He is always perfect and of the nature of consciousness and bliss. His intentness on creation is turned into volition to create the world under the influence of His *māyāśakti* due the nonapprehension of the *Ātman*. It becomes volition, knowledge and action. All existents are of the nature of Śiva or *Ātman*, since He is present in them all, and since He assumes those forms. Hence they are of the nature of Śiva or *Ātman*. He creates the manifold universe without any pre-existent material through His mere volition, even as *yogins* create things without any material through their mere volitions. So all pure, mixed and impure existents are of the nature of Śiva, since they are manifestations of His powers of consciousness, bliss, volition, knowledge, and action. The infinite Śivatattva always shines in the manifold universe of diverse objects. They are the diverse true manifestations of the Supreme Lord.⁸

CATEGORIES: (1) ŚIVATATTVA.—Kṣemarāja defines Śivatattva as Parama Śiva of the nature of volition, knowledge and action and full of perfect delight. Śivatattva is the first vibration of Parama Śiva in His volition to create the universe. He manifests the principles in Himself as the foundation. Śivatattva is His first desire to manifest the principles as reflections of towns and the like in a mirror because of His being possessed of five powers and absolute freedom, which exist in Him as nondifferent from His nature as of the nature of manifestation, and in which His powers of consciousness and the like predominate. Abhinavagupta defines Śivatattva as the highest principle of the nature of universal consciousness, perfection, and infinite delight because of His resting in Himself, endowed with infinite powers, full of the rays of consciousness and volition, devoid of all differences, pure, calm, beginningless and endless. The universe to be created rests in Him. He transcends all other principles. Yogirāja elaborates this definition. The universe to be created exists and shines in Him as nondifferent from Him. He is of the nature of infinite manifestation. He is perfect because of His desirelessness. He is infinite bliss because He is self-complete, self-fulfilled, and delights in His nature consisting in the artistic experience of infinite 'I' (*akhaṇḍāhantācamatkāra-rasa*). Thus He is different from insentient matter manifested by Him because He is of the essence of manifestation (*sphurattā*) and infinite delight. He is of the nature of the power of volition, the power of knowledge, the power of action, etc. He is different from the unqualified and

powerless Brahman of Śaṅkara and his followers, who is almost insentient. He is endowed with infinite powers. He is unlimited in nature and so devoid of limiting determinations and differences. He is pure since He is devoid of the impurity of differences. He is calm since He is free of agitation due the distinction of subjects and objects. He abides in His nature united with His powers. He is not like a piece of stone. He is without origin and end since He is eternal. There is no time—past, present and future—in Him since time is produced by Him. Śivatattva is universal consciousness, which is of the nature of great manifestation, which transcends all principles, and which is manifested in the hearts of all empirical knowers as perfect 'I'-consciousness and æsthetic experience of delight. He is the first cause of all existents, and the origin of all differences, although devoid of all differences; He is originless and absolutely free. He assumes the state of Bhairava full of the artistic experience of delight due to the power of manifestation consequent on the unfolding of infinite diverse absolute freedom. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara defines Śivatattva as the self-luminous principle.⁹

ŚAKTITATTVA.—Kṣemarāja defines Śaktitattva as the first vibration of the Supreme Lord desirous of creating the universe because of His power of volition being unrestrained. He calls this principle icchāśaktitattva. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara defines Śaktitattva as Parama Śiva's powers of knowledge and action. Yogirāja defines Śaktitattva as Parama Śiva's experience full of creative delight desirous of creating the universe, the seed of all existents, assuming a slightly manifest state. His blissful experience of 'I' desires to create the universe. Śaktitattva is the experience of 'I' because of the desire to create the external universe owing to absolute freedom and predominance of the artistic experience of supreme delight. Ādyanātha defines Śaktitattva as Parama Śiva's volition desirous of creating the universe and veiling it with 'I'-consciousness. Śaktitattva is Parama Śiva's transparent volition, which exists always in Him, which is the seed of the universe that is merged in Her. His absolutely free power of volition becomes Śaktitattva—the seed of the universe to be created. The Supreme Lord Himself assumes the state of Śaktitattva because of the degrees of His artistic experience of perfect 'I' due to the upsurging of His power of lordship. Hence His power of delight predominates in Śaktitattva. His logical experience is not the cause of the universe. But His volition to create it with the predominance of creative delight and the æsthetic experience of delight is the cause of the universe. His power of 'I'-consciousness veils the universe to be created; it remains merged in His power as nondifferent from Him. The Supreme Divine Power, dynamic consciousness, absolutely free and full of perfect 'I'-consciousness, and nondifferent from Parama Śiva, is the cause of the universe.¹⁰

(3) SADĀŚIVATATTVA.—Somānanda regards Sadāśivatattva as the state assumed by Parama Śiva when His power of knowledge predominates, and Īśvaratattva as the state assumed by Him when His power of volition predominates. Kṣemarāja defines Sadāśivatattva as the principle wherein the universe exists as potential and dominated by His 'I'-consciousness. The universe exists in Him as indistinct consciousness of 'this' which is dominated by His 'I'-consciousness. Utpaladeva avers that Parama Śiva's power of knowledge and power of action are inseparable from each other, that they are directed inward and outward, that when His introversion predominates He assumes the state of Sadāśivatattva or

Sādākhyatattva, and that when His extraversion predominates He assumes the state of Īśvaratattva. His enfolding within is Sadāśivatattva while His unfolding without is Īśvaratattva. Somānanda avers that Parama Śiva's power of knowledge called the state of Sadāśivatattva is the supreme state of Logos or experiencing subtle speech (paśyantī) of the Śābdikas. His power of knowledge predominates in Sadāśivatattva, but his power of action is not absent since it is said: 'His power of knowledge and power of action are Sādākhyā'. Utpaladeva observes that both Sadāśivatattva and Īśvaratattva have power of knowledge and power of action since power and powerfull Being are nondifferent from each other, that power of knowledge is predominant in the former while power of action is predominant in the latter. According to Yogirāja there is nondiscrimination of 'this'-consciousness and 'I'-consciousness in Sadāśivatattva, and He has consciousness 'I am this'. His power of knowledge predominates in this principle—the seed of the origin of the universe in the state of the void, since His power of action rests in His 'I'-consciousness attended with an æsthetic experience of delight. Sadāśivatattva is also defined as Parama Śiva engaged in the act of bestowing His grace on all, ready to manifest the universe by ejecting it out of His power of volition, and veiling Himself by it. Rājanakānanda opines that His power of volition predominates in this principle because of indistinctness of 'this'-consciousness, and that He assumes the role of bestowing His grace on all because of His desire to manifest the principles out of Himself, which are not yet manifested.¹¹

(4) ĪŚVARATATTVA.—Kṣemarāja defines Īśvaratattva as the germinating universe existing in Parama Śiva dominated by His 'I'-consciousness, although it is not yet created. In this principle both 'this'-consciousness and 'I'-consciousness are distinct and coexist in the same substratum. In Sadāśivatattva 'this'-consciousness is indistinct and dominated by distinct 'I'-consciousness. The universe to be created is known as 'this'-consciousness. Utpaladeva defines Īśvaratattva as Parama Śiva's unfolding outward, and avers that His extraversion predominates herein. His power of action is predominant in this principle. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara defines Īśvaratattva as the principle that urges the universe to be created. Īśvaratattva is also defined as Parama Śiva experiencing all principles as 'this', although they are not yet created. He has distinct consciousness of all principles as 'this' and imbues them with 'I'-consciousness. Rājanakānanda holds that His power of knowledge predominates in Īśvaratattva because of His distinct knowledge of the objects of knowledge. Yogirāja avers that Parama Śiva assumes the state of Īśvaratattva when He knows the principles as 'I am this' because of His equally distinct consciousness of 'I' and 'this' which He does not discriminate from each other and when He experiences a flash of delight in 'I'-consciousness.¹²

(5) ŚUDDHAVIDYĀTATTA.—Kṣemarāja defines Śuddhavidyātattva as the knowledge of identity of 'this'-consciousness and 'I'-consciousness. The universe is known as an object of knowledge whose essence is difference. Utpaladeva defines Śuddhavidyātattva as coexistence of 'I'-consciousness and 'this'-consciousness in the same substratum. Parama Śiva at this stage identifies Himself with the universe and knows it as 'I am this universe.' Existents are of the nature of consciousness. Parama Śiva assumes the state of objects of knowledge, and

knows them as His own states and of the nature of pure consciousness so that His knowledge is pure. Rājānakānanda opines that His power of action predominates in this state since the principles are more distinctly known in it. Yogirāja avers that the Lord's Śuddhavidyātattva is a flash of delight in the experience 'I am I'. 'This is this' wherein 'this'-consciousness predominates and 'I'-consciousness is subordinate. Abhinavagupta opines that Śuddhavidyā does not make any distinction among knowers, knowledge, and objects of knowledge, that it apprehends all differences as reflected in māyā, that it is really the cause of the universe, that it is a triangular great cave (mahā-guhā) because it is not known in its real nature since the distinction of knowers, knowledge, and objects of knowledge is dominated by the knowledge of nondifference, and that it is triangular mahāvidyā the object of worship and the source of all religious sentiments. This great cave full of śuddhavidyā is the basis of the creation of the universe. It is absolute freedom of Parama Śiva, of the nature of 'I'-consciousness (vimarśa) manifested by His supreme consciousness or manifestation (prakāśa) apprehending the universe as 'this'. It is the resting place of His 'I'-consciousness. His manifestation is full of æsthetic experience of delight apprehending His natural, innate power of Logos and power of mantra. His manifestation is realised in His 'I'-consciousness. These are the stages of creation. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara opines that Śuddhavidyā enlightens a bound soul on the nature of Parama Śiva taught by the Śaiva scriptures. Varadarāja avers that when a yogin acquires śuddhavidyā at the will of the Lord, when he experiences his innate bliss, and when he does not care for trifling supernatural powers, he attains the state of manifestation of Parama Śiva dwelling within him, which is devoid of difference, and which is full of perfect bliss, and attains transcendence of the universe.

The knowers known as Mantramahēśvaras are governed by Sadāśivatattva. The knowers known as Mantreśvaras are governed by Īśvaratattva. The knowers known as Mantras are governed by Śuddhavidyātattva. The first have realised Sadāśivatattva; the second have realised Īśaratattva; and the third have realised Śuddhavidyātattva.¹³

(6). MĀYĀTATTVA.—Kṣemarāja defines māyā as the appearance or manifestation of difference among the existents with their specific natures. Utpaladeva defines māyāśakti as the Lord's knowledge of difference among the existents, although He is of the nature of consciousness and the sole agent of them. Some hold that He knows the universe as different from Him, although He knows Himself to be its agent full of consciousness. Vidyā makes the bound souls recognise their identity with the Absolute. Māyā veils their knowledge of identity with one universal consciousness. It creates two kinds of illusion in them: it produces the illusion of their difference from Parama Śiva, although they are nondifferent from Him; it generates the illusion of their identity with not-self, e.g., the void, buddhi, or gross body. It produces three kinds of taint (mala) in them. Somānanda defines māyātattva as the Lord's sportive power of concealing His nature as one universal consciousness, and of assuming the state of the impure principles. Māyātattva is also defined as the knowledge of difference among its modifications and among all individual souls, which veils the Lord's absolutely free spiritual wealth. In creating impure states He conceals Himself and generates the knowledge of difference of the principles from Himself and from one another for the experience of bound

souls by His *māyāśakti* because of His power of doing the impossible. Abhinavagupta describes *māyā* as the cause of the world. It is the cause of distinction of the knowers, knowledge, and objects of knowledge. Paramo Śiva full of supreme powers is present in the empirical distinction of these factors. He assumes the distinction through *māyā*. He is of the nature of self-manifest consciousness and devoid of the taint of all differences and yet He assumes the empirical distinction through *māyā*. Abhinavagupta defines *māyāśakti* as Śiva's supreme freedom, which veils the nature of His Self and which makes the impossible possible. It is called the principle of *māyā* (*māyātattva*). Yogirāja explains it in the following manner. *Māyāśakti* is Śiva's power which does not depend upon any other Being. It is free in the sense that it is the power of creating the world. It is Śiva's power and divine (*devī*). It is called *māyā*, because the empirical world of knowers and known objects is definitely known because of *māyā*, and also because it deludes the individual souls and binds them to the world. It is not foreign to the nature of the Brahman as the Advaita Vedāntins hold. It is the power of the Lord for His sport. It is His power of freedom through which He creates the world of subjects (*pramāṭṛ*) and objects (*prameya*), which cannot be created by any other Being. His power of *māyā* creates the three taints (*mala*) which veil the real nature of the embodied bound souls (*paśu*). They are nothing but Śiva Who of His own will assumes the state of bondage by contraction.

Māyā is nondiscrimination of the coverings (*kañcūka*) and the other principles from *kalā* to earth. Varadarāja explains its nature thus. *Māyā* consists in a soul's not knowing the principles as the Ātman because of its being covered by its coverings and because of its identifying itself with its subtle body and gross body. *Māyā* deludes an individual soul which knows itself to be a limited agent, and which does not know itself to be the omnipotent agent on account of its coverings. The world of diversity is due to nonapprehension of the principles. Delusion (*moha*) consists in a soul's nonapprehension of its real nature as the Ātman—Absolute consciousness. It is nescience. A soul that is overcome by nescience and identified with it becomes a victim of sufferings, is tainted with merits and demerits, and called *Karmātman*. Ādyanātha defines *māyātattva* as the Lord's knowledge of difference among the existents which are like His own parts or states¹⁴.

(7—11) *KAÑCŪKA* : *KALĀ*, *VIDYĀ*, *RĀGA*, *KĀLA*, AND *NIYATI*.—Kṣemarāja describes the nature of the coverings (*kañcūka*) of the bound souls in the following manner. Paramo Śiva's omnipotence, perfection, eternity, and all-pervasiveness are contracted, and become *kālā*, *vidyā*, *rāga*, *kāla*, and *niyati*, respectively, although they are unlimited in their real nature. The Lord Himself assumes limits and contracts His powers. His powers are not limited by any external entities. The contractors (*kañcūka*) of His powers are due to His volition. *Kalā* is the cause of an individual soul's limited agency. *Vidyā* is the cause of its limited knowledge. *Rāga* is the cause of its love for particular objects. *Kāla* is the cause of sequence among the existents, which are known and cease to be known. It is the cause of temporal order—the past, the present, and the future. *Niyati* is the cause of regulation in regard to righteous and unrighteous actions. It is the cause of limitation in regard to space and cause. It connects specific causes to specific effects. Thus

Śiva becomes an individual bound soul, being limited in His powers. When its powers are expanded fully, it becomes the Absolute. Utpaladeva avers that a bound soul has limited knowledge and agency due to the agency of vidyā and kalā, although it is insentient and dependent because of its false identification with its mind-body-complex. Its limited knowledge and limited agency are due to Parama Śiva's knowledge and action, which are contracted by vidyā and kalā respectively. Rājānakānanda avers that existents reflected in a bound soul's buddhi cannot be rightly known because of their being composed of sattva, rajas and tamas, and that they are rightly known through the agency of vidyā. He avers that Parama Śiva's power of eternal, perfect delight being limited becomes a bound soul's affection for particular objects of pleasure. Particular affections for particular objects are branches of common love for objects of enjoyment. He also avers that Parama Śiva's absolute freedom being limited regulates the relation between virtues and vices and their effects, and specific causes and specific effects.

Abhinavagupta calls māyāśakti and its five products—kalā, vidyā, rāga, kāla, and nityati—six coverings (kañcūka-ṣaṭka). Parama Śiva is omnipotent, omniscient, universal consciousness unlimited by time, space and conditions. Although He is absolutely free, He assumes the nature of an atomic (aṇu) individual soul through His power of Māyā. His power of knowledge and power of action are contracted, and thus an individual soul acquires vidyā and kalā. It is deprived of its omniscience, omnipotence, etc., by its āṇava mala which veils them up. Yogirāja explains Abhinavagupta's view in the aforesaid manner. The five principles produced by māyā are called coverings (kañcūka) since they veil the real nature of a bound soul as the Absolute. They are called bondage since they bind individual souls to embodied existence by deluding them, since they generate their sufferings, and since they make them empirical knowers.¹⁵

(12) PURUṢATATTVA.—Kṣemarāja avers that when the Supreme Lord assumes the state of a limited knower owing to His power of māyā which conceals His nature, He is called an individual soul (puruṣa). It is deluded by māyā, bound by merits and demerits, and becomes subject to transmigration. Its delusion does not affect the Lord, although it is nondifferent from Him. When it recognises its identity with Him owing to vidyā, it attains liberation and becomes one universal consciousness or Parama Śiva. It is conscious, but its consciousness is contracted, and it has the universe in a contracted form as its body. The Lord's power of māyā conceals its nature, and, consequently, its consciousness appears to be contracted. It appears to be a limited knower, although it is really identical with Parama Śiva whose body is the universe. In reality, all knowers are the venerable Lord Whose body is the universe, and identical with the light of one universal consciousness. Even contraction of Parama Śiva's consciousness, which is self-imposed, is full of His consciousness since it is revealed to be identical with Him on close consideration. He is the only supreme reality. Either contraction is He or nothing. All His powers of lordship are contracted in an individual soul. The Lord limited by His power of māyā and with all His powers of lordship contracted assumes the state of an individual soul, even as the red sun with its rays withdrawn into itself is unable to manifest itself. An individual soul is atomic (aṇu) because it is denuded of its powers of lordship owing to contraction. It is not able to recognise its identity with Parama Śiva, and

transmigrates. When it recognises its powers of lordship through vidyā owing to the descent of the power of the Lord (śaktipāta) or His grace, it becomes Parama Śiva. He is the Supreme Knower and knows the universe as His own parts or states since He is possessed of the powers of Lordship. But an individual soul tainted with afflictions, potencies of actions and dispositions becomes bound, and knows the existents as different from itself and from one another owing to His power of māyā. Utpaladeva draws a distinction between the Lord and a bound soul in this manner. He describes a bound soul as universal consciousness limited by a subtle body. It has nonapprehension of nondifference from the Absolute due to māyāśakti, distinguishes between subject and object, and becomes subject to embodied existence. It is atomic, ignorant, dependent, impotent, imperfect, and subject to the power of māyā. It is tainted with impurities (mala). Somānanda defines an individual bound soul as ignorant of its real nature as the Absolute, and a released soul as recognising its nature as the Absolute and devoid of agitation due to the distinction of subject and object. Utpaladeva avers that a bound soul is atomic owing to its limitation, although it is eternal and incorporeal in its real nature, that it is ignorant owing to its renouncing the knowledge of its pervading the universe, that it is of limited powers due to its dependence or loss of absolute freedom and due to its loss of infinite power of knowledge and infinite power of action, that it has affection for particular objects due to its being limited by rāga, and that it is subject to māyā in that its mind-body-complex is created by māyā. Abhinavagupta avers that an individual soul experiences objects owing to powers arising from a mass of sounds or words because of its being deprived of its powers by kalā. It is an empirical knower of objects, and its knowledge is subject to the distinction of subjects and objects, words and objects. It does not know that subjects and objects as well as words and objects are creations of, and identical with, the Absolute. Parama Śiva Himself becomes a bound soul when He assumes limitation through His power of māyā and becomes tainted with impurities, and when He is related to the five coverings of kalā, vidyā, rāga, kāla, and niyati. Abhinavagupta mentions avidyā instead of vidyā in contradistinction from śuddhavidyā. Avidyā is not the absence of knowledge. Vidyā enables an empirical knower to know present objects and prevents it from knowing the past, future and remote objects.¹⁶

(13) PRAKṚTITATTVA.—Kṣemarāja defines prakṛti as the root cause of the principles from mahat to earth and other gross elements. Utpaladeva defines prakṛti as the one root cause of twenty three principles which are not separated from one another in it. Abhinavagupta regards prakṛti as a manifestation of Parama Śiva's wealth of powers. Yogirāja regards it as full of sattva, rājā and tamas,—which is modified into causes and effects, which binds the individual souls by generating their pleasure, pain, and delusion, and which is experienced by them. Prakṛti is also defined as Parama Śiva's powers of volition, knowledge and action together devoid of agitation and contracted, or as equilibrium of stava, rājas and tamas, which are of the nature of His aforesaid powers, and which are not yet separated from one another. When they are thrown into disequilibrium they produce the different kinds of existents.¹⁷

(14-16) Buddhi, ahaṁkāra and manas exist in citta as nondifferent from it. Parama Śiva's

power of knowledge and power of action are the principal ingredients in the creation of empirical knowers. They contract and become *Íśvaratattva* and *Śuddhavidyātattva*. They further contract and become *vidyātattva* and *kalātattva*. Further contracting they become the sense-organs of knowledge and the sense-organs of action. His power of action contracting to the extreme limit becomes the subtle elements. His power of volition becomes *rajas* of a bound soul and turns into its egoism (*ahaṁkāra*). His power of knowledge becomes *sattva* and turns into *buddhi*, which is characterised by determinate knowledge of an object. His power of action becomes *tamas* and turns into *manas*, which is characterised by doubt.¹⁸

(17—26).—Parama Śiva limits Himself and becomes the cognitive sense-organs and their objects owing to the predominance of His power of knowledge. He limits Himself and becomes the motor sense-organs and their functions owing to the predominance of His power of action. The auditory organ, the visual organ, the tactual organ, the gustatory organ, and the olfactory organ are the five organs of knowledge. They apprehend sound, colour, touch, taste, and smell, respectively. The vocal organ is the organ of speaking. The prehensive organ is the organ of grasping. The locomotive organ is the organ of walking. The generative organ is the organ of procreation. The excretory organ is the organ of evacuation. These are the organs of action¹⁹.

(27—36).—Sound-essence, touch-essence, taste-essence, and smell-essence are the subtle elements (*sūkṣma bhūta, tanmātra*). Ether, fire, air, water, and earth are the gross elements. Earth has smell. Water has natural liquidity. Fire has hot touch and colour. Air has touch and absence of colour. Ether has sound. The gross elements are the lowest limits of Parama Śiva's manifestation of His apparent insentience due to His extreme contraction. A lower principle is pervaded by a higher principle. Parama Śiva endowed with powers permeates all principles, is immanent in them, and transcendent of them. His power is the source of thirty six principles. He assumes the forms of *Mantras*, *Mantramaheśvaras*, *Mantreśvaras*, etc., by differentiating knowers and known objects. The universe of different objects of knowledge is gross because it is full of difference. The knowers also are gross due to Parama Śiva's volition, although they are of the nature of knowledge. Hence their knowledge also is gross since it depends upon the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge. It is called *vidyā*. Some regard *vidyā* as *mahāmāyā* due to the appearance of difference. Parama Śiva veils the nature of His Self and creates the empirical world of difference full of nonapprehension of nondifference. He assumes *māyāśakti* and creates the world of difference of empirical knowers and objects of knowledge. He assumes the forms of thirty six principles.

INDIVIDUAL SELF.—Utpaladeva gives the following arguments for the existence of a conscious limited knower. Manifestation and 'I'-consciousness are the characteristics of the Absolute Knower. Objects depend for their manifestation on a conscious knower. Their existence and nonexistence are known by a conscious knower. Otherwise, there would be no distinction between them. So their existence is attended with their being known by a conscious knower. Their being is attended with their being manifested; their exis-

tence is attended with their manifestations in a conscious knower in the form of cognitions. Existent objects can induce a knower to perform practical actions (arthakriyā), but nonexistent objects cannot induce him to do so. Hence practical actions depend upon a knower who knows objects. They cannot produce any distinction in a knower unless they are manifested by his cognitions. An existent object can be distinguished from a nonexistent object through the conditions (upādhi) of their manifestations in the knower ; an existent object induces a knower to react upon it ; a nonexistent object does not induce him to react upon it. Otherwise, an existent object cannot be distinguished from a nonexistent object in its nature. Both an existent object and a nonexistent object depend upon the consciousness of a knower. An object which is known to be existent can evoke a practical action in a knower. But an object which is known to be nonexistent cannot evoke a practical action in a knower. Thus the being of an object depends upon the consciousness of a knower. Śaiva monism advocates the doctrine of idealism. If consciousness is of the nature of manifestation only and devoid of 'I'-consciousness, it is insentient. Here Utpaladeva refutes Śaṅkara's doctrine of Brahman as universal consciousness devoid of 'I'-consciousness. Consciousness devoid of 'I'-consciousness does not know itself to be the self's consciousness, and, consequently, cannot be the abode of another existent, or cannot know it. 'I'-consciousness is the foundation of 'this'-consciousness. Different objects cannot be manifested by mere 'this'-consciousness, but can be manifested by 'this'-consciousness attended with 'I'-consciousness. A knower is self-manifest or self-aware ; but an insentient object is manifested by a conscious knower ; it is proved by a conscious knower to exist when he knows it through its manifestation. Insentient objects unmanifested by a conscious knower are as good as nonexistent ; their manifestation depends upon a conscious knower, either 'I' or any other knower. The relation between an insentient object and a conscious knower as a known object and a knowing subject depends upon consciousness (saṁvid). A conscious self devoid of 'I'-consciousness cannot have apprehension of difference and nondifference. 'This'-consciousness of insentient objects is fulfilled in 'I'-consciousness in the form 'I am' or 'This I am'. The knower or Ātman, is either limited by vital forces or unlimited by them. The former is a bound individual soul which is atomic while the latter is the Supreme Self unlimited and all-pervading. Both are of the nature of consciousness or manifestation, and the abodes of the manifestations of objects. Both know the discrete objects and combine them into a unity. Multiplicity exists in the objects. Their unity is due to their knower's synthetic act of apperception. One conscious Knower manifests all insentient objects and withdraws them and makes them unmanifest, which are really nondifferent from Him in their essential nature. He is of the nature of manifestation and 'I'-consciousness. Hence He is more than insentient objects. He is the Lord. But a limited knower in whom consciousness and knowledge inhere is devoid of perfect 'I'-consciousness, and, consequently, insentient. He is partly insentient because his vital forces with which he wrongly identifies himself are insentient objects of knowledge. He cannot, therefore, be the Absolute Knower. The Lord contracts His consciousness and manifestation at His will, and assumes the nature of a limited knower through the limiting adjunct of vital forces and the like. A limited knower is limited by his subtle body and so called a puruṣa-

pramātr. He has a limited knowledge of objects. But the Supreme Self (paramātmān) is unlimited and unconditioned, and the Absolute Knower. When a limited knower recognises his identity with the Lord, he attains to His status. All objects cannot be manifested by a limited knower identified with vital forces, etc., which are insentient, because he is devoid of perfect 'I'-consciousness. But the manifestations of all objects rest in the Absolute Knower or Ātman in the form 'I am the universe'. Perfect 'I'-consciousness is the resting place of the manifestations of all objects because of its absolute freedom and omnipotence and the absence of dependence on all other entities. These are characteristics of lordship. When a limited knower recognises his identity with the Absolute Knower, he knows the world to be full of nonduality and non-difference from Him.

Abhinavagupta asserts that Śiva of the nature of the light of consciousness assumes the power of māyā, and becomes a tainted individual soul called paśu. A bound soul is called a paśu. An individual soul is bound to embodied life owing to its being limited by kāla, kalā, niyati, rāga, and vidyā, which are called the five coverings or contractors (kañcūka) of the universal consciousness of Śiva, the Absolute. The omniscient and omnipotent Śiva is limited by āṇavamala owing to His assumption of the power of māyā, and to His concealment of His omniscience and omnipotence, assumes the taint of āṇavamala of the nature of nonapprehension of nondifference, and becomes limited even as the ubiquitous ether is limited when enclosed in a jar, and is called an individual soul (puruṣa, jīvātman). It is called paśu because it is fettered and maintained by māyā and its products called āṇava-mala, māyīya-mala, and kārma-mala, which taint it.

An individual soul is identified with its internal organs. Manas, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, and citta are the internal organs. They are composed of sattva, rajas and tamas—sattva being predominant in them. A soul bound by them tinged with the impressions (saṁskāra) of external objects and intent on operating on them transmigrates from one species to another in accordance with its merits and demerits because of its inability to know its essential nature as the Ātman. It is a spiritual atom or monad (aṇu) because it is tainted with āṇava-mala which contracts its essential universal consciousness very much. But the Ātman or Śiva does not transmigrate from one species to another because He is of the nature of one pure universal consciousness only and endowed with the power of creative volition, knowledge and action. He is the essential nature of the universe. A bound soul becomes monadic (aṇu) owing to contraction manifested by His freedom, and identifies itself with the internal organs.²⁰

Somānanda describes five kinds of individual souls (jīvātman) or bound souls (paśu). (1) Some do not know their nature as Śiva or universal consciousness, and are so called paśu or bound souls. Their nonapprehension of nondifference is due to Śiva's māyāśakti. They live an empirical life characterised by the difference between empirical knowers and empirical objects of knowledge. The empirical knowers are bound souls or universal consciousness limited by their subtle bodies. So they are called knowers limited by their subtle bodies (puryaṣṭaka-pramātr). They are atomic (aṇu) because their consciousness is limited. They are eternal and incorporeal because they are of the nature of consciousness (caitanya). They are possessed of finite knowledge because they have lost the consciousness of

their immanence in the universe. They are possessed of finite agency because they have lost their freedom and lordship. They are tainted with attachment (*rāga*) because they identify themselves with their subtle bodies and because they think of the means of enjoyment. They are influenced by *māyāśakti*, and are in the womb of *māyā*. They are members of the empirical world due to *māyāśakti*. The venerable Śiva cannot be ignorant of His nature as Śiva, because He is eternally pure, because impurities cannot be produced without His volition, and because they subsist in Him being full of His volition. Hence the individual souls are atomic (*aṇu*) because of their ignorance of their nature as Śiva or universal consciousness and because of their being overcome by Śiva's *māyāśakti*. Their *āṇava-mala*, *māyīya-mala*, and *kārma-mala* are produced by His power of *māyā*. Really there is no difference between knowers (*grāhaka*) and known objects (*grāhya*). The difference between them is due to nescience (*ajñāna*). (2) Some individual souls know themselves of the nature of Śiva under the influence of *mahāmāyā* or power of *vidyā*, to be immanent in the universe, and to be calm (*śānta*), as it were. They are always of the nature of Śiva whether they know this fact or whether they do not know it. So it is said that they are calm, as it were. (3) Some individual souls acquire the firm conceit that they are identical with God (*Īśvara*) as conceived by the *Vaiśeṣikas* owing to a certain degree of the power of *vidyā*. Some individual souls acquire the conceit that they are Śiva owing to a certain degree of the power of *vidyā*. (4) Some individual souls are devoid of any knowledge of objects as different from them, which is due to the taint called *māyīya-mala*, although their being bound remains intact. Their knowledge is due to a different state. They are called *pralayakevalins*. (5) Some individual souls know their nature as *Ātman*, do not identify their selves with their subtle bodies, and do not know objects as different from themselves as the *pralayākālas* do. They are not tainted by *kārma-mala* and are called *vijñāna-kevalins*.²¹

Kṣemarāja defines an individual soul as the Absolute, *Ātman*, or universal consciousness contracted, which has the universe in a contracted form as its body. It is a knower or subject of the universe as a known object. It is nothing but *Parama Śiva*, Absolute, or universal consciousness pervading the universe in a contracted state. It is a knower of the universe as a contracted state of universal consciousness, which manifests the universe in its own basis. There is identity between an individual soul and *Parama Śiva*. An individual soul is identical with Him Whose body is the universe, because universal consciousness is His real nature, but it appears to be contracted because its real nature is not manifested owing to His power of *māyā*. Contraction also is full of universal consciousness because of its being manifested by consciousness. If it is not manifested, it is a mere nonentity. Thus every individual knower is identical with *Parama Śiva* Whose body is the universe. Kṣemarāja says elsewhere : "If nonapprehension is never apprehended, then knowledge alone remains. If it is apprehended, then it is of the nature of apprehension. Thus knowledge alone remains." *Spandaśāstra* also says : "The individual soul is identical with *Parama Śiva*. There is no state in a word, object, or apprehension, which is not Śiva. The knowledge of identity of an individual soul with the Absolute constitutes its liberation, and the ignorance of it constitutes bondage.

It may be objected that an individual subject is of the nature of differentiation which is a function of the mind, that as such it cannot be identical with *Parama Śiva*, the light of

universal consciousness. To this objection Kṣemarāja replies that universal consciousness descends to the state of mental consciousness to apprehend particular objects, and becomes individual consciousness, because it contracts itself in order to apprehend particular objects of knowledge. The individual consciousness is nothing but the universal consciousness. When the universal consciousness conceals its real nature, and is contracted, it has two aspects. Sometimes its contraction becomes subordinate, and the universal consciousness becomes predominant. Sometimes contraction becomes predominant, and universal consciousness becomes subordinate. An individual soul is vijñānākala when the natural state of universal consciousness is predominant with its manifestation without 'I'-consciousness. An individual soul is vidyāpramātā when both manifestation and 'I'-consciousness of Parama Śiva are predominant. As contraction gradually decreases, the stages of Īśa, Sadāśiva, and Anāśrita Śiva are reached. The highest stage of being a knower of the pure path is gradually reached when universal consciousness becomes predominant owing to the effort of meditation and trance. The stage of being a knower of the void is reached when contraction becomes predominant. Thus the universal consciousness assuming the form of a contracted subject descends from the stage of universal consciousness being intent on apprehending objects, is limited by its external objects of knowledge and by its internal objects of knowledge like pleasure, pain, etc., is limited by both limitations, and becomes the individual consciousness. It is said in the 'Pratyabhijñā', 'The Lord's powers of knowledge, action, and māyā become sattva, rajas and tamas in an individual soul.' Thus the universal consciousness of the nature of absolute freedom with the powers of knowledge, action, and māyā becomes the individual consciousness with sattva, rajas and tamas owing to the excess of contraction. Individual consciousness is the nature of a knower of māyā, that is full of limited consciousness. Vasugupta says, 'The knower of māyā is individual consciousness.'

Śiva is one Ātman of the nature of universal consciousness, since consciousness is not divided by space, time and other limiting conditions, and since an insentient entity cannot know it. He is twofold as universal consciousness of the nature of manifestation, and as individual consciousness or a limited knower of limited objects due to His freely assuming vital forces and the like and limiting Himself by them. He becomes threefold as being covered by the taints called āṇava-mala, māyīya-mala and kārma-mala. He becomes fourfold as He assumes the nature of void, vital forces, a subtle body, and a gross body. Void is the object of a pralaya-kevalin's experience. He becomes thirty five principles from Śivatattva to earth. He becomes seven kinds of knowers, viz., Śiva-pramātṛ, Mantramaheshvara, Mantreśvara, Mantra, Vijñānākala, Pralayākala, and Sakala. He becomes fivefold according as His powers of consciousness, bliss, volition, knowledge, and action are limited owing to nonapprehension, and become kalā, vidyā, rāga, kāla, and niyati, which are the five modifications of māyā and called coverings in that they veil the universal consciousness and are its contractors. Mantreśvara is a subject who has experienced Īśvaratattva. Mantra is a subject who has experienced Śuddhavidyātattva. Vijñānākala is a subject who is above māyā, but who has not experienced Śuddhavidyātattva. Pralayākala is a subject who abides in māyātattva. Sakala is an individual soul that abides in māyātattva and has knowledge of difference alone.²²

KINDS OF SOULS.—Utpaladeva describes *Vijñānakevalas* as those individual souls, which are different from one another despite their nondifference in being of the nature of knowledge, eternity and the like,—their difference being due to God's volition,—and which are like *puruṣas* conceived by the *Sāṃkhya*. He describes *Pralayākalas* as those individual souls, which do not identify themselves with void, their vital forces, or their bodies, which know themselves as of the nature of 'I' and agents, which are tainted with subtle impressions of merits and demerits, and whose *māyīya-mala* is imagined because of their relation to objects of knowledge at times. He describes *Vidyēśvaras* as those individual souls, which are endowed with agency, whose knowledge is not limited by merits and demerits, and which are tainted with *māyīya-mala* because of their knowledge of different objects of knowledge. All individual souls comprising gods are tainted with three kinds of taints. Nevertheless, merits and demerits (*kārma-mala*) are the main cause of transmigration and embodied life. The principle of consciousness endowed with agency is limited by *kalā* in an individual soul, and the principle of apparent insentience, like the void, vital forces, and bodies, is of the nature of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. They derive from *Parama Śiva's* powers of knowledge, volition, and action, respectively. Knowledge and agency are the principal characteristics of Him of the nature of consciousness. But an individual soul's knowledge and agency are due to its being related to Him.

Śaivism evaluates the doctrines of the *Ātman* in different systems. The *Cārvākas* regard the *Ātman* as the body endowed with consciousness. But the body is a product of *Śiva's māyāśakti*, and so cannot be the *Ātman* of the nature of universal consciousness. The self is of the nature of manifestation, but the body is insentient and manifested. The body is endowed with mental consciousness, and the mind also is a product of *Śiva's māyāśakti*. The body and the mind are characterised by difference, but *Śiva* or *Ātman* is universal, undifferentiated consciousness. The *Naiyāyikas* regard the *Ātman* in empirical life as a substance endued with the qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit and demerit, and the *Ātman* in release as a substance devoid of these qualities. *Kṣemarāja* opines that the *Naiyāyikas* identify the Self with *buddhi* in bondage, and identify it with void in release. The *Mīmāṃsakas* regard the *Ātman* as a substance endued with these qualities, which is an object of 'I'-consciousness. *Kṣemarāja* opines that they also identify the Self with *buddhitattva*, since cognition and other qualities are the modifications of *buddhi*. The Buddhist realists and idealists regard the *Ātman* as a stream of cognitions. *Kṣemarāja* opines that they also identify the self with *buddhitattva*, since cognitions are the modes of *buddhi*. The Buddhist *Mādhyamikas* regard the *Ātman* as void or nonexistent. *Kṣemarāja* opines that void is an object of knowledge, and that for that reason it cannot be the knowing self. The *Sāṃkhyas* regard the *Ātman* as an eternal, enlightened, individual knower of the nature of consciousness. *Kṣemarāja* opines that they identify the *Ātman* with *vijñānākala* individual souls. The *Śābdikas* regard the *Ātman* as *Śabdabrahma* in the form of *paśyantī*. *Kṣemarāja* opines that they identify the Self with *Sadāśivatattva*. *Somānanda's* criticism of this doctrine is given elsewhere. Some *Aupaniṣadas* regard the *Ātman* as Being (*sat*). *Kṣemarāja* opines that they identify the Self with *Īśvaratattva*. Other *Aupaniṣadas* regard the *Ātman* as vital force. *Kṣemarāja* asserts that vital force is a product of *māyāśakti*. The *Tāntrikas* regard the *Ātman* as transcendent of the universe. Other sacred texts describe the *Ātman* as immanent in the

universe, which is only a form of the Self. The Trika philosophy of monistic idealism regards the Ātman as both transcendent and immanent. The non-Śaiva systems do not know the real nature of the Ātman or Śiva, and identify Him with the various stages of His manifestations or concealments by His absolutely free will beyond which their limited knowledge cannot extend. None can have a complete knowledge of Him without His grace or descent of His supreme power. All the stages are the manifestations of one universal consciousness or the Lord through His free will, and differ from one another owing to the various degrees of free revelation or concealment of His nature. The Vaiṣṇavas and others' minds are tinged with vidyā and rāga, and so cannot know the omniscient supreme Lord. Vidyā contracts their knowledge of the all-pervasive Śiva. Rāga limits their desires to particular desires. So their minds cannot experience the Absolute consciousness which is universal and all-pervasive. 'They are overcome by māyāśakti, and pursue liberation in bondage'. 'They cannot attain to the highest status of Śiva because they pursue the limited (e.g., the gross body, the subtle body, buddhi, etc.) as Ātman'. The Śaivas take the word 'Ātman' in the sense of the universal Self, Absolute, Parama Śiva, and they call an individual self a 'jīvātman' or 'paśu'. Śaṅkara also calls the Absolute 'Brahman' or 'Ātman', and an individual self as 'jīvātman' or 'jīva'. Parama Śiva is universal consciousness with absolute freedom of will. Why is He tainted with the three taints, and why does He become an atomic individual soul bound to empirical life? Kṣemarāja gives the following reply. Parama Śiva contracts His consciousness by His absolutely free will, and assumes the nature of an atomic individual soul. Parama Śiva of the nature of universal all-pervasive consciousness conceals, by His free volition, pervasion of nondifference, and assumes pervasion of difference. Then His power of will and other powers, though unlimited by other objects, appear to be limited. Then only He is tainted with taints, and becomes an individual bound soul.

Does an individual self perform the fivefold acts of creation, maintenance, dissolution, concealment, and granting grace in the empirical condition? Kṣemarāja replies that even in the empirical condition an individual self performs the fivefold acts. The Lord, entering into a body, vital forces, etc., turns outward, and makes 'blue' and other objects appear in definite portions of space and time. Thus it is His act of creation in regard to them. When He withdraws them and makes them appear in other parts of space and time, it is His act of dissolution. When He continues to make 'blue' and other objects appear, it is His act of maintenance. When He makes 'blue' and other objects appear to be different from one another, it is His act of concealment, since they are really nondifferent from one another and universal consciousness manifesting them. When He makes them appear as nondifferent from the Absolute, it is His act of granting grace. Those individual souls which meditate always on these fivefold acts of the Lord in their empirical life, and which know the universe to be an unfoldment of His essential nature of consciousness, attain to embodied release. But those souls, which know the objects of experience as entirely different from one another and the Lord, remain bound to embodied existence.

From the standpoint of the highest end whatever appears through the successive unfolding of the powers of the presiding Deities of the external sense-organs is created. While the self delights in the created object for some time without shutting its eyes, it is

maintained by the Deity of maintenance. When it is withdrawn at the time of artistic experience, it is dissolved. When the objects of experience are withdrawn, sometimes they generate various subconscious impressions of doubt in the mind. Then they may reappear in experience, and continue empirical life and generate concealment of the real nature of the Self. But when the different objects of experience are known to be identical with the Self, then a soul enters the state of grace. Until it acquires the knowledge of identity, it remains deluded and bound. An individual soul is deluded by its own powers. To be bound to embodied existence is to be deluded by its own powers because of the ignorance of the agency of the fivefold act of creation, maintenance, dissolution, concealment, and act of grace. Its ignorance is due to the absence of the unfoldment of its own power which can be effected by the descent of the Divine Power or grace of Śiva. Being bound to empirical life is due to delusion consequent on various doubts generated by the conflicting scriptural texts and views of common people. It is said: 'The cycle of birth and death is due to fear, and fear is due to ignorance.'

Abhinavagupta avers that Parama Śiva Himself assumes the state of a bound soul, and becomes an embodied experiencer of external sensible objects through a body, which is a vehicle of its experience, and the sense-organs, which are the organs of its experience. This is his reply to the objection why the individual souls, which are not really different from the Supreme Knower, become embodied and possessed of finite knowledge and agency. Yogirāja explains his statement thus. Śiva, the Supreme Lord, of the nature of infinite consciousness, bliss and freedom, conceals His nature at His will, and assumes the rôle of the embodied knowers, and becomes the experiencers of the objects of knowledge through bodies full of pleasure and pain constructed by Him, who are bound and maintained by Him. But they are not entities which are different from Him. The difference between the embodied individual souls and the Absolute is empirical and serves practical purposes. The Lord, Śiva, freely becomes the individual experiencers and the objects of experience—subjects and objects—as His objects of sport. His freedom is so unsurpassable that He continues to be the experiencer of all empirical knowers, and experiences Himself as infinite consciousness and bliss, although He assumes the nature of empirical knowers and empirical objects by renouncing His infinitude and perfection. But how can one become many, which differ from each other as darkness and light, and acquire different attributes? Abhinavagupta replies that the Lord becomes many bound souls and empirical objects, even as a crystal is tinged with many colours of objects, and becomes many. But though they are many, or though one Lord becomes many bound souls and objects, yet He remains as one Being of the form of consciousness. The Lord, absolutely free, experiencing all bound souls, and being manifested as their experiencer, remains intact in His essential nature, while the bound souls are born and perish. Hence one Ātman becoming manifold subjects and objects, is manifested as one as the experiencer of all bound souls and thus monism is not compromised.

Śaiva monism differs from Patañjali's view that God is a particular self devoid of potencies of actions, their maturation, and dispositions different from the individual selves, which are subject to them. It differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that God is different from individual souls as father is different from children. Śaiva monism

holds that individual souls are different from Śiva, because they are under the influence of His māyāśakti, and because they wrongly identify themselves with their subtle bodies, but that they are in their real nature Śiva, and that they apprehend themselves as many and different from Him and one another owing to their nonapprehension of nondifference²³.

STATES OF AN INDIVIDUAL SOUL.—An individual soul has five states : waking state, dream, deep sleep, ecstasy and superecstasy. Kṣemarāja describes the waking state as the perception of external objects through the sense-organs, common to all empirical knowers. He describes dream as the internal perception of different objects produced by the manas only, which are peculiar to a particular empirical self. He describes deep sleep as nondiscrimination, nonapprehension, and full of māyā. He describes ecstasy as a flash of supreme delight due to the experience of the manifestation of the Ātman even when empirical objects are perceived as different from one another. A yogin who is always in the state of meditation can have ecstasy. Kallaṭa avers that a yogin knows himself as of the nature of Ātman even in the waking state as the result of constant endeavour and exertion to unfold the nature of spanda. Kṣemarāja recognises superecstasy as the result of the perfection of the practice of ecstasy, in which a yogin becomes like Śiva of the nature of translucent, free, pure consciousness and bliss because his body is not yet destroyed. He becomes Śiva Himself when his body perishes. In ecstasy a yogin experiences the sentiment of delight of ecstasy due to the manifestation of śuddha-vidyā even at the stage of the waking state, dream and deep sleep. He does not swerve from the state of being the experiencer of the supreme delight of ecstasy when he perceives the different empirical objects created. Ecstasy is replete with pure delight. Though it is veiled by māyāśakti, it flashes forth at intervals of enjoyment of objects because of meditation on Ātman and introversion of the manas. It is sustained by the introverted mind, although the body and the sense-organs are extraverted. When a yogin's desire for empirical objects is destroyed, he acquires the state of ecstasy and valid knowledge of Ātman, and ceases to be an empirical knower identified with his subtle body.

Utpaladeva defines waking state as the perception of external objects common to all individual souls through the sense-organs. He defines dream as the knowledge of distinct cognitions of objects through manas alone like the percepts of external objects through the sense-organs due to illusion. Dream-cognitions are false, acquired through manas only, and resemble the percepts of external objects. He defines deep sleep as the knowledge of void resembling dissolution when an individual soul knows itself to be 'I' and an agent in the absence of buddhi and the like which become inoperative, and when it has indistinct, formless subconscious impressions only, and when it has no knowledge of objects. In deep sleep an individual soul is a knower of the subtle body when it identifies itself with the vital forces which sustain the internal function of the sense-organs, and is tainted with māyīyamala whether it has objects of knowledge or whether it has none. Waking state, dream, and deep sleep are reprehensible because of the predominance of the vital forces in the agency of an individual soul and because of its relation to pleasure and pain subject to increase and decrease. In waking state and dream inhalation (prāṇa) and exhalation (apāṇa) are prominent. In deep sleep they become subordinate to samāna. In ecstasy udāna ascends

through *suṣumnā*—the middle *nāḍī*—with *Īḍā* on the left and with *Pīṅgalā* on the right, which is full of fire. *Vyāna* becomes dominant in *Vijñāna*kevala and *Mantreśvara*, and makes them pervade the universe with their consciousness. *Śaiva yaga* is referred to here.

Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara defines waking state as the internal perception of mental modes and the external perception of sounds, temperatures, colours, tastes, and odours, in which *Ātman's* power of knowledge is manifested, and assumes the forms of an empirical knower, empirical knowledge and empirical objects, and which is due to a bound soul's loss of its essential nature. It perceives mental modes and external objects as different from one another because of its loss of the knowledge of its nature as *Ātman*. He defines dream-cognitions as recollections of different objects in the absence of external objects, which conceal the real nature of a bound soul. He defines deep sleep as nonemergence of the Lord's powers of knowledge and known objects, nonapprehension of *Ātman* of the nature of pure consciousness, in which the objects and their recollections exist in the empirical self that rests in the Lord, and which conceals its real nature. He defines ecstasy as the experience of *Ātman* as the real nature of the empirical self, as the consciousness of Him as the only experiencer, in which all false knowledge is destroyed, and which flashes in all the states. Ecstasy is manifested by trance. *Varadarāja* defines ecstasy as apprehension of nondifference, which destroys nonapprehension of nondifference, full of supreme delight, which is experienced in all states. A yogin immersed in trance attains to super-ecstasy in which *Ātman* alone shines constantly. *Utpaladeva* states the first three states thus. Waking state consists in the knowledge of objects common to all knowers and known as external to them through all sense-organs. Dreams are distinct cognitions produced by *manas* alone but wrongly known to be objects perceived through the external sense-organs. Deep sleep is like dissolution in which there are indistinct, formless, subconscious impressions in the self in the status of 'I'-consciousness due to the absence or inactivity of *buddhi*, in which there is 'I'-consciousness in the nature of the subtle body, and in which there is an internal mode which urges the vital forces. Deep sleep is tainted with the impurity of *māyā* and yet untainted with it, with objects of knowledge and yet without them.²⁴

DESCENT OF DIVINE POWER.—*Abhinavagupta* says: "The luminous Lord is reflected in *buddhi* purified by the descent of *Śiva's* divine power (*śaktipāta*), even as a face is reflected in a transparent mirror". *Yogirāja* explains descent of *Śiva's* divine power of granting grace as expansion of the rays of His light of pure consciousness, which destroy the threefold taints of a bound soul. Some individual souls' *buddhis* are covered with *āṇava-mala*, *kārma-mala* and *māyīya-mala* due to *Śiva's* power of veiling. Hence, though their *Ātman* is luminous light of pure consciousness, it is almost unmanifested. They are called bound souls. Others are on the path to liberation owing to the descent of the divine power to them. Others are liberated because of the greater descent of the divine power, or to the grace of the Lord. God's grace is the only real cause of purification of the enlightend *buddhi* of a bound soul. Thus there are different degrees of the descent of the divine power to bound souls, great, mediocre, and slight. When a bound soul's heart becomes pure owing to the descent of Lord's power of granting grace, it acquires the knowledge 'I alone am the Supreme Lord'. So its coverings which make for its bondage are automatically dissolved owing to the emergence of its knowledge of *Ātman*, and consequently, its potencies of actions—merits and demerits—due to the

power of *niyati* consequent on *māyā* cannot generate birth and death. A bound soul's covering of the body and the like is due to its nonapprehension of nondifference from Śiva. It is destroyed by its knowledge of its nature as Śiva. Its flaw of nescience is due to its own imagination of difference. When the Lord's qualities of omniscience and the like are manifested to a bound soul, and when its real nature as Ātman is somehow manifested to it, it becomes like a liberated soul even in an embodied state. Kṣemarāja avers that bound souls' great pervasion to universal consciousness manifested in the universe is not possible without the supreme descent of the divine power.²⁵

TAINTS.—Utpaladeva says : "There are three kinds of taints (*mala*). Āṇava-*mala* consists in the loss of freedom of universal consciousness and in the loss of consciousness of freedom. Māyīya-*mala* consists in the apprehension of the different objects of knowledge, which gives rise to the experience of pleasure, pain and rebirth. Kārma-*mala* consists in not knowing Śiva as the only real agent or doer." These three kinds of taints are involved in one another. Āṇava *mala* contracts one universal and absolutely free consciousness to an atomic, dependent, ignorant individual soul. It involves māyīya-*mala* since it makes the nondifferent universal consciousness appear as different. Merits and demerits are the qualities of the subtle body, which an individual soul wrongly thinks to be its qualities. Thus kārma-*mala* also involves māyīya-*mala* since it involves false knowledge. Parama Śiva's volition, power of *māyā*, is the cause of the formation of the three kinds of taints.

Kṣemarāja describes how an individual soul is covered by three kinds of taints. Śiva's power of will, which is absolutely free and unrestricted, becomes contracted and assumes the form of āṇava-*mala*, which consists in the sense of being imperfect. His power of knowledge is gradually contracted in the world of difference, and His omniscience becomes fragmentary knowledge of a limited number of objects. It becomes extremely contracted when it assumes the internal organs and the external organs of knowledge, and becomes māyīya-*mala*, which consists in apprehending all objects infected with difference. His power of action is gradually contracted in the world of difference, and His omnipotence becomes limited power of doing a limited number of acts. His power of action is extremely contracted when it assumes the external organs of action and becomes kārma-*mala*, which consists in doing right and wrong actions.

Yogirāja gives the following account of the taints. Āṇavamala is an internal impurity of the nature of nonapprehension which conceals the real nature of an individual soul even as a stain veils the nature of gold. *Māyā*, *kalā*, *vidyā*, *kāla*, *niyati*, and *rāga* are subtle coverings, which conceal the nature of an individual soul. Māyīya-*mala* is full of difference, or of knowledge of difference, which manifests its little knowledge and little agency. It is an internal impurity while skin, blood and the like are external impurities. Kārma-*mala* makes an individual soul an impure, empirical knower, who performs righteous and unrighteous actions, and acquires merits and demerits. Āṇava-*mala*, māyīya-*mala* and kārma-*mala* are the subtle taints of an individual soul while skin, blood, etc., are its gross taints. Owing to these taints an individual soul gets contracted, like ether enclosed in a jar, although it is

all-pervasive. Thus an individual soul is enclosed in three sheaths—the bodily sheath, the vital sheath, and the mental sheath, and becomes atomic, although it is all-pervasive in its real nature.

Varadarāja defines āṇava-mala as knowing the mind-body-complex or not-self as the Self wrongly. An impurity is imagined in the self itself by itself at its will, and constitutes bondage. It is of the nature of nescience. Bondage is created by an individual soul's will. Varadarāja describes māyā as the cause of the appearance of difference. Kalā and other principles down to earth are of the nature of māyā. He defines māyīya-mala as full of the appearance of different objects of knowledge, and as cause of the limited knowledge of different objects. He defines kārma-mala as merits and demerits or potencies of actions which produce birth and death and joys and sorrows. These taints produce bondage.²⁶

AN INDIVIDUAL SOUL BECOMES THE ABSOLUTE.—Kṣemarāja describes how an individual soul or consciousness becomes the Absolute, universal consciousness, by introversion and rising to the status of the consciousness of Ātman or Parama Śiva after acquiring the perfect knowledge of its authorship of the fivefold act of creation, maintenance, dissolution, concealment, and act of grace. When it knows its authorship of the fivefold act, the causes of its ignorance are removed, and its delusion generated by its own powers is destroyed. Then it acquires free agency, gives up the contracting powers of extraversion, becomes introverted, rises to the status of the Supreme Knower, and becomes universal consciousness owing to the destruction of the limiting kalā. Thus it enters into the highest stage of universal consciousness which is its real nature. It is objected that the power of universal consciousness, by its very nature, cancels all difference, and should do so even at the stage of māyā, even as the sun manifests all objects even when it is covered by clouds. To this objection Kṣemarāja replies that the power of universal consciousness, which is like fire, and which by its real nature, consumes the universe of different objects, partly consumes the fuel of the objects of knowledge, although it is covered by māyā. When it descends to the sphere of māyā, it does not burn them completely but only partially. It leaves behind their subtle impressions and rouses them to consciousness. Its power of devouring or assimilating the objects of knowledge to itself is proved by one's experience. When an individual soul practises creation by unfolding the powers of the presiding Deities of the sense-organs, and when it practises dissolution by withdrawing the powers of these Deities, it acquires the power of universal consciousness, and assimilates the universe to itself. When it acquires the power of universal consciousness, its coverings of the body and the vital forces are eclipsed, its essential nature is manifested, it assimilates the principles from Sadāśiva to earth to itself, and makes them appear as identical with its real nature. It is said : 'Just as a kindled fire consumes fuel, even so an individual soul consumes the fetters of the objects of knowledge.' An individual attains to perfection when it experiences its body and other entities constituting the thirty six principles as forms of Parama Śiva.

Kṣemarāja gives the following account of the means of attaining identity-consciousness called śāmbhavopāya. Mantras are composed of letters ; all letters are of the nature of universal consciousness of Śiva. Logos, supreme speech (parā vāk), is nondifferent from the

light of universal consciousness, of the form of the eternally sounding great mantra, full of perfect 'I'-consciousness containing all the powers represented by the letters. It is expressed through the stages of paśyantī, madhyamā, and vaikharī. Parā vāk is more subtle than paśyantī vāk. Paśyantī vāk is more subtle than madhyamā vāk. Madhyamā vāk is more subtle than vaikharī vāk which is an articulate sound. It assumes the rôle of a limited subject. It does not reveal its form as Logos to an empirical knower, but reveals particular objects as different from one another. It reveals also the pure stage of nondifference but as veiled by difference. An ignorant person wrongly regards himself as limited to his body, vital forces, etc., being deluded by the various powers of the letters presided over by their Deities. In the stage of a bound soul the aforesaid Deities manifest creation and maintenance in regard to difference, and withdrawal or dissolution in regard to nondifference, and generate only fitness for limited difference. But, in the stage of the Lord, they manifest creation and maintenance in regard to nondifference, gradually reduce difference, and finally manifest the stage of nondifference. Utpaladeva says : "He who knows that all this glory is mine, and that all this universe is 'I' possesses lordship even when differences have their play." An individual soul is bound to empirical life because of its being deluded by its own powers. It can realise its identity with the Absolute by immersion in supreme consciousness and bliss with the aid of Logos embodied in all mantras and enshrined in the divine power of perfect 'I'-consciousness.

Kṣemarāja describes the Śākta means of attaining identity-consciousness (śaktopāya) as follows. The supreme power of consciousness called Vāmeśvarī, because she ejects the universe out of herself, and because she displays the empirical world of different objects for the experience of individual souls, manifests herself as a bound soul, as an empirical knower endowed with limited knowerhood, limited agency, etc, because of the coverings of katā, vidyā, rāga, kāla and niyati, in the form of khecarī, as internal organs in the form of gocarī, as external sense-organs in the form of dikcarī, and as external existents in the form of bhūcarī. She conceals the real nature of self as ether of pure consciousness through the group of khecarī powers, which consist in the powers of kalā, vidyā, etc. She shines through the group of gocarī powers, which preside over the internal organs whose main functions are ascertainment of difference, false identification of Self with different things, and apprehension of things as different, by concealing her real nature, which consists in ascertainment of nondifference. She shines through the group of dikcarī powers presiding over external sense-organs whose main function is the perception of difference, by concealing her real nature which consists in the ascertainment of nondifference. She shines through the group of bhūcarī powers in the form of external objects of knowledge, which appear to be different from one another, by concealing her real nature as the Supreme Self of all and deluding bound souls. But, in the stage of the Lord, the Supreme Power (śakti) of pure consciousness manifests herself as the ether of pure consciousness whose nature is omnipotence and other powers of lordship, as gocarī whose nature is ascertainment of nondifference, as dikcarī whose nature is perception of nondifference, and as bhūcarī whose nature is manifestation of objects as nondifferent from one another, as parts of one's Self—all these revealing the inner nature of the Lord. 'Śakti' (power) is feminine in Sanskrit.

Kṣemarāja describes the means of attaining identity-consciousness called āṇavopāya as follows. When the supreme power of pure consciousness unfolds the power of udāna which ascends through Suṣumnā through the centres of mystic consciousness (cakra) and induces ecstasy, when she unfolds the power of vyāna which makes a soul pervade the universe with its consciousness, and when she unfolds superecstasy which is a mass of pure consciousness and delight, a bound soul attains the state of the Lord and embodied release even when it is endowed with a body. When it ceases to identify itself with the void, the subtle body, vital forces, and the gross body, and when it recognises its identity with one universal consciousness, it attains identity-consciousness and embodied release. Śaiva monism believes in embodied release. (Cp. Śaṅkara).

Kṣemarāja describes how the internal consciousness of perfect 'I'-consciousness, which is supreme trance, and which shines in all states, can be attained by controlling the vital forces. The vital forces of inhalation (prāṇa) and exhalation (apāna) which run through Idā and Piṅgalā do not flow in a straight path. Only when they are equilibrated by breath-control, and when Kuṇḍalinī rises upward through Suṣumnā, vital force flows in a straight path. Breath-control is not necessary in an advanced stage of spiritual discipline. Concentration on the internal supreme consciousness results in trance which persists even in the waking state, dream, and deep sleep. It is not broken by the waking experience. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara opines that the intuition of Self emerges as a result of, concentration on the internal supreme consciousness, of the cessation of the mental modes, and of the complete control of the vital forces. Then a bound soul becomes pure Ātman or or Śiva. Varadarāja observes that concentration on the internal supreme consciousness or the centre (madhya) results in the perfect intuition of it, and in the transcendence of the empirical world. In this state an advanced yogin is immersed in pure 'I'-consciousness transcending the universe. The internal supreme consciousness is called the centre, because it is the foundation of the universe, because it dwells within all created beings as their essence, and because it is full of experience. Vasugupta calls the process control of the centre. In this state a yogin is not deflected by determinations and differences due to the power of māyā, and his Śivahood is manifested. Vasugupta's use of the word 'madhya-saṁyama' has covert reference to arousal of Kuṇḍalinī, Serpent Power, dormant Divine Power, at the basic centre and making Her ascend through the middle path, Suṣumnā, and pierce the higher centres.²⁷ Sir John Woodroffe translates Kuṇḍalinī as Serpent Power. But really it is Divine Power.

WORLD AND ŚIVA-ŚAKTI.—The world is the unfoldment of the Lord's power of action. Its creation is the expansion of divine power. Its maintenance is the continuance of it as external. Its dissolution is its resting in the Supreme Knower. These three acts are the expression of the Lord's power. 'His powers are the entire universe; the Lord is endowed with these powers'. All known entities are of the nature of consciousness, which unfolds and contracts; otherwise they would never be known. This is the Śaiva doctrine of Idealism. It is Absolute Voluntarism as distinguished from Śaṅkara's Absolute Idealism. The Lord persists in the acts of creation, maintenance and dissolution of the world. There is a difference between an agent and an effect. An effect is perishable, but an agent is imperishable. When an effort to produce an effect is suppressed, the

effect is destroyed. But the agent's agency is not destroyed. The divine agent is omniscient and omnipotent, and never divested of His power of 'I'-consciousness. When His power of 'I'-consciousness is enfolded, the created world ceases to be manifested. An advanced yogin who has realised his identity with the Lord, has the experience that the world is created, maintained and dissolved by his powers. Parama Śiva, Who is absolutely free, is the cause of the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of the world. The supreme divine power full of perfect 'I'-consciousness, nondifferent from Him, is the cause of the universe. When this divine power is unfolded, the universe is created. When it sustains the universe, the latter is maintained. When it is enfolded, the universe is dissolved. Māyā, prakṛti, atoms and the like, are different from the manifestation of universal consciousness, and, consequently, nonexistent. Hence they are not the causes of the universe. If they are of the nature of manifestation, they are universal consciousness of the nature of manifestation. For the same reason, space, time and form which are created by universal consciousness cannot manifest its real nature because it is all-prevailing, eternal and self-complete. It may be objected that the universe is nonexistent if it is different from universal consciousness, that it is not the effect of universal consciousness if it is nondifferent from the latter, and that causal relation is not possible between two nondifferent entities. To this objection Kṣemarāja replies that the supreme divine power of universal consciousness, pure and absolutely free, is unfolded in the form of the universe, and that, in this sense, the causal relation between them is ontologically true. Hence the power of universal consciousness is the cause of the manifestation of the universe consisting of knowers, means of valid knowledge, and objects of knowledge. The means of valid knowledge are not capable of proving the power of universal consciousness, that is absolutely free, unlimited and self-manifest; they have the function of manifesting new objects. The Absolute is self-existent and self-manifest.

The power of absolute consciousness does not require any material to create the universe. It unfolds the universe in itself as the basis of its free will. Although the universe is nondifferent from the power of absolute consciousness in its real nature, yet the former is unfolded by the latter as if the former were nondifferent from the latter, even as the reflection of a town in a mirror is manifested as different from it, although the former is really nondifferent from the latter. Unfoldment consists in manifesting what is unmanifest but existent. The existence of the universe means its identity with the power of absolute consciousness that is self-manifest. The universe is manifold owing to the empirical difference between knowers and known objects. Parama Śiva assumes the forms of empirical knowers and objects of knowledge by contracting His universal consciousness, and becomes all principles, pure, mixed and impure, from Śivatattva down to earth and other gross elements. Bound souls are universal consciousness limited by kalā, vidyā, rāga, kāla and niyati produced by the Lord's māyāśakti. Empirical objects are modifications of prakṛti, a power of the Lord. They are not insentient but dormant consciousness. Neither individual souls nor objects are unconscious; they are contractions of universal consciousness, and limited by time and space. When individual souls realise their identity with one universal consciousness, they pervade the universe with their consciousness and transcend it, and experience that it is created, maintained and dissolved by them. (Cp. Śākta Monism.) Parama Śiva is omniscient, omnipotent, and

absolutely free. The body, vital forces, buddhi, and the void are not Ātman. Universal consciousness is the ontological nature of the universe consisting of existents and nonexistents. A known entity, being nondifferent from consciousness, is full of consciousness. So consciousness alone is the ontological reality of the world. The supreme, subtle, all-pervading, taintless, divine power of Parama Śiva, of the nature of supreme bliss and immortality, the mother of all powers, is the creator, maintainer and destroyer of the universe. The internal vibration of the unfolding power of 'I'-consciousness, identified with all powers, that is capable of destroying the universe of differences and determinations, is appropriately called Bhairava. He is the internal vibration of the nature of perfect 'I'-consciousness. It permeates the universe of different entities.²⁸

The manifold world of different entities is reflected in the Absolute, transparent, non-different, universal consciousness, even as a town of diverse objects is reflected in a mirror. The universal consciousness of the supreme Lord is devoid of differences; yet the world of different entities is reflected in it. Entities appear to be different from one another and from the Lord's consciousness, even as different parts of a town reflected in a mirror appear to be different from one another and from the mirror. The difference of entities from universal consciousness and from one another is valid from the empirical standpoint. Their nondifference from one another and from universal consciousness is valid from the ontological standpoint. The empirical knowers know their difference at the stage of common experience. But when they reach the stage of ecstasy, they know their nondifference. The former identify their selves with their gross bodies, vital forces, subtle bodies, or void, while the latter identify their selves with Ātman. Ātman is capable of receiving reflections of different entities, even as a mirror is capable of receiving reflections of different objects. Ātman is not made different by different reflections, even as the mirror is not made different by different reflections. Although universal consciousness is one, transparent, and nontemporal, yet it is manifested because of the excess of creative delight, as the manifold, temporal world of different subjects and objects despite its being nondifferent from the latter, even as a mirror is not affected by the difference of the objects due to space and time, which are reflected in it. Universal consciousness in different entities transcends them, although it is manifested in their forms, even as a mirror transcends the reflections of different objects in it. Universal consciousness transcends different entities as their experiencer, as capable of receiving their reflections, and is manifested to itself in its essential nature. Although it appears to be manifold, yet it is one as consciousness, like a variegated cognition. But there is a difference between a mirror and universal consciousness. Different objects are reflected in a mirror, but are not created by it. But different entities reflected in universal consciousness are created by the latter out of the stuff of its consciousness at its will in itself as the foundation, and known to be nondifferent from itself with artistic experience of delight. A mirror is insentient. But universal consciousness is of the nature of manifestation. An empirical knower's knowledge of difference is illusory, but the Lord's knowledge of nondifference is valid. An empirical knower has nonapprehension of nondifference. Nonapprehension is the absence of apprehension of the perfect nondual Ātman. The perfect universal consciousness is not manifested to an empirical knower, but the imperfect dual nature of subjects is manifested to him. Hence the doctrine of reflection is irrefragable.

Māyā, prakṛti and earth are objects of knowledge. They are manifested as mere being as the final result of meditation on nonduality. The objects do not exist without being known ; so they are of the nature of consciousness. The entities cannot be known without knowledge ; so knowledge assumes the forms of objects. Thus Śaiva monism upholds the doctrine of idealism and regards the universe as of the nature of knowledge. Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa says, "When differences are transcended, they are manifested as mere being" or universal consciousness. It is the supreme Brahman, of the nature of nondifference, omnipresent, eternal, and true, that abides in divine power of the nature of consciousness. Hence differences are ultimately unreal. When the knowledge 'I am all' is repeatedly practised, the appearance of all differences is dissolved, delusion of māyā in the form of false conceit of the mind-body-complex as self is destroyed, contraction of an atomic soul is removed, and it merges in Brahman of the nature of perfect consciousness and bliss. It ceases to identify itself with the gross body, vital forces, the subtle body, or void, and becomes Brahman. Thus Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, Abhinavagupta and Yogirāja regard differences as reflections in the Absolute and as ultimately unreal. Somānanda holds that all are of the nature of Śiva. Utpaladeva avers that all are Śiva since they are of the nature of consciousness. In a sense, Śiva is not different entities, but they are of the nature of Him. In another sense, Śiva assumes the forms of different subjects and objects with his power of māyā.²⁹

Vasugupta calls Parama Śiva or Ātman, a dancer, an individual soul a stage, and its sense-organs spectators. He displays the world-drama in Himself as the foundation by His sportive internal vibration, and manifests the mental stages of waking, dream, deep sleep, and ecstasy by veiling His real nature as universal consciousness in an individual self or knower. He is the universal consciousness contracted by the five coverings, wrongly identifies himself with his vital forces, subtle body, or void, has the states of waking, etc, and called the stage because it delights in the world-play and fun. Śiva, the Supreme Yogin, manifests the world-drama from Sadāśivatattva to earth and other elements. The sense-organs are spectators. Śiva manifests the world-play to an individual soul's sense-organs, which execute their functions with the powers of the Lord, and which cannot veil His nature as omniscience and absolute freedom. They are enchanted with the world-drama manifested to them. Śiva veils Himself in an individual soul, called the inner self, and unfolds His world-drama outside.³⁰

ENJOYER, ENJOYMENT AND ENJOYED.—Enjoyment (bhoga) means enjoyment of pleasure. It includes suffering pain. Pleasure and pain are objects of enjoyment and suffering, respectively (bhogya). Enjoyment implies an enjoyer (bhoktr) or experient. Kallaṭa argues that an object of pleasant or painful experience is produced and destroyed, but that an experient being of the nature of pure consciousness is neither produced nor destroyed, and is therefore eternal. There is difference in the objects of enjoyment or suffering, which originate and perish. But the enjoyer, being of the nature of pure consciousness (cit), has neither origin nor end. The experiencer is omnipresent, and persists in waking state, dream, and deep sleep, and is always awake. Ecstasy and superecstasy are knowable through Āgama. There is no state in which Śiva, Absolute Experient, does not exist in thoughts, words and

objects. He always exists as objects of pleasant and painful experiences in all states. So the Absolute Experient (bhoktr) alone exists in the forms of objects of experience. There are no other self-existent objects of enjoyment and suffering. Śiva is the experient, pleasant and painful experiences, and objects of enjoyment and suffering. Somānanda avers that Śiva is both nondifferent and different, nondifferent as the experient, and different as objects of enjoyment and suffering. Being an experient is the constant state of Śiva in all objects of pleasant and painful experiences.³¹

KNOWER, KNOWLEDGE AND KNOWN.—Kallaṭa argues that the omnipresent Lord endowed with supreme power shines in knowledge and knowable objects in the waking state and dream, and that He shines as of the nature of pure consciousness in deep sleep and ecstasy. The Supreme Knower, Śiva, shines in individual souls or limited knowers of empirical objects through His power of māyā in waking state and dream. But Śiva in harmony with His power shines in deep sleep and ecstasy as pure consciousness. Empirical objects of knowledge are made of sattva, rajas and tamas, and abide in Śiva's power of māyā; yet they cannot exist without being known by the Supreme Knower, Who is omniscient. He ejects them out of Himself for the knowledge of limited knowers. The distinction between empirical knowers and objects of knowledge is made by Him through His power of māyā, and is transcended by Him. They cannot veil His self-luminous nature³². Uṭpaladeva argues that Śiva is the one inner Ātman of all individual souls, is immanent in the universe, assumes its form, and is endowed with undivided 'I'-consciousness in the form 'I am this'. He creates the universe by His volition, which is of the nature of 'this' or object of knowledge. He creates buddhi which knows objects. He knows both subjects and objects through His 'I'-consciousness as of the nature of 'this'. He creates them by His power of action and His power of delight, so that the former may know the latter, and experience joys and sorrows. Individual souls experience joys and sorrows because of sattva, rajas and tamas due to his power of māyā. They are overcome by māyā, and do not know their essential nature as Śiva. The guṇas are modified into sense-organs, internal organs and objects of knowledge. Their differences are due to his power of māyā, He has powers of being, delight and action, when He assumes these forms through His power of māyā. Individual souls do not possess these powers, but they are endowed with sattva, rajas and tamas produced by His power of māyā, and experience pleasure, pain and delusion. The objects of knowledge are 'this'-consciousness of Śiva, mixed modes of the guṇas, different from one another, and produce different feelings in different souls. They appear different from one another owing to the souls' acts of discrimination due to their vital forces. They appear to be common objects of their perceptions because of their distinct manifestations through the cognitions produced by them in the souls. When the souls destroy their distinct cognitions by concentration and meditation on Śiva—One universal consciousness, they gradually attain to the status of the Lord. When a limited knower knows himself to be the Supreme Ātman of the universe, while knowing different objects, as 'I am this' or 'this is my creation', he is released. His consciousness expands and permeates the universe, identifies itself with universal consciousness immanent in it, and transcends the limits of his knowledge created by Śiva's power of māyā. A bound knower knows the objects of knowledge as different from one another and from himself. But a released

ciousness, he is called the Lord. Śiva knows the universe as His body, but a bound knower knows it as diverse because of his being tainted with attachment, aversion, nescience, egoism, merits, demerits, their maturation, and dispositions of actions. His nescience of his essential nature as universal consciousness is the cause of his knowledge of difference. When he is purified of taints due to his nescience, he becomes an unlimited knower, and knows himself to be so. The Lord is the Supreme Knower of all valid knowledge because of His absolute freedom. He alone is the independent Knower, and does not depend upon any means of valid knowledge. The Supreme Knower creates external objects, internal cognitions in limited knowers and their temporal order. He creates objects, means and different kinds of valid knowledge. He creates the difference between knowers and known objects by His volition, knows them to be different from each other, and yet knows them to be nondifferent from Him as universal consciousness.

Diverse objects of the universe are proved by means of valid knowledge, founded in Him, the Supreme Knower. They have dependent existence due to His volition with the aid of His power of māyā in the inferior empirical order; they are created or manifested by Him and dissolved or made unmanifest by Him. He is their real essence. They are universal consciousness in their real nature. He is the foundation of the world of diverse objects. Thus Śiva, the Supreme Knower, is the foundation of knower, knowledge and known object⁸³.

Abhinavagupta adduces the following arguments elucidated by Jayaratha to prove that Śiva, of the nature of manifestation, is the ontological reality of a knowable object. What is of the nature of nonmanifestation cannot be manifested, nor can it be real. Manifestness of blueness of a blue object is not its ontological nature. Were it so, it would always be manifested to all, and it would not be manifested to some at some time, and all would be omniscient. Śiva of the nature of manifestation, the Supreme Knower, is the ontological nature of an object of knowledge. Any other limited knower is not its ontological nature, since it does not know the object as nondifferent from itself. No object can exist, which cannot be manifested. A blue object being manifested in relation to manifestation is itself of the nature of manifestation, and as such is manifested. (Cp. Berkeley). What is not of the nature of manifestation is not manifested. Even the absence of an object (eg., a jar) on the ground is of the nature of Śiva because of its being perceived as different from the ground. So it is said, "Nonapprehension also being cognised is of the nature of Śiva of the nature of knowledge." What is manifestation is always manifested. This fact being undeniable, it does not require any proof. Śiva is the ontological reality and manifester of the proofs of entities. A proof depends on Śiva of the nature of 'I'-consciousness in order to prove its manifestness, or that of another entity. The Lord of the nature of manifestation of other entities is the foundation of all proofs. The Mādhyamikas deny a knower, knowledge, and a knowable object. The Yogācāras deny a knower and a knowable object. The Vaibhāṣikas deny a knower. But a proof in order to prove the non-existence of an entity presupposes the existence of a prover. Provability of an object depends on the existence of the self-existent and self-proved Lord, Who makes one prove it. So the Buddhists' proofs are invalid, since they presuppose the existence of the Supreme Knower of the nature of mani-

festation. He is the foundation of a knower, knowledge and a knowable object. A proof is so called, since it proves a knowable object as characterised by 'thisness', and since it depends upon different kinds of manifestation. They rest upon the Supreme Knower of the nature of consciousness. He is not provable by any proof. If He were so, the act of proving Him would dedent upon another Knower and so on to infinity. So He is self-existent and self-proved. He is independent and free, controls all entities, is unlimited by space, time and form, ubiquitous, eternal, and of the form of the universe. He manifests the variety of empirical knowers and empirical objects.³⁴

AGENT AND OBJECT OF ACTION.—An action implies an agent or doer and an object of action or effect. Kallaṭa argues that an effect is destroyed, but that an agent is not destroyed, since ultimately Śiva is the only agent. An agent is of the nature of pure consciousness, and is neither produced nor destroyed. An effort which produces an effect is destroyed, but an agent who makes an effort is not destroyed. Power to produce an effect, of the nature of activity of external organs of action, is destroyed. When the activity of the motor organs ceases, the power to act ceases. But the conscious agent or Self does not cease. Śiva, the Supreme Agent, is imperishable, although an effect is perishable. He Who is inward-looking, omniscient, omnipotent, cannot be destroyed, and experiences the universe as His manifestation. Somānanda avers that from the standpoint of the highest knowledge Śiva is an agent or doer, an object of action, an instrument of action, activity and fruit of activity. Utpaladeva adduces the following arguments to show that Śiva is the Supreme Agent. His act of manifesting diverse objects is His creative act, which is an act of volition. Unconscious entities — prakṛti, atoms, etc. — cannot create nonexistent entities. A conscious agent is a cause, and an object of action is an effect. A nonexistent entity cannot come into existence. An existent entity also has no use of coming into existence, for it is already existent. Śiva alone can create a nonexistent entity by His volition, and make it knowable by limited knowers through external sense-organs and internal organs. He alone is capable of acting within and without and creating or manifesting external objects and internal cognitions in a temporal order. External entities and internal cognitions can equally abide in Him for their manifestation, existence, externality, and actions, Who creates, maintains and knows them. Seeds are unconscious and so cannot create sprouts. The Lord is conscious, and can create them by His volition. His power of *niyati* connects specific causes with specific effects. Some yogins also can create jars and sprouts by a mere fiat of will. Insentient entities which are not related to each other cannot be related as cause and effect. So prakṛti and atoms cannot produce diverse objects of the world as the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika, respectively, suppose. So the relation of the causal act and the agent of action can exist in Śiva alone—the Supreme Knower. If cause and effect are of the nature of each other, they are identical; if they are different in nature, they are not of the nature of each other. The Lord's act is temporal. He is an agent, and so can be a cause, for He can create an effect by His free volition. He can create a difference of cause and effect within Him, which is empirical only. Difference and nondifference cannot exist in an insentient entity, as it is nondifferent in nature. Each insentient entity has its own nature; so different insentient entities have different natures, and so cannot be related to each other as cause and effect. But they can exist in one Lord of the nature of universal

consciousness, since He is capable of receiving reflections of many insentient entities in the mirror of His consciousness. An insentient entity has no will to become, and so cannot become an agent owing to the absence of freedom. The one Absolute Knower causes the diversity of manifestation of different objects by His creative will, and assumes their forms. So the free Lord's volition to manifest Himself as the diverse objects of the world is their cause. All causation is will-causation. (Cp. James Ward & Martineau).

The Lord's eternal act of 'I'-consciousness is His nature and devoid of origin, end, and sequence. But His act of manifestation of different entities out of His power of *māyā* has sequence due to His power of time. Time produces sequence. Sequence depends upon difference. Difference depends upon the manifestation and nonmanifestation of entities. He manifests spatial order by creating diversity of co-existent objects external to one another. He manifests temporal order by creating diversity of successive events which cannot coexist with each other. A limited knower alone knows different events in succession. But the Absolute Knower does not know them in succession. A limited knower alone knows the spatial order of external entities. But the Absolute Knower knows all entities together, as nothing is unknown to Him. He creates the difference between subjects and objects by His will, and knows them as different from one another and yet as nondifferent from Him in their essence. Different entities are related to one another, and are known to be so by the one Absolute Knower in Whom they abide. Agent, action, effect, temporal order, spatial order, etc., can be created, related to each other, and known to be so by the Absolute Knower alone. They are real to the limited knowers, because they serve their practical purposes. External entities have no innate power of producing their effects; causes can produce their effects because of the Lord's volition. Even they do not independently produce their effects, and they do not by themselves cease to exist. They exist so long as they are manifested by Him. Thus the Lord is the Supreme Agent of all effects or objects of action³⁵.

SIGNIFIER AND SIGNIFIED.—Kallaṭa argues that empirical knowers distinguish between words and objects signified by them. Their cognitions of objects are interpenetrated with words. But when they cease to identify their souls with their gross bodies, subtle bodies and void, they transcend the distinction of words and objects, and become universal consciousness. Śiva assumes the forms of cognitions, words and objects with His power of *māyā*, and deludes bound souls. He destroys their delusion with His power of granting grace, and enables them to transcend the distinction of cognitions, words and objects due to His power of *māyā*, and makes them realise their identity with Him. Śiva's power of action existing in bound souls is the cause of their bondage, and is not known by them. They are deluded by His power of *māyā*, and identify themselves with their mind-body-complexes. Their essential nature is veiled by the divine powers presiding over letters constituting words, and by those presiding over the objects of cognition. They experience joys and sorrows, because they identify their souls with *manas*, *buddhi*, and *ahaṁkāra* owing to the absence of freedom. But when they know Śiva's power of action existing in them, it generates superior and inferior supernatural powers. When they cease to identify their souls with their subtle bodies, they create objects of knowledge and objects of enjoyment and suffer-

ing, and become the transempirical Knower and Experient. When they attain to this stage, they become the Lord of the circle of powers (*cakreśvara*)³⁶.

MĀTRKĀ—Vasugupta says, 'The powers presiding over the letters (अ to ञ) are the basis of empirical cognitions'. Bhartṛhari says, 'There are no cognitions which are unattended with words ; knowledge is always of the nature of words. It is not manifested without a word.' Varadarāja observes, that empirical cognitions of external objects and internal cognitions of empirical egos are attended with the knowledge of words and differences, and that they do not rest in the knowledge of one's Ātman. The presiding Deities of the letters delude bound souls by veiling their real nature as pure consciousness and bliss and by producing false conceit of self in their bodies and the like, and overcome them with empirical cognitions of objects attended with their names. These souls do not know that they are identical with divine power in their essence, and that objects and names are their own creations in that they are creations of divine power. When their pure knowledge is eclipsed, the powers of *mātrkā* delude them.³⁷

MANTRA—A mantra is so called for the real nature of one's self is known through reflection on it as nondifferent from the Supreme Self. Reflection on the Deity represented by a mantra results in the knowledge of identity of a soul with the Deity. The mind of a worshipper reflecting on the Deity embodied in a mantra becomes identical with Him. So Vasugupta calls a yogin's mind a mantra. It experiences Ātman, and becomes the Supreme Knower unlimited by time, space, and endowed with omniscience and the like. A mantra is so called for it releases a soul from bondage through reflection on it. Reflection is meditation on the manifestation of Ātman of the nature of perfect 'I'-consciousness. It unites a soul with divine power. A mantra is a mystic syllable (e. g., 'Om'), a word, or a group of words charged with mystic, divine, spiritual power. The secret of a mantra lies in its power of manifesting pure knowledge because of a soul's immersion in pure, undifferentiated, supramental, transcendental consciousness. A mantra consists of sounds, and embodies pure knowledge. It is composed of letters, and all letters are of the nature of Śiva. Vowels are like seeds, and consonants are like the womb ; they are of the nature of Śiva and Śakti. So mantras are of the nature of the Lord and His divine power, though empirical sounds are full of empirical knowledge of differences. They are, in their real nature, one universal consciousness and power. Āgama says, 'Mantras ought not to be discussed or disputed by persons of small intelligence. Wise persons ought to put faith in them on the authority of Āgama'. 'All gods are of nature of mantras ; all mantras are of the nature of Śiva. Know a mantra to be of the nature of Śiva, and meditate on Him, and mutter a mantra repeatedly'. 'The Lord, the dispenser of mantras, consumed all nescience of a sage by the virility of a flame rising from the fire of His mystic sound'. The Śāktas regard mantras as rays of divine consciousness. The Vaiṣṇavas regard them as composed of infinite consciousness and bliss, and identical with the Lord. The nature and power of mantras are incomprehensible by the intellect. But they are facts of spiritual experience, and should not be brushed aside by the sceptics.

A mantra is the real nature of the power of universal consciousness. A yogin's inner

effort to reflect on the meaning of mantra generates the experience of its identity with divine power embodied in it. He can experience its real nature by continuous meditation on the Deity enshrined in it, and by constant repetition of it for certain periods. Its power is revealed by the Lord at His will through meditation on the Great Lake (mahāhrada). But it is not revealed to a yogin of limited power of meditation, who strives for trifling supernatural powers produced by nāda, bindu and the like. Vasugupta says, "The experience of the power of a mantra is acquired through meditation on the Great Lake. The Supreme Divine Power permeating the universe unlimited by time and space, the essence of mantras, transparent and profound, and replete with perfect 'I'-consciousness, is called the Great Lake. Meditation on it generates the experience of a yogin's identity with it—revelation of Ātman. Mahāmantra is the essence and power of all mantras, which is replete with perfect 'I'-consciousness. The experience of it takes the form of the revelation of one's Ātman. It is acquired through constant meditation on one's identity with the Great Lake after completely withdrawing the mind from external objects³⁸.

MASTER.—Vasugupta says, "A master is the means." He is the means of liberation of a disciple from bondage, since he initiates him in a mantra, since he teaches him the potency of a mantra, a mudrā and the like, and since he instructs him in the ways of spiritual culture. Śiva is the supreme end. A master is the means of realising the end, for he reveals the pervasion of a mantra and the like. Or, he is the supreme divine power in the nature of God's grace, which becomes a means of liberation through a human teacher. A master is equal to Śiva for he reveals the potency of a mantra. Mantras are eternal and devoid of origin and end. A master has awakened his divine power through a mantra, and can impart it to a disciple. Vasugupta says, "A master who is avipastha is competent to impart the saving knowledge to an eligible disciple." One who has acquired mastery over the divine powers presiding over letters can awaken divine power in a disciple by one's power of knowledge. A prince of yogins, who has identified himself with Ātman pervading the universe, who has recognised mantras as rays of the Lord of the nature of pure consciousness, and who has mastered the powers presiding over letters, is called avipastha, and is competent to be a master. The universe is known by him to be the unfoldment of His power, and to be created, maintained, and dissolved by His power. He abides in his being as one universal, pure consciousness in the states of creation, maintenance, and dissolution. He has realised his identity with the Lord³⁹. The Śāktas and the Vaiṣṇavas also regard a master as equal to the Lord. Regarding him as a human being is a sin, like regarding a mantra as a mere collection of letters or sounds.

INITIATION.—A master initiates a disciple in a mystic syllable or word or a group of words (mantra) and instructs him on spiritual practice. Initiation (dīkṣā) is so called because it gives the knowledge of Ātman and because it destroys the fetters of bondage. A person enlightened with saving knowledge and identified with Śiva alone can initiate another eligible person because of the descent of divine power (śaktipāta). An unenlightened person cannot enlighten another. One who has realised one's identity with Śiva is able to rouse in a disciple recognition of himself as Śiva or universal consciousness, freedom and bliss. Initiation

in supreme liberation brings about realisation of one's Ātman, identity with Śiva, and attainment of supreme bliss. It brings on transcendence of the empirical universe, complete control over the powers of internal organs, and entrance into the inner supreme consciousness.

When there is very strong descent of divine power on a soul through a competent master who initiates a disciple, he realises himself as Śiva or the Absolute. He does not require repeated practice of any spiritual discipline. This way is called no-means (anupāya). Initiation is necessary for release. Śiva is eternally manifested as ubiquitous consciousness, which is His nature. He does not forsake His ubiquity when He assumes various forms. Those souls, which are interpenetrated by the most intense divine power descending on them, and which are purged of all determinations enter into the consciousness of Ātman without any means or spiritual discipline. Their means is gradual entrance into perfect consciousness. Abhinavagupta calls it no-means or the fourth means.

A person, who experiences that the whole world is full of him, and his play, is identified with Śiva, and released in embodied life. Śiva, the object of meditation, is manifested in his mind. Whenever he desires to realise his identity with Śiva, he utters his mantra which embodies Him. Because he is devoid of false knowledge, he experiences immortality in the form of consciousness of his essential nature unveiled by nescience. He abides in the essence of a mantra, supreme, transcendental consciousness and bliss, and thus experiences Ātman or Śiva. This is initiation in beatitude, which gives identity with Śiva or manifestation of his nature⁴⁰.

ALL RELATIONS PRESUPPOSE THE SUPREME KNOWER.—Entities are of two kinds : sentient and insentient. Insentient entities are known and acted upon by sentient souls. Knowledge and action are the essence of sentient souls. Knowledge is self-proved or self-aware in one's self. Its action is expressed in a bodily action which is perceived by oneself and others. Ātman, Supreme Self, the Lord of one's soul and other souls, is known by 'I'-consciousness. Their essence, Ātman, is veiled by His power of māyā. Some hold that there is one indeterminate consciousness. Others hold that there are many determinate cognitions such as recollection, doubt, inference and the like attended with words. Both these views are wrong. The permanent Ātman is different from indeterminate and determinate cognitions, and is not manifested in them. Common persons do not apprehend Ātman transcending the mind-body-complex by 'I'-consciousness attended with a word. Ātman is the knower of apprehension. When apprehension is destroyed, its recollection persists. Hence Ātman is the permanent knower⁴¹.

The Buddhist raises the following objection to the Śaiva view. When the apprehension of an object is destroyed, the object no longer exists since all entities are momentary. So even if self's recollection persists, it is without an object, and, consequently, cannot lead to an action on the object. Apprehension produces a residual trace, which produces a recollection ; recollection imitates the previous apprehension, and manifests it with its object. Hence there is no use of the so-called permanent self to account for recollection. If a residual trace be regarded as self, it can account for recollection. The remembering self is as unnecessary as the apprehending self. The so-called permanent self is not made different by its different states—pleasure, pain, cognition, volition, etc., and so cannot recollect the object of the pre-

vious apprehension. Hence the remembering self is as imaginary as the apprehending self. If a cognition were of the nature of consciousness, it would be permanent like self. If it were not conscious, it could not manifest an insentient object. It may be argued that a cognition is buddhi, which is insentient, that as it receives a reflection of self, so it receives a reflection of the object, and that thus an object is manifested. An action also exists in an object and is produced in its place, because it has no permanent self which can combine its successive parts into a unity. Nor has it any substratum persisting for a long time and being of the same nature. An action is a mode of motion, and has a unique existence in a body and the like enduring at many times and in many places, because no other action than this is perceived. The relation of an action and an agent cannot be known without the relation of cause and effect. An antecedent event occurring, a subsequent event occurs. A cause occurring, an effect occurs. An effect is known through causal relation. A relation exists between two relata. One self cannot exist in two relata. Two self-existent entities also cannot depend upon each other. Hence a permanent actor is as imaginary as a permanent knower, and so Ātman cannot be the Lord of all beings. The Śaiva gives the following reply to the aforesaid objection. It is true that a past apprehension produces a residual trace, and that a residual trace produces a recollection, but that recollection exists in the self which is permanent. The self remembers the object of the past apprehension, but recollection does not manifest the object of the past apprehension. All knowledge, which manifests the nature of an object, is self-aware, and is not apprehended by another cognition. The cognition of a colour is self-aware and manifests a colour. The cognition of a taste is self-aware and manifests a taste. The cognition of a colour does not manifest a taste, and the cognition of a taste does not manifest a colour. A recollection produced by a residual trace of a past apprehension merely resembles the latter, but does not manifest it, and because it cannot do so its similarity with the latter cannot be definitely known. It may be argued that a recollection wrongly cognises the object of the past apprehension as the cognition produced by a shell wrongly cognises silver⁴². The Śaiva replies that the past apprehension being not manifested and its object being destroyed, the cognition of the object at present should not be called a recollection of it. An illusory cognition also cannot cognise the object of a past cognition without being related to it. So it is better to hold that a recollection is produced by a residual trace of a past apprehension, and that the former cognises the object of the latter. A recollection is a determinate cognition. A determinate cognition is insentient, and so cannot cognise the object of the past apprehension. But the conscious self can manifest or cognise a past object. Cognitions being different from one another, and being self-aware, they cannot cognise other cognitions and their objects. But practical actions of common people are produced by cognitions cognising the objects of one another. Thus there will be collapse of practical life. Hence the Śaiva holds that the Lord of the nature of consciousness assumes the form of the universe of diverse objects. Cognitions, recollections, negations, etc., are His powers. He relates different cognitions to one another, and apprehends their objects. He apprehends the object of a past apprehension because its object is not unmanifest to Him. So recollection is the recognition of an object cognised by a past apprehension by Him. He manifests the

specific individual apprehended in the past because He is eternal and because He apprehended it in the past. He can remember the object of a past apprehension even when it is destroyed. Otherwise, the recollection of the object of a past apprehension cannot be accounted for. If a recollection were different from the past apprehension of the object, the remembered object would not be manifested. Hence the present recollection and the past apprehension have identity in nature, and He is their Knower. The objects perceived in the past and remembered at present are manifested separately, but the past apprehension of it is not manifested separately, because one's Self is manifested as 'I perceived it in the past'—Self being the object of 'I'-consciousness and enduring in the past and the present. The cognitions of the omniscient yogins also are not manifested by other cognitions, but are self-manifest; they are manifested by the Self in which they subsist. When they are objects of knowledge, they are manifested by themselves. Sometimes the past apprehension and the present recollection are cognised separately by the Self in such a form as 'I perceived the object in the past and I remember it now'. When the Self perceives an object in such a form as 'I perceive this jar' or 'this is a jar', it perceives the object as related to or known by the Self; it does not perceive the object as unrelated to the Self. Sometimes the self knows an object in such a form as 'This is perceived by me' or 'This was perceived by me'. Thus the subject and the object are manifested separately in the self. But the distinctness of the manifestations is due to the power of *māyā*. Even when an object is manifested separately from the perceiving Self, really it is manifested as perceived by the self as existing outside it. An object would not be manifested if it had not the nature of being manifested; it would not be manifested by a cognition if it were not manifested before its cognition. An object's being manifested is its manifestation; they are not different from each other. An object which is of the nature of being manifested can be manifested by a cognition. The existence of an object can be proved only when it is manifested. If it is of the nature of being manifested, then only can it be manifested by a cognition. If external objects were proved by the occasional manifestations of object-cognitions, then mere consciousness, which is nondifferent, could not be the cause of a variety of manifestations or object-cognitions. The manifestations of insentient objects prove their existence; their being manifested only proves their existence. Hence mere consciousness is the ontological reality in them. Although it is nondistinct, yet distinct cognitions or manifestations of objects prove the existence of the latter as external, like the objects of perception. The revival of diverse residual traces is not the cause of the variety of manifestations or cognitions of objects, since there is no cause of the revival of the variety of residual traces. The revival of various residual traces is not different from consciousness. The revival of them is uncaused. Hence external objects are the causes of the different manifestations or cognitions of them. But practical actions of people follow upon the manifestations of objects; the latter are of the nature of manifestations. Hence the assumption of external objects is needless. Further, they cannot be proved by any means of valid knowledge, since they appear to be both composed of parts in that they are possessed of contradictory qualities, and since they appear to be devoid of parts in that they are related to six directions in many ways. The Lord of the nature of infinite consciousness manifests all objects existing within Him as external to Him through His volition without any external material, even as a yogin manifests objects external to him without any material.⁴³

There was never any manifestation of a self-existent external object. So the existence of the latter cannot be inferred from the former, as a seed is inferred from a sprout. The external objects cannot be inferred from their manifestations, since they were never perceived as external to consciousness. All objects are manifested as existing in the Lord, and cannot be manifested without His volition. They cannot be the objects of His volition if they do not exist within Him as nondifferent from His cognitions. His volitions and creation of objects refer to the same manifestations of the same objects. 'I'-consciousness is the essence of the manifestation of an object. Otherwise, the manifestation tinged with an object would be insentient like a crystal. But it is transparent and receives the reflection of a seemingly insentient object; it is consciousness attended with 'I'-consciousness. The manifestation of an object exists in Ātman which alone has consciousness; the act of consciousness is the agency of the conscious Self. So Self is different from an insentient entity or matter. Self is of the nature of consciousness attended with 'I' consciousness; freedom is its essential nature; this is lordship of the Supreme Self or Lord. His agency of manifestation and all-pervading being unaffected by time and space are of the nature of 'I'-consciousness. It is the essence of His nature. He knows Himself, and yet His freedom is not affected by His knowing Himself. He does not know an unknowable entity under the influence of something over which He has no control. If He knew such an entity, His freedom would be compromised. The Lord freely creates the diverse objects of His knowledge, and manifests them as external to Him to fulfil the practical purposes of common people. He is identical with His 'I'-consciousness. He knows Himself, but does not make Himself different by knowing Himself. The Lord of the nature of manifestation manifests the universe of diverse objects, which is really His Self, as if it were different from Him through His power of māyā. The Absolute Consciousness is knowledge, perception, recollection, doubt, determination,—modes of manas and buddhi—in their essence. They refer to the manifestations of objects which appear to be different from Ātman. But really they are nothing but universal consciousness. There is 'I'-consciousness even at the time of immediate apprehension. It is Ātman's consciousness of an object. Ātman's action on an object depends upon its desire to appropriate it or reject it. So it depends upon Self's consciousness of the object. The determinate knowledge 'this is a jar' is manifested as different from Ātman. But it is really nothing but the power of Absolute Consciousness different from names and forms—diverse objects—and is manifested to Ātman as nondifferent from Him, and not as 'this'-consciousness. Absolute Consciousness appears to be different objects because of the Lord's power of māyā, in space and time and as successive through perception, recollection and other kinds of determinate knowledge. 'I'-consciousness, which is of the nature of manifestation embodies Logos in the form of 'I'; yet it is not a false cognition, but a true determinate cognition devoid of duality, difference, or a counterentity.⁴⁴ A jar and a non-jar different from each other are manifested as negating each other. But there is no manifestation of a nonmanifest entity as there is manifestation of a manifest entity. So there is no nonmanifest entity which a manifest entity may negate. Hence the manifestation of the manifest Ātman is not a false cognition. The cognition of a jar is ontologically false because it appears to be different from the free and independent Knower in Whom it is manifested as a cognition. But an empirical self, which wrongly

identifies itself with its body, vital forces, buddhi, or void appears to be different from Ātman or Lord because of His power of māyā. The cognition of it is false because its 'I'-consciousness negates other objects and because it is not perfect 'I'-consciousness in the form 'I am the universe'. In Ātman's perfect 'I'-consciousness there are no other objects different from it. His 'I'-consciousness does not negate other objects different from it. An empirical self's cognitions of objects are ontologically false, because they appear to be different from Ātman because of His power of māyā. Its cognitions of objects modified by the residual traces of its past cognitions with the help of its egoism are ontologically false because it wrongly identifies itself with its body, vital forces, egoism, or the like. The Lord Himself enters into a body and the like, and manifests diverse objects at His will outside Him, which really exist within Him. He manifests them through His power of agency successively. He enters into a body and the like, and manifests Himself as an empirical self or knower. He manifests Himself as 'I' and 'this' simultaneously. He abides in all cognitions of objects,—determinate cognition, recollection, negation, etc.,—in empirical knowers, and manifests Himself within them. He directly manifests Himself in the internal cognitions in the form of the manifestations of external objects. But in recollections He manifests Himself in the form of the past perceptions. Therefore recollections are said to be produced by their residual traces. The Lord's omniscience and omnipotence are manifested in the cognitions of all objects, which He desires to create or manifest. He is the Supreme Knower and creator of all objects which are manifested in succession. But He transcends the temporal order, and is of the nature of infinite and eternal consciousness. (Cp. Green). He is the Supreme Knower of different objects related to each other as cause and effect and known through different cognitions. Their causal relation is due to His act of combining them with each other. He is the Supreme Knower of different objects existing at different times and in different places, relates them to one another by His act of uniting them with one another. Their spatial and temporal relations are due to His synthetic act of apperception. Sometimes causes are perceived and effects are inferred or remembered; sometimes effects are perceived and causes are inferred or remembered. Causes precede effects, and effects succeed causes. There is sequence between them. They do not relate themselves to each other, but they are related to each other by the Supreme Knower by His synthetic act of unifying them. Different objects existing in different places and at different times are unrelated to one another, and can be related to one another by the Supreme Knower alone Who knows them simultaneously by a flash of intuition. (Cp. Green). The causal relation between a perceived effect and an unperceived cause can be established by the Supreme Knower Who can perceive and remember them respectively. Recollection is its own proof since it is self-aware and present; it proves its validity. Past apprehension being absent, its self-awareness is absent, and so cannot prove the validity of recollection. Recollection cannot establish the relation between cause and effect, because when it occurs the prior apprehension is absent, which cognised a cause. Present recollection recalls it. Present apprehension cognises an effect. So recollection cannot establish causal relation between two events. A sublated cognition (e.g., the cognition of silver) and a sublating cognition (e.g., the cognition of a shell) cannot coexist in the same subject at the same time, since they are contradictory to each other. They can be related to each other as sublated knowledge and sublating knowledge by the

Supreme Knower alone Who knows them both together. 'There is the absence of a jar on the ground.' Here the cognition of the absence of a jar is nothing but the cognition of the bare ground. The cognition of the bare ground does not prove its being the absence of a jar, although on that ground a different jar capable of being perceived does not exist. The ground is always exclusive of the nonground; so the cognition of the bare ground cannot prove the absence of a jar, which is different from it. Exclusiveness of a jar different from the ground would be its accidental character, if being together with a jar were its accidental character. Similarly, the cognition of a shell proves the absence of the cognition of silver, and invalidity of the cognition of silver at the moment. But it does not prove the invalidity of the prior cognition of silver. Sublation is not known by inference, because at the time of the cognition of a shell the prior cognition of silver does not exist, and because the subject of inference is not proved to exist. The prior cognition of silver is the subject of inference, and its invalidity is the predicate of inference. The sublating cognition and the sublated cognition both are known together by the Supreme Knower in Whom they coexist, and they are known to be related as such by Him alone Who is the eternal self-aware consciousness. He knows the harmony of the sublating cognition of a shell with its object (eg., a shell). All pure and impure practical actions based on the knowledge of different objects due to the Lord's power of *māyā* are possible in the Supreme Knower Who knows them in their real nature. The pure knowers know them as nondifferent from Him, while the impure knowers know them as different from Him. Sometimes practical actions follow upon perceptions of objects present to the sense-organs. Sometimes they follow upon recollections of objects perceived in the past. Recollections, expectations, etc., which succeed perceptions and other determinate cognitions which cognise different objects, are cognitions of objects existing in the past, the present, and the future, but they do not differ in their real nature because they are manifestations of objects.⁴⁵ In pleasure, pain, etc., their causes are absent, although the manifestations of pleasure, pain, etc., are present. The causes cannot produce pleasure, pain, etc., unless they exist in consciousness. They qualified by the past time can produce these feelings. So the causes of these feelings exist at present in consciousness. Pleasure, pain, etc., are manifested at present because their causes are cognised by consciousness at present. So both the causes of the feelings and the feelings are known by one Supreme Knower. Externality is an adjunct (*upādhi*) of the manifestations of entities and nonentities, but not their essential nature. Recollections cognise external objects, but the externality manifested by them is not their essence. The absence of an object is manifested by a cognition as existing outside it, but its externality is not the essence of the cognition. Externality is a limiting condition of the aforesaid cognitions. It exists in consciousness, but does not exist in the essence of the internal cognitions. It is their adventitious condition. Practical actions are due to the different manifestations, which exist within consciousness, and which are known by one knower; and they are not due to the externality of their objects. The manifestations are of the nature of consciousness, and always exist within consciousness, but they also exist without because they are made to appear to be outside consciousness by the Lord's power of *māyā*. The external appearances of the manifestations or cognitions are popularly called objects. They exist within the Lord's consciousness when He desires to create or manifest them. The so-called external objects are cognised as 'this'.

consciousness. They are cognised by internal cognitions which are known by 'I'-consciousness. Thus the manifestations of jars, etc., exist both within and without. They are known as internal cognitions and external objects knowable through the internal organ and the external sense-organs. Pleasure, pain, etc., are internal cognitions knowable through the internal organ alone. The Lord has immediate experience of the determinate cognitions of objects, and of pleasure, pain, etc. The cognitions of the empirical knowers cannot exist and produce practical actions without being combined into a unity by the one Supreme Knower. The Lord of the nature of infinite consciousness and perfect 'I'-consciousness is the Self of the universe. He has pure knowledge and action. His impure knowledge and action in the empirical knowers are contracted by His power of *māyā*, and related to different objects composed of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Hence the Supreme Knower is necessary for the combination of plurality into a unity in the empirical knowers' knowledge of the universe of diverse objects in time and space and bound by causality.⁴⁶ These arguments of Utpaladeva unmistakably show how adept he was in epistemological thinking.

CRITIQUE OF OTHER SYSTEMS.—Monistic Śaivism holds that there is no difference between Śiva endowed with powers and His powers, even as an action does not exist separately from a substance which acts, and that powerful Śiva creates the world of manifold objects through His various powers. This is not possible according to any other system of philosophy.

Some Vedāntins hold that Brahman is variegated. Somānanda criticizes this doctrine of multiform Brahman. There is no cause of Brahman's manifoldness. Various entities in Brahman are different from one another by their very nature. Jars are different from the lump of earth from which they are made. They have no dual nature in the forms of earth and jars, for in that case jars would always exist. Various entities in Brahman may be said to be due to *avidyā*. If they be produced by *avidyā*, they are unreal like it. But the Śaivas admit the reality of all entities. If various entities in the world be not related to *avidyā*, then they are different from it and consequently real.⁴⁷ Some Vedāntins hold that Brahman Himself becomes the world because He is its material cause. Others hold that Brahman becomes the false world-appearance. Others hold that the world is not real. Others hold that Brahman is the Supreme Self of all individual selves. Others hold that individual selves are like sparks of Brahman. Others hold that they are the reflections of Brahman in *avidyā* or in internal organs produced by it. Others hold that Brahman Himself assumes the forms of diverse objects of the world for His sport. Others hold that individual souls differ from Brahman owing to their mind-body-complexes, even as the reflections of the sun in different earthen vessels of water differ from the sun owing to the earthen vessels of water. Individual souls are not aware of their real nature as Brahman in the state of their bondage, and become aware of it in the state of their liberation. Many Vedāntins regard the world as a false appearance, and existents as unreal.⁴⁸ The Śaiva monists regard individual selves as identical with Śiva endowed with infinite consciousness and powers contracted by five coverings produced by His power of *māyā*, and the manifold world as created by His various powers.

The Pāñcarātrikas regard Vāsudeva, the Supreme Lord, as Brahman Who possesses *vidyā* and *avidyā* as His powers. He creates the world through His power of *avidyā*, and

liberates individual selves through His power of vidyā. He is not tinged by avidyā and vidyā because He is the omniscient Lord. Others hold that the Lord creates the world through His semen or virility. The 'Bhagavad Gītā' states that the Lord revealed His cosmic form to Arjuna through His power of revelation. Both these views of the Pāñcarātrikas are not reasonable. If avidyā be a positive entity, it is identical with vidyā. If it be a negative entity, it cannot be the means of creating the real world. A negative entity cannot be related to the real world since it involves self-contradiction. Therefore some other entity than avidyā should be assumed to be the material cause of the world. If avidyā be the material cause of the world, the Pāñcarātrika view becomes identical with the Vedāntin's view. If the Lord create the world through His power of vidyā, then another God should be assumed to relate His vidyā to the insentient world.⁴⁹

The Jainas hold that individual souls differ from one another, that they are not pervasive, that they become bound owing to avidyā which generates infraatomic particles of karma-matter, which encrust their souls, and that they are liberated by the destruction of the particles of karman. Somānanda criticizes the Jaina doctrine. The Jainas cannot account for the souls' acquiring avidyā and being bound by it to embodied life. Further, when a soul completely destroys particles of karman due to avidyā, it becomes a conqueror (jīna) or Lord. Somānanda urges that the Jaina's concept of the Lord is tantamount to a formless void. The Jainas are atheists, and do not admit the reality of God. They believe in liberated souls which are conscious of their innate infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite happiness, and infinite power. So Somānanda's criticism of the Jaina view is not fair. But he is right in observing that a liberated soul is not equivalent to God, because God can create the world while a liberated soul cannot create it.⁵⁰

The Buddhist realists, the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, admit the reality of momentary external objects, which are different from one another. Somānanda urges that they cannot account for the difference among them. They cannot trace their difference to the volitions of God because they are atheists. The Buddhist Vijñānavādins, the Yogācāras, hold that momentary cognitions are real, but that external objects are unreal. Somānanda offers the following criticism of it. He asks how a real cognition can produce an unreal external object. The Vijñānavādin may reply that just as a lustful person creates the false hallucination of an unreal woman, so a real internal cognition produces an unreal external object. Somānanda urges that a lustful person experiences the hallucination of an unreal woman, whom he perceived as real on a former occasion. Further, a cognition is a means of knowledge, and depends upon an agent of knowledge or a knower. But the Vijñānavādin denies the existence of a permanent knowing self. If he regards a mere act of knowing as a knower, then it must have a means of knowledge. If he regards a cognition as being both a knower and a means of knowledge, then it involves self-contradiction, and becomes successive. If a cognition is nontemporal and devoid of sequence and a knower, then he accepts the Śaiva view that Śiva is the Supreme Knower, regards a cognition as permanent, and thus abandons the doctrine of momentariness. The Vijñānavādin holds that a momentary cognition knows in such forms as 'I know' and 'he knows me' as a knower and a means of knowledge. But if a cognition exists for two moments, it ceases to be momentary. If a cognition cognises an object as a knower and as a means of knowledge at different moments, then it exists at different moments. If it is momentary, it cannot have a sequence,

and consequently cannot have a result of the act of cognition. The Vijñānavādin argues that a single cognition appears to be subject and object different from each other, and that a pure cognition appears to be an unreal external object through avidyā of the nature of a subconscious impression (vāsanā). Somānanda urges that a pure cognition cannot be tainted with the subconscious impression of avidyā, that a volition arises prior to a cognition, and that, consequently, there must be a knowing self before a cognition can arise. There is no indeterminate jar which may be apprehended by a pure knower. When the cognition of a jar comes into existence, it cannot apprehend a determinate jar with its many qualities simultaneously. If it apprehend a qualified jar with its qualities simultaneously, then it exists at least for two moments, and thus ceases to be momentary. A cognition cannot apprehend an external object at the moment when it is produced. External objects are not unreal, because unreal objects cannot be cognised. A cognition of an object is manifested, whether the object is manifested or whether it is not manifested. A cognition is of the nature of valid knowledge (vidyā), and is not therefore momentary. A cognition is real, and, consequently, nonmomentary, since what is real is nonmomentary. The Vijñānavādin may argue that a light manifesting an object is neither permanent nor an agent. Somānanda replies that a light is an agent of manifestation or a manifestor, and that the visual organ is the means of manifestation. Similarly, the manifesting self, which knows an object, is permanent. If a cognition is a means of knowledge, then it leads to infinite regress. It is a means of manifesting an object. Another cognition is a means of manifesting the cognition, and so on to infinity. Therefore a cognition is not momentary if it cognises an object. The Mādhyamikas hold that the reality is Void (śūnya), and that both internal cognitions and external objects are false appearances (saṃvṛti). Somānanda offers the following criticism of it. Void is devoid of consciousness, and so cannot enlighten a void on the nature of void. Nor can it be contradicted by a void. It can neither be proved nor disproved. Further, one phenomenal appearance (saṃvṛti) cannot be contradicted by another phenomenal appearance, because Void is the absolute reality which is veiled alike by all phenomenal appearances.⁵¹

Some Sāṃkhya thinkers are atheists and believe in the reality of many individual souls, which are independent and free. They hold that their bondage is due to nondiscrimination, and that their release is due to discrimination. Somānanda urges that they cannot account for the origin of nondiscrimination. Some Sāṃkhya thinkers are theists, believe in the existence of God, an omniscient Soul, and also believe in many individual souls. Somānanda urges that they cannot account for the difference between God and individual souls. Some Sāṃkhya thinkers identify God with prakṛti, and think of Him as devoid of consciousness. They think of God as an emergent of prakṛti. Somānanda urges that God devoid of consciousness is nothing but insentient matter. Some Vedāntins also regard Brahman as devoid of consciousness. Somānanda urges that such Brahman is like insentient matter.⁵²

The Śābdikas hold that one eternal sound (śabdabrahma) is the supreme reality. Bhartṛhari describes it as one eternal sound of the nature of supreme word or speech (parā vāk) which is manifested as paśyantī or seeing or experiencing. It is devoid of the functions of the sense-organs, unlimited by space, time, causality, forms, and sequence. It is free

of the distinctions of subject and object. It is the self which pervades all bodies. It is the formless consciousness which experiences internal cognitions. It experiences all objects. It is the supreme reality. It is a principle of sound which is imperishable and without origin and end. It assumes the state of madhyamā and becomes cognitions. It becomes articulate and assumes the state of vaikharī. It is manifested as manifest sounds or words and external objects. It assumes the forms of internal cognitions and external objects. All cognitions are attended with words and cognise objects. No objects can be cognised by cognitions unattended with words. Paśyantī is indivisible and nontemporal or devoid of sequence. One who knows Śābdabrahman well can know Supreme Brahman. Somānanda opines that Śiva's power of knowledge in the form of Sadāśiva conceived by the Śaivas is the Śābdika's supreme reality called paśyantī or experiencing ultimate sound (Logos). Utpaladeva expounds the Śābdika view thus. What is of the nature of infinite consciousness or Supreme Brahman is of the nature of eternal sound or supreme word. It experiences and is so called paśyantī. Even Supreme Brahman, although of the nature of consciousness or manifestation, cannot be manifested without a word. The word or sound experiencing within is an experient. It is of the nature of mere consciousness and devoid of objects of knowledge and called the self because it pervades the entire body, which is its vehicle of experience. It is also the omniscient Supreme Self. The eternal sound that experiences the endless world is the Supreme Self. It is devoid of subjects and objects, and the supreme experiencing sound (paśyantī). When it is tainted with avidyā and experiences different objects owing to avidyā, it becomes a bound individual self. Its empirical existence is subject to space, time, genus, and form. Its experience of sensible objects is due to the operation of the sense-organs. But the Supreme Self is not limited by space, time, genus, and form. Its experience is independent of the operation of the sense-organs. Thus the experiencing, supreme, eternal sound called paśyantī is the supreme reality. It becomes a cognition (madhyamā vāk) when it desires to experience an object. It becomes an articulate sound (vaikharī vāk) when it desires to express itself in the external world. It assumes the forms of external objects owing to avidyā, which are known through external sense-organs, and become objects of knowledge. It is tinged with the subconscious impressions of external objects owing to avidyā, and assumes the unreal forms of external objects. Thus the experiencing eternal subtle sound becomes the Supreme Self, individual selves, and external objects—the two latter being unreal appearances due to avidyā and the first being the only ontological reality. The Śābdika believes in monism of an eternal sound⁵³.

Somānanda offers the following criticism of the Śābdika view. Common people admit articulate words only which are perceived. Therefore parā vāk and paśyantī are rejected. Words are uttered by the vocal organ which is a motor organ. It is an organ of a bound individual self, and consequently cannot be the Supreme Self. Words and the vocal organ are due to avidyā, a product of God's māyāśakti, and consequently cannot be the Supreme Self. If they be of the nature of Brahman, then hands and feet also are of the nature of Him. If paśyantī were said to be of the nature of Brahman because of its being subtle apprehension involved in all kinds of experience, then the vital forces entering into the heart, the seat of manas and self, would be real since they involve inner experience. When there are voluntary actions in regard to external

objects, there is always an inner experience. But external objects signified by words do not constitute the nature of Ātman. So the words including the subtle experiencing speech do not constitute the nature of Ātman. It is objected that those yogins who meditate on inner speech attain supernatural powers, and that therefore the inner speech is Ātman. Somānanda replies that the Deities presiding over the sense-organs and the gross elements grant supernatural powers to them. So the objection is not sound. Their hands and feet, which are motor organs, are not of the nature of Brahman. So their vocal organ also is not Brahman. The Sāṃkhya regards it as a construction of prakṛti related to an individual soul for whose experience it is constructed. It is not related to the experience of the Supreme Self. All objects are real when they are experienced. The entities which are not experienced are unreal. Experience devoid of 'I'-consciousness is not experience. 'I'-consciousness, which is the essence of all reality when it is experienced, is attended with a name. But hands and feet are not attended with names. So the subtle experiencing sound is not like hands and feet. Somānanda considers paśyantī by its nature and name. Paśyantī refers to an act at the present time. 'To see' is a transitive verb. What does paśyantī see or know? What is the objective case of the verb 'to see?' The transitive verb 'to see' abides in an agent who sees. What is the object that is seen or known? If paśyantī saw external objects as 'this,' then it would be unreal since they are unreal. They are unreal appearances, and so paśyantī does not really see them, and thus ceases to be paśyantī. The Śābdikas do not regard external objects as real entities. If paśyantī were said to see unreal objects due to avidyā, then paśyantī would be unreal, and would be related to avidyā. Avidyā is unreal by its nature. So paśyantī cannot be related to unreal avidyā. If paśyantī be unreal, then its being of the nature of Brahman is not conceivable. The Śābdikas may urge that paśyantī first creates external objects, and then sees them. But it is strange that real paśyantī creates unreal objects, and that it attains the nature of paśyantī after creating them. If paśyantī is unreal at first because it does not see any objects before creation, then it cannot create any objects. If any unreal entity were the cause of any effect, then any effect would be produced by any cause. If a cause were unreal without producing an effect, then a real cause also cannot produce an unreal effect. Then does paśyantī create unknown objects or known objects? If paśyantī first creates objects and then sees them, then it creates unknown objects. But the Śābdikas do not admit that paśyantī creates unknown objects. If it be said to create unknown objects, it is not possible since it cannot create them without knowing their nature and the means of their construction. Paśyantī cannot create them without any motive or end. The Śābdikas do not admit that paśyantī creates objects without any end or motive in sport. Hence paśyantī cannot create objects either with or without prior knowledge of them. But paśyantī is real. If objects known by it are real, then it is not real and cannot know them, because it involves dualism. The Śābdikas are monists and admit the reality of paśyantī only. If objects are unreal, then paśyantī becomes tainted by creating them, and by creating them it makes its knowledge of them illusory. Further, whether paśyantī knows real or unreal objects, it cannot create them because it has no motive or end to realise in doing so.⁵⁴ Further, is avidyā paśyantī's own attribute or another's attribute? If avidyā is its own attribute, then it is tainted. If avidyā is an attribute of another entity, what is that

other entity? The Śābdikas are monists and do not admit the reality of any other entity than paśyantī or Śabdabrahman. They do not admit the reality of avidyā as another entity. If it is another independent entity, it cannot be destroyed. If it were produced and destroyed by another entity, then it would cease to be independent. Further, if avidyā is indescribable, either as real or unreal, or as eternal or noneternal, then it is a nonentity since it is devoid of any nature. A nonentity devoid of any nature cannot be known by paśyantī. If avidyā is not known by paśyantī, then the latter becomes insentient since it does not know anything. If avidyā is known by paśyantī definitely as distinguished from other entities, it becomes describable. Hence avidyā is not indescribable. Further, if avidyā is not known by paśyantī, by what means of valid knowledge do the Śābdikas know that avidyā is indescribable? How do they prove that avidyā is indescribable? If avidyā is said to be proved by inference from the knowledge of difference, then it is not undescribable. If it is inferred from the knowledge of difference in order to account for it, then it is known by inference to be of a definite nature. Hence it is not of an indefinable nature or indescribable. Further, the Śābdikas' inference of avidyā from the knowledge of difference is not valid for the same reason. If it is inferred to be of a definite nature, then it is not indefinable. Bhartṛhari says, "The existent entities are known by inference to be different because of the difference in condition, space, time, and different powers." Hence different entities are definite in nature and describable. Indefinite and indescribable avidyā cannot be inferred from different entities, which are of a definite nature, and which are describable. If different entities are perceivable, they are not indefinite and indescribable. If they are not perceptible, they cannot be proved.⁵⁵

Avidyā is either existent or nonexistent. But it cannot be both, since existence is the negation of nonexistence, and since nonexistence is the negation of existence. Avidyā is not vidyā, but is not mere negation of vidyā or knowledge, but like vidyā in that it appears as the world. Hence avidyā is certainly existent, and is consequently neither indescribable nor consistent with monism. If both avidyā and paśyantī are real, the Śābdika doctrine involves dualism. If avidyā be mere negation of valid knowledge, then it is mere void or a nonentity since negation is its chief characteristic. Void cannot contradict paśyantī that is of the nature of valid knowledge, since it is devoid of any form or character. If void contradicts paśyantī of the nature of valid knowledge, then it is real, and leads to dualism. But a nonentity cannot contradict paśyantī that is real. Further, paśyantī is not of the nature of sound, but is a power of God. But the Śābdikas do not admit the reality of God. They hold that paśyantī is a subtle sound which exists as nondifferent from an object which is signified by it. A sound is composed of air or its modification, and not the supreme reality, even as hands being composed of earth or its modifications are not the supreme reality. A mere sound cannot exist in the states of parā, paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī, like the roar of an ocean. The Śābdikas may urge that real paśyantī is not contradicted by avidyā, but that madhyamā is contradicted by it, that a word in the state of madhyamā apprehends an external object which appears to be different from it, that madhyamā is related to buddhi, an internal organ, which assumes the form of a cognition of an object, but that paśyantī is not related to buddhi. What is the cause of madhyamā? Paśyantī cannot be its cause, since the former is pure whereas the

latter is impure, and since the latter apprehends an external object as different from it where- as the former does not apprehend it. Paśyantī is pure and devoid of the distinction of subject and object. But madhyamā is impure and tainted with the distinction of subject and object. Hence paśyantī cannot produce madhyamā. If paśyantī be the efficient cause of madhyamā, the former is different from the latter, even as a potter is different from a pot. If paśyantī be the material cause of madhyamā, the former is identical with the latter in nature, like threads and cloth. If paśyantī be different from madhyamā, then the Śābdika doctrine is not monism. If madhyamā be of the nature of paśyantī, then it cannot be impure and apprehend an object as different from it or appearing as nondifferent from it. If paśyantī be of the same nature as madhyamā, then it ceases to be pure, and becomes tainted with avidyā. If paśyantī know external objects as nondifferent from itself, then madhyamā also should apprehend them as nondifferent from itself, and should not apprehend them as different from it and one another. But different objects are perceived through different sense-organs. This fact would not be possible if madhyamā did not apprehend them as different from itself and one another. Further, paśyantī either exists inside the body at the stage of 'I'-consciousness or extends outward to an external object. If it exist inside the body only, it becomes limited. If it extend also to an external object, and if it know the latter as 'this', then the distinction of paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikhari is useless. If paśyantī extend through nāda and bindu in the form of vital forces, and create and destroy the world, then also it is not pervasive but limited, and not one, but many. Hence paśyantī cannot perform the function of God, and the Śābdika doctrine of paśyantī is atheistic. Moreover, paśyantī is different in different bodies or identical in them. If it be different, then there are different paśyantīs, and the Śābhika abandons monism. If it be one and the same, then one person uttering a word, all would utter a word without making an effort. If one paśyantī appear to be different in different bodies as limiting adjuncts, even as one crystal appears to be different according as it is tinged by different coloured media, then the bodies are real, like the media. But the Śābdikas do not regard the bodies as real. Unreal entities are incapable of performing any function. Further, paśyantī is a transitive verb and must have a real objective case. Hence the object of paśyantī is real. Paśyantī is real if its object of knowledge be real. But paśyantī is one, indivisible, nondifferent and nontemporal while its objects are composite, divisible, different and temporal. Its objects being limited by time and space, it cannot be nonspatial and nontemporal. If paśyantī know its objects as limited by time, space and forms, then its knowledge is valid. If it know them as not limited by their forms, space and time, then its knowledge is false, and paśyantī becomes of the nature of nescience. If it know them as limited by their forms, space and time, then it cannot be one, indivisible and nondifferent. Furthermore, paśyantī existing at present cannot know a nonexistent future object as present, but it can rightly know a present object only. If it know a past object or a future object, then it knows a nonexistent object. But paśyantī knows all objects, past, present and future according to the Śābdikas. They regard space and time as mere distinctive marks. The Śābdikas may argue that paśyantī knows different objects limited by different portions of space and time as different cognitions, and that then it knows a common entity in them as a common cognition, and that it thus knows all entities. Somānanda refutes this contention thus. Let the cognition be common to all objects. Its nature as paśyantī experiencing them

should be determined. Its nature as paśyantī or experiencing depends upon particular objects limited by particular portions of space. Its objects being particular and different, the so-called common cognition also is different in cognising different objects. It is not common to them because of its nondifference from them. If it were nondifferent from them, it would never cognise a past object or a future object. Paśyantī nondifferent from a past object or a future object cognises it in the past or in the future. Or, it is different in cognising different objects such as 'blue', 'yellow', etc.; so the cognitions of them are different from one another. The Śābdikas may argue that paśyantī as mere consciousness is nondifferent. Somānanda refutes this contention by observing that mere consciousness cannot cognise particular objects, e.g., 'blue', 'yellow', etc., and that if paśyantī cannot cognise them, it ceases to be paśyantī because it does not experience any object.⁵⁶ The Śābdikas hold that paśyantī is devoid of sequence or temporal order, and argue that because it is devoid of sequence, it is one, indivisible and partless, and that it does not differ in cognising different objects. Somānanda asks what destroys the sequence of parts or events in it and collects them together. If another entity destroys the sequence of parts or events, it destroys their sequence in paśyantī or in some other entity. If it do so in paśyantī, then the latter has sequence, which is denied by the Śābdikas. If it do so in another entity, then they admit dualism. If they admit that paśyantī had at first sequence and then became devoid of sequence when its sequence of parts was destroyed by some other entity, then there are two natures in paśyantī. But it cannot possess two natures since it is indivisible. The Śābdikas may argue that paśyantī experiences itself by itself by its own powers of object and instrument of experiencing without having parts. Somānanda refutes it by observing that paśyantī becomes insentient and ceases to be paśyantī, if it assume the nature of an object and an instrument of experiencing and become dependent. Paśyantī, being of the nature of mere consciousness, is incorporeal, unextended and devoid of parts, and consequently it becomes insentient, if it has parts in that it is an object of experience and if it is an instrument of experience. Further, either paśyantī experiences itself as not experienced before or as experienced before. Both these alternatives are not reasonable. If paśyantī experienced itself before, it cannot have desire to experience it. If it did not experience itself before, it is not paśyantī. Paśyantī is of the nature of manifestation and so cannot but manifest itself. If it do not manifest itself, it ceases to be an experiencing principle. The nature of paśyantī does not change every moment so that it may experience itself as existing at present. Further, paśyantī experiences itself either as of the nature of manifestation or as of the nature of nonmanifestation. If it experience itself as of the nature of nonmanifestation, then it becomes insentient. If it experience itself as of the nature of manifestation, then it already knows it and so cannot have any desire to know it. If it experience itself although it know itself already, there will be no end to its knowing itself. If the Śābdikas hold that paśyantī experiences itself as subtle and pure and untainted with determinations such as 'blue', 'yellow', etc., then they come to accept the Śaiva view that Ātman, infinite self-luminous consciousness, knows itself as devoid of the distinction of the act of knowing, the agent of knowing, and the object of knowing, and devoid of the determinations of time. In fact, if paśyantī be assumed to be an object of the act of knowing, then its being an agent of knowing will be dependent. Further, it involves self-contradiction because

paśyantī, the agent of knowing, cannot be the object of the act of knowing.⁵⁷

The Śābdikas admit the reality of a sphoṭa over and above paśyantī. Somānanda asks whether a sphoṭa is identical with paśyantī or whether it is something different from it. They admit both to be real and eternal, and so advocate dualism. Whether a sphoṭa be identical with paśyantī or whether it be different from the latter, paśyantī experiences a real object or comprehends the meaning of a sentence through the experience of a sentence-form (vākyasphoṭa), which is different from the constituent words. All sphoṭas are perceived to be different from the sentences which are admitted to be real. If a sphoṭa be different from paśyantī, and if a real sphoṭa convey the meaning of an unreal object, then there is no harm. But if paśyantī of the nature of pure consciousness apprehend an unreal object, there is a flaw because a sphoṭa identical with paśyantī conveys the meaning of a real sentence. Further, a verbal sentence is valid if it is uttered by a reliable person; and a sphoṭa is uttered by a reliable person because it is eternal. So the sounds represented by the letters are noneternal. They are not the cause of the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence; nor are they valid. A sound in the form of a sphoṭa is the cause of the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence. It is not noneternal; nor is it produced or uttered by a reliable person. Thus the admission of a sphoṭa would destroy the rule about the validity of a sentence uttered by a reliable person and about the invalidity of a sentence uttered by an unreliable person, because all sentences would be equally valid. Further, if all sphoṭas be real and eternal, then monism advocated by the Śābdikas will be overthrown. Further, how can a sphoṭa of a sentence be manifested by words and letters which are false and unreal? If the former can be manifested by the latter, then the latter are true or real. A sphoṭa is immutable, eternal and real, and so cannot be manifested by false, unreal words, letters and sounds representing them, which are entirely different from it. If the former can be manifested by the latter, then the latter are real. If a sphoṭa be of the nature of paśyantī, then it cannot, for that very reason, be manifested by unreal, false words, letters and sounds represented by them. If a sphoṭa identical with paśyantī be manifested by them, then they cease to be avidyā, because they manifest the meaning of a sentence. But the Śābdikas regard them as unreal due to avidyā.

Further, Somānanda asks what means of valid knowledge establishes the reality of paśyantī. The Śābdikas regard paśyantī as imperceptible. Inference is based on the perception of invariable concomitance between a probans and a probandum. If paśyantī be imperceptible, it cannot also be inferred. Nor can it be proved by testimony, because it is a sentence uttered by a reliable person who has perceived an object. But the Śābdikas hold that paśyantī is not experienced by a person. So testimony cannot prove the existence of paśyantī. The Śābdikas may argue that paśyantī is perceived by self-experience due to meditative trance. Then paśyantī becomes an object of the act of self-experience in the form of meditative trance. But they regard paśyantī as the supreme reality which cannot be an object of the act of trance. He who experiences paśyantī is the supreme Lord Who experiences the omniscient paśyantī. But this admission undermines the doctrine of the Śābdikas who consider paśyantī to be the supreme reality. The Śābdikas may regard a flash of intuition as the means of valid knowledge which proves the reality of paśyantī. A sister has sometimes an intuition 'My brother will come tomorrow'. It is produced by an object,

undoubted and uncontradicted ; nor is it produced by a cause vitiated by defects. If it is contradicted by a contradictory cognition, then it becomes invalid. Otherwise it is valid. Somānanda refutes the validity of pratibhā. It resembles perceptual apprehension, but it is not perception since the object of perception (e.g., brother) does not exist at the time. The Śābdikas may argue that intuition apprehends a future object as future. But futurity is prior nonexistence. Nonexistence is not related to existence. The Śābdikas may argue that pratibhā is like the intuition 'there is water in the well'. There is no apprehension of its being produced by a nonexistent object or by a future object ; and therefore it is valid knowledge. Somānanda refutes this argument by observing that pratibhā is without any cause, and, consequently, of the nature of doubt, and that its doubtful nature is not experienced at the time. 'Is it silver or non-silver ?' This is doubt. A person in doubt is not engaged in an action. But a person who has undoubted knowledge is engaged in an action. Hence pratibhā, which is of the nature of doubt, is not valid knowledge, and cannot establish the reality of paśyantī. Pratibhā is not inference because it is not based on the ascertainment of the invariable concomitance of a probans with a probandum according to the Śābdikas. If the invariable concomitance be not determined, it cannot infer the existence of a probandum. If pratibhā be trance due to meditation, it is not always manifested, but is acquired by an expert yogin at some time. Paśyantī is proved by pratibhā at a particular time when it is intuited. But paśyantī is not eternal, if it be apprehended and proved by a discontinuous intuition. But the Śābdikas regard paśyantī as eternal⁵⁸.

The Śābdikas may argue that paśyantī experiences itself through itself always. Somānanda refutes this argument. If paśyantī experience itself through itself, then it cannot be proved in order to convince another person. If paśyantī be self-manifest, another person is not convinced by one's self-experience. Instruction is of the nature of an injunction which enlightens another person on an unknown object. If paśyantī be self-manifest, it cannot communicate its nature to another person who does not know it. If paśyantī do not know itself through apprehension but through itself, then it becomes an object of itself that is said to be proved. If it be proved, it becomes limited ; and if it be limited, it ceases to be paśyantī because it is known by its apprehension of its limited nature. If it be an object of its apprehension, it ceases to be self-manifest because manifestation of it by its apprehension becomes predominant. Further, if paśyantī be the object of its apprehension, it becomes impure because all objects of apprehension are impure. But the Śābdikas assume paśyantī to be pure and self-manifest, and all other entities to be false and unreal. Hence paśyantī cannot be established by any person by any means of valid knowledge. If paśyantī be established by some pramāṇa, then that pramāṇa is true, and consequently paśyantī and the pramāṇa which establishes it are true. This position overthrows monism. If the pramāṇa be false, then paśyantī is not established by it.

Some Grammarians hold that there is an unproduced and eternal sound over and above sphoṭas. Somānanda refutes it. The unproduced and eternal sound also cannot be established by any pramāṇa like a sphoṭa. A sound uttered by an unreliable person is equally eternal like a sound uttered by a reliable person, and is equally valid like the latter. Nor can an eternal sound be manifested by a produced sound, because an eternal sound is always of the same nature and cannot be unmanifest or manifest. The Śābdikas may argue

that the eternal sound is manifested by a produced sound, even as the eternal ether (ākāśa) is manifested by the ether enclosed by a jar or the like. This argument is not valid because ether is always inferred from its quality (viz., sound) and because it is neither manifested nor perceived.

The Śābdikas may argue that what is created by Śiva according to Śaivism is equally false and unreal like the objects produced by paśyantī according to the former. Somānanda contends that this argument is not valid because what is created by Śiva according to the Śaivas is of the nature of Him and real. But, according to the Śābdikas, what is produced by paśyantī is unreal due to avidyā. The Śābdikas may argue that paśyantī corresponds to Śiva's power of knowledge. Somānanda refutes it thus. This argument is wrong, because paśyantī is insentient in that it is of the nature of sound, and because sound cannot be Śiva's power of knowledge which is sentient. Further, the Śābdikas regard paśyantī as vocal organ (vāk) and sound which is an object of knowledge. But no system of philosophy identifies a sense-organ with its object. The unproduced and eternal sound cannot be experienced by paśyantī, even as a hand cannot be grasped by it. The supreme subtle sound (parā vāk) is the vocal organ and the supreme reality experienced by paśyantī which is its form. If it were true, then a hand would be grasped by itself. But an organ cannot be its object. So parā vāk cannot be experienced by paśyantī. Further, paśyantī is an action; it is an act of seeing or experiencing, and so has prior and posterior parts. First there is a volition to create an object (e.g., a jar), which is prior to the act of seeing or experiencing. The volition cannot act to create an object without prior intentness (aunmukhya) of the Self on creation of such an object and the knowledge of it. Thus there is a sequence of volition, knowledge and action, which depends upon and is known by Śiva or the Self. Hence paśyantī is Śiva's power of knowledge, but not a vocal organ or an eternal sound. Paśyantī of the nature of a word or a sound cannot take the place of Śiva. If paśyantī of such a nature be the supreme reality, then a jar or the like may be the supreme reality. Paśyantī is a word or the vocal organ, and is a product of Śiva's māyāśakti, which is of the nature of nonapprehension of nondifference. It is a motor organ full of difference and belongs to the lowest order or māyā. Hence the supreme subtle sound (parā vāk) or the experiencing sound (paśyantī) cannot be the supreme reality. But subtle and gross sounds are creations of Śiva and of the nature of Him like other created objects through His māyāśakti. Power of māyā arises from Śiva, and is of the nature of nonapprehension of nondifference from Him.⁵⁹

OBJECTIONS REFUTED.—It is objected that if all existents be of the nature of Śiva, He becomes mutable, insentient, composed of parts, dependent on other entities, pure and impure, higher and lower, perishable, and leads to collapse of practical life, but that He is said to be immutable, conscious, partless, independent, pure, supreme, imperishable, and not to cancel practical life. Śiva is of the nature of pure consciousness and devoid of increase and decrease. If earth, water and the like were of the nature of Śiva, He would be modified into them, and if He assumed their forms, He would become insentient and composed of parts like them, and depend upon other entities for being produced and experienced by other experients. If He were modified into the elements, as milk is modified into curd, He would become pure and impure, higher and lower. If an effect were nonexistent in its cause,

the cause would be destroyed in order to produce an effect, and Śiva, the cause, would be destroyed when He produced the elements. If all objects were of the nature of Śiva, we would walk upon Him, spit upon Him, and do such acts as would entail atonement for our sins, and in this way our practical life would cease. Further, if all existents were of the nature of Śiva, bondage and liberation would become nonexistent, the scriptures teaching the means of attaining liberation from bondage would become meaningless, all would be liberated and dispense with instructions, and the Deities and the spiritual teachers would become unnecessary. Further, Śiva being devoid of kārma mala, He would not produce dharma and adharma. He would not be the cause of individual souls' voluntary actions, since false knowledge, attachment, etc., are their causes. Thus dharma prescribed by the Śaivas would become useless. Besides, there would be no distinction among the efficient cause, the inherent cause, and the noninherent cause of an effect, since they are all of the nature of Śiva. All persons would become omnipotent, omniscient, and eternally liberated. There being no distinction between good and evil, there would be no distinction between worshippers and the worshipped, disciples and teachers, means and ends, and there would be an excess of materialism. All being liberated, none would require instructions about the scriptures. Moreover, if Śiva imagined Himself to be the elements, He would be possessed of imagination. But He is devoid of imagination, for Śaivism, since vikalpas are of the nature of avidyā in that different objects are nonexistent. If Śivatattva be devoid of imagination, He is possessed of apprehension, and apprehension is not false or does not know a nonexistent object. He apprehends either His Self or another self, an unapprehended entity or an apprehended entity. There is a distinction between an apprehender and an apprehended object. This difference will give rise to many difficulties. Further, if Śiva's volition be the cause of an effect, then another volition of Him is the cause of another effect. Different effects are produced by different causes. This means that different effects are produced by different volitions of Śiva according to Śaivism. What are the causes of His different volitions? Furthermore, if all existents be of the nature of Śiva, then they are equally true or real. But the Śaiva scriptures sometimes declare them to be false and unreal like magic shows. Thus the Śaiva doctrine of all existents being in the nature of Śiva contradicts the Śaiva scriptures, and comes into conflict with the other systems.

Somānanda and Utpaladeva refute the above objections in the following manner. If Śiva were gross, He would be modified into the elements, as milk is modified into curd. If He were subtle, He would be modified into them, as māyā and prakṛti are modified into them. But He is of the nature of pure consciousness, and neither gross nor subtle, since material things alone are either gross or subtle, and since they are modified into gross and extended objects. He cannot be modified into them, since He is of the nature of pure consciousness. He creates the elements by his sheer fiat of will, even as yogins can create them by their mere volitions. He does not create them by modifying Himself into them. They are His creations at His will, and not modifications of Himself; they come into existence just after His volitions. There is difference of superior, mediocre and inferior entities among His creations, as there is such distinction in the creations of the yogins. Or, there is a distinction between Śiva and the universe, as there is a distinction between an ocean and its waves despite their identity. The divinity of

the universe is not destroyed, even as water does not lose its nature as water when it becomes a wave. Unmoving water is unqualified, and moving water is qualified. Similarly, Śiva in His acosmic form is unqualified, and He in His cosmic form is qualified. Thus even in the state of an existent its divinity persists.⁶⁰ Hence Śiva does not become insentient and composed of parts, as a yogin does not become insentient and composed of parts by creating different objects by mere volitions. The elements created by Śiva by His mere volition are neither insentient nor produced out of *māyā* and *prakṛti* which are insentient because they are His particular volitions, like the objects created by a yogin by his mere volitions. (Martineau : atoms are standing volitions of God.) The defence that they are insentient because they are apprehended as of the nature of 'this' is useless, since what are apprehended as 'this' are not necessarily insentient. Śivatattva is the Self of all existents, and, consequently, not composed of parts. He is the knower of all existents, and so cannot be reduced to them which are known, and which consist of parts. He exists as transcendent of the universe and immanent in it independently through His absolute will. So He is independent of other experients or individual souls. Because He creates existents by His will, He does not depend upon other entities for doing so. If He were modified into them, even as milk is modified into curd, He would become insentient and subject to increase and decrease, purity and impurity. But He does not cease to be conscious at any time, and His consciousness is not modified into insentient existents. So He does not become insentient, impure, less and the like. His nature is not divided into different existents, but He creates them by His mere volition. They are all alike of the nature of Śiva. But there is a distinction among them for the purpose of empirical life only. It is an imaginary distinction of mere names for practical purposes. Practical actions are not nescience as Śaṅkara and others hold. Śiva exists as practical actions through His volition. They are not another entity called *avidyā*. He exists as practical actions for the purpose of common people's empirical life. He creates them and persists in them. There is no difference of His nature in them. The scriptures do not make any distinction in Śivatattva existing in them. They simply give instructions about purification relating to our practical actions. They being only particular volitions of Śiva, they do not make any real difference in Śivatattva nor make Him impure. He does not lose His real nature when He assumes forms filled with His powers. What is the cause of Śiva's passing from an acosmic state to a cosmic state? The question does not arise because in the acosmic state He is Śiva and because in the cosmic state He is Śiva. His acosmic state is real; what is real is existent; existence is being; being is agency of being; agency is freedom of Śiva of the nature of consciousness and possessed of the powers of volition, knowledge and action. Action is of the nature of agency; an agent is free and conscious because freedom is voluntary action according to one's free will. Hence, wherever there is being there is will to be; will to be depends upon knowledge. Created entities depend upon, and are of the nature of, Śiva possessed of the powers of volition, knowledge and action. How can difference among existents exist in uniform and nondifferent Śiva of the nature of pure consciousness? Somānanda replies that the mutual difference among the existents also is of the nature of Śiva. All are of the nature of Śiva, and differences among them also are of the nature of Śiva. The power of an existent is nothing but the power of Śiva; power and a potent being

are nondifferent from each other. Hence all existents and their differences are nothing but Śiva since they are of the nature of pure consciousness.⁶¹ It is objected that all entities being of the nature of Śiva, Śaivism cannot account for the usefulness of spiritual teachers and the scriptures. To this objection Somānanda replies that Śiva Himself becomes a spiritual teacher as omniscient and enlightened by His volition, and that He Himself becomes a bound soul by His volition by assuming contraction, and receives instructions and is enlightened by His volition. He gives instructions through the scriptures by His volition, and He receives instructions by His volition. He becomes the means by His volition, and He becomes the end by His volition. It is objected that all entities being of the nature of Śiva, virtue and vice cannot differ from each other. To this objection Somānanda replies that virtue which realises the good is created by Śiva by His volition and is of His nature, and that vice which realises evil is created by Śiva by His volition and is of His nature. Both are His creations and their difference also is His creation. All entities which are apprehended by our consciousness are of the nature of Śiva or universal consciousness. This absolute voluntarism is tantamount to pantheism and negation of human freedom. It is objected that all entities being of the nature of Śiva, an efficient cause, an inherent cause, and a noninherent cause do not differ from one another. To this objection Somānanda replies that an efficient cause (e. g., a weaver), an inherent cause (e. g., threads), and a noninherent cause (e. g., conjunction of threads) are created by Śiva's volitions, and that they differ from one another, although they are alike His volitions, even as a king's commands differ from one another, although they are alike his commands. Utpaladeva accounts for their difference in two other ways. Śiva Himself is the efficient cause; His volition is the inherent cause; His volition in the form of conjunction of the parts of an entity is the noninherent cause. Or, although Śiva is one, He becomes threefold, an efficient cause, an inherent cause, and a noninherent cause for the purpose of empirical use which is of the nature of nonapprehension of nondifference.⁶² It is objected that gross elements being imagined by Śiva, He is endowed with imagination. To this objection Somānanda replies that Śivatattva does exist in gross elements, and that they are imagined in the sense that their real nature as Śivatattva is not apprehended by bound souls. He creates gross elements by His volition. Hence they are real and should not be said to be imaginary. They do not differ from one another in being of the nature of Śiva. It is objected that all entities being of the nature of Śiva according to Śaivism, there is no difference between its proponent and opponent. Somānanda refutes this objection by asserting that the difference between them is intended for empirical use, which is not based on ontological reality, but which is based on nonapprehension of nondifference. Empirical life is based on appearances of Śiva, empirical differences, subjects and objects. Although they are unreal, they appear to be real and are illusory. Even nonentities are of the nature of Śiva as appearances. Śivatattva of the nature of pure consciousness and experience of the universe is not like paśyantī vāk—experiencing Logos. He experiences existents of the nature of names and objects named, devoid of space, time, and temporal order, and is devoid of the cognition of difference because He manifests them as perfect 'I'. Although He has the experience of 'I', He is devoid of the cognition of difference, even as a perfumer experiences a large number of scents without experiencing their

specific scents. The experience of 'I' being of the nature of Logos or supreme speech is not the cognition of difference. What is of the nature of the light of consciousness or manifestation has no counterentity different from it. No entity different from it is manifested by it. It is objected that the state of Śiva before the commencement of any particular knowledge and action and after their cessation is devoid of experience and insentient because it is devoid of the power of volition and the like. Somānanda replies that this objection is baseless, since Śiva is never devoid of all powers and insentient. He is always endowed with the powers of volition, knowledge and action in a subtle state. So there is no difference in Him. He is not powerless after the completion of one action and the commencement of another action. After the completion of one action He has another volition with a distinct cognition of another object of action. He has never any state of powerlessness. His experience never ceases. It presupposes a prior volition to experience. His experience is in the form of 'I am', and is always manifested since unmanifested experience is not possible. Hence it is not insentient. It is objected that stones and the like being of the nature of Śiva, He becomes insentient. Somānanda observes that Śiva is not insentient, although stones are of the nature of Śiva and appear to be different from Him because of nonapprehension of nondifference. One volition of Śiva being accomplished, He initiates and accomplishes another volition. His powers always exist in Him, and He moves on from one volition to another because of their natures, since they are endless. He is absolutely free, and His volition is not determined by any other cause. The endlessness of His new volitions follows from His absolute freedom. The delight of His ever new volitions to experience His inexhaustible wealth of spiritual perfection is the cause of the endlessness of His volitions. It is objected that if all existents are of the nature of Śiva, then this view contradicts the assertion of the Āgama that the universe is unreal like a bubble. Somānanda replies that it is aimed at inculcating dispassion for the transient world and its really being of the nature of one universal consciousness. The statement that all existents are Śiva does not prove that they are many Śivas. Śiva is not of the nature of a jar and the like, but they are of the nature of Śiva. He is of the nature of one pure consciousness, and does not differ owing to the absence of the difference of space, time and nature.⁶³

SPIRITUAL CULTURE : 1. WORKS.—The monistic Śaivas describe a few acts of spiritual discipline for advanced aspirants. Initiation is necessary for entering upon the way of realisation of the highest reality. It consists in imparting knowledge of Ātman to another person, and breaking his fetters. Both a master and a disciple should be eligible. Kṣemarāja avers that a person, who has acquired command over the powers of the Lord, can enlighten a disciple by his power of knowledge. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara also avers that a person, who has acquired the knowledge of Ātman due to the descent of divine powers, is competent to initiate a disciple. Rāmakaṇṭha avers that the Lord is the supreme Master, Who initiates a disciple, through a human master (guru), by granting His grace, and making His divine power descend upon him. A disciple should have earnest desire to be free of his fetters. Abhinavagupta regards a vow as relishing the experience of identity in the perception of difference in the world. Yogirāja explains a vow as firmness in the experience of identity acquired by repeatedly listening to scriptural testimony, reasoning on monistic texts, and

intuiting identity in the midst of difference in such a form as 'I am manifested in all this'. It is the experience of one divine consciousness as perfect 'I'-consciousness, the essence of differences, with a flash of delight. Kṣemarāja regards a vow as maintenance of the body with the experience 'I am Śiva'. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara regards a vow as abiding in one's Ātman without any hindrance and as feeling a vibration of the Lord in one's bodily actions. Varadarāja regards a vow as maintaining the body for service of one's self, which is identical with the Supreme Self, Śiva, with devotion to Him. An aspirant constantly prays for the maintenance of his body as a vehicle for the experience of Śiva, and of pure devotion to Him surging from the heart. Charity consists in discarding the nature of a limited self and assuming the nature of Śiva-Śakti of the nature of infinite consciousness. The highest gift is the gift of one's self to Ātman—Śiva (ātmadāna). The self should be completely dedicated to Śiva (ātmanivedana). The experience of His nature is the result of the offering of all works performed without any desire for fruits to Him. Somānanda regards ablution as purification by knowing one's bondage and release both to be taints, and as delight due to the experience 'I am the universe full of infinite consciousness' in happiness or misery. He regards worship as that of Śiva as nondifferent from one's self, for worship, a worshipper, and the worshipped are He. Abhinavagupta regards worship as the experience of Śiva as the only ontological reality. Chanting hymns, offering oblations to a sacrificial fire, making obeisance to a Deity, and the other acts of devotion are not necessary for an aspirant, who has acquired integral knowledge of identity, since they depend upon the knowledge of difference. He is replete with perennial bliss, and does not take delight in artificial joy derived from chanting, sacrifice, or obeisance. There being none besides Śiva, there is none to make obeisance to. A sacrifice, for Somānanda, is the experience of delight in all forms,—the experience 'I am Śiva', the sacrificer and the Lord to Whom a sacrifice is made—the experience that the place of sacrifice and the instruments and material of sacrifice are 'I' or Śiva. Offering oblations to a sacrificial fire, for him, is the experience 'I am desireless and perfectly contented Śiva', and the knowledge of all existents as the forms of Śiva. Abhinavagupta regards offering oblations to a sacrificial fire as consuming the subconscious impressions of all desires (vāsanā) in the fire of Śiva-Śakti with the molten butter of supreme love for all, and offering the knowledge of external and internal differences to the blazing fire of one universal consciousness. It is consuming the seeds of external and internal differences in the blazing fire of the integral experience of Śiva. Yogirāja explains it as consuming the difference of subjects and objects in the fire of the experience of perfect 'I'-consciousness replete with a flash of delight without any effort. An aspirant enters into one universal consciousness because of the destruction of his false conceit of identity with his body, vital forces, buddhi and the like. Abhinavagupta regards meditation as contemplating that Śiva Himself always creates diverse forms in the mirror of buddhi, and that there are no entities other than manifestation of divine power. Yogirāja explains all forms as pictures painted in the scene of divine consciousness, and all mental modes as unfoldment of supreme divine power. Somānanda regards meditation as the experience 'I am Śiva' in all forms and all thoughts. He regards repeated muttering of the Lord's name or mantra (japa) as the continuous experience 'I am all and create all by volition' while uttering it. Abhinavagupta regards japa as transforming all principles, worlds, and sense-organs into the internal experience of perfect

'I'-consciousness, and as recognising their identity with it every moment. Yogirāja observes that such transformation can be effected by controlling the vital force in *Suṣumnā*, by awakening divine power (*Kuṇḍalinī*), making Her ascend through it, and unite with *Parama Śiva* in *Sahasrāra*. Japa is the recognition of the universe as nondifferent from perfect 'I'-consciousness every moment. The uttering of a mantra, a signifier, awakens the Deity signified by it, and makes the vital force in the form of a thread vibrate and sound in *Suṣumnā*, pervade the universe, and transform it into perfect 'I'-consciousness. The process refers to the esoteric practice of yoga according to monistic Śaiva Tantras. Kṣemarāja regards it as continuous repetition of the experience of perfect 'I'-consciousness, which is the essence of a mantra. Vasugupta defines japa as muttering a mantra. Kallaṭa explains it as continuous transformation of the universe into the spontaneous 'I'-consciousness for a mantra of Śiva is full of contemplation of perfect 'I'-consciousness. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara recognises four kinds of japa : *sākta*, *hamsa*, *paudgala*, and *niṣkala*. Breathing goes on 26000 times in 24 hours in a person. This is called *paudgala* or *ajapā*. *Hamsa* is of the nature of *nāda*—a subtle sound—heard in the heart-centre not due to the impact of two sounding bodies. *Niṣkala* is the utterance of 'Aum' or 'Om'. *Śākta* is the experience of one's self as perfect 'I' or Supreme Lord. *Varadarāa* regards japa as meditating on the Supreme Lord resulting in the manifestation of *nāda* expressing divine power—the essence of a mantra. Constant japa or meditation on Him inverts the outgoing vital current, and turns it into the experience—'I am He' (*so'ham*). Japa is so called because it creates and sustains the universe.⁵⁴

2. DEVOTION.—*Rāmakaṇṭha*, a disciple of *Utpaladeva*, gives a monistic account of the nature of devotion. It is the worship of *Ātman*, or the Lord, or a Deity by meditating on Him as of the nature of Brahman or nondual transcendental consciousness. When it reaches the highest stage of immediate experience of the nature of the Lord, it is called integral knowledge (*vijñāna*). Supreme devotion is the result of the knowledge of all entities as nondifferent from the nature of the Lord. The highest knowledge of the nature of immediate experience of absolute nondualism itself is the highest devotion. So *Rāmakaṇṭha* identifies the highest knowledge with the highest devotion. *Abhinavagupta* avers that *Parama Śiva's* divine power (*Śakti*) should be worshipped with supreme devotion, and the worshipper's self should be dedicated to Her. Worship requires supreme devotion, self-dedication, self-surrender, and self-consecration. Devotion is humility of a devotee's mind fit for entering into identity with the divine power, that creates the difference between a worshipper, worship and the worshipped Deity, *Śakti* is the supreme end, absolutely free, entirely different from insentient entities because of Her absolute freedom, and full of transcendental consciousness. Self-dedication is complete dedication to *Ātman*, for there is no other reality. Worship is the apprehension of the pure, ontological nature of Śiva. Self-offering is offering of a limited self and all belonging to it to *Śiva-Śakti* of the nature of absolute consciousness. A sacrifice is consuming all seeds of subconscious dispositions in the fire of *Śiva-Śakti* ready to consume the fuel of all entities. Devotion consists in transcending bodily, vital, and mental consciousness, and merging the limited soul in the Absolute Consciousness. Supreme devotion consists in acquiring the certain knowledge of identity of

one's soul with all--the Absolute. (Cp. Vallabha's concept of becoming all). Worship with supreme devotion and self-dedication should be continued until the limited soul is purified of all taints and identified with Śiva-Śakti—integral reality.⁶⁵

3. YOGA.—Somānanda regards yoga as offering all acts—walking, sitting, running, eating, etc., to Śiva, and as thinking 'I am all beings', and 'all entities are created by my volition by unfolding my powers'. The Śaiva monists describe some acts of yoga for advanced yogins. Posture, according to Varadarāja, consists in discarding the fixation of mind on certain parts of the body, meditation and other acts of yoga, in abiding in identity with Śiva-Śakti of the nature of universal consciousness and power, in being immersed in the Great Lake already explained, and in drowning 'this'-consciousness in the infinite 'I'-consciousness. In this state a soul identifies itself with the Divine, destroys delusion, acquires pure knowledge (śuddhavidyā) owing to excess of immersion in Śiva-Śakti, and assimilates divine bliss. Varadarāja regards breath-control as equilibrating prāṇa flowing upward through Idā and apāṇa flowing downward through Piṅgalā, pushing udāna upward through Suṣumnā, rousing coiled divine power (Kuṇḍalinī) at Mūlādhāra, carrying Her upward through Svādhiṣṭhāna, Maṇipūra, Anāhata, Viśuddha, and Ājñācakra, uniting Her with Parama Śiva in Sahasrāra, and identifying one's limited consciousness with universal consciousness. It consists in first equilibrating prāṇa with apāṇa, then discarding the control of gross vital forces, then controlling the subtle vital force in Suṣumnā, and then acquiring extremely subtle supreme vibration of divine power. A yogin, who practises the last kind of breath-control, does not fall from his union with the supreme power of universal consciousness. Varadarāja regards withdrawal as drawing the mind away from external objects, and entering into the supreme abode of the Lord. It is entrance of a soul's limited consciousness into universal consciousness, which breaks the fetters of bondage. Varadarāja regards fixation as fixing the mind on the Supreme Ātman, which releases a soul from bondage. He regards trance as the sense of equality in all beings, and as the experience 'I am Śiva without a second'. Meditation has already been explained. All acts of yoga from breath-control to trance lead to complete immersion in the Supreme Reality.⁶⁶

4. KNOWLEDGE.—Vasugupta says, "Knowledge is food." Kallaṭa explains knowledge (jñāna) as a soul's recognition of one's nature as 'I'-consciousness, which is its food because it generates complete fulfilledness, and because it is the cause of resting in one's Ātman. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara explains knowledge as supreme knowledge of Śiva, which is the means of supreme contentment and perfection. Varadarāja observes that when a yogin is firmly established in the experience of Śiva of the nature of perfect manifestation, his causal body, subtle body, and gross body due to potencies of actions are consumed in the fire of this knowledge, and he acquires a divine body, which is pervasive and composed of pure consciousness. So long as he lives, his three bodies are permeated by the knowleege that he is Śiva—the Supreme Knower. When his pure knowledge (śuddhavidyā) is eclipsed, he perceives empirical differences, which are like dreams. Just as dreams are destroyed by waking perceptions, so the perception of differences is destroyed by the knowledge of nondifferent, universal consciousness.⁶⁷

A bound soul is released from bondage by meditating on Parama Śiva, and becomes the Lord of the world, like Sadāśiva. A soul in bondage has knowledge implying the distinction of subjects and objects. But a yogin is attentive to their relation to Ātman, knows them to be 'I', and experiences the bliss of trance. A bound soul delights in external insentient objects and physical pleasures. But a yogin delights in his Ātman within and the bliss of trance. Ātman is Parama Śiva, Supreme 'I', universal consciousness, dynamic 'I'-consciousness—Integral 'Self-consciousness distinguished from vital ego, mental ego, empirical, limited ego, or egoism.

A yogin who delights in Ātman freely in the waking state, dream, and deep sleep is called a prince of yogins (vīreśa) or heroes. He rests in Ātman or Parama Śiva, experiences his identity with Him, and delights in the bliss of ecstasy (turīya). He experiences identity-consciousness devoid of difference in the three states, bliss of identity-consciousness as the result of concentration at the centres of mystic consciousness (cakra), and of meditation on the ether of transcendental consciousness at the heart-centre, and a flash of transcendental wonder and delight. He experiences all knowers and objects, and is yet not attached to them. He becomes autonomous and unrivalled in spiritual powers and wealth. His sense-organs become almost inoperative owing to his experience of unique supreme bliss even when he experiences their objects. He is not contented with the experience of Ātman—Supreme Self—common to all stages of the experience of ecstasy. He gradually rises to the higher stages of ecstasy, and reaches the highest stage of superecstasy (turīyāṭīta) resting in Ātman. The bliss of ecstasy is delight in abiding in the state of the Supreme Knower in the midst of the knowledge of empirical subjects and objects⁶⁸. When a yogin practises ecstasy for a long period, and when he acquires excellence in it, he transcends ecstasy, and acquires superecstasy. He becomes like Śiva of the nature of translucent, infinite consciousness and absolute freedom and bliss because his body continues. When his body is dissolved, he becomes Śiva. He achieves embodied liberation in life, and disembodied liberation after death⁶⁹ (Cp. Śaṅkara).

Parama Śiva's power of creative will is called Virgin Umā, the divine power of His absolute freedom engaged in the sportive acts of creating, maintaining, and dissolving the universe. A prince of yogins experiences his internal states and external objects as parts of himself, and not as different from him. When he is completely absorbed in and identified with Umā, he acquires a body according to Her or the Lord's creative will, and acquires supernatural powers. He can perceive objects remote in time and space, separate physical elements from one another, appease all afflictions of the body like diseases, foster animate and inanimate beings, and acquire the experience of being identical with the world if he desires to do so. Supreme fulfilment is within his power. He can acquire the status of the Lord of the circle of divine powers, if he applies his powers with a view to experiencing his identity with the Supreme Self of the universe. When he acquires the pure knowledge (śuddhavidyā) of his identity with the universe, he attains to the status of supreme lordship (cacreśa). In the plane of śuddhavidyā—pure knowledge 'I am the universe'—'I'-consciousness and 'this'-consciousness abide in the same substratum. When the pure knowledge of the supreme nondual consciousness emerges, the pure ether of consciousness called khecarī mudrā is manifested. It is the state of the Absolute⁷⁰.

Impure knowledge is the empirical knowledge of difference, finite knowledge, false knowledge of various determinations (*vikalpa*) called dream from the standpoint of the Absolute. It is incomplete, imperfect, inferior knowledge. When a yogin disregards the supernatural powers which accrue to him unsought, and when he resorts to *śuddhavidyā*, he achieves supreme fulfilment. An advanced yogin should discard the gross means of breath-control and the like implying the knowledge of difference, enter into his essential consciousness with his mind purged of the taint of difference, and immerse his nature as a limited knower identified with his mind-body-complex in ecstasy—inner consciousness permeated with a flash of delight. Gradually when his *buddhi* enters into the supreme status, his vital forces are purified by immersion in the unfolding divine *Śakti*, and he experiences nondifference because of his becoming of the nature of transcendental consciousness and bliss. Until he becomes independent of his mind-body-complex, he cannot acquire the pure knowledge of nondifference. When he transcends bodily, vital, and mental consciousness, he acquires the saving knowledge of nondifference.

A bound soul overcome by delusion is tainted with merits and demerits, and has knowledge of difference because of its false egoism. When Śiva's divine power of grace descends on a bound soul, its false conceit of ego-sense is destroyed, its consequent knowledge of difference is removed, its innate freedom is manifested, and it acts in a higher order of creation. Its knowledge of difference due to *kāla*, *vidyā*, *rāga*, *kalā*, and *niyati*, the five coverings (*kañcūka*)—products of the power of *māyā*—is eclipsed, and it rises to a higher plane. The power of freedom is the essence of a knower, which is veiled by *māyā*. When *māyā* is destroyed by Śiva's power of grace, its innate power of freedom is manifested, it attains to the state of ecstasy replete with delight, and abides in it constantly. Ecstasy permeates its waking state, dream, and deep sleep, which assume the forms of creation, maintenance, and dissolution. It is the state of delight in *Ātman* and detachment from all external objects. A yogin's power of freedom of the nature of Self-delight can create objects at his will. When his *āṇava mala* and *kārma mala*—atomicity and merits and demerits—are destroyed by the Lord's grace, his desires for external objects are destroyed, his subtle body with which he identifies himself is attenuated, and he attains to the state of self-completeness and self-delight.⁷¹

A yogin, who rules over the powers, and who is like Śiva, experiences that the universe is the unfoldment of his powers, that its creation is the manifestation of his power of action, that its maintenance is the continuance of its manifestation outward, that its dissolution is the involution of his power of manifesting the universe and its resting in the Supreme Knower of the nature of transcendental consciousness. He does not lapse from his experience of ecstasy full of perfect 'I'-consciousness of the nature of transcendent wonder and delight in the midst of its creation, maintenance and dissolution full of difference. He is not affected by pleasure and pain, for he ceases to identify himself with his subtle body. He does not consider them to be 'mine', but considers them to be 'this'-consciousness or external objects. A yogin, who is completely freed of the experience of pleasure and pain, and of their subconscious impressions, becomes a free knower of the nature of pure consciousness. Pure consciousness is supramental, transcendental consciousness.⁷²

A yogin whose volition is identical with Śiva's power of absolute freedom, experiences

his body as a known object, like a jar, a lifeless thing, wherewith he does not identify his self. A known object appears to him like a body, and his body appears to him like a known object. His internal cognitions and external objects, which are known, appear to him like parts of his self, and not as different from him. As his mind is concentrated at the heart-centre on Ātman, the universe is experienced by him like dream-cognitions. The binding power of delusion due to nescience is destroyed in him. So he experiences the universe including his body as full of the Lord, and becomes the ruler of the universe, like Sadāśiva.⁷³

NESCIENCE AND TRUE KNOWLEDGE.—Utpaladeva regards nescience (ajñāna) as the knowledge of difference, and true knowledge (jñāna) as the knowledge of nondifference or identity. Nescience is due to nonapprehension of nondifference. It is the knowledge of a limited knower wrongly identified with his mind-body-complex, relating to different objects, and producing practical actions. His cognitions of different objects have empirical validity since they lead to successful actions, but they have no ontological validity since they do not cognise the ontological reality—one universal consciousness or the Absolute. When an empirical knower recognises his identity with Śiva, his false egoism is destroyed, and he is liberated. Varadarāja defines nescience as false knowledge of self as not-self and not-self as self, and true knowledge as recognition of one's identity with Śiva. Nescience is knowledge of difference due to māyā. True knowledge is knowledge of supreme nondifference (Cp. Śaṅkara). Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara regards nescience as false knowledge of 'I' and 'mine' in the mind-body-complex, as knowledge of difference interpenetrated with words or verbal images due to māyā mala, and as bondage characterised by the veiling of reality. He regards true knowledge as supreme knowledge of nondifference, which destroys the knowledge of difference.

Abhinavagupta avers that nescience (ajñāna) is the cause of bondage and that true knowledge (jñāna) is the only cause of liberation. A taint (mala) is nescience and the seed of birth and death. Jayaratha avers that nescience is of the nature of incomplete knowledge, āṇava mala, false conceit of self in not-self, and of not-self in self, and not a substance. Nescience is of two kinds : self-nescience (pauruṣa) and buddhi-nescience (bauddha). Self-nescience is nescience in an individual self (puruṣa). Buddhi-nescience is nescience in buddhi. Self-nescience is the cause of bondage. Buddhi is an internal organ produced after self's embodied life. So nescience in buddhi is not the cause of bondage. When nescience in self is removed by initiation, it is independently the cause of liberation. It is said, "Bonds in a self are purified by initiation, and not those in buddhi. Even if bonds in buddhi persist, initiation is not infructuous." A self is really of the nature of mere knowledge. Complete knowledge is the absolute negation of nonapprehension itself, that is the real nature of Ātman,—a mass of manifestation and bliss. Liberation is the apprehension of this real nature of a self, or its Śivahood.⁷⁴

It is asked why nescience is not mere absence of knowledge, but incomplete knowledge. Abhinavagupta replies that if nescience were mere absence of knowledge, even a stone and the like would have nescience and be bound. So nescience is defined as incomplete knowledge (apūrṇa jñāna). Vasugupta says, "Knowledge is bondage". Here knowledge means positive incomplete knowledge or knowledge of an object in its partial aspect. 'This

is blue'. 'This is pleasure'. These cognitions are of the nature of apprehension of duality or difference and so incomplete. 'The real nature of known objects is Śiva of the nature of manifestation. So the aforesaid cognitions are nescience or incomplete knowledge. Vasugupta says, "Consciousness is Ātman." Abhinavagupta avers that the positive word 'consciousness' (cāitanya) means mere freedom (svātantrya) devoid of any distinctive characters. In Vasugupta's aphorism 'knowledge is bondage' knowledge means an act of knowledge or an organ of knowledge. It means knowledge of duality of mere consciousness. Apprehension of duality is nescience because it is false, and so it ought to be destroyed. Jayaratha avers that the act of consciousness is common to all cognitions. Ātman has complete act of knowledge. The quality of possessing the complete act of knowledge is consciousness. That is called the nature of supreme lordship or freedom, So it is mere freedom, Eternity, ubiquity, etc., are its distinctive features (viśeṣa). 'Knowledge' in Vasugupta's second aphorism means the act of knowledge by which an object is known. It makes a distinction between a knowing self, act of knowledge, and an object of knowledge. It refers to different factors involved in knowledge, and does not describe its complete form (pūrṇarūpa). Here 'knowledge' is apprehension of duality—incomplete knowledge. It is incomplete because of its incompleteness. It is not complete for it does not apprehend Ātman of the nature of nondual consciousness, which is its real nature. This incomplete knowledge is stained by three taints, and contracted by good and evil dispositions, and forms of body and objects. So it is called bondage. Because it is of the nature of bondage it should be eradicated.⁷⁵

Abhinavagupta divides nescience into two kinds : nescience in buddhi and nescience in a soul, and true knowledge into two kinds : true knowledge in buddhi and true knowledge in a soul. Soul-nescience (pauruṣa ajñāna) produces a taint, which veils the soul's Śivahood of the nature of omniscience and omnipotence. It is indeterminate knowledge of the bound soul, of the nature of contracting knowledge and action. But buddhi-nescience (bauddha ajñāna) is determinate, since determination is the function of buddhi. Buddhi-nescience is of the form 'I know this'. This kind of knowledge produced by the relation of a knowing self and a knowable object is called nescience ; it arises in buddhi owing to reflection of nescience in a soul limited by atomicity (āṇava mala) and contracted by its five coverings. When the atomic, bound soul's impurities are destroyed, and when it attains to the state of Śiva, its soul-knowledge expands, becomes ubiquitous and indeterminate. When soul-nescience is destroyed by initiation, ubiquitous, indeterminate knowledge of Ātman is distinctly manifested after death. When buddhi-knowledge destroys buddhi-nescience, embodied release is achieved. Buddhi-knowledge arises from listening to scripture teaching nonduality of the Lord. Initiation too prior to buddhi-knowledge contributes to release. So buddhi-knowledge produced by listening to monistic scripture has a prime importance. It is not mere intellectual comprehension of scripture but a spiritual discipline. When buddhi-knowledge is produced, buddhi-nescience is destroyed, and the knowledge of being liberated arises in buddhi. This state is embodied liberation. Soul-nescience is destroyed by initiation, but the soul's inner state of freedom from its atomicity is not known until buddhi is purified and until buddhi-knowledge arises. So long as the body continues, false conceit of identity of a soul with body and buddhi persists. If soul-

nescience were already not removed by initiation, liberation would not be achieved even after death. When buddhi-nescience is removed, all determinations (vikalpa) of buddhi are eradicated, and liberation is achieved.⁷⁶

BONDAGE AND LIBERATION.—Somānanda opines that difference being due to Śiva's volition and as such being of His nature, there is no difference between bondage and release. There being no real bondage, there is no real release, which depends upon prior bondage. Bondage and release are only phenomenal appearances, and not ontologically real. (Cp. Śaṅkara). Utpaladeva opines that embodied life is called bondage characterised by nescience. Somānanda thinks of bondage and release as mere experiences (prāpti). Utpaladeva thinks of liberation as mere experience of nondifference from Śiva, and of bondage as nonexperience of this nondifference. Śiva at His will assumes the state of bondage and release of the nature of mere experiences of difference and nondifference. Difference is of the nature of Śiva. So there is no real bondage, and in its absence there is no release. It may be objected that, all being of the nature of Śiva, bondage and liberation are not different from each other, and that therefore every person should know 'I am Śiva.' Somānanda replies that bondage is of the nature of nescience, and that liberation is of the nature of true knowledge. In bondage there is no firm knowledge that all existents are of the nature of Śiva endowed with the powers of volition, knowledge and action. In liberation there is firm knowledge that they are of such a nature. Firm knowledge or immediate experience of the nondifference of all existents from Śiva is liberation. The absence of such knowledge is bondage. Nonapprehension of nondifference is bondage. Apprehension of nondifference is liberation. It may be objected that even if bondage and liberation be of the nature of Śiva, Śaivism ought to prove that they are of the nature of experience, and that if they are of the nature of Śiva, they should not be spoken of as different from each other. Somānanda refutes the objection by observing that Śaivism proves that all existents are of the nature of one Śiva, but that it does not disprove that they are one or many. All being of the nature of Śiva, whether they be one or many does not involve any conflict. Śaivism advocates monism, and holds that all existents are of the nature of one Śiva, that no existent is better than any other, and that no existent is worse than any other. To assert the existents to be one or many is to admit their independence. But Śaivism denies this, and admits the existence of one Śiva alone. There is no difference between bondage and liberation in reality, since both are of the nature of Śiva. There being no bondage, there is no release from it.⁷⁷

Abhinavagupta avers that there is no abode of release nor movement of a soul to another region, but that release is manifestation of a soul's own power of breaking the knot of nescience. He believes in embodied release. When the knot of nescience is broken asunder, all doubts are dispelled, all false knowledge is destroyed, merits and demerits are worn out, and a soul is released even in embodied life. Merits and demerits burnt by the fire of knowledge do not produce birth again, even as seeds burnt by a fire do not sprout. Yogirāja expounds Abhinavagupta's view. Liberation is destruction of false conceit of 'I' in its mind-body-complex, and manifestation of a soul's own powers characterised by freedom of its Ātman. Its consciousness contracted by false conceit is called bound',

as it were. When bondage by the mind-body-complex is destroyed by manifestation of a soul's real nature as Ātman, its innate powers expand, and it is called 'released', as it were. So bondage and release are mere false conceits. In Reality—integral consciousness—nothing new is accomplished; Its own nature is manifested. So a soul, that has acquired the saving knowledge, and whose limitation by nescience has been destroyed, is released, though it continues to exist in an embodied state for bestowing grace on others. Nescience is false conceit of self in not-self due to nonapprehension. It is a knot since it contracts a soul's perfect nature. Its complete freedom, ubiquity, eternity, etc., are contracted by its false conceit due to nescience. The knot of false conceit is broken asunder by firm practice of complete freedom of its Ātman. When the knot is torn, its innate powers expand and it realises its eternity, ubiquity, omniscience and omnipotence. This state is called liberation. It is complete isolation of a soul from its body and experience of its essence, which is æsthetic delight of the experience of perfect 'I'. It has no distinct abode for it is not limited by space, time, and form. So there is no movement of a released soul to any abode. It is identical with ubiquitous Absolute consciousness in its real nature. So when it recognises its identity with universal consciousness, it need not go anywhere to realise its essence as supreme 'I'. It may be contended that an embodied soul is bound, and that therefore it cannot be released. Yogirāja observes that this contention is false, since bondage consists in false conceit of the self in the mind-body-complex, and since a soul that has destroyed its nescience, false conceit, merits and demerits, and subconscious potencies of bodily, vital and mental desires, has achieved embodied release despite its connection with a body. It achieves disembodied release after death. Mere connection with a body is not bondage. Its nescience has been burnt by the fire of its knowledge of identity with Śiva, and by the knowledge of identity of the world with Him, and by the experience of its perfect 'I'-consciousness. Its actions do not produce merits and demerits, for it has no desire for their fruits. It has recognised its real nature as free, omnipotent, omniscient Supreme Self immanent in all empirical knowers and of the nature of infinite pure consciousness. It has known that it is not a real doer as an empirical self or ego, or that the supreme divine power of absolute freedom does all actions. So as pure universal consciousness it is not affected by its desireless actions. An action produces a fruit, if an agent has a desire for it, and if he strongly identifies himself with it. But it does not produce a fruit, if an agent has no desire for it, and if he has no false conceit that he is the agent of the action. A released soul is egoless, and has destroyed desires for appropriation of some pleasant objects and rejection of painful objects, and is devoid of the knowledge of difference. It is awakened to the consciousness of its identity with the Absolute, and shines as Ātman. It has transcended the knowledge, of empirical knowers and objects, of the difference of pleasure and pain, become tranquil, and realised its nature as Supreme Self in all creatures, and is released wherever it lives. It is purged of all taints, merits and demerits, and has realised the supreme end. The potencies of actions acquired in this birth are burnt by initiation. Those acquired in past births which have not yet ripened and begun to bear fruits are burnt by the experience of identity with Śiva, and cannot bear fruits. Those which will be acquired in future births are prevented by restraints, moral observances and other acts of yoga. The prārabdha karmans, which have begun to bear

fruits, will be worn out by the experience of their fruits in this birth. So after achieving embodied release a soul continues to live an embodied life until the aforesaid potencies are exhausted.⁷⁸ Yogirāja opines that Śiva's power of veiling the nature of a bound soul is the cause of its bondage owing to which its nature as Śiva is not manifested, and that it performs moral and immoral actions, experiences pleasures and pains, and transmigrates. His power of granting grace is the cause of its liberation.

Abhinavagupta describes liberation as no other than free Ātman. It has no distinct name from that of Ātman. (Cp. Śaṅkara). What is false is bondage. What is true is Ātman. Jayaratha defines liberation as the knowledge or intuition of Ātman. What is the characteristic of Ātman is the characteristic of liberation. A bound soul is gradually released by removing limitations by lower principles. When these are destroyed, limitations of a self by higher principles persist, and it is reborn in a plane of higher principles after death. When it acquires the highest knowledge of Ātman, free of all limitations by principles (tattva), with absolute freedom and consciousness devoid of distinction, it achieves liberation.⁷⁹ Abhinavagupta regards release as nothing over and above the manifestation of the essential nature of a self, and its essence is consciousness of Ātman. Consciousness is the essence of Ātman. True knowledge of it is Its manifestation. The distinction between knowledge and emancipation—means and end—is imaginary, and not real. Powers of actions and the like are nothing distinct from consciousness. If they are conceived to be attributes of an unconscious entity (e. g., self), the reason is unproven, since the existence of the attributes has not been proved. Pratyabhijñā Śaivism does not accept any substrate of the attributes like power of action and the like as Kaṇāda does, and it does not conceive of powers as attributes of a powerful being—a substrate. Kaṇāda thinks of a self as the unconscious substrate of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, volition, aversion, merits and demerits. Just as there is no difference between a fire and its power of burning, so there is no difference between powerful Ātman and Its powers. So supreme free consciousness is designated as endowed with powers which are mere adjuncts (upādhi). If there were a difference between powers of knowledge and action and Ātman or Śiva, Śaiva monism that Śiva alone is the Reality would be contradicted. The different powers are of the nature of consciousness and freedom. Śiva is endowed with manifold powers nondifferent from Him. So knowledge of Ātman itself is liberation. In fact, there is no cause-effect relation between knowledge and liberation. But one who has acquired intuition of Ātman is certainly released. It is said, 'Knowledge is a means to liberation'. So there is a cause-effect relation between knowledge and liberation. Abhinavagupta opines that the text asserting the aforesaid relation between them is not primary but secondary. An action is of the nature of knowledge, because it cannot exist apart from knowledge. An action is not devoid of knowledge. Different actions and their external objects are not different from knowledge. So liberation is of the nature of knowledge. It is one. The doubt that different means would produce different kinds of liberation is dispelled by the aforesaid reasoning. There is no difference between means and ends. Knowledge of the essence of Ātman is the only means. There being no difference in means, there is no difference in liberation. It is objected that many means have been enjoined in monistic Śaivism. Abhinavagupta replies that though many means have been inculcated, they have the same

end, viz., destruction of all taints and their powers. Though there are many causes of the destruction of a jar, the effect is one. So the argument that different means must realise different ends is false. Here the difference between means and end is unreal. So the objection that ends must differ is groundless. The power of volition, the power of action, and the power of knowledge being threefold, liberation—the end—is only one. Śāmbhavo-pāya, śāktopāya and āṇavopāya already explained result in one liberation.⁸⁰

Abhinavagupta avers that Ātman exists in the state of manifestation of consciousness, that undifferentiated consciousness endowed with manifold powers constitutes Its nature, and that It assumes the form of a bound soul by veiling Its lustre. Its release is brought about by a prescribed method of manifesting Its nature as self-luminous. Manifestation of Ātman is that of consciousness distinct from that of an external object. Consciousness is undivided, of the nature of one, integral manifestation. Infinite powers are innate in Its nature. Though It is one and nondual, and possessed of inconceivable, infinite powers and freedom, It conceals Its omniscience and omnipotence, assumes duality of subjects and objects, and becomes an individual soul. This is called bondage. Liberation is nothing more than manifestation of Ātman's nature as consciousness. It is manifestation of Its lustre characterised by omniscience and omnipotence. Atomicity (āṇava mala) itself is false knowledge—incomplete knowledge in the form of manifestation of difference. It produces flaws in Ātman in the form of false conceit of 'I' in not-self. So pure, complete knowledge becomes impure owing to false knowledge. It is manifested as incomplete knowledge because of Ātman's freedom. When a self knows itself as the Absolute Knower, its knowledge becomes complete. Ātman veils Its nature by false conceit of 'I' in not-self. In reality, there is neither bondage nor liberation. So there is no variety in liberation⁸¹.

Kṣemarāja opines that when Śiva conceals His omniscience and omnipotence, and generates delusion in a soul by investing it with a subtle body and gross body, its being deluded by them is bondage. But when He generates the state of ecstasy (turiya) in it, it pervades the universe and transcends ecstasy, and becomes a mass of pure consciousness and bliss, and achieves identity with Śiva and embodied release⁸².

CRITICISM OF OTHER VIEWS OF LIBERATION.—The Yogācāras regard liberation as the cognition : 'I am devoid of love, hate and the like.' The mind is naturally luminous but veiled by love, hate, etc., adventitious impurities due to beginningless nescience. These constitute bondage, and when they are destroyed by meditation on four noble truths, luminous consciousness is manifested, which is called liberation. Jayaratha refutes this view. The Yogācāras regard the mind as a series of momentary mental modes. Meditation is the cause of the destruction of its impurities. But it cannot produce an excellence in the momentary psychoses ; it can do so in a permanent substance alone. Fragrant flowers can perfume sesame seeds, because they are permanent. Momentary impure mental modes cannot produce a pure luminous cognition, but they can produce only impure cognitions. Meditation cannot produce an illuminating cognition. The advocates of the doctrine of momentariness cannot account for bondage and liberation. Those philosophers alone who believe in permanent souls can account for them. A permanent soul is bound and released. A series of momentary cognitions is neither bound nor released, since a single cognition is

not so. The Yogācāras regard the same cognition as of the forms of joy, grief, etc., and so consider the knowledge of buddhitattva to be liberation, and call it omniscience. There is the cessation of the lower principles when buddhitattva is attained. A soul that has attained this principle is born in higher planes of existents. Jayaratha interprets the Yogācāras' view of emancipation in this way.

The Mādhyamikas regard the cognition 'I am void within' as liberation. They think all external entities to be essenceless (niḥsvabhāva) and false and all internal cognitions also to be so, and therefore think liberation to be void (śūnya). Jayaratha refutes their view. For them, 'blue' and other external objects are false, and cognitions also are false like them. Consciousness also being merely of the nature of manifestation is false and nonexistent, since nothing is manifested. The Mādhyamikas' argument in defence of their position that consciousness of manifestation is undeniable is invalid. They contend that what is devoid of all substrates, all attributes, all afflictions, and all dispositions, is not really a void, and that what is devoid of imaginary distinction of subject and object, etc., is not devoid of consciousness. This contention amounts to the Yogācāras doctrine of Vijñānavāda : momentary cognitions alone are real, and the world is manifested as varied cognitions of the mind. This doctrine has already been refuted.⁸³

The Sāṃkhya regard liberation as discriminative knowledge of the self : 'I am not a doer, but a conscious neutral knower different from prakṛti and its modifications.' Mind (buddhi) is active, but the self is an inactive neutral spectator. If it were active, it would never be conscious. Prakṛti and its modifications alone are unconscious and active. Jayaratha refutes this view. If the self were inactive, it would never be released. Even if a self acquired discriminative knowledge of itself, it would not abide in its essential nature, since prakṛti being by nature active it would not be neutral to the self, and would bind it again. Prakṛti being unconscious cannot know : 'I am seen by this self', 'I shall no more act for its experience', and so it would act for the self's enjoyment and suffering, although it has acquired discriminative knowledge of its self. So the self cannot be released. The Sāṃkhya regard the self's abiding in its essential nature after completely discriminating itself from prakṛti or not-self of the nature of pleasure, pain, etc., as liberation. So liberation, for them, is the attainment of puruṣatattva devoid of pleasure, pain and the like. The Sāṃkhya concept of liberation is higher than that of the Buddhists, since the doctrine of self is higher than that of not-self, mind, or cognition. This is Jayaratha's interpretation of the Sāṃkhya view of release.⁸⁴

Patañjali regards liberation as complete aloofness (kaivalya) of the self from prakṛti and its effects through meditation on God. Jayaratha interprets Patanjali's concept of liberation as the attainment of niyatitattva, which regulates causes and effects, actions and fruits. Niyatitattva is higher than puruṣatattva. Jayaratha interprets liberation conceived by Mausula as the attainment of māyātattva, Pāsupatas' concept of liberation as the attainment of Īśvaratattva, that is higher than māyātattva. The Buddhists' concept of liberation means the destruction of māyīya mala. Mausula's concept of release means the destruction of kārma mala. Pāsupatas' concept of liberation means the destruction of āṇava mala, which is the false conceit of self in not-self. Abhinavagupta regards release as the destruction of limitations, and complete release as the destruction of all limitations. A principle

(tattva) is a limitation which generates bondage in a self. A self that has destroyed a lower principle is reborn in a plane of a higher principle. God binds it again in a higher plane, which has achieved release from a lower principle. The Śaiva attains the highest emancipation by destroying all principles and limitations and by realising his Śivahood. Knowledge of all principles, destruction of all limitations by them, and extermination of all nescience are liberation. It is manifested as knowledge of supreme 'I'-consciousness devoid of all kinds of 'this'-consciousness and their subconscious impressions.⁸⁵

SOMĀNANDA : ALL IS ŚIVA.—Śiva produces the world of diverse objects by His volitions. Different objects are products of His volitions without any external material. They are His externalised volitions. All are Śiva in this sense. They are created out of His creative delight for His play. There is the nature of Śiva in all entities, which exists equally in them all. Difference is real, because it is the creation of Śivatattva, which is multiform. The manifoldness of the world is real, and not a false appearance. All categories are of the nature of the Lord, Śiva. All cognitions also are of the nature of Śiva, because He infuses His power into them. So all are of the nature of Śiva. He assumes the forms of all existents by His volitions, not by modifications of His nature. The world in its subtle state and gross state both is full of existence, or being; being is the agency of becoming; agency is the quality of acting, of the nature of freedom and consciousness of Śiva. So all entities are Śiva. His action is voluntary. His act is an act of will. Being full of the powers of volition and action is being of the nature of Śiva, since powers and powerful Being are nondifferent from each other. Though there are many things of the nature of Śiva, He is not many consciousnesses. He is one transcendental consciousness (cit). Thus all are Śiva.⁸⁶

UTPALADEVA : ĀBHĀSAVĀDA.—Śiva is the light of universal consciousness. Śakti is the mirror of dynamic consciousness wherein He is reflected, and He sees Himself. He turns back upon Himself through Śakti, and becomes self-conscious or 'I'-conscious. Śiva is consciousness and self-consciousness or 'I'-consciousness while Śaṅkara's Brahman is mere consciousness. Consciousness is manifestation (prakāśa), and self-consciousness is self-manifestation (vimarśa). Śiva is self-manifest through Śakti. She makes Him self-manifest through His reflection in Her. She is the power of self-manifestation. She is sovereignty (aiśvarya), freedom (svātantrya), power of differentiating into subjects and objects, psychic or spiritual vibration (spanda), power of action (kriyāśakti), power of manifesting diverse objects of the world, and of reflecting them on the screen of Śiva's transparent consciousness, and power of synthesising different elements into a unity. So Śiva is the archetype (bimba) whereof the world is a manifestation (ābhāsa) or reflection (pratibimba). Or, Śiva is the reflection of Himself in Śakti or dynamic consciousness, and the world is a secondary reflection (ābhāsa) of Śiva. The world is real, though it is a reflection, and is projected by His volition outward for the experience of limited knowers or souls. Diverse objects are the materials of His world play which is real. They are not false appearances. The world play is real, souls are real, and different objects are real. They are products of His māyāśakti. They are known because they are of the nature of illumination, but they are insentient, since they are devoid of self-illumination or 'I'-consciousness. Śiva

is their material cause, since He enters into their constitution. He is their efficient cause, since His *māyāśakti* and other powers are their efficient cause. His powers are inseparable from Him. *Niyati* due to His *māyāśakti* connects specific causes with specific effects. Space, time, causality, recollection, differentiation, sublation and the like are due to His act of synthetic apperception. He apprehends diverse objects as nondifferent from Him, though bound souls know them to be different from themselves, and from one another. Released souls apprehend them as nondifferent from themselves. So diverse objects, though reflections of Śiva in His dynamic consciousness, are not unreal. They are not subjective ideas of bound souls. Utpaladeva does not advocate subjective idealism. He advocates Ideal-Realism, like *Somānanda*, his teacher. *Somānanda* mentions *pratibimbavāda* in 'Śivadrṣṭi'

Utpaladeva says, "An object is not manifested, if it is not of the nature of manifestation; manifestation to a self is its manifestation. A manifestable or knowable object of the nature of manifestation cannot be proved to be of the nature of nonmanifestation. So an object is proved to be of the nature of manifestation. The Lord of the nature of consciousness manifests all objects outside Him by His internal volition like a yogin without any external material. The Lord manifests the objects which exist in Him; if they did not exist in Him, He would not have volition to manifest them outside Him. He projects the objects which exist as nondifferent from Him outward to be known by limited knowers. "The essence of manifestation is the urge of the Lord (*vimaṁśa*) to create an object. A manifestation (*prakāśa*) tinged with an object is like an insentient crystal tinged with the reflection of an object. *Ātman* or Śiva is different from an insentient crystal, since He is the agent of dynamic consciousness which manifests an object. The Lord knows 'this is a jar' as His power, and not as 'this'. The Lord enters into a body, and manifests internal objects by His volition outside Him. Manifestations full of consciousness exist always inside the Lord or *Ātman*; they exist outside Him also when they are projected outward by Him through His *māyāśakti*. They exist inside Him when He wills to create them and make them perceptible to limited knowers. Manifold manifestations or reflections constituting the world can exist in the permanent self-luminous Lord's consciousness, though He is devoid of variety. This Lord alone can manifest manifold objects of the world because of His omnipotence by His volition. This divine will constitutes His creativeness of the world. "Different manifestations (*ābhāsa*) cannot be created by the one Lord of the nature of consciousness without His 'I'-consciousness characterized by the volition to create them". "His will to exist as the world of the nature of manifestations is the cause of its continued existence. The one Lord assumes the form of the manifold world, which is the unfoldment of His 'I'-consciousness in the form of 'this'. The Lord is the creator of diversity. Śiva is the creator of all objects (*artha*) with their relation to Him, and of difference and nondifference. The objects (*vastu*) are the forms of consciousness alone (*cinmātra*). Differences are constructed by *māyāśakti*. They are nondifferent from Śiva. Externality of objects is inessential." These statements clearly show that Utpaladeva was realistic in his approach to the world, and advocated Ideal-Realism. The objects are reflections on Śiva's consciousness, and yet they are real.⁸⁷

Abhinavagupta also advocates the doctrine of manifestation (*ābhāsa*) or reflection (*pratibimba*). He says, "Śakti, *māyā*, *prakṛti*, and the earth are manifested by the Lord

because of His omnipotence. The world consists of various bodies, sense-organs, spheres of existence ; it is the unfoldment of His powers ; He assumes the forms of embodied souls that enjoy the world. Śiva of the nature of consciousness is reflected in His transparent consciousness of the nature of Śakti, as a face is reflected in a transparent mirror. Śiva, the pure, tranquil, indeterminate, supreme Reality is reflected in the world consisting of thirty six principles. As a town with its various objects is reflected in a mirror without annulling their difference, so diverse objects are reflected in the indeterminate consciousness of the Lord. They are reflected in His differenceless consciousness as different from one another. They are due to His māyāśakti. When a soul conquers māyā producing difference, it merges in Brahman."⁸⁸ "The Lord manifests the play of creation and dissolution of the limited world in His ether of consciousness by His absolute freedom. The events of the world are reflected in the Lord's consciousness as different from one another, as earth, water, etc., are reflected in water. What is repulsing in the world is made of māyātattva, and what is not repulsing in it is made of sadvidyātattva. The Lord unfolds the world in two forms of manifestations and shines as archetype (bimba) and reflections (pratibimba)"⁸⁹. These statements show that Abhinavagupta advocates the doctrine of reflection. But they do not show that reflections of different objects of the world are unreal phenomenal appearances. Abhinavagupta says, "What is repulsing and what is unrepulsing in the world are mere reflections (ābhāsamātra) in their essence, and not ontologically real (tātvika)". This statement shows that the world is a phenomenal appearance. It may be interpreted in the sense that from the absolute standpoint of Śiva the world is a phenomenal appearance, but from the empirical standpoint of a bound soul, it is real. But when it acquires recognitive intuition of its identity with Śiva, it knows the world to be nondifferent from its Ātman or Śiva. Vasugupta describes determinate cognitions as dreams. Utpaladeva says, "The manifestations of objects always exist in Śiva, but they exist outside Him also projected outward by His māyāśakti". So they are empirically real to a bound soul fettered by bonds, tainted by impurities, and contracted by coverings, created by māyāśakti. But they are unreal to Śiva because He knows them to be nondifferent from Him. Abhinavagupta says, "As invisible Rāhu reflected in the moon is manifested, so the ubiquitous Ātman is reflected in buddhi in the form of objects. Ātman or Śiva is reflected in buddhi rendered transparent by the descent of Śiva-Śakti, as a face is reflected in a transparent mirror. The world is reflected in Śiva Himself as jars, etc., are reflected in water ; all issue out of Śiva like dreams issuing out of a sleeping person's mind"⁹⁰. So the world is reflected in Śiva's consciousness and reflected back in a jiva's buddhi.

PRATYABHIJÑĀ SCHOOL OF ŚAIVISM AND ŚAṂKARA'S ADVAITAVĀDA.—The former differs from the latter in the following points. 1. Śaṅkara regards Brahman as the ontological reality while Somānanda regards Śiva endowed with divine power (Śakti) as the ontological reality. Śiva and Śakti are inseparable from each other. Śiva is endowed with the power of consciousness or illumination, self-illumination, bliss, volition, knowledge and action. Brahman is infinite existence-consciousness-bliss. They are Its essential characteristics.

2. Śaṅkara regards God (Īśvara) as a phenomenal appearance of Brahman limited by nescience (avidyā). God is the omniscient and omnipotent creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world, while Somānanda regards Śiva as the omniscient and omnipotent creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. Śiva is not a phenomenal appearance. 3. For Śaṅkara, māyā is neither real, nor unreal, nor both, nor either, but indefinable, while, for Somānanda, māyā is a real power of Śiva, a principle of self-limitation whereby He produces the world. 4. For Śaṅkara, the world is a false appearance (vivarta) of Brahman due to māyā, while, for Somānanda, the world is created by Śiva by His power of volition and by His power of action without any extraneous material; it is the product of His volition. Śaṅkara advocates absolute idealism while Somānanda advocates absolute ideal-realism or voluntarism (svātantryavāda). The former regards the world as an unreal appearance while the latter regards it as real: all are Śiva. Somānanda regards the diverse objects of the world as created or projected outward by Śiva, and sustained and dissolved by His volitions. Abhinavagupta regards them as created by Śiva and reflected in the foundation of His transparent consciousness as houses and trees are reflected in the water of a tank by His powers. 5. For Śaṅkara, the individual soul is an unreal appearance, a reflection of Brahman in nescience, while, for Somānanda, the jīva is real in that Śiva limits Himself by māyāśakti and becomes the jīva. 6. For Śaṅkara, the soul's bondage is due to its nescience or ignorance of its identity with Brahman, and its liberation is due to the destruction of nescience by the knowledge of its identity with Brahman. But, for Somānanda, bondage is due to the taints due to nescience, and liberation is due to the destruction of the impurities and nescience, the acquisition of omniscience and omnipotence, and the recognition of the soul's Śivahood. 7. For Śaṅkara, Brahman is mere infinite knowledge, while, for Somānanda, Śiva is the unlimited Knower. 8. For Śaṅkara, the jīva, in its real nature, is mere knowledge, while, for Somānanda, the jīva is a limited knower, doer and enjoyer; it derives its consciousness or illumination (prakāśa) and 'I'-consciousness or self-illumination (vimarśa) from Śiva, and is a limited self-conscious knower of its cognitions, feelings and volitions. 9. For Śaṅkara, Brahman is transcendent of the false world-appearance and unreal empirical selves, while, for Somānanda and Utpaladeva, Śiva-Śakti is both transcendent and immanent. 10. For Śaṅkara, Brahman as pure identity is real, while, for Somānanda, Śiva is real as unity, plurality, and unity of plurality. 11. For Śaṅkara, time, space and causality are mere categories of the intellect infected with nescience and inapplicable to Brahman, the Reality, while, for Utpaladeva, they are real, applicable to the real world, and presuppose Śiva, the Supreme Knower, Who unifies plurality and synthesizes different elements into a unity. 12. Śaṅkara advocates vivartavāda while Utpaladeva advocates ābhāsavāda or pratibimbavāda. Certainly, the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism is more satisfactory from the monistic standpoint than Śaṅkara's absolute idealism as a philosophical doctrine⁹¹.

PRATYABHIJÑĀ ŚAIVISM AND DUALISTIC ŚAIVISM.—Both accept Śiva as the supreme, independent reality, and the soul and the world also as real. Both accept thirty six categories (tattva), and three taints as real, though their accounts of them slightly vary. But the former is monistic while the latter is dualistic. The former regards Śiva as the ontological

reality of the soul and the world while the latter regards them as eternally distinct from Him. The Pāśupata regards Śiva as the efficient cause and prakṛti as the material cause of the world while Pratyabhijñā Śaivism regards Śiva as the efficient, material, and auxiliary cause of the world. Śrīkaṇṭha's Śaivism and Śrīpati Paṇḍita's Vīra Śaivism are influenced by Rāmānuja's qualified monism (viśiṣṭādvaitavāda). Their views represent Śaiva Viśiṣṭādvaita. There are other differences also.

SPANDA ŚĀSTRA.—'Śiva Sūtra' of Vasugupta and his 'Spandakārikā' are the basic works. They do not expound any new philosophy, but Pratyabhijñā works and Spanda Śāstra expound the same doctrine of Śaiva monism or Trika philosophy. The accounts of knower, knowledge and knowable object, of enjoyer, enjoyment and enjoyable object, agent, action, and effect given already were based on 'Spanda Kārikā' also. 'Spanda Śāstra' lays greater stress on the spiritual discipline for the recognitive intuition of a soul's identity with Śiva. 'Śiva Sūtra' also lays greater stress on the method of realisation of the supreme goal. Somānanda's 'Śivadṛṣṭi' and Utpalavadeva's 'Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā' and 'Siddhitrayi' expound the philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism. Abhinavagupta's 'Paramārthasāra' expounds the Pratyabhijñā Śaiva philosophy. His 'Tantrāloka' and 'Parātriṃśikā-tattvavivaraṇa' expound the Pratyabhijñā theology and Śaiva Kuṇḍalinī-yoga.

Vasugupta describes spanda as psychic energy, throb or vibration in a body, which is agitated in intense anger, joy, deliberation and the like. It is expressed in self-appropriation of a particular object and determination to do a particular action. It is divine power in the form of serpent power (kuṇḍalinī) which is asleep or coiled at the basic centre, awakened by breath control and concentration on the Divine at it, and made to pierce six centres (cakra) in Suṣumnā, spinal cord, and ascend to the highest centre above the cerebrum and unite with Śiva. An ignorant soul is freed of nescience, and acquires the knowledge of its Śivahood, which is no more veiled. Kallaṭa avers that when powers are calmed, psychic vibration distinctly emerges. Its nature is known from an adept Master. When inhaled air and exhaled air are calmed, and when the mind is concentrated on the ether of Śiva's consciousness, a soul's real nature as universal consciousness, Ātman or Śiva is manifested. An earnest, aspiring, and persevering soul constantly making efforts to know spandatattva knows its essential nature in no distant time in a waking state. It knows its essential nature in a state of ecstasy (turīya).⁹² Kṣemarāja speaks of throbbing consciousness of the Lord, which is the heart, and which transcends the world, and which is immanent in it. The Lord is of the nature of illumination and self-illumination (vimarśa) or 'I'-consciousness. If He were devoid of 'I'-consciousness, He would be insentient. Vimarśa is transcendental consciousness (cit), dynamic consciousness (caitanya), freedom (svātantrya), sovereignty (aiśvarya), agency, throbbing, heart, essence, vibration and the like. Kṣemarāja speaks of Śiva as possessed of spanda and self-existent. So spanda is vibration of divine power of freedom nondifferent from Him. Spanda is not vibration of physical energy, or vibration of vital force, or vibration of mental energy, but spiritual vibration of divine power. In the human body it remains coiled at the lowest centre of mystic consciousness and completely awakened at the highest centre. It can be roused by Kuṇḍalinīyoga. It is common to

Śaivayoga and Śāktayoga. Spanda is the one power of Śiva's 'I'-consciousness. It is so called because it assumes the form of slight movement, throbbing, wave, strength, effort, heart, essence and the like. Though it is one, it simultaneously unfolds and enfolds, evolves and involves. (Cp. Vallabha and Aurobinda)⁹³.

PRATYABHIJÑĀ ŚAIVAYOGA : KUṆḌALINĪYOGA.—There are seven circles (cakra), lotuses, or centres of mystic consciousness in Suṣumnā in the spinal cord with the nerve Idā on the right and the nerve Piṅgalā on the left. There is the basal centre above the anus, mūlādhāra of four yellow petals with the letters 'vaṁ', 'śaṁ', 'ṣaṁ', and 'saṁ' inscribed on them. Divine power, serpent power, Kuṇḍalinī, lies asleep, coiled, dormant, in three coils and a half around Śivaliṅga. Divine power or Mother ascends from it to the higher centres. She is awakend by breath-control and concentration at the centre on the Divine Being. Aurobindo dispenses with breath-control in Kuṇḍalinīyoga. At the base of the sex-organ there is a lotus called Svādhiṣṭhāna of six white petals with the letters 'baṁ', 'bhaṁ', 'maṁ', 'yaṁ', 'raṁ' and 'laṁ' inscribed on them. Śivaliṅga resides in this lotus. At the base of the navel there is a lotus called Maṇipura of ten red petals with the letters 'ḍaṁ', 'ḍhaṁ', 'ṇaṁ', 'taṁ', 'thaṁ', 'daṁ', 'dhaṁ', 'naṁ', 'paṁ' and 'phaṁ' inscribed on them. Fire-god resides in this lotus. At the heart-lotus there is Anāhata lotus of twelve smoky petals with the letters 'Kaṁ', 'Khaṁ', 'gaṁ', 'ghaṁ', 'ṇaṁ', 'cham', 'chhaṁ', 'jaṁ', 'jham', 'ñaṁ', 'taṁ' and 'thaṁ' inscribed on them. The Divine Being as the Inner Controller and the jīva reside here. The lotus is called Anāhata because an occult sound 'Auṁ'—nāda—is heard here when the mind becomes calm and tranquil after prolonged practice of Kuṇḍalinīyoga. At the base of the throat there is the Viśuddha lotus of sixteen blue petals with the letters 'aṁ', 'āṁ', 'iṁ', 'īṁ', 'uṁ', 'ūṁ', 'ṛṁ', 'ṛīṁ', 'liṁ', 'līṁ', 'eṁ', 'aiṁ', 'oṁ', 'auṁ', 'aṁ' and 'aḥa' inscribed on them. Śivaliṅga resides here. Between the eye brows there is the Ājñācakra of two yellow petals with the letters 'ha' and 'kṣa' inscribed on them. Śivaliṅga resides here like a luminous lamp. In the centre of the crown of the head above the cerebrum there is the Sahasrāra lotus of a thousand multicoloured petals with fifty letters inscribed on them. At the centre there is a circle of effulgent light inside which there is a triangle. Parama Śiva and Divine Power (Śakti) reside here. This lotus is called Akula. Kuṇḍalinī is aroused, ascends through Suṣumnā, pierces all the lotuses, and is united with Parama Śiva, in this highest lotus, in the state of fully awake, infinite consciousness and bliss. The Śāktas call it the abode of Divine Mother. The Śaivas call it the abode of Śiva. These centres of mystic consciousness are not found on dissection through a microscope. They are revealed to yogins through occult vision. The Pāsupatas enjoined meditation on 'Om' at the heart-lotus but not at the other centres. They were not aware of Kuṇḍalinīyoga. Vīra Śaivism expounded by Śrīpati Paṇḍita enjoined Kuṇḍalinīyoga. But it is unique to Pratyabhijñā Śaivism and Spandasāstra, especially emphasized by Vasugupta, Kallāṭa, Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja, and Śāktatism. Somānanda briefly expounds it in his 'Śāktavijñāna'. I have explained it in my 'Śākta Monism'. Aurobindo regards the Mūlādhāra as governing the physical, the Svādhiṣṭhāna as governing the lower vital, the Maṇipūra as governing the larger vital, the Anāhata as governing the emotional, the Viśuddha as governing the expressive mind, the Ājñācakra as governing the dynamic mind,

and the Sahasrāra as governing the higher thinking mind, and illumined mind. He describes the Mulādhāra with four red petals, the Svādhiṣṭhāna with six deep purple red petals, the Maṇipura with ten violet petals, the Anāhata with twelve golden pink petals, the Viśuddha with sixteen grey petals, the Ājñā with two white petals, and the Sahasrāra above the head with blue petals surrounded by gold light. He dispenses with the letters inscribed on them, and simplifies Kuṇḍalinīyoga. He emphasizes concentration at the centres and meditation on the Divine with perfect self-surrender, opening to higher consciousness, persevering, aspiring, and seeking for Divine grace. Breath-control should not be practised without the guidance of a yogin. Kuṇḍalinīyoga should be practised while sitting erect with folded legs.⁹⁴

PRATYABHIJÑĀ ŚAIVISM AND ŚĀKTA MONISM.—Both are types of spiritual monism and allied systems. They resemble each other in many respects. They regard Śiva-Śakti as the supreme ontological reality, believe in māyāśakti, the world as unfoldment of the Divine, the individual soul as the Divine limited by five contractors (kañcūka), and as tainted with three taints (mala), the thirty six principles (tattva), bondage as due to nescience, and release as due to destruction of nescience and taints, and Kuṇḍalinīyoga. They differ in some respects. Śaiva monism regards Śiva as higher than Śakti, and transcendent of the world, creating the world with His power. Śākta monism regards Śakti as higher than Śiva, transcendent of, and immanent in, the world, evolving in it, and enfolding it. It regards Śakti as endowed with illumination (prakāśa) and self-illumination (vimarśa) whereas Śaiva monism regards Śiva as endowed with these qualities. The former regards Śiva as static, calm Absolute while the latter regards Him as dynamic and endowed with the powers of consciousness, bliss, knowledge, volition and action, creating, sustaining and dissolving the world. Somānanda regards the world as real and produced by Śiva's volition while Śāktaism regards the world as a phenomenal appearance. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta regard the world as a reflection of Śiva in His universal consciousness. Besides Kuṇḍalinīyoga Śaiva monism enjoins āṇavopāya, sāmabhavopāya, śāktopāya and anupāya, which are foreign to Śāktaism.

Somānanda criticises Śāktaism which enjoins the worship of Śakti's highest state devoid of Śiva. His criticism of Śaivism has already been dealt with. But later Śāktaism does not recognise Śakti as devoid of Śiva. Therefore Somānanda's criticism does not apply to it⁹⁵. Lakṣmana Deśikendra quotes from authoritative Śākta works about the nature of Śiva. "Śiva with His Divine Power (Śakti) pervades the universe, and assumes the forms of diverse objects through His Śakti." "Śakti nondifferent from Śiva issued from Him, and created the universe." Śiva is the transcendent, self-manifest, infinite, undifferentiated consciousness. He is the static, impersonal Absolute. Śakti is the personal, dynamic, Divine Power invested with 'I'-consciousness. She creates the universe by Her free will. She is the cause of bondage and liberation of jīvas. She projects the world of phenomenal appearances with Her māyāśakti, and entangles jīvas in embodied life by veiling their spiritual nature by nescience. Śiva and Śakti are inseparable from each other. Thus many functions of Śiva of Śaiva monism are assigned to Śakti by Śākta monism. She is 'I'-consciousness (vimarśa), and differentiated into subjects and objects, and modified into thirty six principles⁹⁶.

- ¹ APS., 23-26.
- ² IS., 6-7, 14, 36, 41-42, 53-54, & 56; ĪPK., i, 38, 51-56, 59; iii, 10-11; ŚD., ŚDV., i, 44-45; iii, 80-81.
- ³ IS., ISV., 18-27, ĪPK., i, 2-3; ĪPKV., 1-2; IS., 26-42.
- ⁴ ŚDV., iii, 1.
- ⁵ ŚD., iii, 1-6, 20, 64-65; i, 3-6; ŚDV., i, 3-7; cp. ŚM., pp. 1-5.
- ⁶ APP., i; PS., PSV., 46; ŚD., i, 7-8, 11, 15, 17 & 27; ŚDV., i, 2, 8 & 12.
- ⁷ ŚD., ŚDV., i, 19-20, 24-25 & 27.
- ⁸ ŚD., i, 28, 39-41, 44 & 49; ŚDV., i, 28, 40, 44-48.
- ⁹ PPR., p. 6; APP., p. 18; ṢṬTS., ṢṬTSV., i; PS., 10-11, p. 32; PSV., 10-11, p. 32; 14, p. 41; ŚSV., iii, 3, p. 45. PTTV., p. 178.
- ¹⁰ PPR., 6-7 & 11; PSV., 14; PHV., 1.
- ¹¹ ĪPK., ĪPKV., iii, 3-4; ŚD., ŚDV., ii, 1; ŚD., i, 30; BŚSV., ii, 3; ṢṬTS., ṢṬTSV., 4.
- ¹² PHV., 3; ṢṬTS., ṢṬTSV., 4; PPR., p. 7; ĪPK., ĪPKV., iii, 3-4; ŚD., i, 3; ŚDV., ii, 1; BŚSV., ii, 3; PSV., 14; VŚSV., ii, 3.
- ¹³ PHV., 3; PSV., 15; ĪPK., ĪPKV., iii, 3-4; ṢṬTS., ṢṬTSV., 5; VŚSV., ii, 3.
- ¹⁴ ĪPK., ĪPKV., iii, 6, 7 & 16; ŚD., ŚDV., i, 32; PPR., p. 7; PS., PSV., p. 15; SS., SSV., iii, 3, 14-16 & 35; BŚSV., iii, 3; APP., 21; ṢṬTS., ṢṬTSV., 5.
- ¹⁵ PPR., pp. 8-9; ṢṬTSV., 7-12; VŚSV., ii, 7, 42-46; PHV., 9, PSV., 17; ĪPKV., iii, 9; APP., 23-25; BŚSV., ii, 25; pp. 43-44; cp. ŚM., pp. 20-21.
- ¹⁶ PPR., pp. 7-8; APP., 22; PH., PHV., 4; ĪPK., iii, 10 & 14; PS., PSV., 4; ṢṬTSV., 6.
- ¹⁷ APP., 26; PPR., p. 9; ṢṬTSV., 13; cp. AG., pp. 362-72.
- ¹⁸ ṢṬTS., ṢṬTSV., 14-15; PPR., p. 10; APP., 26-27.
- ¹⁹ ṢṬTS., ṢṬTSV., 16-20; PPR., p. 16.
- ²⁰ APS., 2-14, 17-23; PSV., 16; VŚSV., iii, 1, 1-7.
- ²¹ ŚD., ŚDV., i, 41-43; ṢṬTS., 6; ĪPK., iii, 13-20 & 31.
- ²² SpK., ii, 3-4; SS., i, 1; PH., PHV., 3-5 & 7.
- ²³ ŚD., ŚDV., iii, 98-99; ĪPK., ĪPKV., iii, 18-23; Svachchanda Tantra, X, 1141; Netra Tantra, viii, 30; PHV., 8-12; PSV., 5-7 & 16.
- ²⁴ SpK., SpKV., 21; KŚSV., iii, 20, 25, 32, 38-39 & 41; VŚSV., i, 55-56, 38-45; SS., i, 7-10; ĪPK., iii, 24-31; cp. ŚM., pp. 5-7, 10-11, 29-35, 40-41.
- ²⁵ PSV., 18, 33, 8-9; PTTV., pp. 136-37.
- ²⁶ ĪPK., iii, 15-16; PHV., 9; PSV., 24; VŚSV., i, 2, śl., 15-20.
- ²⁷ PHV., PH., 12-13, 15-17; ŚS., KŚSV., BŚSV., iii, 44; VŚSV., iii, 44, śl., 198-205; cp. ŚM., pp. 5-7, 29-35; cp. AG., pp. 314-15.
- ²⁸ KŚSV., i, 1; iii, 30-31; VŚSV., i, 9, 12-13; i, 5, 33-35; iii, 43, śl., 191-92; iii, 30-32; PHV., 1-2, 10, 12-13; ŚD., i, 40 & 48; cp. AG., pp. 319-42.
- ²⁹ PS., PSV., 13, 41-43 & 51; ŚD., ŚDV., i, 2 & 32.
- ³⁰ ŚS., KŚSV., VŚSV., BŚSV., iii, 9-11.
- ³¹ SpK., SpKV., 14, 17 & 29; ŚD., vii, 99.
- ³² SpK., SpKV., 18-19.
- ³³ ĪPK., ii, 2, 8, 30-31; iv, 1-15; iii, 14; ĪPKV., iii, 14; PS., PSV., 41; ĪPK., ĪPKV., iii, 15-23; ii, 31, 33 & 39; i, 2.
- ³⁴ TA, TAV., i, 52-62.
- ³⁵ ĪPK., ii, 2, 9, 12, 14-15, 27, 33-42, 46, 48, 50-52; ĪPKV., ii, 2, 33-34, 36-38, 40-41; 46-47, 52-53; SpK., SpKV., 14-15; ŚD., vii, 100-01.
- ³⁶ SpK., SpKV., 47-51.
- ³⁷ ŚS., i, 4; iii, 19; KŚSV., VŚSV., i, 4; iii, 19; BŚSV., iii, 19.
- ³⁸ ŚS., ii, 3; i, 22; BŚSV., KŚSV., VŚSV., ii, 2-3, 4-9; i, 22, śl., 103-08, 110-11; PHV., 12; PTTV., 148 & 243; TTV., i, 46; cp. ŚM., pp. 17-18; CCA., ii, ch. 17; J R DL.
- ³⁹ ŚS., KŚSV., BŚSV., ii, 6; iii, 29-31; VŚSV., ii, 6, śl., 26-29; cp. ŚM., pp. 14-15, J R DL.)
- ⁴⁰ PTTV., pp. 260 & 299; VŚSV., iii, 29-30; śl., 123-36; BŚSV., iii, 28-29; TA., TAV., ii, 4 & 7; SpK., SpKV., 30-32.
- ⁴¹ ĪPKV., i, 5; ĪPK., i, 4-5.
- ⁴² ĪPKV., ĪPK., i, 9-18.
- ⁴³ ĪPK., i, 19-25, 27-36; ĪPKV., i, 26-34, 37-38.
- ⁴⁴ ĪPK., i, 40-44, 49, 51 & 53; ĪPKV., i, 51 & 53.
- ⁴⁵ ĪPK., i, 54, 56, 59, 64 & 66; ĪPKV., i, 70 & 79.
- ⁴⁶ ĪPK., i, 4-72, 84-85 & 87; ĪPKV., i, 4-72, 75 & 88.
- ⁴⁷ ŚD., vi, 1-7. ⁴⁸ ŚD., vi, 8-15.
- ⁴⁹ ŚD., vi, 16-24. ⁵⁰ ŚD., vi, 24-26.
- ⁵¹ ŚD., vi, 32-49, 84-85.
- ⁵² ŚD., vi, 27-29. ⁵³ ŚD., ŚDV., ii, 2-11.
- ⁵⁴ ŚD., ŚDV., ii, 13-16, 20-28; ŚD., ii, 24-25.
- ⁵⁵ ŚD., ŚDV., ii, 28-33; VPD., i, 32.
- ⁵⁶ ŚD., ŚDV., ii, 34-49. ⁵⁷ Ibid, ii, 50-57.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid, ii, 58-65. cp. HIP., Vol. I, pp. 870-71.
- ⁵⁹ ŚD., ŚDV., ii, 65-69, 76-90.
- ⁶⁰ ŚD., iii, 34; ŚD., ŚDV., iii, 21-39; ŚDV., i, 32.
- ⁶¹ ŚD., iii, 42-44, 47, 52-57; ŚDV., iii, 40-44, 48-19, 56 & 59.
- ⁶² ŚD., 77-79; ŚD., ŚDV., iii, 71, 73-76.
- ⁶³ Ibid, iii, 82-83, 85-97.

- ⁶⁴ ŚD., vii, 78-80, 85-86, 88-92, 96-67 ; ŚS., KŚSV., BŚSV., VŚSV., iii, 26-28, śl., 110-15 ; PS., PSV., 73-78 & 80 ; RKBG., iv, 24 ; xvi, 24 ; PTTV., 32, p. 267 ; cp. ŚM., pp. 27-29.
- ⁶⁵ PTTV., 32, pp. 266-67 ; RKBG., ix, 24 & 27 ; xiii, 11 ; xviii, 55 ; cp. ŚM., pp. 42-44.
- ⁶⁶ ŚD., vii, 81-84 ; ŚS., VŚSV., iii, 16, śl., 60-65 ; iii, 6, śl., 30-39 ; iii, 5, śl., 21-25 ; iii, 16, śl., 60-63.
- ⁶⁷ ŚS., KŚSV., BŚSV., VŚSV., ii, 9-10, śl., 56-61.
- ⁶⁸ ŚS., i, 16-18 ; KŚSV., i, 18 ; VŚSV., i, 16-18, śl., 82-90 ; i, 11-12, śl., 57-66 ; BŚSV., i, 17-18, śl., 76-81 ; cp. ŚM., pp. 39-42.
- ⁶⁹ ŚS., KŚSV., iii, 25.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid, i, 21 ; ii, 5 ; i, 13-14, 19-21 ; VŚSV., i, 19-21, śl., 91-101.
- ⁷¹ ŚS., ii, 4 ; VŚSV., śl., 17-19 ; iii, 21-22, śl., 87-93, ŚS., KŚSV., iii, 35-41.
- ⁷² ŚS., KŚSV., iii, 30-34.
- ⁷³ Ibid, i, 15-16 ; ŚS., VŚSV., i, 14, śl., 73-76 ; i, 15, śl., 77-81 ; cp. ŚM., pp., 29-32.
- ⁷⁴ TA., TAV., i, 22 & 24.
- ⁷⁵ TA., TAV., i, 25-30 ; ŚS., VŚSV., BŚSV., i, 1-2.
- ⁷⁶ TA., TAV., i, 36-45, 47-50.
- ⁷⁷ ŚD., iii, 68-70 & 72.
- ⁷⁸ PS., 60-62, 67-70 ; PSV., 9, 60-61, 67-68 ; cp. Post-Śaṅkara Vedānta.
- ⁷⁹ TA., TAV., i, 31-32. ⁸⁰ Ibid, i, 156-70.
- ⁸¹ Ibid, i, 330-31.
- ⁸² PH., PHV., 16. ⁸³ TA., TAV., i, 33, pp. 64-67.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid, pp. 68-70. HIP., Vol. II, pp. 737-42.
- ⁸⁵ TA., TAV., i, 34-35, pp. 70-73.
- ⁸⁶ ŚD., i, 41, 45, 47-49 ; ii, 88 ; iii, 17, 20, 29, 34-35, 55, 60-61, 64-65 ; V, 2.
- ⁸⁷ ŚD., V, 33-34 ; IPK., i, 38, 41-43, 51-53 & 59 ; ii, 30 ; IV, 1 ; IPK., IPKV., i, 30-31, 33-34 & 84 ; ii, 33, 52-53, IS., 35 ; ŚS., i, 8. See also 'Kashmir Śaivism' (J. C. Chatterjee), K. S. T. S., 1914, pp. 53-61 ; AG., pp. 319-21, 323-41.
- ⁸⁸ PS., 4-5, 9-10, 12-13 & 51.
- ⁸⁹ TA., iii, 3-4 & 10.
- ⁹⁰ ŚS., i, 9 ; IPK., i, 84 ; PS., 8-9 & 48.
- ⁹¹ ŚD., i, 3 ; iii, 2-3, 34-35 ; iv, 1 ; vi, 1 & 7 ; vii, 99 ; IPK., i, 42, 44, 49, 51, 57, 59, 66 & 88 ; ii, 2-12, 23, 26, 30, 34, 36, 39-40, 49-53 ; PS., PSV., 12-13. See also 'The Doctrine of Recognition' (R. K. Kaw), pp. 330-33.
- ⁹² SpK., SpKV., 1, 21-25.
- ⁹³ SpS., pp. 1 & 5 ; PPR., pp. 1-2 ; ŚV., pp. 47-49. Cp. ŚM., pp. 29-32 ; LY., pp. 16-19, 66-68 ; MLY., pp. 34-36.
- ⁹⁴ ŚV., PTTV., SpK., SpKV., i, 24-25 ; cp. ŚM., pp. 29-35 ; LY., pp. 18-19 ; MLY., pp. 35-36.
- ⁹⁵ ŚD., iii, 1. ⁹⁶ ŚM., pp. 1-5, ŚT., i, 6 ; VS., YH., i, 9 ; YHD., i, 50-52. cp. HIP. Vol. II, pp. 744-46.

CHAPTER III

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PĀŚUPATA

INTRODUCTION.—The account of the Pāśupata Śaiva given here is based mainly on the 'Pāśupatasūtra' and the 'Pañcārthabhāṣya' of Kaunḍinya. It is based on Haradatta's 'Gaṇakārikā' and Bhāsarvajña's 'Ratnatika' on it and on Mādhava's 'Sarvadarśanasamgraha' (1400 A.D.) also which summarises the 'Pañcārthabhāṣya' and the 'Gaṇakārikā' and reproduces portions of the 'Ratnatika'. The Pāśupatasūtra with the 'Pañcārthabhāṣya' edited by R. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī was published in Trivandrum in 1940 A.D. A. Śāstrī dates the former about 100-200 A.D. and the latter about 400-600 A.D. S. N. Das Gupta is inclined to place the latter one or two centuries earlier. Śāstrī dates Haradatta about 800-900 A.D. and Bhāsarvajña 1000 A.D. Akṣapāda, the author of the 'Nyāyasūtra' (200 B. c.) and his followers (400-1000 A.D.) were Pāśupatas. Kaṇāda, the author of the 'Vaiśeṣikasūtra' (300 B.C.) does not explicitly mention God in the aphorisms. His followers, Praśastapāda, Udayana and others, were theistic Pāśupatas. They regarded God as the efficient cause of the world,—and not as its material cause.¹

The 'Pāśupatasūtra' is said to have been written by the Lord (paśupati) who incarnated in a village on the bank of the Narmadā in Gujrat and taught a Brāhmaṇa named Kuśika at Ujjayinī. His teachings took the form of the aphorisms. They contain very little metaphysical speculation and elaborately deal with the rituals practised by the Pāśupata ascetics. They do not refer to the theory of Karma, transmigration the worship of the phallic symbol, and the doctrines of māyā and attributeless Brahman. They reject the worship of the gods and sacrifices to them and srāddha—offering of food to the spirits of the departed ancestors. They regard the Brāhmaṇas alone as eligible for initiation into the Pāśupata spiritual discipline, look upon women and the Śūdras with disrespect, recommend a rigid code of conduct for the ascetics, and stress meditation on the mystic syllable 'Om' in the heart. They prescribe taking refuge in God, devotion to Him, offering one's self to Him, muttering His mantra or 'Om' or gāyatrī in honour of Śiva, the supreme Lord, and invoking His grace. Kaunḍinya explains the nature of the effects, the cause, the union of the soul with God, the method of effecting it, and the extinction of pain. He refers to prakṛti and its modifications advocated by the Sāṃkhya in his account of cosmology, and affiliates it to his theistic cosmology. He often refers to the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga and criticises their views, but not to the Vedānta. He does not refer to the Advaita doctrines of the attributeless Brahman and māyā and falsity of the world, and falsity of individual souls. He flourished certainly before Śaṅkara and the articulate formulation of the atheistic Sāṃkhya philosophy and the Yoga system of Patañjali. His account of restraints and moral observances partly differs from that of Patañjali. He explains breath-control, withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects, fixation of mind, meditation, and

trance, mentions posture without elaborating it, but emphasises muttering of a mantra or 'Om', fixation of mind in the heart, meditation on 'Om', constant recollection of God, abiding of mind in Him, offering of all actions to Him, offering of the self to Him, taking refuge in Him, devotion to Him, and invoking His grace. Patañjali regards meditation of God as one of the methods of attaining liberation but does not regard it as the only method. Patañjali considers yoga to be the arrest of all mental modes and liberation to be complete isolation of the self from prakṛti and its modifications. Kaṇḍinya, on the other hand, regards yoga as union of the self with God, and liberation as the absolute cessation of pain and the acquisition of divine powers, close proximity to, or intimate union with, God. Thus Kaṇḍinya's yoga substantially differs from that of Patañjali and his followers. Kaṇḍinya, like Akṣapāda, refers to the grace of God, His being the efficient cause of the world, and individual souls' merits and demerits. But, unlike him, Kaṇḍinya admits perception, inference, and scriptural testimony as the means of valid knowledge, and rejects comparison as a distinct pramāṇa. He mentions knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, and volition as the qualities of the self from which its existence can be inferred, like Akṣapāda. But unlike him, he regards consciousness as an essential quality of the self. Kaṇāda does not distinctly refer to God in the 'Vaiśeṣikasūtra', though his followers prove His existence as the efficient cause of the world. Kaṇḍinya does not mention Kaṇāda's doctrine of atoms, though he mentions the five subtle elements. His cosmology is similar to the Sāṃkhya cosmology, but he regards prakṛti and its modifications as the effects of God, who is the supreme Cause. Neither the 'Pāsupatasūtra' nor Kaṇḍinya refers to meditation on God at the six centres of mystic consciousness in the Suṣumnā within the spinal cord or Kuṇḍalinīyoga nor to the worship of Umā as the power or consort of Śiva emphasised by the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism in Kashmir and Vīra Śaivism as expounded by Śrīpati Paṇḍita in the 'Śīkarabhāṣya' on the 'Brahmasūtra'.

The Pāsupata system is called Lakulīśa philosophy because Lakulīśa was its founder. The word means one who bears a staff in his hand. He was an incarnation of Śiva born at Karavan, the account of which is given in the 'Kāraṇamāhatmya'. 'Lakulīśa' is called also 'Nakulīśa'. Viśuddhamuni mentions twenty eight incarnations of Śiva including Lakulīśa, the last. Haribhadra (1400 A.D.) mentions eighteen incarnations of Śiva including Nakulīśa, the first, in his 'Saḍdarśanasamuccaya'. Mādhava gives an account of 'Nakulīśa-Pāsupata-darśana'. Evidently, 'Nakulīśa' and 'Lakulīśa' are the names of the same person, the founder of the Pāsupata system. Haribhadra avers that the Naiyāyikas also called the Yaugas are Śaivas and that the Vaiśeṣikas are Pāsupatas, although their systems differ little from each other, because their categories are comprised in one another despite their difference in number, and although the means of valid knowledge recognised by them differ in number. Rājaśekhara (1400 A.D.) identifies the Yauga school with the Śaivas, and mentions eighteen teachers of whom Nakulīśa is the first. He mentions Akṣapāda, Jayanta, Udayana, and Bhāsarvajña, the Naiyāyikas, as Śaivas in his 'Saḍdarśanasamuccaya'. Guṇaratna (1400 A.D.) avers that the system of Akṣapāda is called the Śaiva, and that the system of Kaṇāda is called the Pāsupata, since the former is devoted to Sadāśiva while the latter is devoted to Paśupati, in his commentary on Haribhadra's 'Saḍdarśanasamuccaya'.

J. N. Banerjee opines that Lakulīśa flourished in Kathiavar in the second century A.D. He revived and strengthened the Pāśupata religion which originated even before Buddha and Mahāvīra.²

EPISTEMOLOGY.—Kaunḍinya admits three means of valid knowledge : perception, inference, and testimony. Perception is of two kinds : sense-perception and self-perception. Perception of external objects and their qualities is called sense-perception because it is acquired through the sense-organs. Sound, touch, colour, taste, and odour are the qualities of physical substances. Jars and the like are external substances. Self-perception is acquired through the grace of God when a self whose essential nature is consciousness is purified of all stains due to attraction towards physical objects and sense-organs, and due to emotions such as love, hate, anger, greed, envy, delusion and the like. A self is perceived when the pure mind is completely concentrated on it dissociated from the body, sense-organs and the like. Inference is preceded by perception. The existence of God is inferred from the world as an effect as its efficient cause. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika hold this view. They are Pāśupatas. Inference is of two kinds : *drṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodrṣṭa*. *Drṣṭa* is of two kinds : *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat*. 'This is that of the dimension of six fingers' is a *pūrvavat* inference. 'This is a cow'. This fact is inferred from the perception of horns and the like. The movement of the sun is inferred by *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* from its passing from one place to another in the sky. Testimony is scriptural testimony derived from God and seers. These are the three *pramāṇas*. Comparison, presumption, inclusion, nonapprehension, tradition, flash of intuition and the like are included in them. A *pramāṇa* is a means of valid knowledge. It is generated by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects which manifest knowledge, and by the assistance of virtue, vice, manifestation, place, time, a moral imperative, or a command of God, and the like. God is the inducing cause of a *pramāṇa*, and makes a *pramāṇa* produce valid knowledge. A self is the knower of valid knowledge. Effects, sense-organs, union of a soul with God, the method of accomplishing the union, and release, which includes the absolute extinction of pain, are the objects of knowledge. Consciousness is valid knowledge. Consciousness, thought or knowledge is the manifestation of *vidyā*.³

ONTOLOGY : CAUSE : GOD.—God is called Śiva because He is self-complete and self-fulfilled. He is absolutely devoid of pain. He is the Lord (*pati*) because He is the supreme cause of the bound souls, the world, fetters and the like. He is called *Īśvara* because He is the ruler of all bound souls. He is the supreme Lord of all rulers, *Brahmā* and the like. He is the fulfilment of all desires. He is eternal and exists in all times. According to the atheistic Sāṃkhya *prakṛti* is the cause of the world. But the Pāśupata regards God as the cause of the world, Who is different from *prakṛti*. God is the ruler of all kinds of *vidyā* and the like, which are the means of virtue, wealth, happiness, and absolute isolation from *prakṛti* and its effects. He is the ruler of *prakṛti* and its effects. He is the ruler of the souls that pursue wealth, happiness, virtue, and isolation from *prakṛti*. He is the ruler of all conscious entities and unconscious elements. He is called '*Īśvara*' since He is possessed of supreme lordship intrinsic to His nature. Some souls acquire lordship which is their acquired

quality. He is the Lord of Brahmā who rules over vidyā, kalā, and creatures. Brahmā is an individual soul. God is the Lord of Brahmā and other rulers, and so called the 'Supreme Lord'. He is called 'Paṭi' since He knows, maintains, and enjoys all effects—the bound souls and the physical elements. He is called 'Ṛṣi' since He rules over all effects, vidyā, kalā, and bound souls. He is called Vipra since He knows all objects and since He pervades them, with His power of knowledge. He is called 'Mahat' since His power of knowledge and power of action are His essential powers and not aquired powers. He is called 'Eṣa' because He is eternally present with a constant nature. He is untainted by words, since He is indescribable by words through qualities and characteristics, since He is different from them and unspecified by them, and since He should be contemplated as different from physical qualities, vidyā, kalā, individual souls and the like through the manas, discarding words. He is said to be free of association with words because He is the supreme cause, because He is endowed with essential powers of sovereignty, and because He is indescribable by words. He is called 'Maheśvara' since His powers of lordship are the greatest and not acquired like those of Brahmā and other individual souls. He is called 'Vāma' because He is endowed with the most excellent qualities and virtues and because He is the supreme cause among the subordinate causes and because He is the cause of the virtues that generate liberation.⁴ He is called 'Deva' since He is endowed with the power of producing all effects by His mere volition and since He veils the knowledge of individual souls and binds them to embodied life, produces vidyā, kalā, and bound souls (paśu) and removes their nescience playfully. He is called 'Jyeṣṭha', because He is superior to the released and the aspirant souls, whose nature is controlled by Him, and whose desires for happiness, renunciation of desires, and abiding in Him are controlled by Him, and because His power of knowledge, power of action, power of lordship are eternal and greater than those of individual souls. He is called 'Rudra' because He associates individual souls with various kinds of fear arising from names. He is called 'Kāla' because He produces all effects from Brahmā down to earth and other elements, associates individual souls with particular places, bodies, sense-organs, and their objects, and dissociates the former from the latter and destroys the former's internal organs through the function of time. He is called 'Kalavikaraṇa' since He associates individual souls with particular places, bodies, sense-organs and their objects, and with virtue, vice, knowledge, nescience, detachment, attachment, sovereignty, and its absence, although He is devoid of internal organs and external sense-organs, because of His unobstructed power of knowledge and power of action. He is the Lord of the different worlds, bodies, sense-organs, and their objects. He is called 'Balapramathana' because He has the power of the operation, suppression, and destruction of virtue, vice, knowledge, nescience, detachment, attachment, sovereignty, nonsovereignty, desire, aversion, and volition called vidyā. He is called 'Sarvabhūta-damana' since He destroys excessive attachment of gods, men, beasts and birds to particular places, bodies, sense-organs, and their objects by producing in them the insight that all are done by God, according to Kaundinya. But Bhāsarvajña avers that God is so called because He produces excessive attachment in all gods, men, beasts, and birds to the objects of pleasure. Both the statements are correct because God is the cause of both bondage and release by veiling individual souls'

knowledge and manifesting it. God is both immanent and transcendent. He is immanent since He rules over all effects—physical things and their qualities—and sense-organs, and since He favours the operation of all cognitive and motor organs. He is transcendent, since He is devoid of all effects and sense-organs, since He is possessed of infinite powers, and since He knows all beings and objects but is not known by any other being. He is called 'Amana' since He is devoid of the internal organ. He is called 'Manas' since He favours the functioning of the internal organ. He is called 'Paśupati' for He is the Lord of bound souls (paśu). He protects them by His power of pervasion by His unlimited power of knowledge, and by His power of ruling over them. Their voluntary actions for the acquisition of wealth and happiness, and for the acquisition of virtue and release, their existence, their attainment of good and evil, and their association with places, bodies, sense-organs, and their objects depend upon His will. He has the power of obscuring their knowledge and binding them to embodied life. He has the power of revealing their knowledge and liberating them from bondage. He has the power of bestowing His grace on bound souls by destroying their miseries. He has the power of creating, maintaining, and destroying the world. His lordship consists in His infinite power of knowledge and power of action, and His being the First Cause consists in His being eternally related to His powers of lordship or in His being endowed with them which are not acquired by Him. He is called 'Śaṁkara' because He is the cause of mind-control or equanimity, happiness and liberation. He is called 'Aghora' because He rules over an infinite number of bodies which afford pleasures to individual souls. He is called 'Ghoratara' because He rules over an infinite number of bodies which cause pain to them. He is called 'Puruṣa' because He pervades and rules over all kinds of knowledge, which are effects, and because He has the power of producing an infinite number of bodies as desired by Him. He is called the 'Brahman' because He is the greatest. He is called 'Bhagavat' because He always exists with an unchanging nature everywhere. He is called 'Śiva' because He is completely fulfilled. These qualities of God should be contemplated at the time of muttering His name or mantra. Such contemplation quickly increases the purification of the soul.⁵

Kaundīnya asks whether God is dependent on individual souls' merits and demerits or whether He is independent of them. He replies that He is independent of souls' merits and demerits. Individual souls depend upon God in performing their actions, but He does not depend upon them or their voluntary actions and consequent merits and demerits. So God is independent of souls' merits and demerits. He is absolutely free and independent.

Mādhava discusses this question in his account of the Pāśupata system. It is objected that if God were the absolute cause of all effects irrespective of individual souls' merits and demerits, they and souls' voluntary actions which are their causes would become useless and they would produce their fruits simultaneously. This objection is not valid because there is no fault in this view. If God is the absolute cause of all effects, souls' merits and demerits become useless. There is no defect in this view. If it is objected that, in that case, there is no end or motive of an action, whose end of action is absent? If souls' merits and demerits become useless, who is the cause of their becoming useless? Are souls its cause? Or, is God its cause? The answer is: when souls' actions and consequent merits and demerits are favoured by God, they bear fruits. So souls are not the cause of their actions and their

merits and demerits becoming useless, since their volition and actions are controlled by God's volition. Nor is God the cause of souls' actions, merits and demerits becoming useless, since He is completely self-fulfilled and devoid of an end in doing an action. The objection that all merits and demerits of individual souls will produce their fruits simultaneously is not sound, since God is endowed with inconceivable power and unrestricted power of action whereby He can make the subordinate causes or "second causes" produce their effects according to His volition. Kaunḍinya avers that God can make souls' merits and demerits produce their fruits either simultaneously or gradually according to His absolute will. A Pāśupata scripture says. 'God is independent of souls' merits and demerits, and absolutely free in His volitions and actions. So He is the cause of all causes.'⁶

EFFECTS.—A bound soul is an effect. Effects are vidyā, kalā, and paśu. Bound souls are produced, favoured, veiled, influenced by time, and modified. Kalā is of two kinds: effects and organs of knowledge and action. Bound souls are of three classes: gods, men, and beasts, birds and insects. They are impure and pure. Vidyā, Kalā, and bound souls are different from one another. According to the Sāṃkhya, prakṛti and some of its modifications are causes, but they are effects according to the Pāśupata doctrine because they are known by souls and fetter them to bondage (pāśa). According to the Sāṃkhya, bound souls are causes, but according to the Pāśupata they are effects because they are bound by God. Physical elements are effects as they are modifiable. Bound souls are modifiable since they are effects. Their knowledge can be veiled and manifested by God. They can be bound and liberated. They are subject to the influence of time. According to others, souls are causes, but they are effects according to the Pāśupata because they are bound by God. An individual soul is called 'ātman' or 'kṣetrajña' since it pervades the unconscious effects—prakṛti, physical things, and sense-organs, and knows them. It is conscious while they are unconscious. It is the hearer, toucher, seer, taster, smeller, thinker, speaker, and comprehender. It is conscious, atomic, and immortal. It is a knower of objects, an experiencer of pleasure and pain, and a witness. It is known from its pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, and consciousness. It is unborn and not generated by physical elements and qualities—sound, touch, colour, taste, and odour. It is eternal. It is not non-eternal. When it is dissociated from prakṛti, effects, and sense-organs, and united with God through meditation and trance, it is said to be eternal.⁷ Consciousness is not its acquired quality but its essential quality. Though the Naiyāyikas and the later Vaiśeṣikas are Pāśupatas, they hold that consciousness is an acquired quality of an individual soul generated by its conjunction with manas and sense-organs. When it fixes its mind on God dwelling in all creatures as their Supreme Soul, when it renounces desire and aversion and voluntary actions for the attainment of happiness, it is filled with friendship and good will for all. Universal good will arises from equality towards all. When its mind is fixed on God steadily, an attached, nonmeditative, unsteady, noneternal, born, unfriendly soul becomes detached, meditative, eternal, unborn, and friendly to all beings. A soul's steady abiding in God is acquired by the complete control of all sense-organs. They are controlled by withdrawing them from evil objects and associated with good objects. Men, beasts, birds, reptiles, etc., all are embodied individual souls. The masters of yoga are included in gods because they

abound in merits. The souls residing in hell are included in beasts, birds, etc., because they abound in demerits. The fourteen worlds with their denizens are called 'saṁsāra' because they are the fields of birth and death. They are produced by God—the efficient cause. Souls are the experiencers of the fruits of these worlds. God causes their enjoyments and sufferings, destroys them, and manifests their experience by associating them with the appropriate bodies, sense-organs, and objects. He is the cause of kalā in the forms of effects and sense-organs. Earth, water, light, air, and ether are effects. The ears, the skin, the eyes, the tongue, the nose, the hands, the legs, the vocal organ, the generative organ, the evacuative organ, manas, buddhi, and ahaṁkāra are the sense-organs. God associates individual souls with the different worlds, bodies, sense-organs, and objects, and with virtue, vice, knowledge, nescience, attachment, detachment, sovereignty, and nonsovereignty. All souls except those which are released in embodied life are endowed with consciousness. They are of two classes : those which are tainted with the five physical elements and the sense-organs, and those which are neither attracted towards nor detached from effects and sense-organs since being associated with bodies, sense-organs, and their objects depends upon merits, demerits, manifestation, place, time, sacred commands and the like. Bhāsarvajña divides individual souls into tainted souls and taintless souls. The former are related to the bodies and the sense-organs. The latter are of three kinds, viz., those which are not attached to sense-organs and their objects, those which are in the state of steadiness, and those which are completely isolated from prakṛti and its effects.⁸

GOD AND EFFECTS.—God is the supreme cause. Vidyā, kalā, and bound individual souls are effects. They are produced, maintained, and dissolved in Him as stars appear and disappear in the sky. They abide in Him, and He is their abode, seat, or substratum. Effects are modifications of His power, and exist in it. He exists in them by His volition and power as inexhaustible and immortal. All subordinate causes and their effects exist in Him. They are inseparable from Him—the supreme cause. But causes and effects are not intermixed with each other as the sun and the objects illumined by it are not intermixed with each other. The supreme cause and the antecedent subordinate causes are more pervasive than the succeeding effects which are permeated by them. So they are distinguished and separated from each other. God is all-pervasive and pervades twenty five entities beginning with individual souls. Souls are more pervasive than twenty four entities beginning with prakṛti, which are permeated by souls. Prakṛti is more pervasive than twenty three entities beginning with buddhi, which are permeated by it. Buddhi is more pervasive than twenty two entities beginning with ahaṁkāra, which are permeated by it. Ahaṁkāra is more pervasive than eleven sense-organs and ten subtle elements and gross elements, which are permeated by it. Eleven sense-organs are more pervasive than five subtle elements and five gross elements, which are permeated by them. Five subtle elements—sound-essence, touch-essence, colour-essence, taste-essence, and odour-essence—are more pervasive than five gross elements, which are permeated by them. Ether, air, light, water, and earth are five gross elements. Ether is more pervasive than air, light, water, and earth, which are permeated by it. Air is more pervasive than light, water, and earth, which are permeated by it. Light is more pervasive than water and earth, which are permeated by it. Water is

more pervasive than earth, which is permeated by it. Earth is more pervasive than earthen products—gods, men, beasts and birds, trees, plants, creepers, grass, and the like, which are permeated by it. So causes and effects are not intermixed with each other. It may be objected that there is no example of nonintermixture of entities by their functions. The answer is : turmeric water is an example in which there are the qualities of water—coolness, wetness, etc.—and the qualities of turmeric—odour, colour, pungence, density, etc. In the mixture earth is permeated by water. God is all-pervasive, associates individual souls with places, bodies, sense-organs and their objects, and pleasures and pains produced by them. He knows prakṛti, souls' merits and demerits, and gives them pleasures and pains in accordance with them, and remains immutable in them. So He is not intermixed with them, although they abide in Him. Immutable God is not intermixed with His mutable effects. Causes and effects are not intermixed with each other owing to their different functions, although they are pervasive, the former being more pervasive than the latter. They abide in God—the substratum. So effects are eternal for God in them is eternal. They are maintained by God. Because God, the maintainer, is eternal, effects maintained by Him are eternal. They exist in Him in the past, the present, and the future, as a seed exists in earth.

God is the cause of vidyā, kalā, and bound individual souls. He produces, favours, and dissolves them. They are produced, favoured, and dissolved by Him. So He is their cause, and they are His effects. He produces gods, men, beasts, birds, and insects. He produces virtue, knowledge, detachment, and sovereignty, and vice, nescience, attachment, and the absense of lordship. He binds them, and He liberates them.⁹ He binds them by eclipsing their knowledge and powers, and liberates them by extending His grace to them and manifesting their knowledge and powers playfully. Effects and the sense-organs are fetters of bound souls. Wealth, happiness, virtue, liberation, and the means of attaining them are vidyā. God is their Lord, and rules over them. Vidyā is the knowledge which reveals the nature of one's self, and of other selves, like a lamp. It is the result of austerities, and reveals the distinction between good and evil, and the actions which are conducive to recollection of, union with, and abidence in, God, and the way to the attainment of supreme perfection. Vidyā is the knowledge which manifests the nature of the real entities described in the Nyāya system which advocates the Pāśupata philosophy. One who has acquired the knowledge of acquisition, impurities, and the means of attaining to liberation, is called wise. God is the cause of knowledge.

Kalā includes effects and sense-organs. Earth, water, light, air, and ether are effects. Sound is the quality of ether. Sound and touch are the qualities of air. Sound, touch, and colour are the qualities of light. Sound, touch, colour, and taste are the qualities of water. Sound, touch, colour, taste, and odour are the qualities of earth. The ears, the skin, the eyes; the tongue, the nose, the legs, the hands, the vocal organ, the generative organ, the excretive organ, manas, buddhi, and ahaṁkāra are the sense-organs. There are five cognitive organs, five motor organs, and three internal organs. The sense-organs are so called because they receive, discard, and move towards, objects. The mind (citta) is so called because it makes the soul know objects, feel pleasure and pain, and acquire virtue and vice. The internal organ is called citta, or manas.¹⁰

Mādhava gives the following account of vidyā, kalā, and bound souls. The entities which are dependent on God are effects. They are of three kinds, viz., vidyā, kalā, and paśu. Bound souls are included in vidyā since they are endowed with vidyā. Vidyā is of two kinds, viz., conscious and unconscious. Conscious vidyā is of two kinds, viz., discrimination and nondiscrimination. Discrimination is the function of the internal organ. All animate beings endowed with it know objects generally and individually. Bound souls' merits and demerits are unconscious vidyā. The entities which depend upon God, a conscious Being, but which are themselves unconscious are called kalā. Mādhava following Kaundinya divides kalā into effects and sense-organs. Five elements and their five specific qualities are effects. Five organs of knowledge, five organs of action, and three internal organs, manas, buddhi, and ahaṁkāra,—are the thirteen sense-organs. Doubt, determinate knowledge, and ego-sense are the functions of manas, buddhi, and ahaṁkāra, respectively.

A bound soul is an individual soul fettered by bonds. Bound souls are of two kinds, viz., impure and pure. The souls related to bodies and sense-organs are impure. The souls devoid of them are pure. They are elaborated in the 'Pañcārthabhāṣya' and the 'Dīpikā'. The bondage of individual souls consists in their lack of supernatural divine powers, or in the concealment of God's causal power, or in dependence. It is beginningless. Effects and sense-organs called kalā are the fetters. Individual souls are fettered by them, and become subject to their influence. This constitutes their dependence, nonsovereignty, bondage. Individual souls are bound because they are fettered by effects and sense-organs. They perceive effects and are attached to them, and are thus fettered by them to embodied life. It is implied that divine powers of lordship are inherent in individual souls, but that they are suppressed in bondage, and liberated in release.¹¹

YOGA.—Yoga is the union of an individual soul with God. Patañjali defines yoga as the suppression of mental modes by withdrawing the mind from all objects. But, according to the Pāsupata, yoga is the union of a soul with God through trance or complete absorption of the mind in Him. The mind can be fixed on God when it is withdrawn from all objects of pleasure and when it becomes pure and free of distracting emotions and passions. Mere suppression of mental functions is not yoga, but complete union of a soul with God is yoga. Kriyāyoga consists in the mind's abiding in God for a long time, meditation, recollection and the like. It leads to the union of a soul with God. Penance also generates it. The union is brought about by a soul's meditation, recollection, and abiding in God, and by the command and grace of God, and by both. It is a state of an individual soul, and it is produced in God. When a soul is united with God, He is united with the soul.¹²

SPIRITUAL DISCIPLINE.—The union of a soul with God is not acquired by mere knowledge of the scriptures, but by a method of spiritual discipline prescribed by the Pāsupata scriptures. Mādhava avers that the union of a soul with God is effected through the mind. It is of two kinds, viz., yoga characterised by actions, and yoga characterised by the cessation of actions. The former consists in the repeated uttering of a name or a mantra of God, meditation, and the like. The latter consists in the movement of the mind. Vidhi is the action which generates virtue or merit. It is of two kinds, viz., principal actions and subordinate actions.

The principal actions directly generate virtue or merit. Good conduct is of two kinds, viz., vows and actions preparatory to them. Besmearing the body with holy ashes, lying in them, offering actions to God, repeatedly uttering a name or a mantra of Śiva, and walking round a temple are the vows. The offering of actions is that of loud laughter, singing God's excellent qualities, dancing in the prescribed manner, crying in an appropriate manner, bowing to God, and uttering His name or mantra to Him. These actions should be offered mentally to Him if other people are present. The preparatory actions are pretending to sleep while one is awake, shaking the limbs as if one is struck by epilepsy, dragging one's feet as if one is lame, making gestures like a lewd person towards a young beautiful woman, performing reprehensible actions like a person devoid of the power of discrimination between right and wrong actions, and speaking incoherent and meaningless words.¹³ These are certainly repulsive actions.

The body should be besmeared with holy ashes in the morning, at noon, and in the evening. An aspirant should lie in holy ashes, but should not sleep. He should study the scriptures, teach other aspirants, meditate on God, and remember Him. After satisfying the calls of nature, eating, spitting, etc., he should touch ashes to purify himself. He should bear flowers offered to Śiva at the time of worship. The body should be besmeared with ashes, and flowers should be borne as the signs of being a Śaiva as prescribed by the Pāśupata scriptures. He should live in a village, a forest, a holy place, or a temple of Śiva. If he lives in any other place than a temple, e.g., under the sky, at the root of a tree, or in an open space, he should walk round the place and treat it as a temple. He should offer these actions to God. He should offer all his bodily, vocal, and mental actions to Him, and wait on Him as a servant after withdrawing his mind from the functions of all the sense-organs. These actions should be performed for the increase of devotion to God. Devotion to other gods is prohibited. Wearing a single cloth or a loin-cloth to cover one's nudity, or wearing no cloth in order to practise nonpossession, not seeing human urine and stool, and not talking to women and Śūdras in order to avoid the loss of knowledge, penances, and learning acquired from the scriptures, are prescribed. If an aspirant is compelled to talk to them in a village, he should atone for it by touching ashes and not water,—practising breath-control, and muttering gāyatrī in honour of Śiva—not Vaidikī gāyatrī. Japa is a mental act of muttering. Seeing impure things and talking to women and Śūdras make the mind impure by exciting desire, aversion, and anger. Women and Śūdras were not justly treated at the time. The 'Bhagavad Gītā' also condemns both despite its lofty and liberal teachings. Mendicancy should be adopted for one's livelihood, penances should be undergone, journey from one place to another should be made, and one should not remain in one place for some days.¹⁴

Then an aspirant should practise restraints, moral observances, breath-control, withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects, concentrate his mind on a vital part of the body, meditate on God, and be absorbed in and united with Him. Non-injury, celibacy, truthfulness, abstention from trade and commerce, and not-stealing are the five restraints. The absence of anger, service to the preceptor, purity, temperance in eating and drinking, and vigilance are the five moral observances. One who does not do any injury to any

creature in mind, and by words or by deeds, becomes immortal. Non-injury is greater than sacrifices, penances, celibacy, truthfulness, vows, study of the scriptures, and charity. An aspirant should strictly observe celibacy. A woman is the root of all evils. So no wise man should embrace a woman. Abstention from sexual union generates equanimity and penance. Strict celibacy makes an aspirant immortal, or emancipates him from bondage. The mind is the chief of the sense-organs, which should be controlled by it. External sense-organs are controlled by the mind, and it is controlled by the self. So sense-restraint is the control of the self by itself. Celibacy, in a wider sense, means the control of all sense-organs. Speaking the truth is truthfulness. An aspirant should speak words which agree with facts. Speaking the truth for the harm of others is forbidden. Speaking an untruth for the good of all beings is enjoined. A wholesome truth should be spoken; an unwholesome truth should not be spoken; a wholesome falsehood should not be spoken. A falsehood conducive to the good of all beings becomes a truth, and is enjoined by the Pāśupata scriptures.¹⁵

Trade and commerce should be shunned. Commerce consists in buying and selling merchandise. It causes pain to oneself and to other persons. In the former case a person suffers in this life. In the latter case he acquires vice which generates pain either in this life or in future life. So an aspirant should not engage in commerce. One who commits sins, one who praises sins, one who assists sinners to commit sins, and one who enjoys sins, are all sinners. One who does not enter upon an enterprise, who is not boastful, who ungrudgingly performs right actions, who performs restraints and moral observances, becomes a sage, and conquers old age and death. Nonstealing should be practised. There are six kinds of stealing, viz., taking what is not given in charity, seizing wealth from children, insanes, intoxicated persons, old persons, and sick persons, taking undesirable articles, e.g., insects, bees, birds, flies, etc., taking unapproved articles, e.g., land, cattle, birds, beasts, etc., seizing gold, clothes, etc., from others through deceit, magic, and other dishonest means, and eating, drinking, licking, and chewing any food without offering a part of it to a preceptor. Nonstealing is abstention from these six kinds of stealing. A thief suffers in this world and in the next world. He is wicked, malevolent, and dreadful to all persons. The five kinds of restraints are described. The absence of anger should be cultivated. There are four kinds of anger, viz., anger relating to emotions, e.g., intolerance, aversion, pride, conceit, envy, and the like, anger relating to actions, e.g., quarrel, enmity, beating, etc., anger causing mutilation, chastisement of hands, legs, nose, fingers, etc., and anger causing suicide or killing others. The absence of anger is eschewing these four kinds of anger. It consists in enduring all bodily and mental conflicts due to bodily, mental, or supernatural causes. An aspirant should not be angry if his country, caste, family, or conduct is condemned by any person, because his self is conscious, pervasive, and pure. One's own self and others' selves are not perceived. An angry person commits sins, speaks sinful words, and becomes shameless. So anger should be discarded. His muttering God's name or mantra, sacrifice, penance, charity, study of the scriptures, and even equanimity become fruitless. Those who can pacify their anger are great. Knowledge is accompanied by penance; penance is accompanied by fulfilment; fulfilment is accompanied by forgiveness. Forgiveness is the greatest friend; anger is the greatest

enemy. Forgiving persons conquers this world and the next world. Service to a preceptor should be practised. He should be served day and night and respected by rising before him, bowing to him, doing him good, executing his commands, dedicating one's self to him, following him like a shadow and looking up to his favour. A disciple should impart his knowledge acquired from his preceptor to many pupils and thus serve him and praise his greatness. If sense-restraint is accidentally relaxed, respect for a preceptor always expiates the lapse. The past, the present, and the future are revealed to a disciple by his preceptor's instructions. He is the instructor of the way to liberation. He is the giver of immortality. God imparts knowledge through a preceptor, who enlightens a person by imparting the saving knowledge to him. One who disrespects one's preceptor goes to hell, since he is the giver of immortality. One who honours one's preceptor in all conditions worships God. A preceptor is a person, who initiates a disciple in the Pāśupata cult, and who knows the nature of the supreme cause, effects, union of the soul with God, the means of effecting the union, and liberation. A disciple is born in a noble Brāhmaṇa family, endowed with keen sense-organs, and possessed of a strong desire to know the truth and attain divine powers.

Purity should be practised. Purity is of three kinds, viz., bodily purity, mental purity, and purity of self. Holy ashes burn impurities due to association, inheritance from the parents, eating and drinking impure food and drink, and inherent in bones and marrow. They destroy the most heinous sins due to theft, sexual congress with a preceptor's wife, and killing a Brāhmaṇa. They are consumed by muttering Śiva's name or mantra or gāyatrī in His honour. One who besmears one's body with holy ashes every day with sense-restraint attains the highest good. Bodily purity should be observed with restraints and moral observances. Mental purity is acquired by truthfulness, penances, sense-control, compassion for all creatures, desirelessness in receiving gifts, in entering on an enterprise, and in experiencing the objects of the sense-organs. Even the gift of all one's wealth with an impure mind is not conducive to virtue. Good dispositions lead to the fulfilment of all noble desires. One who remains unperturbed even when one is despised, humiliated and calumniated, attains purity of self. There is no other greater spiritual discipline than being insulted as it produces endurance, humility, imperturbability, and egolessness.¹⁶

Begged food is the best and purest food. Mendicancy is the best penance, and generates the highest good. One should beg food of Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras, but not of depraved sinners. One should not associate with them in all conditions. Even an ascetic falls owing to association with them. Evil company should be eschewed by all means. Begging food from door to door, begging food without any desire, begging food with an intention, accepting unsolicited food, and receiving food got by chance are the five kinds of begging. Temperance in eating and drinking should be cultivated. It consists in taking light diet. Overeating is forbidden as it is injurious to self-control. One should perform breath-control three times while taking a morsel of food. This act is not prescribed by any other religious sect. Vigilance should be practised. Negligence and inadvertence should be shunned. Restraints should be performed with vigilance and constant recollection of duties. A Brāhmaṇa should meditate on God with vigilance, mind-control, renunciation and good conduct. By doing so he destroys fears due to

confinement in the womb, pangs of rebirth, old age, and death, and becomes like God. Accidental talking to women and Śūdras should be expiated by performing breath-control. A morsel of food should be taken with breath-control thrice. It should be performed with knowledge, desire, and volition. The time of retention of breath should be four times that of inhalation, and the time of exhalation should be double that of inhalation. It should be done under expert guidance according to one's capacity. An easy squatting posture is a precondition of breath-control. It destroys impurities and sins, gradually steadies the mind, and makes it fit for meditation. Japa is the repeated muttering of a name or a mantra of God. It is of three kinds : audible, inaudible and mental. Audible muttering is ten times better than sacrifices or oblations to a sacrificial fire. Inaudible muttering is a hundred times better than sacrifices. Mental muttering is a thousand times better than sacrifices. Mental japa should be performed ; it destroys vices, increases virtues, deflects the mind from wrong actions, and fixes it on God. 'Om', or a mantra of Śiva, or gāyatrī of Śiva, should be muttered mentally. Unconditioned and undivided devotion to Śiva, the supreme Lord, is required of an aspirant in the Pāśupata cult. Devotion to any other subordinate god is forbidden. Śiva is the grantor of bliss and liberation, and so called Śaṁkara. Devotion is meditation.¹⁷ An aspirant should speak of God, think of God, and act for God. He should always meditate on God while walking, sitting, waking, or sleeping. (Cp. Caitanya). All emotions should be directed towards God, and not to any other being. (Cp. 'Bhāgavata') Śiva alone should be worshipped by a Pāśupata ascetic. Sacrifices to gods and offering food to the souls of the ancestors are prohibited. They are in God's power, and created, maintained, and destroyed by Him. They are bound souls. Devotion should be withdrawn from them, and directed towards God. God is the cause of vidyā, kalā, and bound souls. He associates individual souls with their bodies, sense-organs and their objects, and dissociates the former from the latter ; He is the cause of their bondage and release. Eight kinds of obeisance are the means of offering and dedicating oneself to God. Self-dedication implies complete self-surrender to Him. It eradicates a worshipper's egoism, and awakens divine powers in him.

The objects of the sense-organs and their qualities, sound, touch, colour, taste, and odour are blemishes, for they are causes of the fulfilment of desires. Desire, anger, greed, fear, dream, love, hate, delusion, and the like states, emotions, and passions are causes of voluntary actions. They are the motives of action. So acquisition, preservation, loss, of the objects of pleasure, association with them, and injury to others are blemishes. The acquisition of the objects of enjoyment causes pain to oneself and to others. Causing others pain generates a demerit which produces pain in the next world. The preservation of them with the aid of weapons causes pain to oneself and to others. The loss of them due to seizure by a king, arson, theft, etc., causes pain to oneself and to others. So renunciation of them is better than acquisition, preservation, and loss of them. Renunciation destroys all suffering. So it should be cultivated by an aspirant for the destruction or prevention of all his sufferings. Without discarding the objects of sentient pleasure he can never be truly happy. Food, women, and power and domination are the three sources of danger, which bring about the degradation of all persons. There is no greater enlightener than knowledge ; there is no greater enemy than anger ; there is no greater misery than greed ;

there is no greater happiness than renunciation. Desire is never pacified by gratification but intensified by it. Rich crops, cattle, gold, and women can never produce contentment. So a wise person should acquire detachment and equanimity. Attachment should be destroyed, and detachment should be cultivated. Attachment is due to nescience. The objects of enjoyment, attachment and other consequent emotions and passions, which are blemishes, can be dissociated from the soul by the mind favoured by virtue, recollection, knowledge of the sacred injunction, etc., and fixed on God. Vice is the cause of distraction of the mind, and virtue is the cause of concentration of it, and its steady abiding in God. Meditation, recollection, abiding in God, and the like are due to virtue. The abiding of the mind in God without anything intervening between them is called abiding (sthiti). The sense-organs should be gradually controlled by the mind with the help of self-control, mental concentration, recollection, meditation, and muttering a mantra of God. When the sense-organs are withdrawn from their objects, when the mind is disengaged from all objects of pleasure, when merits and demerits cease to function, and when the mind is fixed on God without flickering, the soul becomes one, inactive, fearless, and devoid of grief. Oneness consists in the soul's being unaffected by its body and sense-organs. Inactivity consists in the cessation of all bodily and mental actions. Fearlessness consists in the soul's conquering all fears. Grieflessness consists in freedom from all thoughts, good and evil. The study of the scriptures, recollection, meditation, etc., are good. Nonstudy, nonrecollection, nonmeditation, etc., are evil. In this state a seeker becomes entirely free of grief whether or not it engage in muttering a mantra, fixing the mind, meditating on God, and remembering Him.¹⁸

The withdrawal of the mind from the objects of the senses, and its fixation on God are absolutely necessary for union with God. It depends upon the control of the mind by the self. Then the mind should be concentrated in the heart. The self abides in it. Then the mystic syllable 'Om' should be meditated on. Mental concentration is a prerequisite for meditation. Kaundinya calls abiding of the mind in God for a very long time 'adhyayana', which generally means the study of the scriptures. Transcendent and formless God unassociated with words and endowed with essential powers of lordship should be meditated on. 'Om' should be meditated on, as it is a symbol of God. Meditation leads to the merging of the self in His power of knowledge and power of action. He impels it to unite with these powers. Its union with Him is not possible without His volition. Meditation is uninterrupted thinking of God represented by 'Om', which results in the merging of the self in Him. Merging is absorption. Meditation with or without breath-control even for a short time destroys sins. Meditation, recollection and the like produce the withdrawal of the functions of the uncontrolled sense-organs, purification of the soul, acquisition, conquest of the senses, and constant proximity to God.¹⁹ Regular meditation for six months unites the self with God constantly.

Recollection is constant thinking of God. The object of meditation should be constantly contemplated. Constant thought or recollection destroys merits and demerits. When these are destroyed, blemishes are destroyed, and the mind is not deflected from God but is constantly united with Him. Constant recollection of God or 'Om' brings about the continuous abiding of the mind in Him. It is firmly established in divine consciousness.

'Adhyayana' ordinarily means the study of the scriptures. Kaunḍinya explains it also as mental muttering of gāyatrī in honour of Śiva. It steadies the mind like meditation, and facilitates the formation of a habit of uninterrupted meditation. Recollection brings about the mind's constant proximity to God or His constant presence. Kaunḍinya also explains adhyayana as the abiding of the mind in God for along time. Kriyāyoga consists in the study of the scriptures, mental muttering of a mantra or gāyatrī of Śiva, meditation on Him, and the like. The practice of meditation for six months produces constant proximity to God. The self is gradually unaffected by its body and sense-organs, and acquires supernatural powers by the grace of God. These powers are called 'guṇa'.

Ascetics who have acquired supernatural powers are not associated with merits and demerits owing to these powers and soul-force, and not associated with bodies and sense-organs. They do not acquire vices, and commit sins. The union of the self with God can be attained by the performance of duties prescribed by the Pāśupata scriptures with a pure mind purged of immoral emotions and passions. It can be attained by the performance of penances without performing the prescribed duties mentioned above. Prescribed conduct and penances produce merits which bring about joy due to the revelation of supramundane entities. Then supernatural powers such as minuteness, lightness, largeness, extension of the powers of external sense-organs and internal organs, acquisition of distant objects, fulfilment of all desires, subduing others, and irresistible will are acquired. The first three are the qualities of the effect. The other five are the qualities of internal and external organs. These eight supernatural powers are called 'aiśvarya' in the other systems, but they are called 'joy' in the Pāśupata system. An ascetic becomes joyful and vigilant if he does not take pride in these supernatural powers due to virtue, knowledge, and soul-force. An ascetic acquires greatness by performing the prescribed duties, by undergoing penances, and by practising restraints, moral observances, withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects, fixation of mind, muttering Śiva's mantra or gāyatrī, meditation, recollection, and steady abiding in God, with supreme devotion. Greatness is the power generated by austerities.

An advanced ascetic should perform supreme offering, supreme worship, and supreme penance for the attainment of supreme union with God. Supreme offering is the offering of one's self to God. The self is the giver of offerings to God. If the self is given to Him, there is no need for an ascetic's giving any other articles. The offering of the self results in the cessation of rebirth. It does not result in the further association of the self with any place, body, sense-organs, and their objects, but in the attainment of the soul's absolute proximity to God and of the cessation of rebirth. It is supreme offering, as its fruit is the highest good. The 'Bhāgavata' says, 'God gives Himself to a devotee who gives his self entirely to Him'. Aurobindo says, "The Divine gives itself to those who give themselves without reserve and in all their parts to the Divine." He requires an aspirant to offer all his actions to God. Jīva Gosvāmī also requires a devotee to offer all his actions, physical, vocal and mental, and considers this act to be a precondition of pure devotion. Oblations to a sacrificial fire are a bad mode of worship, for they produce temporary, relative, and limited goods. But the worship of God with all bodily, vocal and mental actions is supreme worship, because it does not entail the labour of collecting requisite articles,

the trouble of accepting gifts, and the sin of killing animals. The common penances stated above produce merits and destroy demerits. Supreme penance produced by supreme offering and supreme worship generates joy and greatness explained above. Supreme penance makes an ascetic attain supreme union of the soul with God even without the study of the scriptures, meditation, and the like. It produces infinitude and constant union with God. The virtue produced by supreme offering, supreme worship, and supreme penance engenders absolute and perfect proximity to God, which stops rebirth. An ascetic should not be attached to the joy produced by the penances and should continue to perform them.²⁰

An advanced ascetic does not exhibit the signs of a Śaiva, but performs actions which are contrary to the Pāśupata cult. He acts like an insane, an idiot, a dullard, or a person of reprehensible conduct. He conceals his knowledge, vows, purifying words, and actions preparatory to vows. He is despised by ignorant people for his reprehensible conduct, chastised and persecuted by them, and slandered and calumniated by them. Their actions are beneficial to him. He imparts his sins to them and receives their virtues, and his fortitude is enhanced by their actions. They increase his virtues and decrease his vices, bring him in close proximity to God, and make him acquire supernatural bodies, sense-organs, and objects. Despisement, persecution, and condemnation make him acquire the fruit of all austerities—the intuition of the self. Calumny becomes praise, and makes him immaculate. Dishonour is his best honour. This is the best way; it destroys his pride, eradicates his egoism, brings him in close proximity to God, stops his rebirth, and prescribed by the omniscient Lord. A Brāhmaṇa ascetic attains constant proximity to God, and is not born again.²¹

LIBERATION AND ITS MEANS.—For the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, a soul's complete isolation or dissociation from prakṛiti and its products is liberation. It is a state of absolute extinction of bodily and mental pain, and of misery due to supernatural agencies. Bodily pain is due to diseases of the body. Mental pain is due to anger, greed, delusion, fear, dejection, envy, intolerance, hate, pride, conceit, malice, attachment, and other passions. Pain is due to fear of confinement in a womb, fear of birth, fear of nescience, fear of old age, fear of death, fear of this world, and fear of the next world, and due to the loss of good, the advent of evil, and obstruction to desire. Liberation is the extinction of rebirth. Released souls, according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, are devoid of the knowledge of their own souls and other souls, and almost unconscious. But, according to the Pāśupata, they are omniscient, and acquire the knowledge of their own souls and other souls; they not only completely exterminate their sufferings, but also acquire divine powers of independence and lordship through the grace of God and vigilance. The classical Sāṃkhya holds that souls are eternally pure, enlightened, and free, and not unconscious. Kaṇḍīya describes an older Sāṃkhya-Yoga view. According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga detached souls are released and attain peace and extinction of suffering. Their systems are impure. But, according to the Pāśupata, the attainment of supernatural divine powers,—omniscience, lordship, etc.,—is liberation. It is not mere isolation from prakṛiti and its modifications. A soul's union with God is the supreme end. It is direct and perfect contact of a soul with Him, but it is not the extinction of a soul in Him. A liberated soul retains its integrity in the state of

complete union with God. Liberation includes the absolute cessation of pain, but it is not only complete extinction of suffering, but it is also the acquisition of omniscience and omnipotence of God. It is attained through a soul's vigilance in spiritual discipline and God's grace. His grace consists in His volition to bestow liberation on a bound soul. The complete destruction of all kinds of suffering and the attainment of the divine qualities and powers of lordship depend upon the grace and will of God.

Mādhava discusses the means of attaining liberation in his account of the Pāśupata doctrine. Is liberation attained by the knowledge about God, or by the immediate intuition of God, or by the ascertainment of the real entities? The first alternative is untenable, since then the repeated study of the scriptures will become unnecessary in that the common people will be liberated without studying the scriptures by simply knowing that God is the Lord of gods. The second alternative also is untenable, since bound souls tainted with an excess of impurities are incapable of acquiring the immediate intuition of God. The third alternative is in accord with the Pāśupata view. But the real entities cannot be ascertained without the help of the Pāśupata scriptures which describe the five kinds of real entities,—cause, effect, union of a soul with God, the means of such union, and liberation. Mādhava avers that absolute extinction of suffering is liberation according to the Sāṃkhya, but that the Pāśupata regards it as the attainment of the lordship of God also.²² A soul's complete isolation from prakṛti and its modifications is the result of meditation according to the Sāṃkhya, but its attainment of divine powers, and of the total extinction of pain is the result of meditation according to the Pāśupata. Supernatural powers are acquired by penances, meditation, and the like. Seeing subtle, remote, hidden, and all visible objects is occult vision. Hearing all audible sounds is occult hearing. The knowledge of the objects of all thoughts is occult thinking. A liberated person acquires the knowledge of the thoughts of gods, men, beasts and birds, about wealth, happiness, virtue, and liberation. He acquires the occult knowledge of all real entities described in the scriptures. He becomes omniscient. Omniscience is the occult knowledge of all sensible objects, and of all bound souls and liberated souls. It is the knowledge of all real entities collectively and individually. The power of knowledge is one, but appears to be manifold according as its objects are manifold. Omniscience is acquired by a soul while it is essential to God. A liberated person acquires the power of acting most quickly like the mind. As soon as he has a volition to do an action, it is done for his power of knowledge and power of action are unobstructed. If he desires to destroy a thing, it is destroyed at once. His volitions in regard to other persons also are executed at once. A liberated person can assume all forms according to his volitions. This power consists in assuming infinite forms by mere volitions without any bodily actions. Earth, water, light, air, and ether are under his control. His sense-organs being pervasive can act upon these objects. He can rule over all forms at the same time. He becomes nondifferent from God in pervasiveness. He acquires the power of performing the functions of all sense-organs even though they are deficient and inoperative. His sense-organs become subtle, perfect, and grasp all objects. Hence liberation is the power of knowing and acting on objects without the help of the sense-organs. According to the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga a liberated soul is divested of all qualities except pure consciousness, but according to the Pāśupata it acquires

the qualities and powers of God through His grace,—the power of assuming all forms, the power of knowing all objects without the help of the sense-organs, lordship, all-pervasiveness, omniscience, and the like.²² A liberated person can subdue all bound souls, even gods, but he can never be subdued by them. He is endowed with divine powers, and so cannot be subdued by the powers of all bound souls. He can not only subdue all bound souls but can also enter into them, suppress their consciousness by his power, and fill them with his presence due to the pervasiveness of his power of knowledge and power of action. But others cannot enter into him, suppress his consciousness, and overpower him. He cannot be possessed by ghosts, demons, and other evil spirits. He can not only subdue and influence others powerfully, but can also compass their death by his supernatural power. But none can bring about his death. He becomes absolutely fearless, and has no fear of the past, the present, and the future. Unsubduability consists in complete independence of others. Unpossessibility consists in unsuppressibility of one's knowledge and consciousness by other beings. Indestructibility consists in not being deprived of one's life by others. Fearlessness consists in conquering all kinds of fear. A liberated person becomes imperishable owing to the possession of divine lordship which is eternal. Imperishability consists in acquiring eternal relation to divine lordship. A liberated person conquers old age, and does not suffer any loss of the power of knowledge and power of action due to the deficiency of his sense-organs. Unagingness consists in not suffering from the consequences of the infirmity of his body, and of his sense-organs. A liberated person becomes immortal. He does not experience pain due to the cessation of the function of the vital forces. His movement to all places becomes unrestricted. He can go anywhere he desires to go. He becomes endowed with eight supernatural powers, viz., unsubduability, unpossessability, indestructibility, undauntability, imperishability, unagingness, and immortality called irresistibility. He becomes greater than all bound souls owing to the excess of his supernatural powers. He acquires the power of ruling over all effects including all bound souls. Minuteness, lightness, largeness, heaviness, obtaining objects out of sight, irresistible will, power of ruling over others, and power of fulfilling all desires are acquired by meditation and penances. Liberated souls are called 'siddha', because they have acquired all supernatural powers, and because they have destroyed all seeds of suffering and have acquired resemblance to God.²³

FIVE KINDS.—Haradatta mentions acquisition, means, places, conditions, purifications, and requisites for initiation each to be of five kinds. Bhāsarvajña enumerates them as acquisition of knowledge, acquisition of penances, acquisition of constant proximity to God, acquisition of the state of abiding in God, and acquisition of supernatural powers, and avers that they consist in the manifestation of those powers which were dormant in an aspirant's soul. His account bears resemblance to that of Kaṇḍīya, who describes them as acquisition of knowledge, acquisition of penances, acquisition of constant proximity to God, acquisition of constant union of the soul with God, and acquisition of excellent qualities. Kaṇḍīya states nescience, vice, strong attachment to the objects of pleasure, nonacquisition of abiding in God, and lack of supernatural powers as the five kinds of

taints of the soul. Haradatta mentions the taints to be of five kinds. Bhāsarvajña states them to be false knowledge, vice, attachment, lapse from one's essential nature, and bondage. Kaṇḍinya states the five means of the purification of the soul, viz., residence in a holy place, meditation, restraint of all sense-organs, recollection of God, and God's grace. Bhāsarvajña states them as residence in a proper place, performance of the prescribed rituals, muttering a mantra, meditation, constant recollection of God, and God's grace. He states the total destruction of false knowledge, vice, attachment, lapse from the spiritual nature of the self, and bondage as the five kinds of purification. Kaṇḍinya mentions the five places, viz., a holy place, a human habitation, an empty house, a cremation ground, and a temple of Śiva. Bhāsarvajña mentions five places as the following—a preceptor's house, a village, a cave, a cremation ground, and a temple of Śiva. Haradatta mentions five conditions of an ascetic, viz., manifest, concealed, conquest of the sense-organs, snapping, and steadiness of mind. When an ascetic exhibits the signs of a Pāśupata, smears his body with ashes, lies in them, and bears the signs, he is in a manifest condition. When he does not express the conduct of a Pāśupata ascetic and conceals the signs characteristic of the sect, he is in a concealed condition. When he has conquered his sense-organs and passions, he is in a condition of conquest. When he has reached the state of dispensing with all external rituals, he is in the state of snapping. When he has absolutely stopped all acts of spiritual discipline, he is in a state of steadiness. The state of a ghost, an insane, a fool, etc., is the state of concealment. The states of conquest and snapping are not admitted to be the state of concealment. The state of steadiness is the state of self-realisedness, because then there are no taints to be destroyed, and because there is no end to be realised. Those who are not eligible cannot attain to these states. Uninitiated persons are ineligible. Eligible persons can attain right knowledge and sinlessness. In the first state an ascetic should live in a place (e.g. a village) approved by his spiritual teacher. In the second state he should live in a place where persons of different ages and castes live and perform actions, which generate their merits and demerits. In the third state he should live in an empty house or a cave where there are no objects of attachment. In the fourth state he should live in cremation grounds until he dies. In the last state he should live with the supreme Lord Who is bodiless. Bhāsarvajña takes the word 'vāsa' in a technical sense. It means reception, retention, association, rejection, comprehension, knowledge of the scriptures, service to the spiritual teacher, and constant effort. Reception is the power of adequately understanding the meaning of a sentence uttered once. Retention is the power of recollecting what was received once after an interval of a long period. Association is the power of understanding the meaning of another part of a system of knowledge on hearing one part of it. Rejection is the power of selecting the rational part and rejecting the irrational part of the assertions of those who are like the spiritual teacher. Comprehension is the power of reflecting on a subject heard from another in various ways and arriving at a rational conclusion. Right knowledge of the scriptures consists in finding out scriptural statements, which are free from contradiction and repetition, and in manifesting one's right knowledge, which destroys the taint of false knowledge, and which satisfies a teacher by uttering a flawless scriptural statement. Action consists in service to the spiritual teacher by rising before him and rising from one's

seat when he rises. Constant effort consists in excessive endeavour in comprehending the meaning of the scriptural statements in due consideration of the antecedent and subsequent parts in their proper relation to one another. Haradatta states that five things are necessary for initiation, viz., articles, time, a ritual, an image, and a spiritual teacher. Bhāsarvajña enumerates the requisite articles as kuśa grass, ashes, sandal paste, a thread, flowers, incense, and a mantra. A Brāhmaṇa is eligible for initiation. Time is forenoon. Ceremonial act consists in purifying an image of Śiva and a disciple. There are two kinds of teachers, viz., superior and inferior. The supreme Lord is the superior teacher, and a human teacher is His instrument, who is an inferior teacher. He is expert in propounding the Pāśupata cult according to the scriptures, possessed of excellent wisdom, efficient, and capable of communicating knowledge. Haradatta states the five kinds of strength as devotion to a spiritual teacher, purity of mind, conquest of mental conflicts, virtue and vigilance. Bhāsarvajña explains them as follows. Devotion to a spiritual teacher consists in faith in his ability to save one from the misery of bondage by instructing one in the five topics. Mental purity is freedom from impurities. It is of two kinds, viz., destruction of the existent impurities despite the presence of the seeds of future impurities and destruction of the seeds of all impurities and nonproduction of future impurities. The conquest of mental conflicts is the conquest of the causes of bodily, mental, and supernatural sufferings, or endurance of them. The performance of the prescribed actions produces virtue. Vigilance is supreme wisdom acquired by an ascetic in the state of steadiness. There are three means of livelihood, viz., mendicancy, taking food left by others, and taking food which is got without being asked for. Mendicancy is the means of livelihood in the first state. Taking food left by others is the means of livelihood in the second state. Living on food acquired without being solicited should be resorted to by an ascetic living in cremation grounds. In the last state there is no necessity for livelihood because the body is then absent. Livelihood consists in acquiring food by means which are not conducive to one's honour or dishonour for the attenuation of the five kinds of impurities of the soul. There are eight topics in the Pāśupata system, viz., acquisition, taints, means, places, states, purifications, requisites for initiation, and strength. Each of them is of five kinds as described above.²⁴

Bhāsarvajña gives the following account of the taints of the soul. False knowledge is invalid knowledge such as doubt, error and the like. Lust, anger and aversion are sins and included in false knowledge since they spring from it. Demerit is a cause of sinful acts. Its various forms also are demerits, since modifications are nondifferent from what is modified. The objects of the sense-organs are the causes of attachment. Attachment is clinging to the objects of sentient pleasure which is false conceit of pleasure. Sensible objects, causes of attachment, absorb the mind in them, and make it impure. So they are a kind of impurity. Lapse or even the slightest deviation of the mind from God is a kind of impurity. False knowledge with its seeds or causes is a taint. Demerit with its modifications is a taint. The cause of attachment with its modifications is a taint. Lapse of the mind from God with demerit—its seed—is a taint. Boundness is a quality of the soul, distinct from merit and demerit, which is inferred from the restriction of its innate powers of knowledge and action which are infinite. Nonomniscience, dependence,

etc., are the fourteen kinds of boundness. They are the beginningless causes of the wheel of birth and death. Those souls, which have achieved complete isolation from prakṛti and its modifications, and whose four kinds of taints have been destroyed, are not born again. Virtue, knowledge, and detachment are not taints.

Bhāsarvajña avers that muttering a mantra and meditation are the means of attaining close proximity to God. Japa is of two kinds, viz., japa resulting in the withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects and japa resulting in trance. It may be objected that japa with a mind attached to other objects, even if continued for a hundred years, cannot withdraw the sense-organs from their objects. To this objection Bhāsarvajña replies that there are two kinds of withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects, superior and inferior. Japa with a conscious effort of the mind is inferior. When it is practised repeatedly for a long period, it purifies the mind, and makes it rest in God without a conscious effort. Such withdrawal is superior, and said to be preceded by japa. It makes the mind fixed on God by consuming merits and demerits acquired in many births. Meditation consists in a continuous stream of similar thoughts of God. It is of two kinds, viz., meditation preceded by japa and meditation preceded by fixation of mind. The first has already been mentioned. The second is preceded by fixation of the mind without an object for the wise. In deep sleep and swoon the mind becomes objectless because of the cessation of all mental modes. But the wise make their minds objectless by acquiring the true knowledge, which favours their minds, and makes them objectless. Their minds purified by concentration on God do not lapse from Him for a long time. Such meditation preceded by concentration is superior to meditation preceded by japa. Meditation should be continued till death in all conditions with the best of one's ability. Constant recollection of God is close proximity to God (cp. Rāmānuja). Recollection is the principal means of achieving abiding in God. Some hold that close proximity to God and the conquest of passions are nondifferent from each other. Bhāsarvajña criticizes it by pointing out that they are different in their nature. The conquest of sense-organs and passions consists in mastering the enjoyment of sense-organs and rejection of objects by them. But close proximity to God consists in repeated practice of meditating on Him. God's grace consists in the desire to achieve the qualities of God. It does not depend upon any other cause than His grace.²⁵

¹ PSS., Introduction, p. 11 ; DHIP., Vol. V, p. 145; PO., p. 150.

² PO., p. 153.

³ PAB., i, I, p. 7 ; iii, 19 ; V, 8 & 40. Cp. HIP., Vol. II, pp. 731-33.

⁴ PAB., ii, 2 & 21.

⁵ Ibid, ii, 2-3, 23-27 ; V, 26-28, 40, 42-44, 46-47 ;

RT., pp. 11-12 ; Karaṇapadārtha, 1-26 ;

SDS., Ch. vi, 10.

⁶ PAB., ii, 6 ; SDS., ch. vi, 15.

⁷ PAB., V, 3-4, 47 ; ii, 22 ; PSS., V, 3 ; RT., p. 10.

⁸ PAB., V, 26 & 28, 5-7 ; i, 23-24 ; ii, 24-25 ; i, i ;

RT., pp. 10-11.

⁹ PAB., i, 42 & 44. 24.

- ¹⁰ Ibid, i, 9 ; V, 42 & 47 ; ii, 24-25 ; vi, I ; iii, 19 ; V, 7 & 37.
- ¹¹ SDS., ch. vi, 9 ; PAB., I. ¹² PAB., i, 20.
- ¹³ SDS., ch. vi, 11-12 ; RT., pp. 14 & 19.
- ¹⁴ PAB., i, 2-19 ; BG., ix, 22.
- ¹⁵ PAB., i, 9 ; Cp. YS., ii, 32.
- ¹⁶ PAB., i, 9 ; V, 16 ; ii, 20 ; V, 21 ; i, 17 & 39.
Cp. YS., i 27, 28 & 32 ; ii, 49-52 ; YBh., i, 28 ; ŚM., pp. 27-29, 42-44.
- ¹⁷ PAB., ii, 10, 11 & 21 ; V, 37-39 ; GKV., p. 16.
- ¹⁸ PAB., V, 20, 25, 27-28 & 30 ; iv, 12, 23-24 & 30.
- ¹⁹ Ibid, V, 34, 21 & 28 ; ii, 11, 13-14 ; V. 31 & 35 ; ii, 15-19. Cp. Bhāg., X, 86, 33 ; XI, 3, 22 ; LY., pp. 40 & 73.
- ²⁰ PSS., PAB., iii, 1-3, 5-11, 18-19 ; iv, 1-9, 13-20.
- ²¹ Ibid, V, 33, 40-41 ; i, i, vi, 16 ; SDS., vi, 14 & 16.
- ²² PAB., i, 21-26 ; RT., p. 10.
- ²³ PAB., i, 27, 29-38 ; RT., pp. 10 & 16 ; HIP., vol. II, p. 167.
- ²⁴ GK., 1-8 ; RT., 2-8, pp. 4-5, 6-9, 17, 22-23 ; SDS., vi, 2-4 ; PAB., V, 30.
- ²⁵ RT., pp. 21-23.

CHAPTER IV

THE ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

INTRODUCTION.—The South Indian School of Śaivism is called the Śaiva Siddhānta. Mādhava's account of the Śaiva Darśana is that of the South Indian School. It is based on twenty eight Śaiva Āgamas. Mādhava quotes from the 'Mṛgendra Āgama', the Jñānapāda of the 'Kāmikā', the 'Pauṣkara', 'Kirana', 'Karaṇa,' and the other Āgamas in 'Śarvadarśana-saṁgraha'. The Śaiva Siddhānta flourished from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. The account of the doctrine given here is based on king Bhojadeva's (1100 A.D.) 'Tattvaprakāśa,' 'Tātparyadīpikā', Śrīkumāra's commentary on it, 'Mṛgendratānta' and 'Mṛgendratāntavṛtti', a commentary on it by Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha. The doctrine propounded in these books is dualistic Śaivism as distinguished from Pratyabhijñā monistic Śaivism of Kashmir. It recognises souls to be distinct from God and bonds. The Pāśupatas regard God as the independent efficient cause of the world, while the Śaiva Siddhānta regards Him as its efficient cause with the help of souls' merits and demerits (karma). Śakti, His conscious energy, is the instrumental cause, and māyā, His unconscious energy is the material cause of the world. Śakti is not independent of God. Individual souls are eternal, and become identical with Śiva in release without losing their distinctness.¹

The Śaiva Āgamas treat of the three chief entities : the Lord (pati), bound souls (paśu), and the bonds (pāśa). Bound souls are atomic. Mala, karma, māyā, the world produced out of māyā, and God's power of veiling are bonds of the souls. Some souls are bound to embodied life. If their existence be not admitted, there cannot be embodied life. If there be no bondage consisting in the experience of pleasures and pains and birth and death due to merits and demerits, there can be no cessation of embodied life, and the scriptures which propound the means of release from bondage become useless. If the bonds called mala, karma, māyā, and the objects produced by māyā do not exist, there can be no bodies, sense-organs, and their objects, there can be no heaven and hell, and birth and death, because the souls being inactive cannot bind or liberate themselves. If God do not exist, there can be no creation, maintenance, and destruction of the world, and bondage and liberation of the souls, because nonomniscient souls without bodies cannot be their causes. So the existence of God, souls, and bonds must be admitted. One God assumes the three states of the Lord, souls, and bonds without losing His nature. The 'Śivarahasya' says, "God Himself becomes atomic souls by veiling His qualities. He becomes a taint which is a trace of His power." The pure principles are comprised in God. The mixed principles and the impure principles are included in bound souls and bonds, respectively. These three realities are the chief ones. The 'Pārameśvara' says "God is the binder ; individual souls are bound, and bonds are their fetters." The 'Vāyaviya' discusses the nature of conscious souls, unconscious entities, and their controller—God. The Śaiva Āgamas also discuss the nature of the Lord, bound souls

and bonds. They are created by God, Who is omniscient and so devoid of nescience, illusion, love, hate, etc., and cannot compose false works. So they are authoritative.²

ŚIVA : GOD (PATI).—The Śaiva Siddhānta discusses the nature of the Lord, bound souls, and bonds. Bhojadeva describes God as one, ubiquitous, eternal, self-existent, transcendent Lord, Who is of the nature of pure consciousness, the cause of the world, and the bestower of grace on all beings. His lustre of the nature of the power of knowledge and of the power of action is neither created nor destroyed. He is not released, but bestows release on bound souls. He emancipates them by His power that is one, original, and of the nature of pure consciousness. His power is not different from Him. He is eternally free, one, and embodied in five mantras. He performs fivefold acts : creation, maintenance, dissolution, act of veiling, and act of bestowing grace. God is one, and without a second, because the Vedas declare Him to be so, which are eternal revelations to the seers, and the most authoritative. The authority of the Vedas cannot be overridden by perception and inference which are weaker than scriptural testimony. He is of the nature of pure consciousness. The Śruti says : “He is indeed a mass of knowledge, supreme bliss, without inside and outside, and infinite.” So He is a mass of consciousness, of the nature of consciousness, and of the essence of consciousness. He is ubiquitous and omnipresent. He pervades all formed entities without movement. He is ubiquitous because He is the essence of all entities. He is ubiquitous like ether, but not insentient like it. He is eternal. The Śruti says : “God is immutable and eternal, but prakṛti is mutable.” He is eternal as pervading the past, the present, and the future, or as being nontemporal. He is eternally self-existent and self-manifest. His manifestation is never produced or destroyed. The Śruti says, “This Person (God) is self-luminous.” The ‘Īśvaragītā’ says : “He is the supreme Person.” He is Lord in the sense that His lordship is unrestricted, and that He is the creator, objects of creation, and instruments of creation. Or, He is the Lord in the sense that He creates all effects without any instruments. Or, He is the Lord in the sense that He creates the world without any physical action. A creator with physical action ceases to be the Lord because He undergoes physical strain. God’s lordship is devoid of it. He is transcendent, and so devoid of all physical actions. Or, He is devoid of a physical body subject to merits and demerits, because His being possessed of such a body would make Him bound and subject to transmigration. But He is incapable of transmigration because He is devoid of all physical actions of another entity (body), neutral, omniscient, independent, and omnipotent. The Śruti says, ‘He is partless, inactive, transcendent, immaterial, and pure’. The ‘Īśvaragītā’ says, ‘Liberated souls vision the supreme Soul as really immutable, blissful, devoid of sorrow, and infinite’. The Smṛti says, ‘God is one, free, indifferent, uncreated, infinite, inactive, transcendent, supreme Lord’. He is the mintuest and the greatest, the supreme Lord, unrivalled and unsurpassed. He is the one root cause of the world. All effects are subordinate to Him. God with māyā as His body is the material cause and the efficient cause of the world, and is yet immutable. He bestows His grace on all beings—conscious and unconscious. He grants all bound souls exaltation and liberation. It is objected that if He creates the world to realise an end, then He is not self-fulfilled and of the nature of supreme bliss, and that if He creates the world without an end, then He cannot have a volition to

create it. Śrīkumāra urges that this objection is unsound, because God creates the world either out of compassion or out of His nature. It may be objected that if He creates the world out of compassion, then He should create all souls as liberated, and should not create the world for their bondage in the shape of enjoyments and sufferings, since that shows His cruelty. He should not create sufferings for them and then create the world out of compassion to remove their sufferings. So it is not reasonable that He should create the world full of sufferings. To this objection Śrīkumāra replies that He creates the world in order to give liberation to bound souls, which consists in the destruction of their nescience, which depends upon knowledge and its cause and the like. Immediate knowledge of the nature of the self and God is the cause of liberation. Immediate knowledge is due to meditation and the destruction of the impressions of nescience. Listening, reflection, and meditation generate the immediate knowledge of God and the self, which depends upon the purification of the mind. The purification of the mind is generated by the performance of the daily obligatory duties and the occasional duties and by the discarding of the prudential duties for the fulfilment of desires and the prohibited actions. Hence the creation of the world is ultimately for the liberation of bound souls. Or, God creates the world out of His nature as full of compassion. He does not liberate all souls because He considers their merits and demerits. He liberates only those bound souls whose merits and demerits have become ripe and borne their fruits. He is of the nature of bliss. It may be objected that if He is of the nature of bliss, He is made of *sattva* which produces pleasure, and thus possessed of a *guṇa*, and undergoes modification. To this objection Śrīkumāra replies that God's bliss is not pleasure produced by *sattva*, but always uniform, eternal, and supreme essence of the self, while pleasure is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, noneternal, various, and limited. So He is not endowed with *sattva*, and so unmodifiable. Pleasure is a reflection of God's bliss in *sattva*, and a false conceit of bliss. He is devoid of nescience, love, hate, merit, demerit, body, and sense-organs. He is devoid of nescience because He is omniscient. He undergoes neither increase nor decrease because He is eternal and uniform. His lustre is of the nature of omniscience and omnipotence. His mantra is His lustre, which is the means of attaining Him. His image is eternal and devoid of origin and destruction. The Vedas are His lustre and eternal. He is a knower and an agent. He grants liberation to His devotees.³

ŚAKTI (DIVINE POWER).—God cannot extend His grace and liberate bound souls without the help of His power. Śiva is omnipresent, transcendent, inactive, and neutral, and, consequently, cannot grant them exaltation and liberation. He can bestow His grace on them only with the aid of His power. Divine power is one and without a second. The objection, that God being one and without a second, His power cannot be one and without a second, is not valid, since every entity being of the nature of God and His power both, God and His power are one and without a second. Liberation is of the nature of consciousness and bliss, because it is the abiding of the self in its essential condition, and, consequently, of the nature of God and His power. If liberation be not of the nature of consciousness and bliss, it cannot be the highest good. The objection, that the absolute extinction of

pain also may be the highest good because of its being devoid of pain although it be not of the nature of bliss, is unsound, since the absence of pain is not the principal end in that it is sought for as favourable to pleasure, and not as the supreme end. Bliss being pursued as a higher end than the absence of pain, liberation must be admitted to be of the nature of bliss. Even if it be not experienced in the state of bondage, then also its experience in the state of liberation must be admitted, since otherwise it cannot be pursued as the supreme end. Hence liberation is of the nature of consciousness and bliss which are experienced, and, consequently, of the nature of God and His power; the experience of supreme bliss is the divine power, and the bliss of the experience is God. Consciousness and bliss should not be considered to be the qualities of the self and different from it, because the Śruti says, 'Brahman is consciousness and bliss', and because if they were different from the self, they would not be its qualities. The objection, that if consciousness and bliss were nondifferent from each other, they being self-manifest and not experienced from any other source, bondage and liberation would be nondifferent from each other, is groundless, because in the state of bondage bliss cannot be experienced not because it is nonexistent but because it is experienced as reflected in the consciousness and pleasure of a bound soul. Bliss is of the nature of God, and is manifested in the state of release. The objection, that a pure principle is of the nature of God and His power, but that God, the supreme cause, endowed with māyā, cannot be of the nature of God and His power, is not valid, because He can be so as the efficient cause and the material cause of the world. As the efficient cause, He is God; and as the material cause He is divine power. Or, God is the efficient cause, and His power of māyā is the material cause. The effects being of the nature of consciousness and unconsciousness are of the nature of God and His power. The creatures as souls are of the nature of God, and as bodies are of the nature of His power. God and His power being nondifferent from each other, both are one and without a second. God is devoid of sex. He is neither male nor female nor neuter. Śiva is of the nature of consciousness. Śakti is of the nature of consciousness. There is no difference between them. Śiva and Śakti are one reality, like a gem and its ray, or like fire and heat. It may be objected that a powerful being or substance is endowed with the quality of power, that for that reason a substance cannot be nondifferent from its quality of power, that if they were nondifferent from each other, they would not be related to each other. To this objection Śrikumāra replies that if a substance and its power be different from each other, then also power cannot be said to be a quality of the powerful substance, that if a relation be admitted between a substance and its quality, which are different from each other, it will require another relation to relate them to each other, and so on to infinity, that if a relation be not admitted between a substance and its quality, the quality cannot be said to belong to the substance, because it is common to all substances, and that therefore nondifference between a substance and its quality must be admitted. Hence God and His power are nondifferent from each other.⁴

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION.—God is omniscient, because He is omnipotent, and because He knows the means and the ends of His action. He who knows an act, its means

and end, can act. He who does not know an act, its means and end, cannot act. God's omniscience does not depend upon any condition to manifest it, like human knowledge, because it is not veiled. Nor is it of the nature of doubt, illusion, and indefinite knowledge, like human knowledge. The knowledge of individual souls is veiled by taints and hindered in regard to its objects, because its manifesting agents, *kalā* and the like, have limited power of manifesting objects. But God's knowledge is not veiled by the powers of taints, and so He is omniscient. Divine knowledge is neither perception nor inference, nor testimony. It always apprehends all objects. God is devoid of the sense-organs, and, consequently, His knowledge is not perception. It is not inference, since inference depends upon perception. Nor is it testimony, since testimony is mediate knowledge in that it depends upon perception and inference. God does not know any object mediately. He knows all objects immediately. His knowledge and action are independent of the sense-organs, and depend upon His mere volition. He is omniscient and omnipotent by nature. He creates, maintains, and destroys the world by mere volition. Though His knowledge is one, it appears to be many because of the manifestation of many objects to it. Its multiplicity is due to the limiting conditions. His action is one, but appears to be many, since He creates many objects. His action is manifold, since it is nondifferent from His knowledge which appears to be manifold. The manifoldness of His knowledge and action is due to the limiting conditions.⁵

PROOF FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE.—Śrīkumāra states the following inference for God's existence. All effects from time to earth and the like are produced by an intelligent agent, because they are effects ; whatever is an effect, is produced by an intelligent agent, like a jar and the like ; all entities from time to earth are effects ; so they are produced by an intelligent agent, viz., God. Their being effects is proved by inference and testimony. Earth and the like are effects, because they are insentient and distinct from *māyā*—the chief material cause ; whatever is insentient and distinct from *māyā*—the chief material cause, is an effect, like a jar and the like ; earth and the like are so ; therefore they are effects. It may be objected that earth and the like being composed of atoms, which are their chief material cause, are not distinct from their material cause (cp. *Nyāya*). This objection is unsound, since the Śaivas do not admit the atoms to be the chief material cause of earth and the like. Further, earth and the like are effects, since they are dependent, since they are of the nature of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, and since they are different from souls, like a jar and the like. Further, the Śruti says : 'Ether was produced from Brahman ; air was produced from ether ; fire was produced from air ; water was produced from fire ; and earth was produced from water'. So earth and the like are effects. Thus all entities other than souls are produced out of *māyā* as the chief material cause. The 'Īśvaragītā' says : 'Māyā is the material cause of the twenty four principles'. Hence the nature of earth and the like being effects is not an unproven reason for inferring the existence of God. The Śaiva argues that earth and the like are produced by an intelligent agent, viz., God. The opponent contends, that earth and the like are produced by an intelligent agent like us, who produces effects with the aid of merits and demerits, and that therefore the agent of earth and the like is like a human agent. This contention

is false, since earth and the like are produced by an intelligent agent who perceives their material cause, the auxiliaries, the ends, and the souls for whom He creates them. Finite beings like us are devoid of perceptual knowledge of all these, and, consequently, cannot be the agents of earth and the like. Being an effect consists in being produced. Production depends upon the action of a cause. The action of a cause depends upon the action of a soul. The action of a soul depends upon a volition of a soul. A volition depends upon a desire. A desire depends upon the knowledge of the means to the attainment of the desired end. Hence an effect is not produced without an intelligent agent. Being an effect is present in positive instances, like jars and the like, and absent from a negative instance, like God. Hence being an effect is not a contradictory reason. Earth and the like are produced by an agent who has perception of their material cause, the auxiliary causes, the ends, and the souls for whose enjoyments and sufferings they are produced. So their agent or efficient cause is omniscient, and cannot be like human agents. This argument reminds us of the Nyāya argument for the existence of God. The opponent contends that earth and the like are produced by an intelligent agent endowed with a body, as jars and the like are produced by intelligent human agents with bodies. Śrīkumāra urges, that when there is a doubt whether earth and the like are produced by an agent, the thesis to be proved is that earth and the like are produced by an agent; that when there is a doubt whether earth and the like are produced by an intelligent agent, the thesis to be proved is that earth and the like are produced by an intelligent agent; that when there is a doubt whether earth and the like are produced by an intelligent agent who has perception of their material cause, auxiliary causes, etc., the thesis to be proved is that earth and the like are produced by an intelligent agent who has perception of these. Both the probans viz., being an effect, and the probandum viz., being produced by an intelligent agent who has perception of the material cause, etc., are present in the positive instances, e.g., jars and the like. The thesis to be proved is not that earth and the like are produced by an omniscient, embodied agent, because there is no doubt about it. Being an effect is not an invariable concomitant of being produced by an intelligent agent endowed with a body. The invariable concomitance of grass, sprouts, etc., being effects with being produced by an intelligent bodiless agent is perceived. Their being produced by an intelligent agent endowed with a body is not present in them. They are effects, and yet are not produced by an intelligent agent endowed with a body. Just as fire in general is inferred from smoke in general, so being produced by an intelligent agent capable of perceiving the material cause, etc., is inferred from earth and the like being effects. Just as a special fire is not inferred from a special smoke, so an intelligent agent endowed with a body is not inferred from earth and the like being effects. There is no contradiction between bodilessness and being an intelligent agent of an effect. The invariable concomitance between being an effect in general and being produced by an intelligent agent in general is known, and not between their special forms, because the former is perceived in grass, sprouts, and the like. The contention that there can be no agency if there is no organ like a body is false, because there is agency in the self's action on the body through a desire or a volition. When a soul impels its body to act, the impelled body cannot be an organ of the soul. The body

acted upon by a soul cannot be the organ of its action. A finger cannot touch itself. Another body cannot be the organ of a soul's action on its body, because it will lead to infinite regress. Similarly, God acts upon the material causes of earth and the like without a body, and produces them. He produces them through His volition. He has no body except *māyā*—the chief material cause of earth and the like. Hence He is bodiless. A body is insentient, and cannot be an agent, like an axe. The bodies of a potter, a weaver, etc., are not agents; they are the organs of their souls' actions. The action of the souls cannot be denied. The actions of the potter's soul, the weaver's soul, etc., cannot be said to be nonexistent because they are not perceived. They are not perceived because they are subtle. Our own souls' actions on our bodies are perceived. There are two kinds of effects, viz., effects produced by bodily actions and effects produced by mere volitions. Jars and the like are produced by bodily actions, and depend upon the presence of bodies. But attraction is produced by mere volition, and does not depend upon the presence of a body. A soul can attract an object at a great distance. Others hold that God with a body creates the world, but that it is not perceptible by us. It may be argued that, a body being noneternal, and God not creating His body, His body is created by another God, and so on to infinity, and that this assumption will involve infinite regress. Some reply that the argument is valid, since the series of God's bodies are beginningless like seeds and sprouts. God with a body creates a world in one cycle. After its dissolution He assumes another body, and creates another world in another cycle. Others hold that God's body is eternal because of its being without an origin. His body must be admitted to be without an origin, since He creates with it a beginningless series of worlds, and *māyā* constitutes His body. Others think His body to be made of Logos (*śabdabrahma*). It may be objected that the inference 'earth and like are produced by omniscient God, because they are effects' is thrown out by the counter-inference 'earth and the like are produced by nonomniscient God, because they are effects'. This objection is invalid, because the alternatives are not tenable. Does the counter-inference deny the omniscience of the agent of earth and the like, or their agent's being a limited knower and a limited doer, or their being produced by an agent? The Śaiva desires to establish that earth and the like are produced by an omniscient agent or God. This thesis can be denied by the denial of earth and the like being produced by an agent. But their being produced by an agent is not denied by the opponent. He denies the omniscience of their agent. His denial of their agent's omniscience does not throw out the Śaiva's thesis. Even jars and the like are produced by omniscient God, the creator of the world, who activates the merits and demerits of the souls for whose enjoyments and sufferings they are produced by some potters. God's volition is the general cause of all effects. The activation of the souls' merits and demerits is not done by any other agent, since there is no evidence for it. It cannot be argued that a large effect is produced by a plurality of agents. Earth and the like are produced by God by mere volition, and, consequently, they do not require a plurality of agents. When an effect is produced by a physical action, a large effect requires a plurality of agents, one of whom cannot produce it by one's physical action. Hence a large effect is produced by one infinite God, and the assumption of many Gods is needless, since it violates the law of parsimony. The Mīmāṃsakas and others deny that earth and the like are produced by

an agent. They do not affirm that earth and the like are produced by an agent with limited knowledge and agency. They cannot be produced by such an agent. God endowed finite knowledge cannot produce all effects. Hence the inference 'earth and the like are produced by God Who knows their material causes, etc., because they are effects, like a jar', is valid. Śrīkumāra's refutation of antitheistic objections is similar to the Nyāya refutation of similar objections. He is certainly influenced by the Naiyāyika theists. Śrīkumāra proves God's existence by scriptural testimony also. Śruti says, 'God's eyes are everywhere in the world'. So Vedic testimony proves His existence. It is proved by yogic intuition too due to meditation.⁶ God is the efficient cause, His conscious power, the instrumental cause, and His unconscious power of māyā, the material cause, of the world. His conscious power being nondifferent from and dependent on Him, and His unconscious power of māyā being dependent on Him, He may be said to be its efficient cause, instrumental cause and material cause. In His own nature, He is the efficient cause, through His power He is the material cause.⁷

THE PRINCIPLES (TATTVA).—There are five pure principles : Śivatattva, Śaktitattva, Sadāśivatattva, Īśvaratattva, and Vidyātattva. Individual souls, māyā, time (kāla), destiny (niyati), kalā, vidyā, and rāga are the mixed principles. Avyakta, guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, the five cognitive sense-organs, the five motor sense-organs, five subtle essences, and five gross elements produced from māyā are the impure principles. These are produced for the bound souls' enjoyments and sufferings as fruits of their merits and demerits. The souls are knowers and active agents. Avyakta, guṇas, etc., are produced from māyā for their knowledge, activity, and pleasures and pains. They are impure principles. Bodies are the vehicles of experience, the sense-organs are the instruments of experience, and sound, touch, etc., are the objects of experience. The souls are born and endowed with bodies and sense-organs for their enjoyments and sufferings. Bodies and the like are not entirely different from avyakta and sattva, rajas and tamas, which are their causes. Twenty four principles—avyakta, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, manas, sound, touch, colour, taste, odour, the five cognitive sense-organs, the five motor sense-organs, and the five gross elements—are of the nature of sattva, rajas and tamas. They are not different in nature from the guṇas. Avyakta is a product of māyā. The guṇas are the effects of avyakta. Buddhi is a product of the guṇas. Ahaṁkāra is an effect of buddhi. Manas, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, the cognitive sense-organs, the motor sense-organs, and the subtle essences are the products of ahaṁkāra. And the gross elements are the effects of the subtle essences. These are the impure principles. Māyā is the cause of time, destiny, kalā, vidyā, and rāga, which are its products. They are the mixed principles which limit the souls.⁸ The Sāṁkhya identifies avyakta with prakṛti. But Śrīkumāra thinks avyakta to be a product of māyā, and the cause of the guṇas.

1. ŚIVATATTVA.—Śivatattva is the one, ubiquitous, eternal cause of all principles, and endowed with the power of knowledge and the power of action. He is one, without a second, unrivalled, unexcelled, and the essence of all elements. He is all-pervasive and immanent in all elements. He is eternal and imperishable, and so different from ubiquitous ether since

it is noneternal. He is the cause of all principles, and so different from an individual soul, which is one, ubiquitous and eternal, but which is not the cause of all principles. He is of the nature of knowledge and action which constitute His essence. Māyā also is one, ubiquitous, eternal, and the material cause of all impure principles, but not conscious and active. So Śivatattva is different from māyā. The 'Śivadharmottara' says: 'Śiva is without origin, middle and end, pure in nature, omniscient, perfect'. The 'Siddhānta hr̥daya' says: 'Śivatattva is one, immutable, immortal, eternal, unrivalled, minutest, greatest, self-manifest, transcendent, immanent, unthinkable, supersensible, peerless, characterless, incomprehensible, inexpressible, of the nature of being, consciousness and bliss, devoid of pain, actor and enlightener, and creates the universe with the aid of māyā'.⁹

2. ŚAKTITATTVA.—The first wink or awaking of God desirous of creating the world in order to bestow His grace on the conscious souls and the unconscious entities is called Śaktitattva that is nondistinct from Śivatattva. God and His power are nondifferent from each other. It may be asked how the existence of Śakti is known. Śrīkumāra replies that the effects cannot be produced without power. Inactive God cannot create, maintain, and dissolve the world, veil the knowledge of the souls, and manifest it without His power. Effects cannot be produced without the existence of the power of God. Kumārila avers that the powers of all entities are known by presumption from their effects. Śrīkumāra avers that they are God's powers which are nondifferent from Him. His power of volition, power of knowledge, and power of action are not different from Him.¹⁰

3. SADĀŚIVATATTVA.—Śivatattva becomes Sadāśivatattva when His power of knowledge and power of action neither increase nor decrease but are in equilibrium, and when His power of volition predominates over them.¹¹ God's power of knowledge, power of volition, and power of action are modifications of His supreme power. When they are unfolded, and when His power of knowledge and power of action reach a state of equipoise, and when His power of volition predominates over them, He becomes Sadāśivatattva, that is absolutely pure and transparent.

4. ĪŚVARATATTVA.—Śivatattva becomes Īśvaratattva, the creator of all principles, when His power of action predominates over His power of knowledge and power of action, which are in a state of equilibrium. It may be objected that God's power of action cannot act when His power of knowledge and power of volition are in equipoise because action depends upon antecedent knowledge and volition. Śrīkumāra urges that God's power of knowledge and power of volition manifest their objects and exist in an inactive state.¹²

5. VIDYĀTATTVA.—When God's power of knowledge predominates over His power of volition and power of action which are in a state of equipoise, Śivatattva becomes Vidyātattva that manifests all, being of the nature of knowledge. This is the principle of pure knowledge.¹³ Nāda and Bindu that are endowed with kalā, always depend upon Śivatattva, and are nondifferent from Him. Others hold that they depend upon Sadāśivatattva. Vidyēśvaras exist in Īśvaratattva. Mantras and Vidyās exist as depending upon Vidyātattva.

because they manifest things. These five principles are devoid of temporal order because they are free of time. But they are imagined to be in this order in the scriptures owing to their functions in creation. Śivatattva is one in reality endowed with various powers, but differences in Him are imagined owing to the difference in their functions. God is not many. He is one and nondifferent. The five pure principles are due to the adjuncts of the functions of His powers. No real differences are possible in Him.¹⁴ The five pure principles are imagined in the nature of God as different moments in the act of creation, though His is nondual. They are pure and of the nature of consciousness.

The nature of difference cannot be conceived. What is the substratum of difference? Is it different or nondifferent? If difference exist in a nondifferent entity, then such an entity does not exist because there is difference in it. If difference exist in different substrata, difference in them becomes useless because the entity is already different. If difference exist in an entity that is different, then such difference is the substratum of another difference, and so on to infinity, and this involves infinite regress. It cannot be argued that a nondifferent entity by itself is the substratum of difference because it involves begging the question. Hence imaginary difference in a nondifferent entity should be admitted to exist, even as the appearance of two moons exists in the one moon. The appearance of the two moons is not real because they exist in the same moon. Similarly, the appearance of the five pure principles exists in one, nondifferent God. They appear to be different owing to the difference of the functions of His powers.¹⁵

God assumes the five forms in order to bestow His grace on the conscious souls stained by the beginningless taint which restricts their innate powers, and on unconscious bonds (pāśa). "The world is of the nature of God. Śiva is the substratum cause; Śakti is modified into the world; Sadāśiva is the controller; Īśvara is the creator; and Śuddhavidyā is the manifester; Śiva bestows His grace on all through these imagined different principles."¹⁶ Creation is an act of grace on the conscious souls and the unconscious entities. He gives the bound souls enjoyments and sufferings and liberation in the form of eternal bliss, and enables the unconscious bonds to perform their functions. It may be objected that giving pleasures and pains to the bound souls is not a matter of favour but of punishment, even as giving rice mixed with honey and poison to a person is a matter of punishment. Śrīkumāra urges that the bound souls' experiences of pleasures and pains are means to the production of their dispassion for the objects of pleasure and attachment to liberation, and, consequently, are a matter of favour. But why does He not liberate the souls without making them experience pleasures and pains? The reply is: liberation in the form of equality with God, which depends upon His grace, cannot be attained without the destruction of merits and demerits, which cannot be worn out without enjoyments and sufferings owing to their beginninglessness.¹⁷ A soul's liberation in the form of union is nondifference from God without losing its distinctness. Granting liberation is His principal favour while granting happiness and misery is His subordinate favour. He creates the world, bodies and sense-organs for the souls' enjoyments and sufferings, which are necessary for the exhaustion of their merits and demerits. He is ultimately their cause as shown already.

Māyā is one, eternal, pervasive, beginningless, endless, and pure. It is one since there is no evidence for its manifoldness. It is objected that it is many, since there is

no evidence for its being one. This objection is groundless, since its existence proves its oneness, and since the existence of many depends upon a prior entity. It is eternal because it is not an effect, being without a material cause. It is the root cause and material of the world. It is pervasive since it permeates all its effects. It is without origin and end, since it is neither produced nor destroyed. It is pure since it is devoid of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It is subtle for it is imperceptible.¹⁸ It is common to all bound souls, because its effects are the common objects of their enjoyments and sufferings. It is modified into their bodies and sense-organs, and stamped with their merits and demerits. The liberated souls do not require bodies because their merits and demerits have been destroyed. In the state of dissolution the bound souls' merits and demerits remain in *māyā*. It produces delusion by nature by veiling their spiritual nature owing to its insentience by inducing them to regard it as their nature. The 'Kiraṇa' says : "Māyā deludes the souls, connecting them with its mala and karma, and makes them experience objects". It may be objected that *avyakta* is the material cause of all effects, and that therefore *māyā*, which is different from it, should not be assumed. Śrīkumāra urges that *avyakta* being of the nature of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which are effects, its eternal material cause must be admitted. It cannot be argued that *avyakta* is not proven to be of the nature of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, because it is of the nature of their equipoise. The 'Īśvara-gītā' and the 'Viṣṇu-purāṇa' speak of *māyā* as the material cause of *prakṛti* and the world. God produces the bodies and the sense-organs of the bound souls with the aid of their merits and demerits by agitating *māyā* by His powers for their respective enjoyments and sufferings.¹⁹

Māyā urged by God's various powers creates the principle of time in the beginning. The principles produced by time cannot be produced if time is not created at first. *Māyā*, the material cause of all impure principles, first creates time. Time is produced by God, His power, merits and demerits of the souls, and *māyā*. It is not produced by time for that would involve infinite regress. The past, the present, and the future are its forms.²⁰

Māyā produces destiny after producing time. Time also is a cause of it. Destiny is so called because it regulates causation or makes specific causes produce specific effects. Oil seeds are the cause of oil. Paddy is the cause of rice. Destiny determines causal relation. It also makes specific merits and demerits produce specific pleasures and pains.²¹ Thus *niyati* is natural order and moral order. *Māyā* produces *kalā* after producing time and destiny. *Kalā* attaches *āṇava* mala to the bound souls, and manifests their limited agency. It is said : "Māyā produces *kalā* after time and destiny, and manifests a soul's limited agency." The "Mātaṅga" says : "A bound soul pierced by *kalātattva* can experience pleasures and pains,—which is not possible without it. So *kalātattva* must be admitted. *Māyā* produces the subtle essences, destiny and the gross elements with the aid of time and *kalā*.²² *Kalātattva* manifests a bound soul's limited agency and produces *vidyātattva* in order to manifest objects to it. *Vidyātattva* is of the nature of manifestation, and can produce the apprehension of objects. The 'Śaivaraḥasya' says : "Vidyā produced by *māyā* is of the nature of manifestation, and manifests buddhi ; it is experienced by a bound soul affected by pleasure, pain and delusion." It pierces the veil of a bound soul's power of knowledge by its power of action and shows it objects, and is its excellent instrument in the state of bondage. It may be objected that buddhi gives the determinate knowledge of objects and

that the assumption of buddhitattva is useless to manifest objects to a bound soul. Śrīkumāra urges that a bound soul experiences objects determined by buddhi through impure vidyātattva, that impure vidyātattva is capable of modification because it is different from a soul, and because it is an effect of māyā, that buddhi does not manifest itself, because it is an effect, and because it is made of sattva, rajas and tamas, like a jar and the like, but that it is manifested by an entity different from itself, that buddhi is manifested because it is insentient, that it is insentient because it is an effect, like a jar and the like, that buddhi is not manifested by another buddhi because of its nonexistence, that it is not manifested by its another mode because it cannot have two modes at the same time, that impure buddhi is not manifested by pure vidyātattva, and that therefore it is manifested by impure vidyātattva.²³ Rāgatattva is of the nature of love, the common cause of a bound soul's voluntary action without the apprehension of objects, and is different from the attributes of buddhi. Some hold that it is an attribute of buddhi. This view is wrong. It is different from an attribute of buddhi. Common love (rāga) is an attribute of buddhi, because it is the cause of a soul's voluntary actions after manifesting objects to it. But rāgatattva is the cause of a soul's voluntary actions when it does not manifest objects to it. A bound soul desirous of release and attached to objects has voluntary actions without the apprehension of objects in regard to the means to release. Hence rāgatattva must be admitted as the cause of such voluntary actions. The 'Kiraṇa' says: "A soul is bound by sattva, rajas and tamas through the relation to buddhi and the other organs, being affected with the attributes of buddhi and being tinged with rāgatattva". The 'Matanga Pārameśvara' says, "A bound soul, being pierced by kalātattva and tinged by desire and unfolded by vidyātattva, experiences the objects of pleasure and pain. A bound soul is urged by rāgatattva to do voluntary actions to adopt the means to liberation, which is different from common love and desire."²⁴ When God being related to time, niyati, kalā, vidyā, and rāga assumes the state of a bound soul, and becomes an experiencer of pleasure and pain, He is called puruṣatattva—a bound soul. It is called a puruṣa because it lies in an abode made of twenty four principles and because it is counted among the principles different from Śivatattva.²⁵

Avyakta is produced from māyā to produce the bound soul's experiences of pleasures and pains. It is so called because it is possessed of sattva, rajas and tamas which are not manifested. The Sāṃkhya regards it as the equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas. So the guṇas are not manifested in it. Avyakta is of the nature of the three guṇas because it is the cause of the gross elements, the subtle essences, manas, buddhi, and ahaṃkara, which are its effects, and which are causes of pleasure, pain and delusion. The nature of avyakta is incomprehensible by reason.²⁶ From avyakta, the equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas, the guṇas in the state of disequilibrium are produced. Their functions are manifestation, activity, and arrest—pleasure, pain, and delusion, respectively. Sattva produces knowledge or manifestation because it is transparent. Rajas produces activity because it is restless. Tamas produces arrest of activity because it is heavy. Buddhi is produced from sattva, rajas and tamas. Its functions are determination of objects, virtue, knowledge, detachment, supernatural powers, vice, ignorance, attachment, and absence of

supernatural powers. Virtue is the cause of exaltation and liberation. A virtue produced by the performance of a sacrifice without desire for fruits produces happiness in heaven. A virtue produced by the performance of a sacrifice without a desire for fruits or by the eight-fold yoga produces liberation. Knowledge is of two kinds, viz., valid knowledge and recollection. Recollection is the exact remembrance of what was apprehended in the past. It is produced by a residual impression produced by a past apprehension. Valid knowledge is right apprehension. It excludes doubt, illusion and the like. Apprehension excludes recollection. Valid knowledge manifests the self or the not-self. The Cārvākas admit perception as the only means of valid knowledge. The Jainas admit two kinds of valid knowledge, viz., vivid knowledge and nonvivid knowledge. Immediate knowledge is vivid knowledge. Mediate knowledge is nonvivid knowledge. The Buddhists and the old Vaiśeṣikas admit perception and inference as valid knowledge, and reject testimony as a *pramāṇa*. The Buddhists reject its validity. The earlier Vaiśeṣikas include testimony and other *pramāṇas* in inference. The Sāṃkhya, the later Vaiśeṣikas, and Bhūṣaṇakāra accept perception, inference, and testimony as the *pramāṇas*. The earlier Naiyāyikas regard perception, inference, comparison, and testimony as the *pramāṇas*. The Prābhākaras admit these four and presumption as the *pramāṇas*. The Bhāṭṭas admit nonapprehension also as a *pramāṇa*. The Paurāṇikas admit tradition, inclusion, gesture, and noncontradiction also as *pramāṇas*. The Śaivas admit perception, inference and testimony as *pramāṇas*. Perception is indeterminate and determinate. Indeterminate perception is devoid of any reference to a name, a genus and the other determinations, and manifests an object alone owing to the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object. Determinate perception apprehends an object with its name, genus, substance, quality, and action. Determinate perception is of five kinds, viz., perception of an object with its name, or substance, or genus or quality, or action. (Cp. Old Nyāya). Again, it is of two kinds, viz., yogic perception and nonyogic perception. The former is the immediate perception of past, future, remote, and supersensible objects. The latter is the immediate perception of sensible objects present 'here and now' to the sense-organs. Inference is the mediate knowledge of a probandum produced by a probans that is known. It is of three kinds, viz., *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. (Cp. Pāśupata). The first kind of inference infers an effect from a cause, e.g., future rain from specific clouds. The second kind of inference infers a cause from an effect, e.g., rainfall in an upper hilly region from a flood in a river. The third kind of inference infers a quality (e.g. colour of a mango) from another quality (e.g., its taste) which invariably accompanies it. It is not based on uniformity of causation but on uniformity of coexistence. (Cp. Nyāya). Again, inference is of two kinds, viz., inference for oneself and inference for others. The Naiyāyikas recognize five parts of the latter, viz., thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion. The Mīmāṃsakas recognize its three parts, viz., thesis, reason, and example. The Buddhists recognize its two parts, viz., example and application. Testimony is right knowledge produced by the statement of a reliable authority. It is of two kinds, viz., personal and impersonal. The statements made by Manu and found in history, Tantras, and Purāṇas are personal. The sentences found in the Vedas are impersonal because they are not uttered by persons. Hence they are eternal and revealed to the seers. They are only manifested by utterance and neither produced nor destroyed.

In the state of dissolution the Vedas exist in and are sustained by God. God is not the cause of the Vedas because there is no reason for the rejection of the antecedent Vedas before creation. In the former creation there was no absence of the Vedas. Their existence is proved by inference. The prior creation was accompanied by the Vedas, because all creations are accompanied by them, because they are creations, like the present creation. Hence the Vedas are impersonal and authoritative and valid. (Cp. Rāmānuja). Comparison (e.g. 'a wild cow is similar to a cow') is nothing but testimony, because it is produced by the statement of a reliable person. The knowledge of the relation of a name (e.g., 'a wild cow') and an object (e.g., an animal) is nothing but inference. The perception of resemblance to a cow in a wild cow is nothing but perception, since it is due to the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object. Presumption is nothing but inference. The existence of Devadatta outside his house is inferred from his nonexistence in his house because he is known to be alive. Nonapprehension is not a *pramāṇa*, because there is no negation which is said to be known by it. The negation of a jar on the ground is nothing but the bare ground or a particular modification of the ground. (Cp. Prabhākara). Even if negation exist as different from an entity, it is known by perception, inference, or testimony. So nonapprehension is not a distinct *pramāṇa*. Inclusion is inference. Tradition is testimony. Gesture also is testimony. Noncontradiction is inference. Hence perception, inference and testimony are the three *pramāṇas*. Detachment is the absence of attachment due to the control of the sense-organs and the internal organs. It is due to the discernment of faults in noneternal earthly and heavenly objects. Supernatural powers are due to the nonobstruction of the sense-organs. Knowledge, virtue, detachment, and supernatural powers are due to the predominance of *sattva* in *buddhi*. Ignorance, vice, attachment, and the absence of supernatural powers are due to the predominance of *tamas* in *buddhi*. Vice is the cause of the absence of exaltation and the absence of liberation. Ignorance is wrong knowledge. It is of three kinds, viz., illusion, *vikalpa* and sleep. Illusion is false knowledge of an object (e.g., silver in a nacre). *Vikalpa* is the knowledge of a nonexistent object (e.g., a ghost), which follows a word alone. (Cp. Patañjali). Sleep is a mode of *buddhi*, in which *tamas* predominates, and which is devoid of waking cognitions and dreams. Patañjali defines sleep as the cognition of nonexistence. Attachment is affection for sensible or supersensible objects. The attribute of *buddhi*, which opposes the emergence of supernatural powers, is their absence. Others hold that the knowledge which apprehends the nature of God is right knowledge, and that any other knowledge is ignorance. *Buddhi* is of three kinds according to the merits and demerits acquired in the past births. *Sattva* predominates in *buddhi* owing to merits; *tamas* predominates in it owing to demerits; *rajas* predominates in it owing to merits and demerits.²⁷ *Ahaṁkāratattva* is produced from *buddhitattva*. Egoism is the function of *ahaṁkāra*. It is threefold and is apprehended as 'I live', 'I do', and 'I am strong' according as it takes the forms of life, action, and pride. The self is devoid of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, inactive, neutral, and of the nature of pure consciousness. So the existence of *ahaṁkāra* must be admitted to account for ego-sense. "Conceit or egoism is the function of *ahaṁkāra* which manifests the relation of a knowing self to a known object limited by time and space" (*Śaivarahasya*). *Ahaṁkāra* is of three kinds—*sāttvika*, *rājasa*, and *tāmasa* according as *sattva*, *rajas*, or *tamas*

predominates in it, respectively. With the predominance of *sattva* it is called 'vaikārika'; with the predominance of *rajas* it is called 'taijasa'; with the predominance of *tamas* it is called 'bhūtādi' or primal matter.

Manas is produced from *rājasa ahaṁkāra*, and is restless because *rajas* is of the nature of activity. The ten sense-organs are produced from *sāttvika ahaṁkāra*, because *sattva* is of the nature of manifestation and lightness. The subtle essences are produced from primal matter, because they abound in *tamas*. The *Sāṁkhya* holds that the eleven sense-organs are produced from *sāttvika ahaṁkāra*, and that the subtle essences are produced from *tāmasa ahaṁkāra*. *Manas* is of the nature of desire. Its function is doubt. The ears, the skin, the eyes, the tongue, and the nose are the cognitive sense-organs. The existence of *manas* is inferred from the nonsimultaneous production of the auditory, tactual, visual, gustatory, and olfactory cognitions. (Cp. *Nyāya*). If *manas* were nonexistent, these cognitions would be simultaneously produced. The objects of the aforesaid cognitive sense-organs are sound, touch, colour, and odour, respectively. Their functions are the apprehension of them, respectively. The vocal organ, the hands, the legs, the anus, and generative organ are the motor organs. Speaking, receiving, walking, evacuation, and generation are their functions, respectively. *Manas*, *buddhi*, and *ahaṁkāra* are the internal organs. There are five subtle essences. The five gross elements are produced from the five subtle essences. The principles are dissolved in their causes in the opposite order. They are dissolved in *māyā*. The pure principles are dissolved in *Śaktitattva*. *Śaktitattva* exists in union with *Śivatattva*. In dissolution *māyā*, the bound souls, and God exist. From them again creation follows. God dissolves the world to give respite to the bound souls. He again creates the world in order to ripen their merits and demerits, and associates them with their fruits—joys and sorrows. He wears off their merits and demerits by giving them enjoyments and sufferings, initiates them into the cult of *Śiva*, and liberates them through His grace.²⁸

The 'Mṛgendratānta' gives the following account of the mixed principles. Time is produced by *māyā*, agitates an individual soul tainted with impurities and determined by *niyati*, and makes it active, and is the cause of the cognitions of the different periods of duration. Destiny makes a bound soul experience pleasures and pains due to its merits and demerits till dissolution. A bound soul experiences pleasures and pains which follow the principle of time through the cognitive sense-organs, the motor sense-organs, and the internal organs, on which it depends for the manifestation of its powers of knowledge and action. An individual soul's power of action is eternal and pervasive like God's power. It is not manifested in regard to objects without the aid of God's grace because of its being veiled by the beginningless taint called 'darkness'. *Kalātattva* is its aid. God agitates *māyā*, makes it ready to produce *kalā*, and makes a bound soul ready to experience pleasure and pain. *Kalā* is full of lustre, and manifests a bound soul's power of action. It removes the veil of its innate taint in one part, and manifests its power of action; thus it is the cause of a soul's limited action. Without its aid a bound soul cannot have limited action. God manifests a part of a soul's power of a consciousness and manifests its power of action limited by its taint with the aid of *kalātattva* which is full of lustre. *Kalātattva* removes taint from one part of a bound soul. *Niyatitattva* removes taint from a soul in a particular degree. A bound soul, whose power of action is manifested, being desirous of knowing *buddhi* in which objects are reflected, and being

unable to perceive them unaided, depends upon vidyātattva. God created it after agitating kalātattva and making it prone to produce its effects and manifest the principles, which is an excellent instrument, because it excites a soul's power of knowledge and because it connects a soul with its internal organs and external sense-organs. A soul knows buddhi in which external objects are reflected, and external objects which are reflected in it through its cognitive sense-organs and motor sense-organs with the aid of vidyātattva, which manifests its power of knowledge. A bound soul, whose power of knowledge has been manifested by vidyātattva, and which perceives an external object, does not exert itself to appropriate it until its desire for it is produced. So God created rāgatattva from kalātattva. A bound soul being tinged with desire or love desires an object produced by māyā, and exerts itself, appropriates it, experiences pleasure or pain, and does not give up attachment to it under the influence of rāgatattva.²⁹

INDIVIDUAL SOULS (PAŚU).—The souls become atomic because they are related to the taints which cause their atomic nature, and which make them possessors of finite knowledge and agents of limited actions, although they are in their essence of the nature of God,—omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent. Celestial souls, human souls, and the like—all are bound and subject to birth and death. They are bound because they are bound by the bonds, and atomic because they have the power of acquiring limited knowledge and of doing limited actions, and not because they are like atoms. They are conscious but nonpervasive, and are not unconscious atoms. It may be objected that the souls are of the nature of God, that therefore they cannot be related to the bonds of mala, karma, and māyā, that their relation to these being beginningless, their relation to the bonds does not depend upon any cause. What has a beginning has a cause. But the relation of the souls to the bonds being beginningless, is not produced by a cause. Śrīkumāra rejoins that the souls are essentially of the nature of God because the Śrutis and the Āgamas assert their divine nature, and that therefore God binds them to embodied life with the bonds. They are mala, karma, māyā, the world produced by māyā, and God's power of veiling the souls' knowledge and action. The 'Śaivarahasya' mentions three bonds—mala, karma, and māyā—of which the innate, beginningless mala is the chief one. The 'Prayogamañjarī' also mentions three kinds of bonds. This view is wrong because God's power of veiling also which favours the bonds is a bond. Mala, karma, māyā, the world produced by it, and God's power of veiling are the five kinds of bonds. The liberated souls are of the nature of God, but they are liberated by His grace. They are not eternally free like Him. God is eternally free and one. They are liberated and many. They can be liberated by muttering His mantras and meditating on Him. They are not like God in the state of bondage because they are stained with taints. But God is never stained with taints. The 'Vāyaviya' says, "God is called Śiva because He is absolutely pure in nature because of the prior negation of relation to beginningless mala". The 'Lingodbhava' says, "God is transcendent, subtle, unmanifest, and immanent in the world. He is Liṅgin, and assumes prakṛti as liṅga in order to create, maintain, and dissolve the world". The 'Pārameśvara' says, "God is independent Lord Who destroys the bonds of the bound souls".³⁰

There are three classes of the individual souls : vijñānakala, pralayākala, and sakala. The first are tainted with mala ; the second are tainted with mala and karma ; and the

third are tainted with mala, karma, and māyā.³¹ The last are of two classes : those whose sins have been destroyed and those whose sins have not been destroyed. The bound souls are called paśu because they are fettered by the bonds. God bestows His grace on the vijñānakalas whose sins have been destroyed, initiates them into the proper spiritual discipline, induces them to hear of, reflect on, God, and gives them mediate knowledge of their spiritual nature and of God. He does not give them immediate knowledge of their selves and of God, because it is produced by meditation, which destroys merits and demerits, and which prevents all hindrances. He appoints such souls to the office of Vidyēśvaras who are almost like the liberated souls. He appoints the others to the office of Mantras and Mantreśvaras.³² He appoints some pralayākālas whose mala and karma have been burnt by the fire of knowledge to the office of the lords of the worlds. He makes some of them the lords of the gaṇas, and others Mantreśvaras. He makes the sakalas transmigrate with their subtle bodies from one birth to another under the influence of their merits and demerits. The subtle body, some hold, is composed of manas, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, the five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, sound, touch, colour, taste, and odour. Others think it to be composed of manas, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, sound, touch, colour, taste, and odour. Others consider it to be made of the five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, manas, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, citta, five vital forces, desire, karma, nescience, and the five subtle essences.³³

The 'Mṛgendratānta' describes an individual soul as having consciousness, knowledge and action always in regard to all objects, which are said to exist in it in liberation alone. It is not nonpervasive, momentary, one, insentient, inactive, and not the substratum of knowledge as an adventitious quality, because it is declared by the Śruti to become equal to God when its bonds are destroyed. It is pervasive, permanent, essentially conscious, and active. It is not unconscious in its essential nature as the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika maintain. It is not inactive as the Sāṃkhya maintains. Consciousness is not its adventitious quality, which it acquires in conjunction with manas and the sense-organs as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, because the Śaiva scriptures assert a soul to be identical with God after its bonds of nescience and the like are destroyed. It is said : "God grants knowledge to a bound soul in order to manifest its divine nature and destroy its mala, karma, and māyā". Its divine nature does not consist in its nonpervasiveness or in being devoid of knowerhood or agency. It consists in pervasiveness, knowerhood, and agency. Nor does it acquire pervasiveness, eternality, omniscience, and omnipotences in liberation because what were nonexistent cannot be produced.³⁴ There are many souls.

It may be objected that there is no proof for the existence of a bound soul transmigrating from this world to a future world as an entity different from the body, the sense-organs, and the like. Śrīkumāra urges that sometimes a person remembers wealth buried in the previous birth, and recovers it in the present birth. His soul is permanent, although his past body has been destroyed. Such recollection is not false because it is not contradicted. The Āgmas assert the transmigration of the permanent souls, and so they are distinct from their bodies. The soul is not identical with the vital force, because it is of the nature of air, like external air, and because we speak of 'my vital force' and thus distinguish between a soul and vital force. Some hold that a soul is identical with the sense-organs. This view is wrong, because there is recollection of the objects perceived in the past through a sense-

organ even when it is destroyed, because an object perceived by a sense-organ cannot be remembered by another, because a soul perceives all kinds of objects while the sense-organs perceive their proper objects, and because a soul recognises itself in such a form as 'I that perceived a colour through the eyes, hear a sound through the ears'. Nor is a soul identical with manas, because it is an instrument of knowledge, like an axe, and because it is limited in that it is an effect, like a jar, and because the existence of manas is proved by the impossibility of simultaneous cognitions of the objects of the sense-organs, but because the existence of a soul cannot be proved by it. The Buddhists identify a soul with a stream of momentary cognitions. This view is wrong because it cannot account for recollection: cognitions being momentary cannot remember what was perceived by them. But a soul is permanent, and can remember what it perceived before. The Buddhists hold that momentary cognitions can remember because they belong to the same series, and because the residual impressions of the previous cognitions can perfume the subsequent cognitions. This argument is invalid, because the residual impressions and the series also are momentary, and because they are nondistinct from the cognitions. If they are held to be permanent, the Buddhists contradict the doctrine of momentariness. Thus a soul is different from the body, the sense-organs, vital force, manas, and cognitions.³⁵ (Cp. Nyāya).

The 'Mrgendratra' criticizes the Cārvāka's view of the self, and Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha explains his arguments and criticisms. The Cārvāka holds that the soul is a product of earth, water, light and air, and that therefore the world cannot exist for the experience of the individual souls. This view is wrong, because the body made of earth, water, light and air is a means for the experience of another conscious entity, until consciousness emerges from it. The Cārvāka argues that consciousness emerges in a foetus from the vital forces which are modifications of earth, water, light and air, as intoxicating power is generated by the particles of rice when they are fermented in water, and that the body is perceived as the self such as 'I am lean', 'I am fat', etc., that the self distinct from the body is not perceived, and that therefore the self exists in the body. It may be argued that the sense-organs are aggregates of the elements and the organs of knowledge, and that therefore they must depend upon a self as an actor different from them. This argument is wrong because the Cārvāka denies the validity of inference, and because he recognises the validity of perception alone. Even if inference be supposed to be valid, it can prove that the self inferred is different from consciousness. Consciousness manifests itself, and what is manifested by it is different from consciousness. Hence the self different from the body cannot be inferred. The body endowed with consciousness alone is perceived, and it is the self. Further, consciousness increases and decreases on the increase and decrease of a body, and so it is of the nature of a body, even as heat increases and decreases on the increase and decrease of a fire, and so it is of the nature of a fire. The 'Mrgendratra' urges that a body is not conscious because it is an object of enjoyment and suffering and because it is modifiable, as cloth and the like are devoid of consciousness, because they are objects of enjoyment and suffering, and because they are modifiable. The Cārvāka argues that an entity is an effect of another entity, if the latter being present, the former is present, and if the latter being absent, the former is absent. When the conjunction of a sperm and an ovum, which causes a foetus, is present, consciousness is present, and when the former is absent, the latter is absent. Hence consciousness is an

effect of a body. This argument is invalid, because there is no consciousness in a dead body, and because sometimes consciousness does not appear in a foetus. So it cannot be argued that whenever there is a body, there is consciousness. If consciousness is said to be an effect of a particular modification of the body, then there can be no recollection, because it presupposes a permanent self, which remembers an object, which it perceived in the past. The present modification of a body cannot remember its past modification. So the remembering self is different from its body. Recollection cannot be denied because it is experienced by all. Though the body always undergoes modification, yet the self remains identical in its nature. It is different from its body and its cognitions of the objects. So the remembering self is not identical with its body. The Cārvāka denies the validity of inference, and makes the most of the elements of earth, water, light and air. But he cannot know their qualities without inference. Further, the fact, that perception alone is a means of valid knowledge, and that inference is not so, is not known by perception. Hence the self is different from the body.³⁶ (Cp. Nyāyā).

BONDS (PĀŚĀ).—The bonds are nonspiritual stuff, which corrupts the soul. Nescience, āṇava mala, karma, māyā and God's power of veiling are the bonds, on the removal of which the bound souls are liberated and become like God. So the souls are bound by the bonds. If their dependence is natural to them, and not due to the bonds, then they cannot be said to be liberated. They are said to be so, because they are released from the bonds. A bound soul is dependent on the independent Lord, but a released soul becomes the independent Lord. This is the difference between bondage and liberation. When the bonds are broken, a soul's independence is manifested. Dependence for the attainment of the coveted good is bondage. Independence of a released soul is not obstructed. If a bound soul's dependence be eternal, then it can never be destroyed, and its cultivation of the way of knowledge for the breaking of the bonds becomes fruitless, because its independence can never be manifested. So its dependence is due to the bonds. If a soul's power of knowledge is not veiled by beginningless nescience,—being possessed of eternal and ubiquitous power of consciousness,—then it cannot depend upon the strength of the bonds for the attainment of happiness, and upon the strength of God for the attainment of liberation. If its omniscience and omnipotence be not veiled by the bonds, it would always be pure and omniscient and omnipotent. Hence the existence of the bonds which veil a soul's powers of knowledge and action must be admitted.

The veil of a bound soul is called a taint in the Śaiva scriptures. It is called nescience. It is one in all souls, and not different in the different souls. Although it is one, it is endowed with various powers which veil their nature. It is one in all bound souls, without origin, impenetrable, and veils the ubiquitous souls.³⁷ It is beginningless, innate, and one. It is not adventitious like the products of māyā. If it were many, it would be insentient and be produced by other causes, and would thus not be without origin. God cannot be bound because He is devoid of nescience. But the powers of nescience are manifold, because they veil the nature of many souls. Nescience exists in a bound soul from the beginningless time, and is without an origin. If it existed in a soul with an origin, then its association with it would depend upon the origin. But there is no origin of its association with a soul. If it binds a

liberated soul also, then all efforts for liberation will become needless. Hence nescience is not an adventitious quality of a bound soul, produced by a cause, but is uncaused. The 'Svāyambhuva' says, "The taint—nescience—is originless, and constitutes the bondage of a soul." It is one, because there is no evidence for its being many. What is modified into many is found to be produced by causes, like jars and the like. But nescience is not produced, because it is without an origin, and because it veils the nature of a soul. So it is one. But its powers are many, because all bound souls are not released simultaneously. Its many powers veil the different souls' powers of knowledge and action. If its powers were one, nescience being destroyed in one soul, all souls would be released simultaneously. But they are not released simultaneously. So the manifold powers of nescience must be admitted. But the powers of nescience do not veil a soul's powers of knowledge and action nor are they removed from it independently. They are favoured by God's power to do so, because it favours all. His power of veiling is called a bond in a secondary sense, because it follows the power of nescience which veils a soul's powers of knowledge and action. His power favours all by its nature, and so does good to them all. It may be objected that if God's power favours all conscious souls and all unconscious bonds—nescience, merits and demerits, and māyā and its effects, then it cannot favour them all simultaneously. When it favours the unconscious bonds to fetter the conscious souls, it chastises the latter because their powers of knowledge and action are veiled and because they lose their independence. So God's power cannot favour the conscious souls and the unconscious bonds simultaneously. This objection is not valid, since His power does not favour the unconscious bonds in order to give sufferings to the conscious souls but in order to favour them. The taints can be destroyed after they have produced their fruits in the form of enjoyments and sufferings of the bound souls; when they are destroyed, the souls are released. Hence God's favouring the unconscious bonds and His favouring the conscious souls are not contradictory to each other. The unconscious bonds cannot act without the guidance of God's conscious power. He gives the pains of birth, disease, old age and death to the bound souls in order to release them, even as a physician causes pain to a patient in order to cure him of a disease by operating on him or by giving him bitter drugs. God is ubiquitous and omnipotent, and consequently pervades unconscious bonds also and makes them act. He does not remain inactive in regard to them when He has to do some actions. This is the reason why He, though perfectly pure, activates the unconscious bonds to produce their effects. Thus His power favours all conscious souls and unconscious bonds simultaneously. His power favours all entities to perform their functions, as the sun favours all lotuses and makes them bloom. There is no entity which is not activated by God's favour. His favour to those bound souls whose powers of knowledge and action cease to be veiled by nescience, karma, and māyā is excessively enhanced. His favour acts on the unconscious bonds which undergo modifications in order to free the other souls from their fetters. To make the bonds undergo modifications for the release of the bound souls is to favour them. When nescience ceases to function, and when God's power of veiling is a little loosened, He favours a bound soul by awakening in it the knowledge of its essential divinity, and He favours the bonds by making them

produce all their effects. Thus God's power favours both a conscious bound soul and its unconscious bonds simultaneously—which does not involve any contradiction. He favours unconscious *māyā* to produce its effects from the *kalātattva* to earth, and unconscious merits and demerits by activating them to produce their fruits in the form of pleasures and pains, respectively. The unconscious entities are always directed by a conscious being.

The conjunction of a bound soul with a future particular body, particular kinds of sense-organs, and particular objects of experience is not uncaused. It is caused by a soul's merits and demerits acquired by it by its right and wrong actions. The conjunction exists in a particular place, and is various, temporary, peculiar to a soul, continuous in its future birth, and is not transferred to another soul. Its cause is an unseen principle because it is subtle and imperceptible. It is called 'karma' because it is produced by voluntary actions. It is an auxiliary cause of the conjunction, because it depends upon God's power of veiling, nescience, and *māyā*, and because it does not produce the conjunction independently. It produces a soul's conjunction with a future body, sense-organs, and objects in order to afford it proper enjoyments and sufferings. It sustains the conjunction for a certain period of time necessary for the soul's joys and sorrows. It is an object of experience in the sense that its fruits are experienced. The body, the vocal organ, and *manas* are the means of the experience of pleasures and pains, which are physical, mental and supernatural. The unseen principle is of two kinds, viz., merit and demerit, which are of the nature of truth and falsehood. During dissolution it persists as an impression in *māyā*, and undergoes maturation. It is not destroyed without producing the appropriate pleasures and pains. Though it is produced by voluntary actions, it is said to be without origin, because it belongs to a continuous stream. Though karma manifests merits because of its auspicious nature, it veils a soul's powers of knowledge and action, and fetters it to embodied life. Though it is of the nature of merits, it does not conduce to a soul's liberation. On the contrary, it hinders a soul's release. The soul achieves liberation when its merits are destroyed along with its demerits by the descent of God's power of grace to it.³⁸

Māyā is one, evil, possessed of various powers, the seed of the world, fetters souls until merits and demerits have produced their fruits, pervades its effects, and is not destroyed. It is one, because it is the chief material cause of the world, and because there is no evidence for its being many. It is evil since it deludes the souls. It is the material cause of the world. It is possessed of various powers because it binds the souls until their merits and demerits have borne their fruits. When they are worn out by producing their fruits, the bonds cease to fetter the souls. *Māyā* is pervasive, since it pervades all its effects. It is not destroyed, since it is eternal, and since it exists even during dissolution, like the souls and God. The '*Tattva-trayanirṇaya*' says: "God, the souls, and *māyā* are eternal, pervasive, and endowed with activity. When the modifications of *māyā* are dissolved, the three realities persist." The world with an arrangement requires an agent or efficient cause—God, and a material cause—*māyā*, even as a cloth requires a weaver as its efficient cause and threads as its material cause. *Māyā* is insentient, for its effects are insentient. If it were thought to be conscious despite its effects being

unconscious, there would be no universal causal relation, no inference, and no practical actions. All practical actions depend upon inferences. All inferences depend upon the universal causal relation. Thus, if *māyā* were the conscious material cause of its unconscious effects, there would be complete cessation of practical life. So it is unconscious. If *māyā* were destroyed on the destruction of the world—its effect, then the world would not be created again owing to the absence of its material cause. So it is not noneternal. To argue that God creates the material cause of the world before creating the world involves infinite regress, because even its material cause would require another material cause, and so on to infinity. When the world is dissolved, *māyā* exists as a power of God. This view is not vitiated by any defect. If *māyā* were limited, its effects in all times and places would not be produced. So it is pervasive. If it were many and unconscious, it would be produced like its effects—jars, cloths, and the like. But it is not produced since it is their root material cause, which cannot be many. What is the good of assuming one *māyā* as the material cause of the world? One cloth is produced out of many threads. So let the world be produced out of many causes (e.g., atoms). This view is wrong, since many material causes (e.g., atoms) are produced out of one material cause. The view, that all insentient effects in the world are produced out of one, insentient, material cause—the *māyā*, is flawless. Some hold that unconscious effects are produced out of one conscious God. This view is wrong, for water may be inferred from smoke, if unconscious effects are produced out of the conscious Lord. An effect can be produced out of a material cause of the same nature. An unconscious effect is never found to be produced out of a conscious material cause. If an effect were produced out of a material cause of a contrary nature, then all effects would be produced out of all material causes. Some hold that atoms are the material cause of the world. This view is wrong, because atoms are not made of atoms, because they have parts in that they produce things of extensive magnitude in conjunction with other atoms, and thus cease to be atoms, and because, being unconscious and many, they are produced by other causes, and, consequently, cannot be the root material cause of the world. Some hold that insentient effects are produced by their material causes, as a new body is produced by a sperm and an ovum conjoined together. This view is wrong, since new bodies cannot be produced at the time of dissolution when all bodies will be destroyed. Hence all effects subsist in *māyā* as God's powers, which are unfolded again at the time of creation, and which act to realize their ends.³⁹ So *māyā* is the eternal, pervasive, material cause of the world. Some hold that, if the world existed in *māyā*—its material cause, then no person would collect threads, a loom, a shuttle, and the like, to produce a cloth, since a cloth already exists in threads. If a cloth pre-existed in threads, they would not be its cause. A material cause is a cause if it produces a nonexistent effect, and not otherwise. This view is wrong, since all effects would be produced out of all material causes, if a nonexistent effect were produced out of a material cause. But all effects cannot be produced out of all material causes. A specific effect is produced out of a specific cause. According to *Asatkāryavāda* there is nothing to regulate the production of a specific effect out of a specific cause. Hence a specific cause alone has the power of producing a specific effect, and no other cause has this power. If a specific cause has the power of producing a

specific effect, then an effect exists in its cause as a power, and this view is in accord with the Śaiva view. Otherwise, if a nonexistent effect is produced out of its material cause, there is no use of assembling a collocation of causal conditions to produce an effect (e.g., a barren woman's son). A lump of earth, a wheel, and a stick are unnecessary to produce a nonexistent jar. It may be contended that an effect does not exist in its material cause, but that a cause has the power of producing an effect. This contention is foolish, since there is no difference between the two views except in language. The causal power of a cause produces a specific effect. When the causal power is present, the effect is produced, and when the former is absent, the latter cannot be produced. Thus the former being the cause of the latter is proved by the method of agreement in presence and agreement in absence. When a lump of earth is present, a jar is produced, and when the former is absent, the latter cannot be produced. So the former is the cause of the latter.⁴⁰ It may be objected that a jar does not exist in a lump of earth, but that it is produced by a potter out of a lump of earth, and that after it is produced by his physical action, it is perceived. This objection is groundless, since a jar is not perceived because the conditions of its perception are absent, and since a jar is not perceived, not because it does not exist in a lump of earth. When the form of a jar is manifested by a potter's physical action, it is perceived, as water existing under the earth is manifested by digging. It may be objected that there is evidence for the existence of water under the earth, but there is no evidence for the existence of a jar in a lump of earth, and that therefore a nonexistent jar is produced out of a lump of earth, and that a jar is not manifested. The reply to the objection is that production is manifestation out of a material cause, and that the form of threads obstructs the form of a cloth hidden in them. The form of threads is removed by a loom, a shuttle, and the like, and the form of a cloth is manifested by them. A nonexistent thing cannot be manifested. Hence the *kalātattva* and other principles exist in *māyā*—the material cause—as powers, and are manifested by the action of God, and *māyā* is the chief material cause of the world.⁴¹

Bhojadeva regards *māyā* as a real, eternal, positive principle, which is the material cause of the world. Śrīkumāra avers that the world is real, and that *māyā*—its material cause—is real, because it is the material cause of the world. *Māyā* and the world are not false appearances of God as the Advaitavādins hold. The world—the effect of *māyā*—is real. It is not a false appearance, since there is no proof for it.⁴²

Others hold that *māyā* is a positive entity of the nature of God, and that the world—its effect—is of the nature of Him, because nothing different from God can exist.⁴³ God of the nature of knowledge is manifested as *māyā* and its effect—the world. So He is both *māyā* and the world. This view does not make God modifiable, because He appears to be the world. It adopts the doctrine of false appearance (*vivarta*), which is an entity's becoming a different entity without losing its nature, as a rope appears to be a serpent. A rope is not modified into a serpent. Similarly, God is not modified into the world, but appears to be *māyā* and its effect. The 'Īśvaragītā' says: "God Himself is the root *prakṛti*, mahat, and the other modifications of it, and individual souls." Śatacakāra says: "The supreme reality is devoid of all determinations, pure, transcendent, and without origin and end. The world consisting of thirty six principles is manifested in it, as towns and villages with their distinctions are

manifested in a mirror. Though they are nondistinct from one another in God's knowledge, they appear to be distinct from one another. One nondistinct God appears to be the manifest world."

BONDAGE, LIBERATION, AND YOGA.—God is the cause of the souls' bondage and emancipation. He has two kinds of power in regard to the souls—binding power and liberating power. The first binds them with a network of bonds from the beginningless time. When His binding power has ceased to operate in course of time, and when the souls' merits and demerits have been destroyed, His liberating power in quest of a favourable time descends into them. Then He ripens their taints, assumes the form of a spiritual teacher, initiates them into the cult of Śiva, destroys their taints, and unites them with Śivatattva. He liberates them with the sword of knowledge after destroying their bonds. He engages the sakala souls endowed with subtle bodies in actions for their enjoyments and sufferings in contact with sensible objects in the different worlds after associating them with gross bodies. He infuses His power into those souls whose taints have become ripe in order to destroy them, and engages them in the pursuit of the supreme reality.⁴⁴

There are four kinds of bonds : mala, karma, māyīya, and God's power of veiling the souls' knowledge. Mala is the first kind of taint, because it is the cause of their merits and demerits. Some consider it to be the prior negation of knowledge. Others consider it to be an insentient positive entity like darkness destroyed by knowledge. The Śaiva teachers think it to be a potency or impression of nescience. The 'Śivasūtravārtika' says : "The knowledge of 'I' and 'mine', which manifests difference, which is produced by association with words, and which is the cause of māyīya mala, is characterised by the function of nescience." The 'Kiraṇa' says : "Mala is nescience, darkness, swoon, which veils the knowledge of a soul. Karma is the second kind of taint. Merits and demerits are called karma. Māyīya is produced by māyā, and is of the nature of the subtle body and the gross body. It is the third kind of taint. God's power of veiling is the fourth kind of taint. The existence of the bonds is proved by the fact that bondage or the cycle of births and deaths is not possible without them which bind the souls. Bondage is proved by the Śruti and other pramāṇas. The objection, that there is a vicious circle in the argument that mala and karma are produced when māyā operates, and that māyā operates when mala and karma are produced, is groundless, because mala, karma, and māyā are beginningless like seeds and sprouts.⁴⁵ Mala is one but possessed of various powers, and veils a soul's power of knowledge and power of action. There are many karmas and māyīyas. But mala is one and so different from them. God's power of veiling is one but not possessed of various powers, and so is not mala. The 'Kiraṇa' says : "Though a soul is ubiquitous, mala restricts its power of knowledge and power of action, and so makes it ignorant of God, as a mantra obstructs the consuming power of fire." "A soul is essentially pure like God ; but its mala conceals its essential purity consisting of pure consciousness." Power of knowledge and power of action constitute its essence ; they are omniscience and omnipotence. But mala conceals them, manifests its finite knowledge and limited power of action, and makes it bound. The objection, that when innate mala is destroyed, the soul that is possessed of it is destroyed, is unsound, because the soul's essence is not

destroyed when its innate mala is destroyed, even as the essence of gold is not destroyed when the stain of gold due to copper is destroyed. Karma is beginningless, of the nature of merits and demerits, and various. It is beginningless as a stream, and not in the form of constant existence of one karma. If karma were one positive entity and without any origin and end, it would be eternal like a soul, and therefore liberation would not be possible. Further, if karma were eternal, bondage would not be destroyed. Karma is of two kinds : merit and demerit. It is various because it is the cause of various kinds of fruits. The variety of karma or merits and demerits is the cause of a variety of objects, which produce a variety of experience. Māyā is the material cause of all manifest objects, time, kalā, niyati, vidyā, and rāga. It is said, "Māyā is nondiscrimination of the principles." The world is material and so produced by one material cause, as earth is the material cause of all earthen vessels. Māyā is a real, positive entity, because it is the material cause of the world, like God, Who is its efficient cause. It is eternal since it is the root of the world, like God. If it were noneternal, it would be produced by another cause. The argument, that God is the cause of the world, and that māyā is not its cause because the Śruti and Bādarāyaṇa assert it, is wrong because God and māyā related to each other are the causes of the world. Insentient māyā is not the material cause of the world as independent of God. The Lord, though conscious, is not the cause of the world without māyā because He is neutral and without physical action. They are the causes of the world as related to each other. The world produced by māyā is a real positive entity. Māyā is real, and, consequently, its product, the world, is real. The world is not a false appearance, because there is no proof for its falsity, and because the nature of its falsity cannot be ascertained. God's power of veiling the souls' knowledge favours the bonds which bind them, and is so called a bond. The effects of mala, karma, and māyā are incapable of binding them because of their insentience. God's power veiling their knowledge alone enters into them, and enables them to bind the souls, and is therefore called a bond. Thus there are four kinds of bonds.⁴⁶

The Vaiśeṣika holds that the right knowledge of the nature of substance, quality, action or motion, generality, and particularity with their similarities and differences destroys ignorance, love, hate, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, merit, demerit, and impression due to a soul's conjunction with its body. When all these qualities are destroyed, the soul becomes unconscious ; and if such a soul is liberated, even a dead body should be considered to be liberated.⁴⁷

The Sāṃkhya holds that liberation is due to discrimination between the self and prakṛti and the mind-body-complex—its effect. This view is wrong because the Sāṃkhya regards prakṛti, an effect of kalā produced by māyā as the chief cause of the world. It does not know that kalā and other distinct principles, which have different ends and functions, are the effects of māyā. Prakṛti is the equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas, and not different from them according to it. The guṇas are many, and hence prakṛti is manifold and insentient, and, consequently, must be produced by another cause, like threads. So prakṛti is not the chief cause of the world. Again, the Sāṃkhya holds, that conjunction of a soul with prakṛti is the cause of its bondage, that conjunction is preceded by disjunction between them, and that this disjunction is the cause of liberation. The conjunction of a soul with

prakṛti is the relation of a knowing self to known objects, and not of the nature of union because both are formless. Prakṛti is not perceived by its nature, because it is assumed to be imperceptible. Nor can the self, which knows mahat, ahaṁkāra, and its other modifications, perceive prakṛti. So there can be no conjunction of a self with prakṛti, and therefore there can be no disjunction prior to it. Thus conjunction and disjunction between a self and prakṛti being not possible, prakṛti cannot be the chief cause of the world. The Sāṁkhya does not believe in God. A self, according to it, is not an experiencer of pleasure and pain. What, then, is the use of its body, sense-organs, and their objects, and pleasures and pains? A self's being an experiencer of pleasure and pain cannot be denied, because it is endowed with its body as the locus of its pleasure and pain, and with its sense-organs, which are the organs of its experience. A self, which is an experiencer of pleasure and pain, cannot be inactive, because an inactive entity cannot be related as a cause to any other entity. Further, a self is of the nature of knowing and activity; and if it is inactive, it cannot be a knower because knowing is of the nature of activity. Further, insentient prakṛti without being guided by an intelligent agent cannot produce an effect independently. It is absurd to hold that insentient prakṛti can produce effects, and that a conscious self cannot act.⁴⁸

According to the Advaita Vedānta there is one Self or undifferentiated consciousness in all unconscious and conscious entities, that appears to be many souls and the manifold world in connection with different limiting adjuncts. The nondifferent supreme Brahman appears to be different, and the appearance of difference is illusory, like the appearance of the double moon. But this statement is a mere thesis which is not proved, because there is no reason or example for the inference. If the supreme Self be considered to be the pramāṇa, then it is the object of the proof also. If it is the means of valid knowledge and the object of valid knowledge, then it is also the knower of valid knowledge and valid knowledge. If it is fourfold, it undermines monism. Otherwise, the one supreme Self is unproved. Further, the Advaitavādins do not admit an individual soul's equality of enjoyment with Brahman in release, and real liberation. They consider bondage and liberation as phenomenal appearances only. But the reality of the perceptible world of plurality and of individual souls must be admitted. The variety of objects is the cause of pleasures and pains of the individual souls. They must experience these feelings in order to endeavour to attain release from them, since the scriptures inculcate the practice of a spiritual discipline for achieving liberation. If the individual souls are real, then only some can be happy and others can be miserable. If the bound souls are mere appearances of Brahman, and if they merge in It and emerge from It, their liberation is not real. Further, if Brahman be the cause of conscious souls and unconscious objects, It becomes conscious and unconscious, because effects are of the nature of their causes. But the presence of consciousness and the absence of consciousness cannot exist in It, because they are contradictory to each other. It is partless, and, consequently, cannot be partly conscious and partly unconscious. If It has parts, It is an effect, and ceases to be the chief cause. Further, a material cause is always unconscious, like earth and the like. Thus, Brahman, the material cause of the world, is unconscious. If It be conscious, It cannot be the material cause of the world. If It is unconscious, It cannot be the cause of the conscious souls. It cannot produce the

world until It becomes conscious, because an unconscious entity, like earth, unguided by an intelligent agent, cannot produce an effect, like a jar. If the souls knowing themselves and objects be produced by Brahman, they also become unconscious, like jars and the like. So the doctrine of monism is vitiaied by many defects.⁴⁹

The 'Mrgendra Tantra' describes the eightfold Yoga as the means to the attainment of liberation. Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha elaborates it. Breath-control, withdrawal of mind from the objects of the sense-organs, fixation of mind, meditation, discernment, muttering God's name or mantra, and trance are the parts of yoga. Yoga consists in the immediate experience of the Self or its divinity and absoluteness, and a yogin is one who has realised his Self or divinity. One who has mastered one's sense-organs and passions can become a yogin. Passions can be gradually conquered by breath-control. It consists in inhalation, retention and exhalation of breath in the proportion of 1, 4 and 2 in respect of duration with the muttering of God's name or without it under an expert's guidance. It removes the defects in the humours of the body, and the flaws in the objects of the sense-organs by pacifying the passions which motivate them to function towards them. Then the mind should be withdrawn from the objects of the sense-organs after tasting a trace of inner joy on achieving mental equanimity. Then the mind withdrawn from the objects of sentient pleasure becomes fit for being concentrated on a desired object. Then meditation or thinking of a form of God for a period of time should be practised. Then trance should be practised. It is the continuity of the thought of some form of God without interruption in which alone the object of thought is manifested. It is the complete absorption of the mind in the object of meditation. Concentration is fixation of the mind at the heart or some other vital part of the body in order to make it fit for meditation on God. When the mind is distracted, concentrate it at the heart, and it will become steady. Breath-control, concentration and meditation should be accompanied by the repeated muttering of God's name, either audible, or inaudible, or mental, in order to confront the mind with the object of meditation.⁵⁰ Discernment is insight into the highest good which is covetable and the evils which are to be eschewed. A yogin who practises these parts of yoga individually and collectively perceives the world as pervaded by divine powers. He cannot be harmed by any evil powers, human and superhuman, because he achieves excellent knowledge, power of action, strength, and invincibility. Breath-control attended with muttering God's name steadies the mind. Concentration and meditation lead to a vision of God as a luminous form. Trance generates eight kinds of supernatural powers. Concentration of the mind on God residing in earth, water, and the other elements generates the manifestation of His powers pervading them. Concentration on Śivatattva after complete withdrawal of the mind from all objects practised for a long time leads to the attainment of divinity after death. When the mind becomes completely detached, it is no longer attached to worldly objects, and all its functions are arrested. A detached yogin with a completely controlled mind can concentrate on God with the whole world as His body. He does not concentrate on a limited object or place as pervaded by God, but on the whole world as pervaded by Him. He always perceives God in all beings and does good to them. Meditation on Him makes the mind steady and tranquil. Meditation on formless God repeatedly practised reveals Him with omniscience, omnipotence, and

infinite bliss. The body becomes surcharged with divine light and consciousness, the mind is destroyed, and egoism is eradicated. The body is discarded at the proper time, and one's own divinity is realized.⁵¹ (Cp. Post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta). The account of 'Śaiva Siddhānta' based on 'Sarvadarśanasamgraha' is given in Vol. II. Śaivism in the Upanisads and the Purāṇas is discussed in Vol. I.

¹ SDS., ch. vii ; HIP., Vol. II, 1952, pp. 733-37.

² TP., i, 5. ³ TD., i, 1-3, 6-7.

⁴ Ibid, i, 3 ; pp. 14-18. ⁵ MT., MTV., i, 5, 13-17.

⁶ TD., ii, 17 ; pp. 88-91, 96-97, 99-110. Cp. HIP., Vol. I, pp. 677-95.

⁷ CHL., 1st edition, Vol. II, p. 43n ; DHIP., Vol. V, pp. 162, 163n. & 168.

⁸ TP., TD., ii, 1-4 ; ŚR., pp. 75-76.

⁹ TP., ii, 5 ; TD., ii, 5, pp. 75-77.

¹⁰ Ibid, ii, 7 ; pp. 77-79. ¹¹ Ibid, ii, 8.

¹² TP., TD., ii, 9. ¹³ Ibid, ii, 10.

¹⁴ Ibid, ii, 13. ¹⁵ TD., ii, 14.

¹⁶ Ibid, ii, 14. ¹⁷ TP., ii, 16.

¹⁸ Ibid, iii, 1. ¹⁹ TP., TD., iii, 2-3.

²⁰ TP., iii, 4. ²¹ Ibid, iii, 4-5.

²² Ibid, iii, 6-7. ²³ Ibid, iii, 10.

²⁴ Ibid, iii, 11. ²⁵ Ibid, iii, 12.

²⁶ Ibid, iv, 1. ²⁷ Ibid, iv, 2-3.

²⁸ Ibid, iv, 4-10 ; V, 6-7 ; vi, 1-2. cp. Sāṃkhya.

²⁹ MT., MTV., i, 10, 4-6, 8-14.

³⁰ TP., TD., i, 5-6. ³¹ TP., i, 8.

³² TP., TD., i, 10. Cp. Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism.

³³ Ibid, i, 11-13. ³⁴ MT., i, 2, 5-7.

³⁵ TD., i, 8.

³⁶ MT., MTV., i, 6, 3-6. ³⁷ MT., i, 7, 4-5 & 8.

³⁸ MT., MTV., i, 7, 11-23. ³⁹ MT., i, 9 & 13.

⁴⁰ MT., i, 9, 16 & 19 ; MTV., i, 9, 15.

⁴¹ MT., i, 9, 20-21 ; MTV., i, 9, 13-16 & 21.

⁴² TD., i, 18 ; p. 62. ⁴³ Ibid, i, 19, pp. 71-72.

⁴⁴ TP., TD., i, 15-16. ⁴⁵ Ibid, i, 15-17.

⁴⁶ Ibid, i, 19. ⁴⁷ MT., MTV., i, 2, 22-23.

⁴⁸ MT., MTV., i, 2 & 15.

⁴⁹ MTV., i, 2, 12-14, pp. 64-70.

⁵⁰ MT., yogapāda, i, 2 ; i, 7-9.

⁵¹ Ibid, i, 28-29, 49-50, 52-54, 56-60, HIP., Vol. II, 1952, pp. 733-37.

CHAPTER V

ŚAIVA VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITAVĀDA : ŚRĪKAṆṬHA

INTRODUCTION.—Nothing is known about the life of Śrīkaṇṭha. He mentions in the beginning and at the end of 'Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya' on the 'Brahmasūtra' that he was a disciple of Śvetācārya. This is the only work written by him, which is known. It was published in Mysore in 1903. He does not mention the names of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, or Madhva. But he says in the Introduction to his commentary, that 'Brahmasūtra' is the eyes with which the wise can have a vision of Brahman. It was misinterpreted by the earlier commentators. It is being rightly interpreted by Śrīkaṇṭha (6). Evidently he hints here at Śaṅkara who interpreted it in the light of monism (800 A.D.) He criticises Śaṅkar's doctrines of attributeless Brahman, of an individual soul as Brahman limited by a false adjunct, viz., nescience, of its being a knower as a reflection of Brahman in egoism, of an effect as an unreal appearance of its material cause, and of the world as a false appearance of Brahman.¹ So he was later than Śaṅkara. He criticises the doctrine of difference and identity between Brahman and an individual soul held by Bhāskara (900 A.D.).² Nimbārka (1300 A.D.) also held the doctrine of difference and identity in another way. So he was later than 900 A.D. He quotes a verse from Abhinavagupta's 'Bodhapañcadāśikā',³ and a verse from Utpaladeva's 'Īśvarapratyabhijñānākārikā' (1000 A.D.).⁴ Both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta belonged to the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism, and flourished in 1000 A.D. So Śrīkaṇṭha was later than 1000 A.D. He calls himself a Viśiṣṭādvaitavādin—a qualified monist. This doctrine resembles the doctrine of difference and identity between Brahman and the individual soul.⁵ Śrīkaṇṭha conceives of Brahman as essentially qualified by the powers of conscious souls, and of unconscious matter, which are His attributes and accessories, and which constitute His body.⁶ Brahman is the Supreme Soul with the conscious souls and unconscious matter as His body. He is the substance while they are His attributes. He is the Principal while they are His accessories.⁷ He is the Whole while souls are His parts because they are His body.⁸ Śrīkaṇṭha regards Brahman as qualified by the subtle conscious souls and unconscious matter as the material cause of the world, and Brahman as qualified by the gross embodied souls and unconscious matter as the effect. He regards an individual soul as a knower, enjoyer, and doer, and a released soul as similar to Brahman, and not identical with Him. He regards an effect as a real modification of its material cause, and the world as a real modification of Brahman endowed with power. These are the views of Rāmānuja. Especially, none other than Rāmānuja conceived of Brahman as qualified by the conscious souls and unconscious matter as His body, attributes, and accessories.⁹

So Śrīkantha adopted Rāmānuja's doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita, and was later than he was. Śrīpati Paṇḍita, the author of 'Śrīkarabhāṣya' on the 'Brahmasūtra' (1400 A.D.) calls

Śrīkaṇṭha a follower of Rāmānuja, a qualified monist. The later Vedāntists call the Śaivas plagiarists of Rāmānuja's doctrine. So Śrīkaṇṭha could not be earlier than Rāmānuja. He criticises the doctrine of difference between Brahman and an individual soul.¹⁰ He could not be later than Śrīpati Paṇḍita (1400 A.D.) who explicitly refers to him. Śrīkaṇṭha criticises the Pāsupata doctrine that God is only the efficient cause of the world.¹¹ But he stresses, like the Pāsupata, meditation on 'Om' in the heart-ether, which he identifies with Śiva accompanied by Umā—the pure, infinite, universal consciousness attended with power, which is transcendent of, and immanent in, the universe. The Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism emphasised meditation on Śiva-Śakti at the centres of mystic consciousness including the powerful heart-lotus.¹² Śrīkaṇṭha was a successor of Bhojarāja (1100 A.D.). R. G. Bhandarkar thinks Śrīkaṇṭha's philosophy to be qualified monism, like that of Rāmānuja. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī assigns him 1350 A.D., and thinks that he belonged to the Southern school of Śaiva Siddhānta. Śūrya Nārāyaṇa Śāstrī thinks him to be a contemporary of Rāmānuja (1100-1200 A.D.). S. N. Das Gupta and J. N. Banerjee assign him to the thirteenth century. Roma Choudhury places him after Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. R. K. Kaw dates him 1270 A.D. It is undoubted that Śrīkaṇṭha was influenced by Rāmānuja's qualified monism, and that he was his junior contemporary.¹³ His 'Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya' is a famous commentary on the 'Brahmasūtra', which is not brief and concise like Nimbārka's 'Vedāntapārijatasaurabha' nor elaborate and exhaustive like Rāmānuja's 'Śrībhāṣya'. He describes his commentary as the essence of all Upaniṣads, sweet and fragrant, and a great treasure to the revered devotees of Śiva. Appayadīkṣita (1600 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary entitled 'Sivārkamaṇidīpikā' on 'Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya'. Śrīkaṇṭha based his doctrine on the Upaniṣads whereas the Śaiva Siddhānta based its doctrine on the Śaiva Āgamas.

THE NATURE OF BRAHMAN.—Śrīkaṇṭha calls Brahman Śiva. He is of the nature of being, consciousness, and bliss, and of the nature of 'I', the Supreme Self. He is the creator of all worlds through His power, the source of all scriptures, the repository of all goods, the principal of all conscious souls and unconscious physical things, which are His accessories, and the grantor of emancipation. He is devoid of all blemishes and endowed with supreme knowledge, bliss and other qualities and powers, and greatness.¹⁴ Creation, maintenance, and dissolution of the world, obscuration of the knowledge of the individual souls, and granting them grace are His acts.¹⁵ Bondage is the obscuration of the souls' knowledge of their real nature. Emancipation is the manifestation of their knowledge of their real nature. He is the cause of their bondage and release. His being the creator, maintainer, destroyer of the world, and binder, and liberator of the souls is as essential as His being omniscient, omnipotent, and the like. He is omniscient, eternally contented, independent, possessed of powers which are never destroyed, omnipotent, and endowed with beginningless knowledge. His omniscience consists in eternal immediate apprehension of all objects, independent of the external sense-organs. He is the efficient cause of the world and the bodies capable of producing joys and miseries appropriate to the various merits and demerits of the conscious souls. His being eternally contented consists in being full of supreme bliss and in being devoid of all blemishes. He enjoys His unsurpassable bliss through His manas, which is independent of the external sense-organs. His manas is of the nature of the power of pure

knowledge. He enjoys His essential bliss through it. He has no trace of pleasure due to the external sense-organs. He is devoid of sentient pleasure due to the physical mind. His being endowed with beginningless knowledge consists in His being possessed of self-evident, innate, supreme knowledge. His knowledge of His essential bliss is due to His internal organ. It gives Him the apprehension of His bliss. It is of the nature of originless knowledge. "He is immortal, and abounds in peace and tranquillity." He is supramundane and untouched by all imperfections of the world. His independence consists in His being devoid of wretchedness due to dependence on another being, and in controlling and subduing all other entities. He controls and regulates all conscious souls and unconscious things. He is the creator of all, since He is independent of all other entities. His being endowed with indestructible powers consists in His being possessed of natural, innate, spontaneous powers. His being qualified by the powers of conscious souls and unconscious physical things is natural to Him. He is never unqualified. Śrīkaṇṭha rejects Śaṅkara's view of unqualified Brahman, like Rāmānuja, and regards conscious and unconscious powers as His qualities. Brahman is omnipotent in the sense that He is endowed with unlimited powers.¹⁶ Because He has infinite powers, He is the material cause of the limitless world. The Supreme Lord Himself endowed with subtle and gross, conscious and unconscious powers, is the cause and the effect.¹⁷

He is called 'Bhava', since He always exists. He is the eternal Being, that persists in all beings. He is the material cause of all existents. He is called 'Śarva', since He destroys all entities. He is called 'Īśāna', since He is endowed with unconditional supreme lordship. "He rules over these worlds with His ruling powers". He is called 'Paśupati', since He is the ruler of the bound souls, which depend upon Him. The word 'paśu', or bound soul, implies bonds. Māyā or prakṛti and its effects are called bonds (pāśa) because they bind the souls to embodied existence. Brahman is the controller of the conscious souls and unconscious matter. He is called 'Rudra', because He cures the disease of embodied life. "The knower of Brahman transcends grief." He is called 'Ugra', because He cannot be overpowered by others' lustre or splendour. He is called 'Bhīma', because He is the cause of fear of all conscious souls. He is called 'Mahādeva', because He shines in His infinite greatness, or because He discards the imperfections of all existents, and because He is established in His self-knowledge and sovereignty. He is designated by other names. He is called 'Śivatattva', since He is devoid of all imperfections of empirical life, and since He is the abode of all kinds of goods. He is called 'Brahman', because He is the efficient cause and material cause of the world, and because He is endowed with infinite greatness. He is called 'Śiva', because He is possessed of supreme bliss and other qualities. Brahman as endowed with subtle consciousness and unconsciousness is the cause. He as endowed with gross consciousness and unconsciousness is the effect.¹⁸ He is knowable through the Vedas alone. They were hidden in Him before creation and revealed at the time of creation. So they are impersonal and yet created by God.¹⁹ He is the supremely trustworthy Person, because He has flawless perception of all entities, which is intrinsically valid. So His words which constitute the Vedas are valid. He is the promulgator of all kinds of learning. The Vedas manifest all kinds of entities, and are made or revealed by God. So His omniscience is known for certain by them. If He were not omniscient, He would not be able to speak about all entities

through them. He is ubiquitous and in contact with all entities, and therefore omniscient, and knows them all. He also manifests them all through the Vedas made by Him, which manifest all objects. He communicates the knowledge of them to the bound souls through them. It may be objected that if God is omniscient, seers also are omniscient, because they know all the Vedas. This objection is not sound, because God's knowledge is greater than that of seers. Some Vedic sentences convey their meanings in a primary sense. Other Vedic sentences convey their meanings in a secondary sense. But God is the witness of all, and perceives them directly. So there is a difference between Him and the Vedas. He is greater than the conscious souls and the unconscious world. He communicated the knowledge of the Vedas to Brahmā at the time of creation, which are the means of acquiring all knowledge. So He is the maker of all the Vedas.²⁰

The existence of God cannot be known by inference from the world as made of parts. Many agents are inferred from the world with a wonderful arrangement of parts, as many masons are inferred from a huge gateway to a temple. One God cannot be inferred as the creator of the world. Even if one God be inferred from the world as its creator, He is possessed of merits and demerits and a body, as a potter is possessed of them. Even if one God be inferred from the world as its agent, He cannot be inferred as its efficient cause and material cause. So He is known through the Vedas alone.

Brahman is the supreme reality, transcendent of the world and the souls, and possessed of the highest excellence.²¹ He is of the nature of supreme 'I', and endowed with extraordinary, supreme qualities. Because He is the most excellent Being, He is the object of our reverence and worship.²² He is the Supreme Person, the supreme light, attainable by the released souls. He is devoid of reprehensible qualities and endowed with auspicious qualities.²³ In the aforesaid senses He is both attributeless and endowed with attributes. He is devoid of imperfections and endowed with auspicious qualities. He is full of attributes—supreme purity, absolute holiness, auspicious qualities, supreme good, and devoid of all blemishes. He is called Śiva because of His twofold nature, because of His freedom from connection with beginningless impurities, and because of His being endowed with supreme purity, infinite bliss, and infinite auspicious qualities. He is devoid of attachment, aversion and other imperfections. He abounds in bliss and imparts bliss to others. He is pure consciousness and a conscious knower. Consciousness is His essence, and He is omniscient, and knows all entities at all times. As supremely merciful He resides in the heart of a person as full of light, although He is unlimited, for his meditation on Him. He is the favourer of all, destroys their bonds of embodied existence, and grants them emancipation. He is the sovereign remedy for the disease of bondage.²⁴ He is the Universal and Infinite, because He alone is of the nature of infinite bliss. He alone is the Universal, and none else. "When the Universal is experienced, nothing else is perceived". When infinite bliss is experienced, no desire for less pleasure disturbs the soul. Brahman is eternally self-fulfilled, abounds in tranquillity, and is full of infinite delight. "He is endowed with the body of ether; His soul is truth; His vital force is pleasure; His manas is bliss; He is rich in tranquillity, and immortal". 'Ether' is not physical ether, but of the nature of manifestation, the ether of pure consciousness.²⁵ He is transcendent of the unconscious world and the conscious souls. He is present in all, and the substratum of all, the Soul of the universe and the Inner Controller

of the universe and the souls. He is immanent in the universe, and is manifested in it. He assumes the form of the universe, and is transformed into it. He is the ruler of all, the Supreme Lord, transcendent of all, greater than the universe, greater than all, and higher than all.²⁶ He is pure and immutable, though He is immanent in the universe and the bound souls. Though He is transformed into the universe, He is untouched by its mutability. Though He is immanent in the bound souls, He is not affected by their nescience, sins and imperfections. He is eternally pure and immutable. He is supremely holy, infinite, eternal, and omniscient. The universe is mutable, physical, finite and perishable. The bound souls are ignorant and afflicted with misery. Brahman is the Supreme Lord. The unconscious things and the conscious souls are governed by Him. He is the Soul of all, excels all, and is worshipped by all. His being of the form of the universe is not denied, but His being confined to it is denied.²⁷ Though He is of the nature of unconscious powers and conscious powers, though He is qualified by the unconscious world and the conscious souls, He is not tainted with their impurities, because He is the abode of all auspicious qualities. Their impurities are denied of Him.²⁸ Though He is the cause of the universe and the bound souls, and though He is qualified by them, He is not affected by mutability, ignorance and other imperfections, because He is omniscient, eternally fulfilled, independent, omnipotent, possessed of indestructible powers and eternal knowledge, and the repository of the supreme goods realizable by the bound souls. Though He enters into all mutations, He is absolutely free from any taint of mutation, because He is imperishable and immortal. Though He enters into all conscious souls and unconscious matter, He ever remains the pure, holy, immutable, immortal Lord.²⁹ There is no other supreme reality than Brahman. His supreme power is manifested in all conscious souls and unconscious, physical things. He is free from the potencies of actions and possessed of omniscience and all other auspicious qualities.³⁰ He is the knower, enjoyer, and doer. He is the knower of all, experiencer of His infinite bliss, creator, maintainer, and destroyer of the universe, and binder and liberator of the souls. He is not mere knowledge, bliss and powers, which constitute His essence.³¹ He is stern, just and merciful. He creates the embodied souls or associates the souls with their bodies in accordance with their merits and demerits. He gives them the fruits of their actions appropriate to their deserts. He is neither partial nor cruel. He is the chastiser and redeemer. He is severe and benign. He is terrible and loving and attractive. The souls and the world are real. God is real. They are His attributes, powers, parts, accessories. He is their substratum, substance, whole, principal. He is one in many, an organic whole, Supreme Individual. Many are internal differences within Him. He is devoid of homogeneous difference and heterogeneous difference. But there is internal difference within Him. There is none similar to Him. There is none dissimilar to Him. He is devoid of external difference. (Cp. Rāmānuja).³²

Though God is the Inner Controller of all created entities, He is not tainted with their flaws, since the Śrutis assert Him to be devoid of all blemishes and endowed with the highest good. He is different from the bound souls and the physical causes and effects which bind them to embodied existence. He is the creator of all worlds and their Inner Controller, and not tainted with their imperfections.³³ It is objected that as the soul which is pure becomes impure in connection with a body, so God, Who is pure, is tainted with the blemishes of the

embodied souls and physical things, of which He is the Inner Controller. This objection is not sound, since the Śruti unambiguously asserts that God is the Inner Controller of the earth, etc., which are His body, and is immortal. So He is flawless and pure. But the bound soul's real, spiritual, pure nature is concealed by God's volition. His pure, auspicious, holy nature is never obscured by the imperfections of the created beings. Although God and a soul reside in the same body, they exist as different from each other ; God exists as a neutral spectator while the soul exists as the experiencer of joys and sorrows—fruits of its actions. So God is not tainted with the blemishes of the body. He exists in celestial, human, and animal bodies as the formless Supreme Self, since He is the creator of names and forms. As formless, He is not tainted with the blemishes of the forms created by Him.³⁴ The Śruti says, 'Brahman is partless, inactive, and tranquil' ; 'He is sinless' ; 'He is omniscient and all-knowing' ; 'He is the ruler of prakṛti and the souls, the ruler of sattva, rajas and tamas' ; 'His powers are various and supreme'. He is called Mahādeva because He discards all forms, and glories in supreme self-knowledge, yoga, and sovereignty. So He is flawless and endowed with auspicious qualities.³⁵ Otherwise, numerous Śrutis would become meaningless. The Śruti 'Brahman is truth, knowledge, and infinite' simply asserts that He is of the nature of limitless knowledge, but that it does not deny other auspicious qualities of Him, because there is no specific statement about it, and because His being endowed with other auspicious qualities does not contradict the aforesaid Śruti. His being supremely self-manifest and of the nature of supreme knowledge does not contradict His being omniscient and all-knowing. So there is no contradiction. The Śruti asserts repeatedly that Brahman is devoid of inauspicious qualities and endowed with auspicious qualities. 'Ether is the body of Brahman ; His soul is truth, vital breath is joy, mind is delight ; He is rich in tranquillity, and immortal'. It means that He is of the nature of manifestation, that He is of the form of the ether of pure consciousness and existence, that His delight is in His self, and independent of external objects and external sense-organs, that He is flawless and omniscient, devoid of attachment, aversion, and other inauspicious qualities, possessed of supreme self-delight, favourable to virtues, hostile to sins, and endowed with supreme sovereignty. He is called 'Śiva' because He is absolutely free from beginningless impurities and endowed with absolute purity and holiness, infinite bliss and auspicious qualities. Śiva is Brahman invested with these twofold characteristics, absolutely immaculate, and the repository of the highest good. Brahman is present in all entities, but is not tainted with their changes and blemishes, as ether is present in all pots but is not affected by their limitations, and as the sun is reflected in water in different vessels but is not affected by their increase, decrease and other faults. The Śruti says, 'Brahman has two forms—corporeal and incorporeal' ; 'Brahman is not this, not this'. So both kinds of forms are denied of Him. This objection is not sound, since limitedness of forms alone is denied of Him, and since His power of assuming corporeal and incorporeal forms is not denied of Him. Physical qualities and limitedness alone are denied of Brahman, but His absolute flawlessness and infinite holiness and auspiciousness are not denied.³⁶

GOD'S GRACE.—God is supremely merciful. He is free from all blemishes and endowed with all auspicious qualities. He creates the world of conscious embodied souls and unconscious

subtle and gross matter for His sport. He is eternally self-fulfilled, and does not realise any end in creating the world. His creative delight is the cause of creation. He veils a soul's innate knowledge of its essential spiritual nature and community of nature with Him, and causes its bondage to embodied existence. He reveals the Vedas or eternal wisdom to the seers, and lays down injunctions and prohibitions. A bound soul freely performs prescribed actions and commits prohibited actions, and earns merits and demerits. God creates an appropriate body for it to experience the fruits of these merits and demerits. There is a beginningless series of creation and dissolution. God dissolves the world to give respite to embodied souls afflicted by the miseries of births and deaths out of His grace. He inclines them to listen to the Vedas, reflect on them, meditate on God with detachment and devotion, and acquire immediate knowledge of Him, and releases them through His supreme grace. He removes the veil of their knowledge of their innate divine nature, and takes them to His spiritual abode, and makes them share in His supreme knowledge and power and bliss out of His grace. The Śāktas, the Śaivas, and the Vaiṣṇavas all believe in the grace of God. He is the repository of the souls' highest good. He is the destroyer of their sins and impurities. He destroys their merits and demerits, gives them absolute purity, and makes them similar to Him. His supreme grace is the principal cause of their release from bondage. Śrīkaṇṭha lays great stress on this aspect of Southern Śaivism.³⁷

GOD'S BODY.—God has a spiritual body. He assumes a body at His will. His body is non-physical and not due to merits and demerits, like a human body. So He does not experience pleasure and pain, although He has a body.³⁸ But human souls experience pleasures and pains with their bodies, because they are due to their merits and demerits, and because these produce their pleasures and pains. Human souls have physical bodies, but God has a non-physical body. The Śruti says, "God is sinless, devoid of old age, death, grief, hunger, and thirst, and has true desires and true resolves". So He is free from the qualities of physical bodies. He can assume various bodies to reveal Himself to His worshippers at His will. His bodies are nonphysical, devoid of sins, old age, death, grief and the like, voluntarily assumed by Him for His sport, and for the good of His devotees, and eternal. They exist in His eternal, spiritual body, and are revealed to them for their good. Hence, although He has a body, He is not subject to bondage, like us. The Śruti asserts His being possessed of a body and devoid of sins, old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst which afflict a physical body.³⁹ Śrīkaṇṭha quotes the authority of scriptural testimony, because He does not depend upon reasoning unsupported by it in regard to supersensible realities. Even a fire cannot burn a powerful being. God assumes stable nonphysical bodies full of pure knowledge with the powers of mahāmāyā.⁴⁰

THE ABODE OF ŚIVA.—Śiva abode is above Viṣṇu's abode, which is above Brahmā's abode. Brahmā's abode is above the mundane world. Brahmā is superior to all human souls. Viṣṇu is superior to Brahmā. Śiva is superior to Viṣṇu. Heaven is full of supreme empirical happiness. Celestial souls or gods reside there.⁴¹ They are endowed with celestial bodies, with which they enjoy happiness for ages, and then are reborn on earth, or are released through the intuitive knowledge of Śiva. Their celestial bodies are perishable. Heavenly

happiness is perishable. So the abode of Śiva should not be regarded as identical with heaven, since it is far above heaven. It is pure, eternal, imperishable, composed of pure consciousness, knowable through trance and super-trance, full of bliss, and devoid of pain.⁴² It is full of pure, nonempirical, immutable objects of desire. It is free from attachment, aversion, greed and other passions, which are mental modes—effects of prakṛti. The abode of Śiva is supra-mundane and eternal. It is made of supramundane ether different from the physical element of ether, abounding in supreme bliss, and full of manifestation of Supreme Reality. It is devoid of increase and decrease, origin and destruction. Śiva is different from the bound souls and their bonds, which are prakṛti and its effects. So His abode is supramundane and imperishable. The bound souls are bound to the wheel of births and deaths. The bonds also undergo various modifications, and are created and dissolved. Śiva is the Lord of creation and dissolution, birth and death. So His abode is eternal and immutable. It is different from heaven which is attainable because of merits, and which is subject to increase and decrease. The abode of Śiva is attainable through the destruction of merits and demerits and realisation of the supreme bliss of Śiva and intuition of Him. It is attainable through supramoral, nonphenomenal, absolute purity. It is more luminous than millions of suns and inhabited by Śiva, Umā, and the freed souls. (Cp. Nimbārka's aprākṛta, Rāmānuja's śuddhasattva, and Jīva Gosvāmī's Vaikuṇṭha).

UMĀ—Śiva, the transcendent, omniscient Lord, accompanied by His supreme power—Umā—and qualified by Her is the material cause of the world. He is beyond the cosmic darkness.⁴³ The immutable Supreme Brahman—Śiva—variegated by His supreme power called Umā is the Highest Being. She is the supreme prakṛti of the nature of supreme consciousness and delight, supreme ether nonseparate from Him, manifested in the empirical world of effects created by Brahmā, which are Her different states.⁴⁴ The Pāsupatas do not worship Umā as a Consort of Śiva. She is His supreme power of pure consciousness. She is different from Him, as power is different from a powerful being, and yet She is nondifferent and nonseparate from Him, as power cannot exist separately from a powerful entity. There is duality in unity between Śiva and Umā. Without Her Śiva is static and ineffective. She is called supreme prakṛti, not physical, subordinate prakṛti, which is modified into the physical world. Yet the world is a manifestation of supreme prakṛti—God's supreme power of consciousness and delight, which is the ultimate material cause of the world. It is a state of His supreme power of consciousness and delight. Without delight there can be no activity of God, for He creates for His sport. Creative delight is the motive of creation. Brahman is neither differenceless nor powerless. Umā, His supreme power, constitutes His internal difference. Śakti is identical with Śiva, and yet different from Him. Śakti is dependent on Him as His power and attribute. Śiva is dependent on Śakti for His activities. Yet they are not two Deities. The ether of consciousness is supreme prakṛti, God's supreme power, that constitutes His body. It is the ultimate material cause of the world.⁴⁵ Natural supreme power is the nature of Śiva and His attribute, the being of His supreme existence, consciousness and bliss, His great glory manifested in all conscious souls and unconscious things, unlimited by space, time, causality and the like. His omniscience, omnipotence, being the cause of all, being the regulator of all, being worshipped by all, being the favourer of all, being the abode

of all goods, and the like are not possible without His supreme power. He cannot be called the Supreme Lord, the Supreme Deity, and the Supreme Good without His supreme power. As a hair, nails, etc., are not produced from insentient body alone nor from a conscious soul alone, but from the body animated by a soul, so the world is not produced from *māyā* alone nor from God alone, but from God endowed with *māyā*. God alone is not the cause of the world, nor is *māyā* alone its cause, but God endowed with *māyā* is its material cause and efficient cause.⁴⁶ *Umā* is pure *māyā* possessed of the qualities of *Śiva*—supreme, pure consciousness, power and bliss. She is not impure *māyā* or *prakṛti* possessed of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which is modified into the world. “*Śiva* united with *Umā* should be meditated on as transcending *prakṛti*. *Umā* is ‘Om’, supreme *prakṛti*, supreme power of *Śiva*.”⁴⁷ *Māyā* is the unconscious power of God. At the time of dissolution it discards its gross forms, and persists in a subtle state as the body of God. At the time of creation it assumes gross forms, and is modified into physical things. It is impure *māyā* or *prakṛti*.⁴⁸

HEART-ETHER.—*Śrīkaṇṭha* holds that God Himself is the heart-ether, since He is sinless and flawless. An individual soul tainted with sins and impurities is not the heart-ether. The greatness of the Supreme Lord is experienced in the heart-ether, as the support and unifier of the worlds. “The lotus of the heart-ether is free from grief.” “God accompanied by *Umā*, the tranquil Master, should be meditated on in the heart-ether”. “The Supreme Lord, Friend of *Umā*, abiding in the heart-ether should be meditated on”.⁴⁹ *Śrīkaṇṭha* holds that God Himself is the heart-ether. Not only should God be meditated on in the heart-ether, but the heart-ether itself should be meditated on as the ether of consciousness. There is no conflict between the two modes of meditation. Supreme Brahman is intuited by an aspirant by the repeated and continuous practice of meditation on *Śiva* with *Śakti*, of the nature of Supreme Light, in the heart-ether of the nature of the ether of consciousness. He is attained by the released souls.⁵⁰ The ‘*Pāsupatasūtra*’ inculcates meditation on ‘Om’ in the heart-cavity, which represents *Śiva*. *Śrīkaṇṭha* emphasizes it, and identifies *Śiva* with the heart-ether, and regards it as of the nature of pure consciousness. He identifies it with *Śiva-Śakti*. ‘Om’ is a mantra of *Śiva*. *Umā* is ‘Om’ with a slight variation in its order. ‘Om’ = A + U + M = *Śiva*. U + Ma + A = *Umā*. So ‘Om’ or *Śiva-Śakti* should be meditated on in the heart-ether, and the heart-ether should be meditated on as the ether of pure consciousness according to *Śrīkaṇṭha*. He carries on the tradition of the teaching of the Upaniṣads regarding meditation on ‘Om’ in the heart-cavity. This kind of meditation is called *daharavidyā*. The heart-cavity is a vital centre of mystic consciousness according to *Śaivism* and *Śāktaism*. *Śrīkaṇṭha* quotes a verse, which has a cryptic reference to the union of *Śiva* and *Śakti* on the crown of the head above the twelve centres of mystic consciousness, where a soul experiences itself as spiritual ‘I’ as distinguished from empirical ‘I’ or ego, because of its being divested of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. So he is aware of *Kuṇḍalinīyoga* inculcated by *Śaiva Monists* and *Śāktas*.⁵¹

GOD IS THE MATERIAL CAUSE AND EFFICIENT CAUSE OF THE WORLD.—The *Pāsupatas* hold that God is only the efficient cause of the world, that *māyā* or *prakṛti* is its material cause, and that His powers are its instrumental cause. They argue that if He were its material cause,

He would be modified into this world, as clay is modified into a vessel. Śrīkaṇṭha refutes this doctrine on the following grounds. 1. This doctrine contradicts many Śrutis which assert God to be the material cause of the world. 2. It is not reasonable. God is bodiless, and so cannot act upon māyā, the material cause, and produce the world out of it. A potter with a body alone can act upon clay, and produce a vessel out of it. So the example of a potter is not appropriate. If God be not admitted as the efficient cause to act upon māyā, then the Pāśupatas adopt the Sāṃkhya view, since the concept of God becomes useless. Thus bodiless God cannot be the efficient cause of the world. 3. It may be objected that, though God is bodiless, He can act upon māyā, as a soul, though bodiless, rules over its body and sense-organs. This objection is not valid, since then God would experience pleasures and pains belonging to māyā, as a soul experiences pleasures and pains of its body and sense-organs. So God is not only the efficient cause of the world.⁵² 4. It may be argued that God possessed of a body acts upon māyā, and produces the world out of it, as a potter possessed of a body acts upon clay and produces a vessel out of it. This argument is not valid, since in that case God would be noneternal and nonomniscient, like a potter. 5. If God rules over māyā, different from Him, the following Śrutis will be contradicted : 'I shall become many' ; 'He made Himself into the world' ; 'All are Rudra' ; 'He shines without experiencing joys and sorrows'. These texts show that God is also the material cause of the world. Though He is the efficient cause and material cause of the world, He remains unmodified and changeless, since the Śruti says, 'He is partless and inactive'. Śiva endowed with Śakti is the material cause of the world. Unconscious, impure māyā is not its material cause.⁵³ The Śruti says, "Brahman resolved : 'May I be many'." It shows that Brahman is the efficient cause and material cause of the world, because He resolves to be modified into it. So its material cause is nondifferent from its efficient cause. It may be objected that the transcendent Lord created the world out of māyā different from Him, which is its material cause, since the Śruti says, 'Māyā should be known to be the material cause (prakṛti)' of the world' ; 'Śiva, higher than the universe, the great sage, saw Hiranyagarbha being born'. Śrīkaṇṭha replies that Brahman is the efficient cause and material cause of the world, since the Śruti says : 'Śiva is higher than the universe' ; 'All are Śiva' ; 'That created Himself.' Although He is absolutely pure and flawless and full of infinite auspicious qualities, and transcendent of the world, and as such its efficient cause, He can transform Himself into the conscious embodied souls and the unconscious world. It may be objected that transformation is a change in the form of a cause, that it discards its causal form and assumes the form of an effect. Śrīkaṇṭha replies that Brahman transforms Himself into the world without undergoing a change by His volition.⁵⁴ Śrīkaṇṭha believes in Avikṛtaparināmavāda like the other theistic Vedāntists, and holds that God remains unchanged and immutable while transforming Himself into the world. The Supreme Lord in His causal state, endowed with the subtle powers of conscious and unconscious entities, without concrete names and forms, was transformed into particular conscious states and concrete physical things. He separated the subtle, conscious, and unconscious powers, forming His body, from Himself, turned them into gross forms, being and objects, and entered into them.⁵⁵ So it is proper to hold that God endowed with conscious and unconscious powers is both cause and effect in His different states. (Cp. Rāmānuja).

BRAHMAN AND THE WORLD.—The world is pervaded by Brahman, and so nondifferent from Him, just as a jar is pervaded by earth and so nondifferent from it. Divine power down to earth is pervaded by God, and so nondifferent from Him. If the universe be not pervaded by God of the nature of being and consciousness, it cannot exist and be known, and becomes a false appearance. But it is real and manifested to knowledge. So it is pervaded by God, and so nondifferent from it.⁵⁶ Creation is the state of expansion of God endowed with powers, or of His powers. Dissolution is the state of His contraction or contraction of His powers.⁵⁷ (Cp. Vallabha). Creation is transition from the subtle state of God's unconscious and conscious powers to their gross state. Dissolution is transition from the gross state of God's unconscious and conscious powers to their subtle state. Before creation God exists as pure and endowed with subtle unconscious and conscious powers and supreme divine power nondifferent from Him, in which concrete names and forms are undistinguished from one another. God of the nature of pure consciousness manifests the world out of Himself through His mere volition without any external material, like a yogin. He Himself becomes the material of the world without depending on any other material. So the world, the effect, is nondifferent from Śiva—the Supreme Brahman—the chief cause.⁵⁸ Brahman with a contracted form is the cause, and He with an expanded form is the effect. He becomes Śaḍāśiva down to earth owing to the difference in the operation of His powers. So the world is nondifferent from Brahman—its cause. Though the world is nondifferent from its cause, Brahman, yet He is greater than, and different from, the conscious embodied souls and the unconscious world. The Śruti says, 'Śiva is greater than the world'; 'One God rules over the mutable world and the individual souls.' So Brahman called Śiva is greater than the world. Śrīkaṇṭha does not advocate absolute difference between Brahman and the world and the individual souls, because it contradicts the Śrutis which assert their nondifference from Him. Nor does he advocate their absolute nondifference from Him, because it contradicts the Śrutis which assert difference between their essential qualities. Nor does he advocate their difference and nondifference from Him, because it involves self-contradiction.⁵⁹ He advocates the doctrine of qualified monism, according to which the world and the individual souls are related to God as the body and the soul, as attributes and a substance.⁶⁰ (Cp. Rāmānuja). The world and the souls cannot exist apart from Brahman. There is a relation of inseparable existence between them. The powers of the unconscious world and the conscious souls cannot exist without Brahman; He cannot exist without His powers, as a fire cannot exist without the power of combustion. So Brahman is qualified by them, and nondifferent from them. Still He is greater than, different from, and transcendent of them. This doctrine does not contradict the texts asserting difference and the texts asserting nondifference. The aforesaid passages from the 'Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya' clearly show Śrīkaṇṭha being posterior to Rāmānuja and being influenced by his doctrine. Śrīpati Paṇḍita also was a qualified monist, like Rāmānuja. He admits it in his commentary on the 'Brahmasūtra', and avers that Śrīkaṇṭha also was an advocate of Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda, like Rāmānuja. Some followers of Vallabha assert that Śaivas were plagiarists of Rāmānuja's doctrine, meaning Śrīkaṇṭha and Śrīpati Paṇḍita. So Śrīkaṇṭha flourished in 1300 A.D. He refers to the doctrine of difference and identity as held by Bhāskara.⁶¹

It is objected that if Brahman be modified into the world, He is wholly modified into it,

and no Brahman remains to be worshipped, and that therefore He cannot be modified into the world. Śrīkaṇṭha replies that the Śrutis, which alone prove the existence of super-sensible realities, prove the modification of Brahman into the world by His inconceivable power. He alone, the complete reality, can be the cause and the effect.⁶² He can be the cause and the effect because of His various infinite powers. As a conscious soul, though dissimilar to a physical body, comes into contact with it, as a fire, though dissimilar to water, can come into contact with it, so Brahman, though dissimilar to the world and the embodied souls, can be modified into them through His infinite power. Prakṛti is wholly transformed into the world, since it is partless and unconscious. But Brahman can be modified into the world through His various spontaneous powers, and yet not wholly modified into it because of His omnipotence. He remains changeless despite His being modified into the world. Māyā is His power ; He is endowed with the power of māyā. The world is His part, and pervaded by Him. All powers abide in Him. The Supreme Lord endowed with the supreme power of māyā variegated with various infinite powers assumes the form of the world with a part of His power, and remains transcendent of it.⁶³ The distinction between the possible and the impossible does not apply to Him. Brahman is eternally fulfilled, and has no purpose to fulfil in creating the world. He creates it in sport. Though He has no unfulfilled desires, He creates the world out of His delight. He is free from attachment, aversion and the like, equal to all, and neutral to all. How can He then create some souls with celestial bodies, some with human bodies, and some with animal bodies ? How can He create the embodied souls with unequal lots ? Because He does so, He is partial to the happy souls, and cruel to the unhappy souls. Śrīkaṇṭha replies that He is neither partial nor cruel, because He gives unequal lots to the different souls in accordance with their merits and demerits acquired in their past births by their free voluntary actions. The Śruti asserts that the souls of good conduct are born in high species, and that those of bad conduct are born in low species. The souls are beginningless, and their potencies of action are beginningless. Their embodied existence is due to the beginningless stream of their potencies of actions.⁶⁴ During creation their bondage is due to their contact with gross matter and bodies ; during dissolution their bondage is due to their contact with subtle matter. The omniscient Lord knows the diverse potencies of actions of the different souls, and creates the diverse bodies for them according to their diverse merits and demerits for their appropriate enjoyments and sufferings through His power. So the diversity of creation is due to the diversity of the different souls' merits and demerits. They are not independent of God. They are unconscious and guided by Him, and made to operate and produce their fruits, joys and miseries, by Him. They produce their fruits by their powers. God merely helps them produce their effects, and is not guilty of partiality or cruelty. He creates proper bodies for them in order to mature their merits and demerits, and make them bear their fruits. The souls cannot acquire the saving knowledge until their potencies of actions have fructified and been exhausted. Without the dawn of the saving knowledge, they cannot experience the highest bliss, which constitutes emancipation. God generates their knowledge of Him, reveals their highest bliss, and grants them release, when their minds are purified of all impurities. Just as the sun rises and blooms mature lotuses and not immature ones, so God releases those souls whose taints have matured and borne fruits, and not those whose taints

have not yet matured and borne fruits and been worn out. Though He is the favourer of all, He releases them at different times for their good according to the law of karma. Prakṛti, atoms, merits and demerits, or time cannot create the world. God dissolves the world to give respite to the bound souls, which are fatigued by the miseries of embodied existence.⁶⁵

INDIVIDUAL SOUL.—A soul is not produced out of Brahman, since the Śruti says, 'The soul is neither born nor does it die'; 'The Lord is eternal among the eternal souls'; 'The two unborn ones are omniscient and ignorant, the Lord and the nonlord.'⁶⁶ The soul is a knower by its nature. Knowledge is its essence. It becomes a knower of pleasures and pains in relation to manas, which is a product of prakṛti, and wrongly identifies itself with the mind-body-complex, and transmigrates from one body to another, because its innate knowledge is obscured by the power of māyā.⁶⁷ When its relation to three kinds of impurities is removed by the repeated practice of meditation on Brahman, its innate supreme knowledge is manifested, it becomes like Brahman, and is released. Thus the soul has omniscience as its essential nature, which is contracted by the power of māyā in the state of bondage, and which is manifested in the state of release, when its relation to māyā is destroyed. A bound soul is ignorant or endowed with finite knowledge, but a released soul is omniscient. So the soul is certainly a knower.⁶⁸ It experiences its innate bliss through its internal organ. It is atomic because it departs from its body, moves to higher and lower worlds, and returns to the earth again. If it were ubiquitous, it would not be capable of doing these actions. When its three kinds of impurities are destroyed, it is released, and can pervade the world with its rays of knowledge. The Śruti says, 'This soul is atomic and knowable through the illumined mind.' It experiences sensations in all parts of the body through its knowledge which can expand, though it resides in the heart, as a drop of sandal paste on one part of body cools the whole body, or as a gem illumines proximate objects by its ray of light. Its quality of knowledge is eternal. It is said to have knowledge as its attribute, because it is its essence. Knowledge is its attribute and essence. The soul is of the nature of knowledge and a knower, and not mere knowledge, as Śaṅkara holds. Knowledge exists so long as the soul exists. The soul is eternal, and so its knowledge is eternal. Its knowledge is manifested in the waking state, and not in deep sleep, as the power of procreation is dormant in childhood and manifested in youth.⁶⁹ If the soul were of the nature of mere knowledge and ubiquitous, as the Sāṃkhya holds, it would always have knowledge due to the absence of its contraction, or it would always have no knowledge if the soul by its nature were not-knowing, and it would not sometimes know and sometimes not know. If the soul were ubiquitous and if it had adventitious knowledge due to its contact with manas and the sense-organs, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, it would always perceive because of its contact with manas and the sense-organs at all times in that it is ubiquitous. The soul's merits and demerits also cannot regulate its perception at some time and nonperception at another time, since they are always present in the soul. Perception and nonperception being contradictory to each other, they must be either the causes of perception or the causes of nonperception. The soul is an agent because it freely performs actions prescribed by the scripture. If prakṛti were an agent, it would be the experienter of their fruits. If prakṛti were active, the soul would not be able to meditate on the truth 'I am different from prakṛti', and have a trance. Prakṛti, as

unconscious, is incapable of meditation and trance. The soul acts when it desires to act, and it does not act when it desires not to act, like a carpenter. But prakṛti or buddhi, its effect, is insentient and devoid of desire, and, consequently, cannot act or refrain from acting at its will. But the soul's agency is subject to the will of God. The Śruti says, 'Brahman resides in a soul, and controls it from within.' The soul acts or abstains from an action at its will according as its merits and demerits mature and ripen for bearing fruits. God impels it to perform an action or abstain from it by giving it permission considering the cause of its volition to act or not to act. His impulsion is known from His favour or punishment shown to it as expressed in the fulfilment or nonfulfilment of its actions, or from the observance of scriptural injunctions or the commission of prohibited actions. Although the soul is impelled by God to do an action or not to do it, it becomes responsible for its actions because it freely performs its actions. Its volitions depend upon its merits and demerits partly, though the soul is free, but they are the result of its past free volitions. So it cannot escape from accountability for its free actions. Hence God is not partial. The soul is eternal, a knower, enjoyer, doer, and dependent on God for its free volitions and actions. It does not know its merits and demerits, and so cannot consciously act in accordance with them. God knows its merits and demerits, and makes it act in conformity with them, and experience the fruits of its actions.⁷⁰

The soul is a part of God, a part of His form.⁷¹ He does not become a soul by being limited by an adjunct, e.g., an internal organ, as ether limited by a jar becomes jar-ether. The Śruti 'This self is Brahman' means that the soul is nondifferent from Him because of its being pervaded by Him, even as a piece of wood is called a fire, since it is pervaded by a fire. Just as a piece of wood is not identical with a fire, so a soul is not identical with Brahman. Hence a soul is a part of Brahman, and acquires His nature.⁷² It acquires some of His qualities by meditation, but can never become identical with Him even in the state of release. The Advaita doctrine of Brahman becoming a soul by being limited by an adjunct contradicts many Śrutis. A soul is a part of Brahman because the Śruti says : 'All creatures are a quarter of Brahman'. A soul is a part of Brahman endowed with souls as His body, as a ray of light of a luminous gem is its part.⁷³ It is different from Him, Who is qualified by it as an attribute. Attributes are parts of a qualified substance, and different from it. So the souls are the attributes of God qualified by them, and different from Him.⁷⁴ Though they are equally parts of God, some of them are pure, and others are impure, because of their connection with their bodies. They are different in different bodies and atomic, and so their cognitions and feelings do not intermix with one another in the state of bondage. But when their false conceit of 'I' and 'mine' in their bodies is destroyed by their special knowledge of Brahman in the state of release, they acquire their essential nature as the supreme 'I', pervade the world with their supreme, eternal, and essential knowledge. Thus their knowledge and delight in release are different from their cognitions and feelings in bondage.⁷⁵ The reasonings of the Advaita Vedāntists for Brahman being limited by true adjuncts, like the body and the like, or by false adjuncts, like nescience, and becoming jivas, are fallacious. He never becomes individual souls. If Brahman be limited by real limiting adjuncts or by false nescience, they belong to Brahman Himself, and there is no restriction even by merits and demerits. If the souls are one and the same as Brahman, they cannot have different

experiences. Their merits and demerits belong to Brahman, Who is limited by them, and cannot be restricted to the different souls, and produce their different experiences. If the limiting adjuncts are said to be connected with different regions of Brahman, then also there can be no differences among the souls' experiences, because all the regions are connected with the limiting adjuncts moving about. Hence Brahman being limited by real limiting adjuncts or false adjuncts cannot restrict particular experiences to the different souls. So it is reasonable to hold that a soul is a part of Brahman, and of the nature of His attribute. So Śrīkaṇṭha's doctrine is different from those of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara.⁷⁶

BONDAGE AND LIBERATION.—God is the cause of a soul's bondage and emancipation. Its real attributes such as true desires, true resolves, etc., are concealed by the volition of God because of the beginningless flow of impurities in the form of merits and demerits.⁷⁷ At the time of creation its bondage is due to its connection with gross matter in the form of a body. During dissolution its bondage is due to its connection with subtle matter in which there is no distinction of names and forms. Its bondage and emancipation are due to God's will.⁷⁸ He reveals its essential nature and real attributes when its mind is purified of all taints in the form of merits and demerits which are worn out after maturing and bearing their fruits. He gives it the saving knowledge of Him and its essential nature, and makes it experience its supreme knowledge, delight and powers after maturing and exhausting its merits and demerits. It cannot achieve its release independently of Him.

A soul's bondage consists in suffering unlimited misery, being overcome by the wheel of births and deaths, and being associated with various bodies conducive to the experience of joys and sorrows appropriate to various merits and demerits due to the impressions of beginningless nescience.⁷⁹ Its supreme end is emancipation which consists in the experience of supreme knowledge and bliss resembling those of God on the destruction of its bonds due to His supreme grace, which is evoked by its particular knowledge and devotion consequent on its hearing, reflection and meditation. He is supremely merciful, and the favourer of all, and His grace is evoked by an aspirant's particular knowledge and devotion. So He is the grantor of emancipation.

KARMAYOGA.—Prohibited actions or sins and prudential actions for the fulfilment of desires for happiness here and hereafter should be discarded. The daily obligatory duties, the occasional duties, and the specific duties relating to one's caste and stage of life should be performed without desire for their fruits, because they purify the mind. Sense-restraint, mind-control, endurance of pleasure and pain, withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects, dispassion for enjoyment here and hereafter, and desire for release should be practised. (Cp. Śaṅkara). Śiva's grace is evoked by these virtues of an aspirant, and He arouses devotion in him. He inspired with devotion should meditate on God, because meditation is the principal means to the supreme knowledge of Him. Śrīkaṇṭha inculcates, like a Theist, works, devotion and knowledge as the ways to emancipation, but regards knowledge as the principal means to release, and works and devotion as auxiliary to knowledge. The performance of one's specific duties without desire for fruits purifies the mind, and prepares it for the dawn of the saving knowledge. Sense-control and the like

virtues are indispensable for purification of the mind. Craving for release from bondage is a prerequisite for the achievement of it. Desire for release should be attended with devotion to God. Devotion is granted by the merciful Lord through His supreme grace. His grace is evoked by an aspirant's moral purity and aspiration. Release ultimately depends upon His volition and grace, and cannot be achieved by the unaided and independent spiritual discipline of an aspirant. A Śaiva, a Śākta, and a Vaiṣṇava, who are Theists, equally believe in the grace of God and devotion to Him. But Śrīkaṇṭha gives superiority to knowledge and meditation over devotion and regards desireless works as subsidiary to knowledge because they purify the mind.

The Śruti says, 'An aspirant should be calm, self-controlled, virtuous, patient, collected, and intuit the self in the self'; 'Know Him through faith, devotion, and meditation'. Calmness consists in the conquest of attachment, aversion, and other passions. Withdrawal of the sense-organs from prohibited actions constitutes self-control. Abstinence consists in nonperformance of prudential works and noncommission of prohibited works. Patience consists in endurance of opposites, e.g., heat and cold. Collectedness consists in turning the mind towards God, and in turning it away from all distractions. Faith consists in strong desire for learning the Upaniṣads teaching superior knowledge, and dealing with the Supreme Self, and in aversion to all other treatises which do not teach the means to salvation. Devotion consists in serving Śiva with the internal organ, the organs of knowledge, and the organs of action to the exclusion of the other Deities. Desire for salvation consists in yearning for the direct knowledge of God, or for the experience of the supreme bliss. It depends upon renunciation of all desires for happiness here and in heaven, or dispassion, discrimination between the eternal and the noneternal, calmness, self-control, patience, abstinence, and collectedness. The persons belonging to all stages of life should cultivate these supreme virtues.⁸⁰

The performance of the specific duties relating to one's caste and stage of life without desire for their fruits purifies the mind, and facilitates the dawn of superior knowledge. The Śruti says, 'The Supreme Self is sought after through penance, celibacy, faith, and knowledge.' Even those who do not belong to any stage of life acquire superior knowledge by muttering God's names or mantras or prayers. The persons in all stages of life can certainly acquire the knowledge of Brahman.⁸¹ Renunciation is renunciation of the fruits of actions. Asceticism is the conquest of the sense-organs.

JÑĀNAYOGA.—The Śruti says, 'The knower of Brahman achieves the highest good'; 'On knowing Śiva one attains supreme peace'. So knowledge alone is the means to the attainment of the highest good. But it is objected that the Śruti says, 'Whatever action one does with knowledge'. So knowledge is said to be subsidiary to action. It purifies the agent who does an enjoined action. Knowledge and action coexist in the same person. Knowledge is subsidiary to action, because even one who has attained the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined to perform prescribed actions throughout life. The Śruti says, 'One should desire to live for a hundred years, doing works in this world certainly'. To this objection Śrīkaṇṭha replies that Bādarāyaṇa is right in holding that knowledge is not subsidiary to works, because

knowledge alone directly leads to the attainment of the highest good. Works are subsidiary to knowledge, because desireless, prescribed works are aids to knowledge. Desires for their fruits should be renounced. So knowledge is superior to works. There is no conflict between desireless works and knowledge. 'One should perform works throughout life'. 'One should envelop the world with God.' These texts show that knowledge is not subsidiary to works. A knower of Brahman performing works always is not touched by them because of the superiority of knowledge. So knowledge alone is the principal means to the attainment of salvation. 'When Brahman is intuited, all works are destroyed'. This text shows that works are not superior to knowledge. Hence knowledge alone is the principal means to release, and prescribed works without desire for their fruits are subsidiary to knowledge, and should be continually performed.⁸²

MEDITATION.—Meditation on God should be practised repeatedly, because it generates the direct knowledge of Brahman, as paddy is threshed repeatedly until it is husked. An individual soul acquires absolute purity by knowing Brahman directly. Though Śiva is greater than an individual soul, yet an aspirant should meditate on Him as 'I am Śiva'. The Supreme Brahman favours those worshippers who meditate on Him as identical with their souls, although He is greater than, and different from, Him. Salvation is the attainment of flawless Śiva full of unsurpassed supreme bliss. The attainment of divinity is not possible without the destruction of bondage, or of connection with the body. Bondage cannot be destroyed without meditation on Him. So a worshipper becomes Śiva Himself or like Him, when his bestiality is destroyed by continuous meditation on Brahman as 'I am Śiva'. Śivahood consists in being the abode of the highest good free from all blemishes. Supreme Brahman is of such a nature. A worshipper attains His nature by continuous meditation on Him as identical with his self. None but Śiva, Supreme Brahman, should be meditated on by a worshipper desirous of salvation. False conceit of 'I' in the body can be destroyed, and one's nature as 'Supreme 'I' can be achieved, by meditation on Śiva alone as identical with one's self, Who is of the nature of supreme intrinsic bliss, self-manifest, and omniscient. A worshipper should meditate on Brahman as identical with his self to attain his salvation. Otherwise, his wheel of births and deaths will never cease. Here Śrīkaṇṭha appears to betray his inclination towards monism, like a Śaiva of the Pratyabhijñā school. So some call his doctrine Śivādvaitavāda.⁸³ But his doctrine is Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda like that of Rāmānuja as shown elsewhere. 'A soul becomes Śiva Himself.' The text means that it becomes like Śiva, because a part can never become the whole, and because an attribute can never become a substance. Meditation on Brahman brings about assimilation of His qualities. As meditation advances, His qualities are more and more assimilated. Continuous meditation leads to assimilation of the divine nature. Brahman is greater than a symbol. So a symbol should not be meditated on as Brahman. But Brahman Himself should be meditated on in a symbol. A minister is respected as a king, but a king is not respected as a minister. So symbols should be worshipped as pervaded by Brahman, the most excellent Being.⁸⁴ They should not be worshipped as Brahman. Supreme Brahman alone as the most excellent of all beings is worthy of being revered and worshipped by all.⁸⁵ Brahman should be meditated on in the heart-lotus by a worshipper, while he is sitting, as this posture is favourable to

meditation, in a pure and solitary place. Meditation is preceded by concentration. Concentration of mind requires the withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects, and of the mind from distracting thoughts. Meditation is facilitated by concentration, because it is of the nature of contemplation or uninterrupted thought or remembrance of Brahman undisturbed by the intervention of dissimilar thoughts. Concentration is facilitated by the sitting posture. Continuous meditation depends upon a fixed posture with an unmoving body. One should meditate on God in a pure, solitary place while sitting on a seat, neither very high nor very low, restraining the sense-organs and manas, with a focused mind, and stopping all movements of the body. Meditation on Him purifies the mind of all impurities. There is no restriction as to the time, direction, and the like, in regard to meditation, since concentration is its chief means, and since it does not depend upon direction and the like. The mind is concentrated, when there are no causes of attachment, aversion, and other evil passions. Purity and tranquillity of mind are conducive to concentration. So there is no fixed rule as to the place, time, direction and the like in worshipping God in the form of meditation, whose chief means is concentration. Meditation should be practised every day until death. There should be no discontinuity in meditation on God, because continuous meditation brings on the realization of the divine nature. Brahman reveals Himself to those worshippers who meditate on Him as identical with their selves without discontinuity. Uninterrupted and continuous meditation on Brahman leads to the revelation of His nature.⁸⁶ The sins acquired in the past births are destroyed, and sins do not accrue to the soul of a worshipper in future, who has acquired the direct knowledge of God, since sins are opposed to it. The past merits also of the knowing soul are destroyed, and merits do not accrue to it, since they also are opposed to the knowledge of Brahman. Both merits and demerits are destroyed by the direct knowledge of Brahman, since He is devoid of merits and demerits, and absolutely pure and holy. Sivahood is absolute purity. Divinity is supramental, supramoral, supramundane, supreme purity. It cannot be attained without the complete destruction of merits and demerits, which are mental impurities. The merits and demerits, which have not yet begun to bear fruits, are destroyed by the direct knowledge of Brahman. But those which have begun to bear fruits produce all their fruits in this birth, or in a succeeding birth, but cannot destroy the knowledge of Brahman already acquired by a soul, just as acquired knowledge is not destroyed by intervening sleep. Hence the souls, that have acquired the direct knowledge of God, are certainly released from bondage, and do not undergo a succession of births, because there is no cause of it. The barrier of birth and death, like sleep, cannot destroy their knowledge of Brahman. The knowledge of Brahman is the immediate cause of salvation. Meditation is the chief means of the knowledge.⁸⁷

The realisation of Brahman full of supreme bliss is the highest good. A person desirous of salvation should discard the worship of all other manifestations of Śiva than Himself alone, the cause of auspiciousness. Meditation on the Supreme Brahman as identical with one's self and full of supreme bliss is the principal form of worship.⁸⁸ Śiva united with Umā, His supreme power, is the Supreme Brahman. He is endowed with all excellent attributes, and the Supreme Self of all, immanent in, and manifested in, them. Meditation on Him is the cause of salvation. He is never divested of His essential attributes.⁸⁹ Brahman endowed with attributes is attained by the released soul. It becomes similar to Śiva. It attains

similarity in nature to Him. Śiva devoid of all reprehensible qualities and invested with all auspicious qualities is attained by it. 'It enjoys all objects of desire with Him—the all-knower'. One's self freed from its bondage and empirical qualities and invested with sinlessness and the like should be meditated on. Repetition of the mystic syllable 'Om' while meditating on Śiva united with Umā or 'Om' in the heart-ether brings on union with Him. When He is meditated on in the heart-ether, He should be meditated on as the Universal Soul pervading all the worlds. A worshipper should adopt one kind of meditation on Brahman until he realises the Supreme Brahman, and not adopt various kinds of meditation, for their results are one and the same. Only he should meditate on Brahman as identical with his self. The adoption of various kinds of meditation entails unnecessary exertion, delay, and distraction. Śrīkaṇṭha himself prefers meditation on the Supreme Brahman or Śiva united with Umā in the heart-ether with repetition of the mystic syllable 'Om'.⁹⁰

THE STATE OF THE FREED SOUL.—The Śruti says, 'The disembodied soul, rising from this body, attains the form of supreme light, is accomplished in its essential nature.' The form of supreme light is not the soul's adventitious nature, but its essential nature. It is always existent in the soul, but is manifested by the removal of its impurities. Brahman is of the nature of supreme light or pure universal consciousness. The soul also is of the nature of supreme light or pure omniscience. Its essential nature is like that of Brahman. When it attains Brahman, its impurities are removed, and it becomes like Him, and attains the qualities similar to His. Its divine qualities were existent already in it but were concealed by the impurities. If supreme light were its adventitious nature, the Śruti would not have stated it to be its 'own form' or essential nature.⁹¹ When the soul's impurities are destroyed by the grace of God, its essential nature, like His attributes, is manifested, and not produced, like the fruits of its merits and demerits. Its bondage to embodied existence is due to its connection with beginningless impurities. So the released soul's essential nature—a mass of pure consciousness and bliss, full of omniscience and the like—is manifested. Unlimited knowledge, bliss, and power are manifested in release. They constitute its essential nature. The freed disembodied soul becomes sinless and free from old age, death, grief, hunger, and thirst, and acquires true desires and true resolves. So its attributes resemble those of God. The Śruti says, 'The freed soul becomes stainless and acquires supreme resemblance to Brahman'; 'The freed soul becomes similar to Śiva.' Because the freed soul acquires resemblance to God, it experiences its essential nature as nondistinct from God's nature.⁹² The Śruti, 'The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman Himself' means that the soul that experiences Brahman becomes like Him. Because the freed soul becomes similar to Him, it feels its nature to be nondistinct from Him. It cannot create, maintain, and destroy the world, but it becomes equal to Him in respect of enjoyment alone. Brahman is not limited by time, space, etc., independent, eternally fulfilled, omniscient, omnipotent, possessed of unhidden powers, the cause of all, the Self of all, the supreme Lord, the favourer of all, and capable of releasing all bound souls. The freed soul united with Him enjoys all objects of desire with its natural internal organ through a particular kind of knowledge. Brahman and the freed soul can assume bodies and sense-organs at their will.⁹³ The nature of the freed soul is similar to that of God; it is endowed with auspicious qualities, e. g., sinlessness, self-manifest-

ness, and the like. It is of the nature of pure knowledge.⁹⁴ It attains all objects of desire through mere volition. The fulfilment of its desires does not depend upon external objects. Because it has acquired the nature of God and become sinless and pure, it becomes independent of another ruler. It is no longer under the sway of merits and demerits, because they have been destroyed. God is no longer its controller, because it has transcended the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions—His commands—which are binding on the bound souls for their release, because it is divested of its bondage, and because it has attained divinity owing to the destruction of its impurities. God has omniscience and other qualities. So the freed soul, like God, becomes omniscient, self-fulfilled, independent, omnipotent, possessed of unhidden powers, eternal knowledge, and infinite powers. Bondage is due to contraction of infinite knowledge due to the impurities. When they are removed, the soul becomes omniscient. When nescience, the cause of bondage, is exterminated, its false conceit of 'I' in the body is destroyed, it becomes free from grief due to old age and death, and independent because of the absence of the sway of merits and demerits, delights in the self because of its enjoyment of its supreme intrinsic bliss, becomes self-fulfilled, and free from hunger and thirst, and acquires true desires and true resolves because of its being possessed of unhidden powers. So it becomes independent and similar to God. Sometimes it assumes bodies at its will. Sometimes it does not do so, and enjoys objects with its manas created by God, as a bound soul enjoys the pleasures created by God during dream with its mind. The freed soul perceives and enjoys the world as a form and manifestation of God.⁹⁵

Śrīkaṇṭha does not believe in embodied release. He holds that salvation is attained after the death of this body, when there are no other stronger merits and demerits that obstruct the direct knowledge of Brahman. When there are stronger merits and demerits, salvation is attained in another birth, when they are worn out after bearing their fruits.⁹⁶

CREATION.—A potter makes an earthen vessel out of clay. He is the efficient cause, and clay is the material cause, of the vessel. But God creates the world out of His nature, and is both its efficient cause and material cause. Brahman withdraws the gross world of embodied souls and matter into Himself at the time of dissolution. It is transition from the gross state of matter to its subtle state. There is no distinction of day and night, the sun and the moon, names and forms, subtle and gross, gods, men, and beasts, and the like at the time. It is a state of utter darkness, when God alone remains, self-manifest, Witness of all. The embodied souls and their bonds, matter and material things, exist in their subtle state; they are not completely destroyed. Only their gross states of names and forms no longer exist.⁹⁷ Then the bound souls remain with their subtle bodies but have no knowledge of particular objects or effects because of the destruction of their powers, bodies, and sense-organs, and because of the destruction of names and forms or concrete physical objects. Then Śiva also has no knowledge of His self-manifest form as before, because the organ of His self-knowledge is obscured by the taint of darkness. Dissolution is a great state of deep sleep called darkness wherein all distinctions of particular effects are destroyed.⁹⁸

God, again, creates or manifests all conscious souls and unconscious matter endowed with concrete names and forms by manifesting His first creative power through His mere volition at the time of creation without depending upon any external material cause. The

Supreme Self of the nature of pure consciousness creates all objects by His mere volition without any material cause, like a yogin. (Cp. Somānanda and Utpaladeva). It is wrong to hold that God is the efficient cause, and that *māyā* is the material cause, of the world. The subtle form of God, called *Māyāpuruṣa*, incapable of existing apart from Him, is the material cause of the world. God resorts to His power called *māyā* to become the diverse world of names and forms, of the nature of creative will, and creates the world, considering the bound souls' merits and demerits, and creates the world through His power of action, and enters into it. He becomes the manifest world composed of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* through His powers of knowledge, volition, and action. He is the creator and destroyer of the world.⁹⁹ Śrīkaṇṭha, like Rāmānuja, holds that the conscious embodied souls, the unconscious subtle nature, and the gross physical world cannot exist apart from God. There is inseparable relation (*apṛthaksiddhi*) between them.

SATKĀRYAVADA.—Śrīkaṇṭha, like other Theists, advocates the doctrine of *Satkāryavāda* that an effect pre-exists in its cause. An earthen vessel pre-exists in clay, its material cause, and is nondifferent from it. The effect is a real modification of its cause. It is designated by another name and has a different function. An earthen vessel is called a 'pot', and can carry water while a lump of clay is not called a pot, and does not carry water. It cannot exist apart from clay, and so clay is its essential nature. An earthen vessel is a different state of earth, and performs a different function, but it is not a different substance from earth. It is not an unreal appearance of clay, but another state of clay, although it is not different from clay. Because an effect pre-exists in its cause, the former is nondifferent from the latter.¹⁰⁰ An earthen vessel pre-existed in earth before its production. So it is perceived as of the nature of earth. It pre-existed in earth in a subtle form as nonseparate from earth, and becomes gross when it is produced. So an effect is a manifest state of its cause, which is its unmanifest state. It is not nonexistent in its cause. "The world existed as unmanifest before creation, and become manifest in names and forms after creation." A cause (e.g., a seed) is a contracted form of an effect (e.g., a sprout). An effect is an expanded form of a cause. An effect is the unfoldment of a cause while a cause is the involution of an effect.¹⁰¹ Both cause and effect are real.

THE REALITY OF THE WORLD.—Brahman is the creator, maintainer, and dissolver of the world. So the world is real. He obscures the knowledge of the individual souls, and binds them to embodied existence. He removes the veil of their knowledge, makes them intuit Him, attain resemblance to Him, and achieve salvation. He is the binder and liberator of the individual souls. So they are real. He is different from the bound individual souls and the world which binds them at His will. So Brahman, individual souls and the world are real. His five acts are real and His essential characteristics.¹⁰² The Śruti says, 'Brahman resolved : I shall become many' ; 'All this world belongs to the Supreme Self ; it is real' ; 'The world is created as diverse and multiform. All are Śiva.' So the world is real.¹⁰³

- ¹ ŚKBS., i, 1, 2 ; ii, 1, 15-20 & 22 ; ii, 3, 19 & 33.
- ² Ibid, ii, 1, 22. ³ Ibid, i, 2, 1. BPD., 3.
- ⁴ IPK., i, 38. ⁵ ŚKBS., ii, 1, 22.
- ⁶ Ibid, i, 1, 2 ; i, 4, 2-7. ⁷ Ibid, ii, 1, 22.
- ⁸ Ibid, i, 3, 45.
- ⁹ Ibid, i, 1, 2 ; RBS., iii, 2, 29 ; ii, 3, 45 ; ii, 1, 15.
- ¹⁰ ŚKBS., ii, 1, 22. ¹¹ Ibid, ii, 2, 35-38.
- ¹² Ibid, i, 3, 13, 15-16 ; PSS., V, 2-25 ; PTLV., 2, 25 & 31. HIP., Vol. II, 1952, pp. 742-44.
- ¹³ 'Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha', p. 27 ; DHIP., Vol. V, pp. 10-11 & 72 ; 'Doctrine of Recognition' ; VSMS., p. 127 ; FO., pp. 203-04 ; 'Doctrine of Śrīkaṇṭha', Calcutta, 1962, pp. 5-7 ; PSS., Introduction, p. 5.
- ¹⁴ ŚKBS., i, 1, 1. ¹⁵ Ibid, i, 1, 2. ¹⁶ Ibid, p. 12.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, i, 1, 5. ¹⁸ Ibid, p. 14. ¹⁹ Ibid, i, 1, 3, p. 16.
- ²⁰ Ibid, p. 18. ²¹ Ibid, iii, 2, 31.
- ²² Ibid, iv, 1, 5. ²³ Ibid, iii, 2, 17 ; Ibid, iii, 2, 15.
- ²⁴ Ibid, i, 1, 13, 15, 17, 21 & 35 ; i, 3, 24 & 35 ; i, 4, 27.
- ²⁵ Ibid, i, 1, 2 ; p. 11.
- ²⁶ Ibid, i, 1, 2, 9-11 ; ii, 2 ; 4, 19 & 24 ; iii, 2, 31.
- ²⁷ Ibid, iii, 2, 21. ²⁸ Ibid, iii, 2, 29.
- ²⁹ Ibid, i, 2, 19. ³⁰ Ibid, iii, 2, 30.
- ³¹ Ibid, i, 2, 22. ³² Ibid, iii, 2, 37 & 40.
- ³³ Ibid, iii, 2, 11. ³⁴ Ibid, iii, 2, 14. Ibid, iii, 2, 12-13.
- ³⁵ Ibid, iii, 2, 15. ³⁶ Ibid, iii, 2, 16-21.
- ³⁷ Ibid, iii, 2, 4-5, 11, 15 & 17 ; i, 1, 2 & 4 ; iv, 3, 1 ; i, 2, 1 ; ii, 1, 35 ; iv, 4, 22.
- ³⁸ Ibid, i, 2, 8. ³⁹ Ibid, i, 1, 21.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid, iv, 4, 22. ⁴¹ Ibid. ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Ibid, i, 4, 28. ⁴⁴ Ibid, iv, 3, 14 ; i, 1, 16.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid, i, 2, 7. ⁴⁶ Ibid, i, 4, 27.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid, iv, 4, 22.
- ⁴⁸ 'Doctrine of Śrīkaṇṭha', pp. 44-52.
- ⁴⁹ ŚKBS., i, 3, 13, 15-16 & 22. ⁵⁰ Ibid, i, 3, 22.
- ⁵¹ Ibid, iv, 4, 19. Cp. ŚM., pp. 29-33.
- ⁵² ŚKBS., ii, 3, 35-36. ⁵³ Ibid, ii, 2, 38.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid, i, 4, 27. Ibid, i, 4, 24-26. ⁵⁵ Ibid, i, 4, 27.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid, ii, 1, 17. ⁵⁷ Ibid, ii, 1, 18. ⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid, ii, 1, 20. Ibid, ii, 1, 19 & 22.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid, ii, 1, 22.
- ⁶¹ Ibid, ii, 1, 19-20 & 22. ⁶² Ibid, ii, 1, 27.
- ⁶³ Ibid, ii, 1, 31. Ibid, ii, 1, 28-30.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid, ii, 1, 34-35. ⁶⁵ Ibid, ii, 1, 35-36.
- ⁶⁶ Kath. Up., ii, 18 ; V, 13 ; Śvet. Up., i, 9 ; ŚKBS., ii, 3, 18.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid, ii, 3, 19. ⁶⁸ Ibid.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid, ii, 3, 21-31. ⁷⁰ Ibid, ii, 3, 41. Ibid, ii, 3, 32-40.
- ⁷¹ Ibid, ii, 3, 42. ⁷² Ibid.
- ⁷³ Ibid, ii, 3, 45. ⁷⁴ Ibid, ii, 3, 46.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid, ii, 3, 47. ⁷⁶ Ibid, ii, 3, 52.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid, iii, 2, 4. ⁷⁸ Ibid, iii, 2, 5 ; ii, 1, 35.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid, i, 1 ; 1, p. 7.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid, iii, 4, 23. Ibid, i, 1, 4, pp. 24-25.
- ⁸¹ Ibid, iii, 4, 37-38 & 47. ⁸² Ibid, iii, 4, 1, 4-9, 13-17.
- ⁸³ Ibid, iv, 1, 1 & 3. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śāstrī, 'Śivādvaitavāda'.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid, iv, 1, 5. ⁸⁵ Ibid, iv, 1, 4-5.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid, iv, 1, 12. ⁸⁷ Ibid, iv, 1, 7-12, 15 & 19 ; iii, 1, 13.
- ⁸⁸ Ibid, ii, 3, 14-16. ⁸⁹ Ibid, ii, 3, 39.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid, iii, 3, 40 & 43. ⁹¹ Ibid, iv, 4, 1.
- ⁹² Ibid, iv, 4, 4 ; Muṇḍ. Up., iii, i, 3.
- ⁹³ ŚKBS., iv, 4, 18 & 21. ⁹⁴ Ibid, iv, 4, 7.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid, iv, 4, 8-9, 12-14. ⁹⁶ Ibid, iv, 4, 50.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid, 1, 2, 9. ⁹⁸ Ibid. ⁹⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid, ii, 1, 15-17. ¹⁰¹ Ibid, ii, 1, 15-20.
- ¹⁰² Ibid, i, 1, 2 ; iii, 2, 4 ; iv, 4, 22.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid, ii, 1, 15. E.T., of ŚKBS., (Roma Choudhury, Calcutta, 1959.

CHAPTER VI

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VĪRA ŚAIVISM

VĪRA ŚAIVISM.—Vīra Śaivas are Liṅgāyatas or Liṅgāyets, because they carry the phallic symbols of Śiva, the cosmic creative principle, on their heads or in their bodies. This fact is mentioned in 'Sūtasāṃhitā' included in 'Skandapurāṇa' (600 A.D.). This practice influenced the Liṅgāyatas. Basava (1200 A.D.) was born in a Brāhmaṇa family in Kannada in South India. He strengthened and propagated Vīra Śaivism. He did not write any work. But many sayings in Kannada are ascribed to him. He refers to Śiva as 'ṣaṣṭhala', a mysterious religious tenet, which he learned from his master. The tenets of Vīra Śaivism are found in 'Basavapurāṇa' (1300 A.D.), 'Channabasavapurāṇa' (1600 A.D.) in Kannada, 'Śīkarabhāṣya' of Śrīpati Paṇḍita (1400 A.D.), 'Siddhāntaśikhāmaṇi' of Śivayogi Śivācārya, 'Śivādvaita-mañjarī' of Śivaprabhānanda and 'Anubhavasūtra' of Mogge Māyideva (1440 A.D.). Some believe that Basava was the founder of Vīra Śaivism. R. G. Bhandarkar thinks that it had its origin one or two centuries earlier.¹

According to Vīra Śaivism Śiva is the Supreme Brahman called sthala, because the world is founded (stha) in Him, and dissolved (la) in Him. He is divided into liṅgasthala and aṅgasthala, or Rudra-Śiva, the worshipped, and the self, the worshipper, owing to His innate power. Śiva's power is divided into kalā and bhakti. Kalā abides in Śiva, and bhakti abides in the self. Bhakti means meditation, which generates union between the self and Śiva. Liṅgasthala is divided into bhāvaliṅga, prāṇaliṅga and iṣṭaliṅga. The first is the manifestation of Śiva's being; the second, of His consciousness; and the third, of His bliss. Each of these three principles is subdivided into two parts, and becomes mahāliṅga, prasādaliṅga, caraliṅga, śivaliṅga, guruliṅga, and ācāraliṅga. These six liṅgas are called ṣaṣṭhala. The power of Śiva energised by these liṅgas becomes power of consciousness, transcendent power, original power, power of volition, power of knowledge, and power of action. Bhāvaliṅga is the infinite Divine which intuits its essence and becoming in its essence. Prāṇaliṅga is the universal Divine which comprehends the possibilities to be actualised in the finite. Iṣṭaliṅga is the individual Divine which actualises the possibilities. Mahāliṅga is, the great, prasādaliṅga, the gracious, caraliṅga, the dynamic, śivaliṅga, the auspicious, guruliṅga, the preceptive, and ācāraliṅga, the practical.²

Vīra Śaivism accepts the doctrine of thirty six principles. The power of being predominates in Śivatattva. It is prasādaliṅga with parā śakti, the transcendent power. Śaktitattva is almost simultaneously manifested with Śivatattva because consciousness presupposes being. This principle is caraliṅga with originative power. The power of volition predominates in Sadāśivatattva. This principle is śivaliṅga with power of volition. The power of knowledge predominates in Īśvaratattva with its objective content. This principle is guruliṅga with the power of knowledge. The power of action predominates in Sadvidyātattva. This

principle is ācāraliṅga with the power of action. These are the first group of five pure principles. Māyā, kāla, niyati, rāga, vidyā, kalā, and puruṣa are the second group of seven pure and impure principles. Māyā is voluntary self-limitation, and generates the five coverings. Śiva assumes them, and appears to be a finite soul. The last group of impure principles are twenty four principles—prakṛti, mahat, ahaṁkāra, five organs of knowledge, five organs of actions, five tanmātras, and five elements. The universe exists in an unmanifest state in Parama Śiva, and is manifested at the time of creation.³

ŚRĪPATI PAṆḌITA'S PHILOSOPHY OF VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA.—He was a systematic exponent of Vīra Śaiva philosophy and religion. He flourished in the fourteenth century, and wrote a commentary on the 'Brahma Sūtra' entitled 'Śrīkarabhāṣya'. He avers that his commentary is based on the 'Agastyasūtravṛtti' which is not available. He adores Remuṇa, a self-realised Vīra Śaiva, and Rāma of the Dvāpara yuga, profusely quotes from the Upaniṣads, the Smṛtis, and the Śaiva Purāṇas, and claims to base his interpretation on the Vedas and the Śaiva Āgamas. He criticises the Pāśupata doctrine that God is only the efficient cause of the world. He mentions Śiva and Śakti and their nondifference from each other, like Somānanda of the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism, and refers to ṣaṣṭhala. He criticises the Śaiva Siddhānta view of Śrīkaṇṭha, who follows Rāmānuja in his commentary on the 'Brahma Sūtra'. His main target of attack is Śaṁkara's monism. He criticises his doctrines of the indeterminate and attributeless Brahman, of Īśvara as the phenomenal appearance of Brahman limited by māyā, of an individual self as a false appearance of the Brahman limited by an internal organ produced by its avidyā, individual nescience, and of the world as a false appearance subsisting in Brahman due to māyā, cosmic nescience, and of its creation by Īśvara as apparent only. His criticisms closely follow those of Rāmānuja and Madhva. He criticises Rāmānuja's doctrine of God and the world related to each other as the soul and the body. He criticises Madhva's doctrine of difference between God and the soul. He advocates a type of dualistic monism which he calls Viśiṣṭādvaita, and recognises both difference and nondifference or identity between God and the soul. His doctrine is similar to Bhāskara's doctrine of difference and identity, though not identical with it. Śrīpati regards works, knowledge and devotion as the means to liberation. He accepts Bhāskara's doctrine of the combination of knowledge and works, though he does not mention his name. His dualistic monism is quite different from the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism which is a type of monism. His system is much influenced by Rāmānuja's qualified monism and Madhva's dualism. Though he flourished in the fourteenth century, Mādhava does not mention the Vīra Śaiva system in his 'Sarvadarśanasamgraha'. Mādhava also flourished in the same century.⁴

THE NATURE OF BRAHMAN.—Brahman, the substratum of all, the cause of all, is knowable from the testimony of the Vedas alone. He cannot be conclusively proved by the other means of valid knowledge. The Upaniṣads say, 'The existent alone existed before, one, secondless Brahman'. 'All Vedas speak of Brahman'. All scriptural sentences propound the doctrine of difference and nondifference and speak of Brahman as the material cause and

efficient cause of the world, and reject the doctrine of prakṛti as the material cause of the world. The Mīmāṃsaka avers that the Vedas lay down injunctions about our duties, that there would be two classes of Vedic sentences if some of them prove the existence and nature of Brahman, that some texts speak of prakṛti as the material cause of the world, that Brahman being proved by inference to be the efficient cause of the world, He is not knowable from scriptural testimony alone, and that Brahman being an accomplished reality and foundation of all good, He cannot be proved by the Vedas. Śrīpati rejects the Mīmāṃsaka view. He avers that the Vedas speak of the nature of Brahman and lay down the method of meditation on Him, that they determine His nature by describing His essential characteristics, inessential characteristics, and other distinguishing characteristics.⁵ Brahman is inferred by the Nyāya to be only the efficient cause of the world. But He is its material cause also and permeates it. The world is an expression of Brahman's energy. Energy exists in a substance. There is no energy without a substance as its possessor. They are nondifferent from each other. The world is of the nature of Brahman and created by Him. Brahman is its substratum and material cause and efficient cause. Hence insentient prakṛti cannot be its material or efficient cause. The world and individual souls are both different and nondifferent from Brahman. Individual souls are unborn and eternal. The Vedas speak of Brahman's fivefold acts of creation, maintenance, and dissolution, of the world, and binding and liberating individual souls. The texts speaking of them are praises of Brahman.⁶ Scriptural testimony is the principal source of proving the existence and nature of Brahman. Perception and inference are subordinate proofs. Perception is intuition generated by meditation on Brahman. Intuition is a convincing proof, but it depends upon the practice of meditation based on scriptural testimony. So it is not an independent proof. Inference unsupported by scriptural testimony is a weak and unreliable proof. Śrīpati does not deny that some Vedic sentences speak of our duties, but insists that the performance of duties purifies the mind and prepares it for meditation on Brahman. Hence the principal end of the Vedas is enquiry into the nature of Brahman—our Highest Good. The Mīmāṃsaka objects that the Vedas enjoin the worship of many gods, and, consequently, reject the concept of one God. Śrīpati replies that there are superior, mediocre, and inferior worshippers, that the inferior ones worship many gods because they are incapable of worshipping the one supreme Brahman, and that the superior ones worship Him as full of all gods and their Lord. The worship of Him alone leads to liberation.⁷ Śrīpati agrees with Somānanda, the exponent of the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism, that God is the material cause and efficient cause of the world, that the world is an expression of His energy, that His energy cannot exist without Him, and that He is the Highest Good. But he differs from Somānanda in that for him God's energy is both different and nondifferent from Him while the latter holds God's energy to be nondifferent from Him. Somānanda is an advocate of the doctrine of nondifference or monism whereas Śrīpati is an exponent of the doctrine of difference and nondifference, like Bhāskara. Thus Vīra Śaivism substantially differs from the Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism. Śrīpati regards the individual souls to be eternal, like the Lord, and to be different and nondifferent from Him. He regards Brahman as determinate, qualified, and invested with difference while Somānanda regards Brahman as indeterminate, unqualified, and differenceless as known by a released soul. Both Somānanda and Śrīpati believe in God as invested with diverse

powers which are real and essential. But Somānanda considers the experienced world to be false, although it is an expression of His power of *māyā*, whereas Śrīpati emphatically asserts its reality and being of the nature of Brahman, like Rāmānuja. Somānanda sometimes speaks of the reality of the world because it is created by the divine will. But a liberated soul, for him, has no knowledge of difference but knowledge of identity or perfect 'I'-consciousness. Śrīpati denies it unequivocally and insists, like Bhāskara, that a liberated soul's knowledge of difference persists, although it is eclipsed by the knowledge of different entities being full of Brahman. Śrīpati severely criticises Śaṅkara's doctrines of falsity of the world appearance due to *māyā* or *avidyā* or false attribution, and of Brahman as indeterminate, unqualified, and differenceless, like Rāmānuja and Madhva. But he agrees with Śaṅkara that Brahman is knowable through scriptural testimony alone.

CRITICISM OF ADVAITAVĀDA: ATTRIBUTELESS BRAHMAN.—Śaṅkarites hold that Brahman is unqualified, undifferentiated, and indeterminate. Śrīpati refutes this concept on the lines of Rāmānuja and Madhva on the following grounds. 1. Is the indeterminate or differenceless Brahman existent or nonexistent? If It is nonexistent, then Śaṅkarites accept the view of the *Mādhyaṃika* that void is the ontological reality. If It is existent, then existence is affirmed of It, and It ceases to be indeterminate, since affirmation is different from It. The affirmation that 'the indeterminate Brahman exists' makes It determinate. According to Śaṅkarites the existence affirmed of Brahman would be false. If the nature of Brahman be said to be imagined, then indeterminateness ceases to characterise It. The statement 'That is Brahman where Its nature is imagined' involves self-contradiction, since the indeterminateness of Brahman cannot be imagined, or since It cannot be related to imagination. The Upaniṣads do not speak of the indeterminate Brahman. They make verbal statements which consist of different parts, and therefore cannot make any statement about the indeterminate Brahman. Hence the indeterminate Brahman cannot be proved by scriptural testimony. 2. The difference between false objects and Brahman is either ontologically real or ontologically unreal. If it is ontologically real, then it contradicts Śaṅkarites' principal thesis that Brahman is the only ontological reality. If it is not ontologically real, then Brahman also becomes ontologically real and unreal, since no difference exists between It and false objects. Śaṅkarites may urge that there is no flaw in this position for both difference and non-difference or identity are false. If it were so, then they should admit the falsity of both an individual self and Brahman. But they admit Brahman alone to be real and an individual soul to be false. If they urge that they do so because of the superiority of the scriptural texts regarding identity, then Śrīpati rejoins that the scriptural text 'All are indeed Brahman' emphatically asserts that Brahman is determinate and immanent in diverse objects. 3. Is the indeterminate Brahman of the nature of knowledge or nescience? It cannot be nescience for that contradicts Śaṅkarites' thesis that Brahman is differenceless knowledge. If It is knowledge, it has an object or it is objectless. If it is objectless, it ceases to be knowledge. If it has an object, the object is eternal, since eternal knowledge must have an eternal object. Hence Brahman is not indeterminate and differenceless. Further, if Brahman is eternal knowledge with an eternal object, a released soul which has acquired the right knowledge of Brahman will have knowledge of diverse objects. But Śaṅkarites hold that it has no knowledge of

difference. If it has no knowledge of objects, it ceases to have any knowledge, since knowledge can never be without any object. Knowledge without an object and a self is never experienced.⁸ (Cp. Rāmānuja) Knowledge is always experienced in such a form as 'I know a jar'. Śaṅkarites' concept of selfless and objectless knowledge is as fictitious as a sky-flower. 4. Is the indeterminate Brahman a substance or a nonsubstance? If It is a substance, It is the substratum of qualities, and therefore not indeterminate or differenceless. If It is devoid of qualities, like a jar at the moment of its production as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, then Brahman acquires qualities at some time, but an indeterminate entity cannot have qualities at any time. If the qualities of Brahman are said to be imagined, then also It is not indeterminate, since It is related to imagination and since buddhi cannot imagine qualities without the material of nescience. If Brahman is not a substance, then It subsists in a substance, like a quality or an action. Further, it will contradict the Śruti 'He is founded in His greatness.' If the indeterminate Brahman subsists in a substratum, It ceases to be indeterminate. Hence It is neither a substance nor a nonsubstance. Thus Brahman conceived as existent or non-existent, as different or nondifferent from false objects, as knowledge or nonknowledge, and as a substance or a nonsubstance, is contradicted. Hence It is not an ontological reality. Further, the scriptural text 'That thou art' does not prove the identity of an individual soul with the differenceless Brahman. The word 'that' denotes the determinate Brahman, and the word 'thou' denotes a determinate individual self.⁹ In the scriptural text 'That resolved: I shall become many' the word 'that' denotes the determinate Brahman, the Lord, the cause of the world. Śaṅkarites urge that the aforesaid sentence should be interpreted in a derivative sense. The word 'that' denotes Brahman limited by cosmic nescience or the Lord; and the word 'thou' denotes Brahman limited by individual nescience or an individual self. The limiting adjuncts should be discarded. Then the substratum of God and an individual self is identical, and this identity is not contradicted by any sublating knowledge. Śrīpati asserts that this interpretation of the text is wrong and far-fetched for there are scriptural texts, which declare that Brahman is the impeller of all individual souls and giver of four kinds of release to them, and which prove that Brahman and individual souls are determinate. Further, if Brahman is determinate and qualified, then the knowledge of the one can lead to the knowledge of all beings. If Brahman is indeterminate and differenceless, the knowledge of the one will not lead to the knowledge of all beings. Śaṅkarites may argue that the intuition of Brahman acquired through meditation in an appropriate manner produces the knowledge of all beings. This argument is wrong for whatever is seen is destroyed according to them. Brahman is seen through meditation, and therefore destroyed. So meditation is useless and cannot produce the knowledge of all entities. Śrīpati further asks whether a pure soul which has intuited the supreme Brahman of the nature of infinite knowledge is different or nondifferent from It. A pure soul is not different from Brahman as a ray of the sun is not different from it. Nor is a pure soul nondifferent from Brahman for the Śruti says: 'Brahman is omniscient and omnipotent and an individual soul is endowed with limited knowledge and limited power'; 'Brahman is the Lord of prakṛti and individual souls'. It may be objected that, if an individual soul is like a ray of Brahman, it cannot have an immediate experience of the latter. The objection is groundless, because God can be intuited by an individual self purified by initiation by a competent teacher through His

grace. So there is no conflict between an individual soul being a ray of God and its intuition of Him, as a ray of light, a part of the sun, in the eyes can see the sun. If an individual soul cannot have an immediate experience of God, the following scriptural texts will be false : 'The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman' ; 'This subtle Ātman is to be known through the illumined mind' ; 'On knowing Śiva an individual soul achieves peace'. Hence Brahman is not indeterminate and differenceless.¹⁰

CRITICISM OF ĪŚVARA AS AN APPEARANCE (ŚAṂKARA).—Some Śaṅkarites hold that God (Īśvara) is a reflection of Brahman in cosmic nescience (māyā), and that an individual self is a reflection of Brahman in individual nescience (avidyā). Śrīpati offers the following criticisms of this view. 1. Brahman is formless and colourless, and māyā is ontologically unreal. So Brahman cannot be reflected in māyā. If Brahman were reflected in māyā, then the incorporeal and formless air would be reflected in water. 2. Brahman is all-pervading and exists in māyā also. So the former cannot be reflected in the latter. Only the distant sun can be reflected in water in another place. The original and its reflection cannot coexist in the same locus. 3. When a reflecting medium (e.g., water) is destroyed, a reflection (e.g., a reflection of the sun) is destroyed. So when in the state of release cosmic nescience will be destroyed, God will be destroyed. To admit this is to accept the atheistic doctrine of the Buddhist. No one would make any effort to attain release, if God were a false destructible appearance.

Some Śaṅkarites hold that Īśvara is a limitation of Brahman by cosmic nescience, which is His limiting adjunct. Śrīpati refutes this view on the following grounds. 1. When the limiting adjunct of māyā will be destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman, God will be destroyed. But the destruction of God cannot be regarded as the Highest Good. The Śruti says : 'God is the giver of release'. 2. Māyā, according to Śaṅkarites, is ontologically unreal. So Brahman cannot be limited by it. If māyā is a false appearance, then God also is a false appearance. This view is unacceptable to Śrīpati who identifies God with the supreme Lord. 3. The Śruti 'Aum or Om is Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra' implies that māyā is energy of the supreme Lord. It is not ontologically unreal.¹¹ God is the cause of the world. His being the cause of the world is not His essential characteristic but His inessential characteristic indicative of His nature. So creation, maintenance and dissolution belong to the world, and do not constitute the essential characteristic of God. He is identical with Brahman Who is determinate and qualified.

CRITICISM OF ŚAṂKARITE CONCEPTS OF JĪVA.—Some Śaṅkarites hold that an individual soul is a reflection of Brahman in individual nescience. Others hold that it is a reflection of Brahman in an internal organ, a product of individual nescience. Others hold that a jīva is Brahman limited by individual nescience or by an internal organ. Śrīpati refutes these views. 1. The limiting adjunct cannot be gross because in that case a jīva would not be able to go to the other world after death of its body. Brahman is declared by the Śruti to reside in the heart of a person. So Brahman cannot be reflected in the internal organ of a person. An original and its reflection cannot coexist in the same locus. 2. If a jīva is a reflection, it is false and incapable of doing a successful action. If it is false, the Śruti 'Brahman exists in a

jīva as its Inner Controller' is contradicted. 3. In the state of release individual nescience is destroyed, and so a jīva reflected in it is destroyed. So release or destruction of an individual self cannot be the Highest Good of a person. 4. No person would make any effort to bring about the destruction of his individual self. All would endeavour to achieve earthly happiness, and none would seek for renunciation of desires for earthly enjoyments. None would act upon Vedic injunctions and prohibitions because they are false. 5. If a jīva is a limitation of Brahman by individual nescience or by an internal organ, it will be destroyed at the time of release when its limiting adjunct will be destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman. But the destruction of an individual self cannot be pursued as the Highest Good. 6. If a jīva is a limitation of Brahman by an internal organ, which is insentient, it may as well be regarded as a limitation of Brahman by any other insentient thing, like a jar or a cloth. 7. A spurious text says : 'Brahman creates an individual self and God being reflected in māyā'. So Śaṅkarites argue that they are imaginary appearances. This text is overridden by the superior text : 'Brahman is the omniscient and omnipotent Lord, and a jīva is endowed with ignorance and impotence'. This text emphatically asserts the ontological reality of God and an individual self.¹²

CRITICISM OF THE PĀŚUPATA VIEW.—An opponent argues that God is not the material cause of the world because He is devoid of qualities. Śrīpati asks whether He is not the material cause of the world as different from it or as its Inner Controller, or as invested with forms, or as formless. The first alternative is not tenable since He is all-pervading. If an efficient cause is without any condition or external material, then a potter cannot produce a jar, and a weaver cannot produce a cloth. The second alternative also is not tenable. If God were different from the world, He would be limited like a jar, and be a content in a substratum. The third alternative also is not tenable, since Brahman being invested with forms would consist of parts and would not be conceived of as partless and incorporeal like ether, and would be limited as mentioned already. Nor is the fourth alternative tenable, since the formless and partless Brahman cannot produce the world consisting of parts. An opponent further argues that if Brahman of the nature of truth, knowledge and bliss were the material cause of the world, it also would be of the nature of existence, knowledge and bliss. If the world were not produced, it would not be of the nature of transience, insentience and pain, and would not be modifiable like earth and the like. Further, is the Brahman or prakṛti the efficient cause, or the material cause, of the world, or both? Brahman is not the efficient cause of the world for the Śruti says : 'All are indeed Brahman'. An efficient cause (e.g., a potter) requires external material (e.g., clay) to produce an effect (e.g., a jar). Nor is God the efficient cause of the world for the Śruti says : 'Brahman is one and without a second'. Nor is He both the efficient cause and material cause of the world, since they are of contradictory nature like light and darkness. Prakṛti cannot be the efficient cause of the world, since it is unconscious. Nor can it be both the material cause and efficient cause of the world, since they are of contradictory nature. If Brahman be the material cause of the world as milk is the material cause of curd, then He cannot be of the nature of bliss. If He is the material cause of the world as gold is the material cause of gold ornaments, then He becomes modifiable. If the world be assumed to be nonexistent before creation and then to

emerge as a false appearance like an illusory appearance of a serpent in a rope, then a hare's horn also would emerge as an illusory appearance. Hence the empirical world cannot be produced by Brahman or Prakṛti.

Śrīpati holds that Brahman, the substratum of all, of the nature of being, knowledge and bliss, dwelling in six esoteric centres of the human body, called supreme Śiva, is the cause of the creation, maintenance and dissolution of the world. Though He is partless, He is the efficient cause of the world without any external material. He has the natural power of consciousness, which is the substratum of the world. He has the supreme power of bliss. He produces the world without any external material. Though He is partless, yet He can produce the world even as the partless air can shake a tree, or as a partless individual self can produce dream-cognitions. The corporeal sun can create incorporeal time. The omnipotent Brahman, Who can do what is inconceivable, can certainly produce the world. There is no flaw in the doctrine that Brahman assumes the supramundane auspicious form of Śiva, produces incorporeal and corporeal elements and their modifications for the benefit of His devotees out of His grace.¹³ All things of the world are created, maintained and dissolved in Him, as the waves are created, maintained, and dissolved in the ocean, and are of the nature of Him. God's power is the material cause of the world which is a part of Him. He is the cause of all worlds which are His parts. The Śruti 'From Whom all creatures are born' shows that Brahman is the efficient cause of the world. The Śruti 'In Whom the creatures are dissolved' shows that Brahman is the material cause of the world. He is both the efficient cause and material cause of the world.¹⁴ He is not only the efficient cause nor only the material cause. The material cause and the efficient cause are different from each other in their nature. Yet Brahman can be both the efficient cause and material cause of the world because it is a part of Him. The entire Brahman is not modified into the world. He was qualityless before creation. Then He resolved to create the world. He became intent to create it by unfolding His power. Śrīpati rejects the view of the Pāsupata that God is only the efficient cause of the world.

THE WORLD IS REAL.—A Śaṅkarite holds that the world is false attribution and, consequently, a false appearance. Attribution is false ascription of a quality of an entity to another entity. It is either false ascription of not-self to self or false ascription of self to not-self. It is not the first for the illusion of a serpent in a rope is produced by the residual impression of a real serpent. A Śaṅkarite does not admit the reality of the world-appearance distinct from Brahman, and the reality of any place outside Him. Nor is attribution the second for in that case Brahman would be false. If attribution were false ascription of self to not-self, then the Self would be false and become insentient like the world. If attribution be due to a beginningless series of prior attributions, then it involves infinite regress. What is perceived in an entity cannot be attributed to it. Hence the perceived world cannot be attributed to the Self or Brahman. The character of a serpent cannot be attributed to a serpent, and so the illusion of a serpent cannot be accounted for. Further, Brahman and the world are without an origin. So Brahman cannot be attributed to the world. Besides, it would contradict the Śruti 'From Whom the creatures are born', which asserts that Brahman is the cause of the world and prior to it. If the world be false because it is seen or

known, then Brahman also is false because He is known. If He is said to be unknown in order to avoid this difficulty, then persons cannot have any experience of Him. Moreover, it will contradict the Śāṅkarite view that an individual self is proved by 'I'-consciousness of which it is an object, and for which it is an object of immediate experience.¹⁵ If Brahman is not known, He cannot be an object of immediate experience. But a Śāṅkarite admits Brahman to be directly experienced. A Śāṅkarite argues that Brahman is not an object of 'I'-consciousness, but that an individual self is an object of 'I'-consciousness. This argument is not valid because he does not admit any difference between them from the ontological point of view. If Brahman be not admitted to be knowable from the pragmatic standpoint, the false world-appearance would be without any substratum.¹⁶ Hence the world is not a false appearance due to attribution.

Śrīpati further asks whether falsity of the world-appearance is its nonexistence or indefinability or liability to contradiction. It is not nonexistence since then the Vedas would not be authoritative being nonexistent. Nor is falsity indefinability, since it would lead to complete silence about the world. If the world is indefinable, nothing can be affirmed or denied of it. Nor is falsity liability to contradiction. Liability to contradiction is either being a counterentity of negation at all times or being contradicted by valid knowledge. It is not the first, since the world-appearance fulfils our practical purposes and gives scope for our actions. It is beginningless, and its existence in the past cannot be denied. Its existence at present cannot be denied, for it produces our pleasures and sufferings at present. Its existence in future cannot be denied, since it exists in God in a subtle state even during dissolution. Nor is falsity liability to contradiction by valid knowledge, since the wise who have acquired the knowledge of Brahman continue to experience the world. They are subject to hunger and thirst and appease them by eating and drinking. So their knowledge of difference is not destroyed. Hence the world-appearance is not false either in the sense that it is nonexistent or in the sense that it is indefinable or in the sense that it is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. The doctrine of the world being a false appearance due to nescience is not found in the Upaniṣads. Brahman being the material cause of the world, it cannot be a false appearance since it is in the nature of Him. The world is not different from Him. It is the unfoldment of His power.¹⁷ Even if God is said to be like a magician, and if the world is said to be His magical creation, He is admitted to be its cause. The Upaniṣads never speak of the world as produced by *māyā* or *avidyā*. The statements in the Purāṇas regarding the falsity of the world due to *māyā* or *avidyā* are certainly delusive. Deluded persons speak of the world as unreal, unfounded, and Godless. But in truth, the whole world is full of God, and this truth is realised when right knowledge dawns upon the mind. This is the true view in accord with the Upaniṣadas and should be entertained, and any other view about the falsity and Godlessness of the world should be rejected.¹⁸

The Śāṅkarites argue that the world appearance is false for it is seen or known. Śrīpati asks whether Brahman is known or unknown. If He is known, He must be false, like the world appearance. If He is not known, we cannot speak of Him and act upon the belief in His existence. He can be proved by knowledge alone. If Brahman is not known, nescience cannot be destroyed. Nescience of Brahman can be destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman alone. So what is seen or known is not reality as distinguished from the world

appearance which has a pragmatic reality. If contradictedness consists in being contradicted by the knowledge of Brahman alone, and not by the knowledge of any other entity, then a first knowledge contradicted by a second knowledge cannot be said to be contradicted, and all other cases of contradiction would cease to be so. If what is not contradicted in three or four successive moments is considered to have a pragmatic reality, then a common illusion (e.g., illusion of a circle when a fire-brand is whirled around) would have pragmatic reality for it continues for a long time. The Śaṅkarites hold that the manifold world appearance has only pragmatic reality but no ontological reality.¹⁹ Śrīpati asks about the nature of pragmatic reality. If it is knowability through pragmatic action, then Brahman also has pragmatic reality for He is known through pragmatic action in the form of instruction in the scriptural texts regarding His nature. Otherwise, a teacher cannot teach a pupil the nature of Brahman and a pupil cannot learn it from a teacher. The Śaṅkarites may argue that Brahman is not an object of pragmatic action, since It is indeterminate and differenceless. Śrīpati refutes the argument by observing that Brahman is not indeterminate and differenceless and that the Upaniṣads do not assert that Brahman is differenceless. Nor is pragmatic reality knowability through contradicted practical action, for it would apply to Brahman also. All practical actions are contradicted by the knowledge of Brahman because they are included in the world appearance. If what is contradicted be considered to be a pragmatic reality, then a common illusion (e.g., illusion of silver in a shell) would have pragmatic reality. But the Śaṅkarites regard it as an illusory reality.

Śrīpati avers that the falsity of the world is not taught by the Upaniṣads. What is the falsity of the world? It is either being contradicted by the knowledge of Brahman or being nonexistent in the past, the present, and the future. Śrīpati asserts that the world is not contradicted by the knowledge of Brahman. The Śruti "All this is indeed Brahman" asserts that all things of the world are of the nature of Brahman. The cognitions of different objects are not contradicted by the knowledge of Brahman, but they are eclipsed by the knowledge of them as of the nature of Brahman. The integral knowledge of all objects as of the nature of Brahman stops the knowledge of them as diverse and possessed of distinctive qualities. But the diverse objects are not sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. The world cannot be negated by the knowledge of Brahman because it is of the nature of Brahman. Hence the falsity of the world is irrational.²⁰ If the world is false, the knowledge of Brahman cannot lead to the knowledge of all. Janaka and others, who attained embodied release, lived like common people. Their knowledge of Brahman did not negate the world. To state that the world is a false appearance due to cosmic nescience (māyā) or individual nescience (avidyā) is to delude others. The 'Bhagavad Gītā' says, "The atheists say that the world is false and without any foundation". In fact, the world is true and founded in the Lord. Nor is the falsity of the world being negated in the past, the present, and the future. The Upaniṣads assert that the world is beginningless. It may be objected that the world was nonexistent before its creation since the Śruti says: "This was nonexistent before. Then it became existent". To this objection Śrīpati replies that 'nonexistence' of the world before means its existence in a subtle state because gross things did not exist at the time. "From nonexistence existence was born". Here existence means existence of gross things. If nonexistence meant

absolute nonexistence, then a sky-flower would be the cause of the world. "Existence alone existed before". Here 'existence' means differenceless existence because the word 'before' occurs in the text. There is the Śruti "One Brahman alone without a second". Here the word 'one' shows that Brahman was the cause of the world. The words 'without a second' show that Brahman was the material cause and efficient cause of the world. Hence the world is not false in the sense that it was nonexistent before its creation.²¹ Further, Śrīpati argues that the world is not false, like dream-cognitions, because it fulfils our practical needs, and because it is the field of our actions.²² Bādarāyaṇa says, "The world is not nonexistent because it is perceived", "It is not false, like dreams, because of dissimilarity".²³ Thus Bādarāyaṇa asserts the reality of the world. Śrīpati argues that dreams are true during dream, and that they are not absolutely false, because they are created by God, because they are partly due to the revival of the residual impressions of the waking perceptions of real external objects, and because they sometimes foreshadow future good and evil, which turn out to be true. Hence the world cannot be false like dreams. If it were false, there would be the loss of earned merits and demerits and the acquisition of unearned merits and demerits.²⁴

CRITICISM OF ŚAṂKARITES' CONCEPT OF ĪŚVARA.—Śaṅkara holds that God (Īśvara), a reflection of the indeterminate and attributeless Brahman in māyā, which is different from its substratum—Brahman, is the creator of the world. Śrīpati offers the following criticisms of this doctrine. 1. Śaṅkara admits that Brahman, the substratum of māyā, is indeterminate. Hence Brahman cannot create the world. Such indeterminate Brahman is unreal, like a hare's horn, because It cannot be known by any means of valid knowledge. 2. Brahman cannot be the substratum of Īśvara, since He is a phenomenal appearance according to Śaṅkara. 3. Brahman cannot be the substratum of souls and the world, because they also are false appearances according to him. 4. He denies the reality of two conscious entities, and so admits that Brahman becomes ignorant, like a soul, and is not omniscient. So the Śrutis declaring the omniscience of Brahman become meaningless. 5. Īśvara, being a phenomenal appearance, according to him, cannot reveal the Vedas, which are accepted by him as the highest authority. Thus he contradicts himself. If the Vedas are valid, Īśvara is an ontological reality.²⁵ 6. Perception is indeterminate and determinate. Determinate perception apprehends an object with its genus, quality, action, name and the like. Indeterminate perception apprehends an object endowed with some quality, and cannot apprehend an object devoid of all qualities. (Cp. Rāmānuja). An entirely unqualified object can never be perceived. Inference is based on perception, and so cannot apprehend an unqualified object. Testimony is knowledge derived from the statement of a reliable person through words. Words can express determinate objects alone qualified by some qualities. Hence the so-called indeterminate and unqualified Brahman is unknowable, and therefore unreal.²⁶ Brahman is determinate and qualified and identical with Īśvara, Who is not a phenomenal appearance, and is the creator of the world. The world is real, a part of God's power. God as transcendent is the efficient cause, and as immanent, is the material cause, of the world. Creation is real, and not apparent, as Śaṅkara holds. Śrīpati regards the world as a real expression of a part of God's power. Power is nondifferent from the powerful

beings, for they form an inseparable unity. (Cp. Somānanda). Divine power is nondifferent from God. The world, being a part of divine power, is nondifferent from God. Nondifference of an earthen pot from earth—its cause—must be admitted.²⁷ So Śrīpati advocates satkāryavāda, like Rāmānuja, and rejects Śaṅkara's vivartavāda, which regards an effect as a false appearance of its cause which is real, like the illusion of a serpent in a rope, and which regards the world as a false appearance of the indeterminate and unqualified Brahman. He rejects Madhva's doctrine of difference of the world from God, and Rāmānuja's doctrine of God and the world as related to each other as a soul and its body. He holds that the world is nondifferent from God, being the expression of His power, but that God is not identical with the world because He is transcendent of it. He is both transcendent of, and immanent in, it.

REFUTATION OF CĀRVĀKA MATERIALISM AND MĪMĀṂSAKA ATHEISM.—The Cārvāka puts forward the following arguments for materialism. There is no Brahman since He is not perceived through the sense-organs. Future life does not exist for no departed person returns from the next world and informs anybody of its existence. All material things are produced by the conglomeration of the four material elements—earth, water, fire and air. Life springs out of nonliving matter as beetles spring from cowdung. All unconscious things and conscious beings are produced from the material elements by their aggregation and destroyed by their disjunction and disintegration. A living being is not different from other material things. Life and consciousness spring from the aggregation of the material elements as red colour springs from the combination of turmeric, lime and honey. A soul is nothing but a body attended with consciousness which is a product of matter. The Mīmāṃsaka admits the reality of individual souls in addition to material elements, of future life and transmigration, and of Apūrva which regulates the fruition of merits and demerits and the distribution of rewards and punishments in accordance with them. He does not believe in the existence of God as the regulator of happiness and misery among the souls according to their merits and demerits. Hence enquiry into Brahman is not possible.

Śrīpati refutes these views. Enquiry into Brahman should not be entered upon because its end is absent or doubtful. If it is doubtful, either Brahman is doubtful or an individual soul is doubtful. Brahman is not doubtful for the Śruti says : "Brahman is truth, knowledge, and infinite". Thus Brahman, the supreme Lord, is undoubted. Nor is an individual soul doubtful, because it is known by 'I'-consciousness, and because the Śruti says : "The Lord and an individual soul are eternal ; the former is omniscient and omnipotent while the latter is ignorant and impotent". So an individual soul is known by 'I'-consciousness and from scriptural testimony. Brahman is known by perception, inference and scriptural testimony.²⁸ His existence is known by perception in an indirect manner. Those who are rich in wealth, assistants, talents, etc., are found to be unsuccessful in achieving their ends, and those who are lacking in them are found to achieve inconceivable ends. So God's favour is an indispensable condition of success. Gotama gives this argument for the existence of God. It is a popular argument.²⁹ Chariots, mansions, towers, ramparts and the like are built by intelligent persons. Similarly, ether and other insentient elements and sentient beings are produced by the supreme Lord. This is thought by the wise. It is unreasonable to hold

that all insentient things and sentient beings are produced by the fortuitous combination of the four material elements—earth, water, fire and air.³⁰ Beasts, birds and other animals are not found to be produced by the four material elements. The distinctive qualities of beasts, men and the like are not found in the same kind of body. Life is hidden in cowdung, etc., so that beetles spring from them. Life cannot spring from nonliving matter. Unintelligent Apūrva cannot give the fruits of actions done by persons according to their merits and demerits. God, the Lord of the Law of Karma, can award them enjoyments and sufferings in accordance with their merits and demerits. So the atheistic doctrine of the Mīmāṃsaka is not reasonable. Unintelligent prakṛti also cannot produce the world. So the atheistic Sāṃkhya doctrine is refuted. Insentient atoms of earth, water, fire and air cannot produce the world. So the atheistic Vaiśeṣika doctrine also is refuted.³¹

GOD AND INDIVIDUAL SELF.—The Śruti about two beautiful birds expresses difference between a self and God. The Śruti about the identity of a self with God expresses identity between them. So both difference and identity between them should be admitted. The souls are parts of God, and nothing but His parts.³² Some exponents of the Vedas hold that in the state of release a soul achieving similarity to Him is dependent on Him. Śrīpati does not accept this view. According to him, in the state of bondage a soul is an accessory of God Who is the principal, but in the state of release its dependence on God, which is the cause of its fear, is inadmissible. The Śruti speaks of a released soul as identical with God. There is no contradiction between difference and identity between a soul and God. The Śruti admits both difference and identity between them, which Śrīpati regards as the highest authority.³³ He asserts that his view of difference and identity between a soul and God is supported by scripture, reason, and experience. The doctrines of nondualism or monism and qualified monism cannot reconcile the relevant scriptural texts adequately. They consider some texts to be principal and others to be subsidiary and unimportant. The Naiyāyikas, Madhva and others advocate the doctrine of difference, and cannot reconcile all scriptural texts. So their views are unreasonable and indefensible.

The Śruti says, "All creatures are one quarter of God". So individual souls are parts of God. The 'Bhagavad Gītā' says, "Souls are eternal parts of God". An individual soul is a part of God, as a ray of light is a part of a luminous thing,³⁴ as a white cow is a part of the genus of cow. A part is a qualification of a qualified object; a qualification is a part of a qualified object, which is a whole. Though the former is a part of the latter, there is difference in their nature. A ray of light is different from a luminous thing. Similarly, an individual soul is different from God. Yet it is nondifferent from God, because it cannot exist separately from Him. A soul as a qualification always exists as dependent upon God Who is the principal. The Śrutis expressing identity of a soul with God show that He is its Inner Controller. The Smṛti also says, "God is not affected by the joys and griefs of an individual soul, which are the fruits of its actions". Parāśara asserts that an individual soul is a part of God, as a ray of light is a part of a luminous thing, or as a power is a part of a powerful entity. God is superior to an individual soul in that He is devoid of merits and demerits and neither bound nor released, while it acquires merits and demerits, and is bound and released. So God is not affected by its happiness and misery.³⁵

Although all individual souls are equally parts of God, yet some of them are pure and others are impure in connection with their bodies, as although all kinds of fire are equally parts of fire, yet fire in cremation grounds is impure and sacrificial fire in a Śrotriya's house is pure. Thus Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras possess different degrees of purity and impurity. Although individual souls are equally parts of God, yet they are atomic, different, and endowed with different bodies, and, consequently, do not share the experiences of one another. The souls released in embodied life, which have acquired the knowledge of God, being atomic and different from the other souls due to their being limited by their bodies till they attain disembodied release, do not share the experiences of the other souls. The bound souls' experiences of joys and sorrows are not intermixed with one another because of their atomic dimensions, difference, and being endowed with different bodies, although they experience the fruits of their actions due to the ripening of their merits and demerits which have begun to bear fruits. The released souls are pure because of their knowledge of God while the bound souls are impure and bound to embodied life and affected by pleasures and pains because of their ignorance of God.³⁶

There are three kinds of individual souls. The bound souls are called 'paśu', have false conceit of 'I' in all actions, are not initiated by a competent teacher into a mantra of Śiva, and are devoid of devotion to Him. Pure souls are endowed with the qualities of sense-control, mind-control, endurance, detachment, desire for release, devotion, and servitude to God, and initiated into a mantra of Śiva. The released souls are those whose mental modes are merged in Śiva. They are released in embodied life if they are entirely free of love and hate, and independent of the bodily experience of pleasure and pain. They transcend bodily life despite their being shackled with bodies. If they are affected by the frailties of their bodies, they have not attained disembodied release. Those souls have attained disembodied release, which are disembodied in their embodied life.³⁷ They have realised their disembodied souls.

There are four kinds of liberation, viz., residence in the abode of God, proximity to Him, community in nature with Him, and merging in Him. They are attained through sense-control, mind-control, endurance, abstention from sentient pleasure, detachment, desire for release, faith, devotion, servitude to God, meditation, and trance.³⁸

An individual soul is a part of God, since the Śruti speaks of it as both different from, and identical with, God. It speaks of God as creator, controller, omniscient, independent, pure, endowed with auspicious qualities, and the Lord, and of an individual soul as created, controlled, ignorant, dependent, impure, endowed with inauspicious qualities, and a servant.³⁹ It also speaks of identity between them as shown above, and of God's pervading an individual soul. So its being a part of God must be admitted. Its being created, controlled, manifested, and maintained by Him, being contained in Him, being accessory to Him, worshipping Him, acquiring wealth, happiness, virtue, and release, and experiencing the fruits of its actions through His grace, shows its difference from, and dependence upon, Him. Otherwise, it cannot be established, since it cannot be perceived. Nor can a soul's identity with God of the nature of infinite, pure consciousness be proved by any other pramāṇa. The Śruti speaks of God's desire to become many, creating the elements and the world composed of them, entering into it as individual souls, and making it full of diverse objects. Thus souls

perceive manifold objects, and experience happiness and misery because of the immanence of God in them as their Inner Controller, Who binds them to embodied life and releases them from bondage. So creation, bondage, and release are not false. A soul is not Brahman limited by a limiting adjunct, viz., nescience, since the Śruti speaks of its being controlled by God. Hence a soul should be admitted to be a part of God in order to reconcile difference and identity between them asserted by the Śruti.⁴⁰ The Smṛti also says, "God is real; the world is real; and individual souls are real by nature". Hence those who believe in the Vedas should admit that an individual soul is a part of God, being both different from, and identical with, Him in order to reconcile the 'difference'-texts with the 'identity'-texts, which are equally authoritative.

This is Śrīpati Paṇḍita's view. Some hold that the Śrutis expressing difference between an individual self and God either express conditional difference or attributed difference. Śrīpati urges that they cannot express conditional difference because if a soul be naturally nondifferent from God, it cannot worship God. Granting that a soul, though naturally identical with God, can worship Him, does God know the soul or not? If He does not know it, He ceases to be omniscient and becomes insentient. If He knows it, He knows its misery as His own misery since He is identical with it, and becomes tainted with its sins of omission and commission. Nor do the Śrutis expressing difference express attributed difference between a soul and God due to nescience. Does nescience exist in a soul or in God? A soul being really identical with God, cannot have nescience, because in that case it would cease to be of the nature of knowledge. Nor can God have nescience, because He is of the nature of self-luminous knowledge. He cannot be the Witness of nescience, and create the world through nescience. It cannot be argued that His manifestation is veiled by nescience, since the so-called veiling also is destroyed by His manifestation. Further, self-manifestation is His nature, and, if His manifestation is veiled by nescience, His nature is destroyed,—which is impossible. So His manifestation cannot be veiled by nescience. Therefore there is a natural difference between a soul and God.⁴¹ A conscious soul attains identity with God through His grace, even as copper becomes gold through the influence of an elixir.⁴² There are some Śrutis which express identity of a soul with God. There are some Śrutis which express natural difference between them also. Bādarāyaṇa advocates the doctrine of difference and nondifference or identity between them.⁴³ It is obvious in the 'Brahmasūtra'. It may be objected by Rāmānuja that difference and nondifference are contradictory to each other, that natural difference cannot be terminated, and that therefore qualified monism which reconciles difference with nondifference is reasonable. The souls are qualities of God Who is endowed with qualities. Śrīkaṇṭha has propounded qualified monism in his commentary on the 'Brahmasūtra'. To this objection Śrīpati rejoins that difference and nondifference are not contradictory to each other, and that the Śruti, the Smṛtis, and the Purāṇas advocate the doctrine of difference and nondifference. All experience that there is difference in waking state and dream, but that there is nondifference in deep sleep. Similarly, there is difference in creation, and there is nondifference in dissolution. A soul becomes God or Śiva through His grace through devotion. If God were the soul and if a soul were His body, as Rāmānuja holds, then God would be limited like a soul.⁴⁴ But He is unlimited and infinite, and a part of His power is manifested in the world. He is devoid of a

body and sense-organs. So Rāmānuja's view is wrong. A soul discards its finitude, merits and demerits, and becomes identical with God, as rivers discard their names and forms and merge in an ocean. But a soul in bondage is not absolutely identical with God. Wood, stone, and iron are different from one another, although they are insentient and homogeneous in kind. Similarly, a soul and God are naturally different from each other, although they are conscious and homogeneous in kind. There are many Śrutis which assert natural difference between a soul and God. "The self and God both are unborn and eternal ; God is omniscient and omnipotent while the self has little knowledge and power". "God possesses the power of māyā, and creates the world with it ; a soul is overcome by māyā". "The one Lord enters into mutable prakṛti and immutable souls and controls them". "He is the Lord of prakṛti and souls". "He is eternal among the eternal souls, one among many, and fulfils the desires of many souls". If the souls were absolutely nondifferent from God, He would be tainted with their flaws. If they were absolutely different from Him, their difference would never be destroyed.⁴⁵ Hence a soul is both different and nondifferent from God.

The individual souls are real, many, eternal, and atomic. They are not illusory. They are of the nature of knowledge and knowers. They are active agents and experiencers of happiness and misery. They are not coextensive with one another and do not share the experiences of one another. The doctrines of unreality, and oneness of a soul, and of its identity with God are wrong.⁴⁶ If souls be Brahman limited by nescience, they are really one despite the difference of their limited adjuncts, and therefore they experience the joys and miseries of one another.⁴⁷ The souls cannot be reflections of Brahman in nescience or in internal organs produced by it, because the original and its reflection cannot exist in the same locus (e.g., the sun and its reflection in water), but a soul and Brahman are said to reside in the heart. The individual souls' merits and demerits also, which are causes of their limiting adjuncts, depend upon Brahman, and, consequently, cannot prevent the intermixture of their experiences. If their merits and demerits or limiting adjuncts can limit the one, indivisible Brahman, then they destroy Its nature. Further, the souls being ubiquitous according to Advaitavāda, they are present in all bodies, and, consequently, share the experiences of one another. Their merits and demerits cannot prevent the intermixture of their experiences. Hence the souls' atomic dimension, multiplicity, and natural difference in different bodies must be admitted.⁴⁸ If the Advaitist doctrines were true, there would be no distinction between some souls being possessed of love and others being possessed of hate. Desires are causes of love and hate. Merits and demerits are causes of desires. They cannot prevent the intermixture of souls' experiences of one another. It may be objected that Brahman makes some souls do right actions and others do wrong actions according to the Śruti, that therefore their experiences of happiness and misery due to their merits and demerits are really God's experiences, and that God urges the souls to do right actions in accordance with their merits and demerits, which are beginningless. To these objections Śrīpati replies, that the souls are not insentient like jars and the like, although they are not omniscient like God, that they are free agents of their voluntary actions, although they are dependent on and controlled by God, like the servants of a king dependent on him, and that therefore they must be the experiencers of the joys and sorrows, which are the fruits of their free actions in accordance with their merits and demerits. The Śruti unequivocally asserts that the souls have limited

knowledge, limited freedom of volition and action, and are bound, and endowed with bodies from beginningless time. It undoubtedly advocates the souls' limited freedom of agency. They are conscious and free agents, although they are controlled by God. Their free will is limited by the divine will.⁴⁹ The denial of their limited freedom contradicts the Śruti, and is repugnant to reason and experience. There is no contradiction among the Śrutis which assert souls' free agency and those which assert God's controlling their actions, because souls are limited, being parts of God, and because parts are nondifferent from a whole.⁵⁰ Though they are nondifferent from God, He does not experience their joys and sorrows, because He is devoid of merits and demerits, and because He does not perform their actions. The souls perform their actions with their limited freedom, and must therefore experience their fruits in accordance with their merits and demerits, although God controls their actions and impels them to do right or wrong actions according to their merits and demerits. They cannot escape from the fruits of their merits and demerits acquired by them by their free actions in the past. God does not constrain them to do their actions, but impels them to do certain actions in order to wear off their merits and demerits, which are innate predispositions of their past free actions. They can undo their merits and demerits by their free actions. God controls their actions as their Inner Controller. Śrīpati is not a pantheist, and does not advocate God's swamping human freedom in His absolute freedom.⁵¹

A liberated soul becomes supremely luminous Brahman, and shines in its own essential nature. Śrīpati holds that a soul that worships an image of Śiva attains gradual liberation, and that a soul that worships the formless Śiva attains immediate release, and becomes identical with Him. A soul attaining final release becomes omniscient, omnipotent, infinite being, knowledge and bliss, and identical with eternally pure and free Śiva. A bound soul's knowledge and action are limited by its merits and demerits, and so it is different from God in the state of bondage. But a liberated soul's knowledge and action are not limited by its merits and demerits, because they are destroyed at the time, and so it becomes identical with Him. Its natural nescience is destroyed by its knowledge of God, and so it attains identity with Him.⁵² If a soul were essentially identical with Him, its attainment of essential identity could not be its highest good, since it is already attained. A soul that meditates on Śivatattva as formless, ubiquitous, supreme light of consciousness in the heart-ether destroys its subtle body, and attains identity with Him in embodied life. Śrīpati believes in embodied release. Although a soul and God are possessed of contradictory attributes from beginningless time, a soul can destroy its three kinds of impurities, become pure, and become identical with God. Difference and identity of a soul and God are clearly asserted by the Śruti. A bound soul is different from God, but a liberated soul is identical with Him in nature, and remains as both different from, and identical with, Him, like a river merged in an ocean.⁵³ Just as a river does not entirely lose its identity in an ocean, though it loses its distinctive characters, so a released soul does not entirely lose its identity in God, though it loses its limitations, and exists as inseparable from Him. The Śruti says, "A released soul becomes stainless and pure, and attains supreme equality with God"; "A released soul enjoys all objects of desire with God". Hence such difference as exists in the state of bondage between a soul and God cannot be admitted in the state of release.⁵⁴ In disembodied release a soul's existing inseparably and indistinguishably from God is supported by the Śruti. Śrīpati advocates identity of a

soul with God in disembodied release but maintains that it does not lose its integrity in Him. Kaunḍinya also, a Pāsupata Śaiva, regards sāyujya as intimate union of a soul with God without losing its identity in Him.⁵⁵ Śrīpati asserts that Vīra Śaivism advocates the doctrine of difference and identity between a soul and God, which is in conformity with the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, and which is the view of Bādarāyaṇa.⁵⁶

AN INDIVIDUAL SOUL.—An individual soul is atomic, for the Śrutis declare it to depart from its body, move to other spheres of existence, and return.⁵⁷ Movement is movement to heaven to enjoy happiness and to hell to suffer pain. Return is return to the earth after exhausting enjoyment of happiness in heaven, and of misery in hell. So a soul is atomic. If it were ubiquitous, it would not be capable of movement, and be dissociated from its body. God is ubiquitous, but a self is atomic. The Śruti says, "This Self is great and unborn". Śrīpati avers that it refers to the Supreme Self or God. The Śruti says unambiguously, "This self is atomic and knowable through the illumined manas"; "The self is minute like the hundredth part of a hair". Śrīpati avers that these texts declare an individual soul to be atomic.⁵⁸ The Śruti says, "As rivers flow into an ocean and lose their names and forms in it, so a self, that has acquired the saving knowledge, is divested of its names and forms and attains to the Supreme Self." A self is the attainer, and God is to be attained. If the former were ubiquitous, it could never attain to the latter. One ubiquitous entity cannot attain to another ubiquitous entity. Further, if a self were ubiquitous, God would not be its Inner Controller. The atomic magnitude of a self is not due to the limiting adjunct of the internal organ, since it is unborn and eternal, and since it does not owe its existence to an internal organ which is produced after creation. Hence its atomic magnitude is natural to it. Śrīpati regards a bound soul as atomic and a released soul as ubiquitous.⁵⁹

The self is of the nature of a knower.⁶⁰ It is not unconscious, and so not produced. Only insentient entities are produced. Is the self of the nature of knowledge as the Buddhist idealists, the Sāṃkhya and Śaṅkara maintain? Or, is it unconscious in its real nature but acquires consciousness as an adventitious quality as the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika maintain? Or, is it of the nature of a knower? Which of these views is rational and in conformity with the Śruti? If the self were of the nature of consciousness, it being ubiquitous would always and everywhere be conscious, and know objects, and its merits and demerits would be useless. But its consciousness is not perceived in deep sleep, swoon, and the like. In waking state knowledge of the soul is perceived, because the complement of its causes is present, while in deep sleep and the like its knowledge is not perceived, because its causal conditions are absent. Hence knowledge is not an essential quality of a self. Nor is knowledge its adventitious quality, which it acquires in conjunction with the manas and the body, because it is ubiquitous according to the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, and so always in conjunction with the manas and the body. Hence it is of the nature of knowledge and a knower; it is neither unconscious nor mere knowledge, but of the nature of knowledge and a knower.⁶¹ The Śruti says, "The self is full of knowledge, an internal light, a person"; "Who can know the knower"?; "This self is a seer, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker, doer, knowing person". Knowledge is the essential quality of an individual self while bliss is the essential quality of

the Supreme Self.⁶² A jīva's being a knower is sometimes manifested as in waking state and sometimes unmanifested as in deep sleep and the like. A released soul has knowledge. Hence a soul's minuteness and being a knower are not opposed to each other.⁶³

Śrīpati next reproduces Rāmānuja's argument in exactly the same language. If a jīva were ubiquitous and of the nature of knowledge, it would either always have knowledge and absence of knowledge, or it would always have either knowledge or absence of knowledge, but it would not sometimes have knowledge, and sometimes not have knowledge. But, according to Śrīpati, a soul is atomic and has knowledge when endowed with a body and has no knowledge in other conditions. All souls being ubiquitous and, consequently, being connected with all sense-organs, their knowing at some times and their not knowing at other times would not be regulated by their merits and demerits also.⁶⁴

Is the self an active agent or inactive? Śrīpati reproduces Rāmānuja's arguments in the same language. Some hold that the self is inactive, that the insentient guṇas—sattva, rajas, and tamas—are active, and that their activity is attributed to the jīva. The 'Bhagavad Gītā' says: "Prakṛti is the cause of activity of a cause in producing an effect"; "All actions are done by the guṇas of prakṛti"; "The jīva thinks itself to be an active agent, being deluded by egoism"; "The self is the cause of experiencing pleasure and pain". Thus prakṛti is active and the self is inactive.

Śrīpati refutes this view after Rāmānuja. The self is an active agent, since the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions are meaningful. It freely performs enjoined actions and abstains from committing prohibited actions, acquires merits and demerits, and experiences pleasures and pains as their appropriate fruits. If the self is not a free agent, the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions become meaningless. The scriptures produce the knowledge of right and wrong in the souls which are conscious, but they cannot produce it in prakṛti, which is unconscious. They enlighten conscious souls and impel them to perform right actions and refrain from committing wrong actions, for they alone can experience their fruits. The guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas—are the causes of natural bodily actions alone, and not of voluntary actions which alone are moral or immoral. The 'Bhagavad Gītā' emphatically says: "The active self, the body, the sense-organs, various efforts, and daiva—merits and demerits—and divine will, are the causes of an action". It does not deny the freedom and activity of the self.⁶⁵ It can act in conjunction with insentient internal and external organs. Its power of action is restricted in the absence of internal and external organs. There is no contradiction in this view. The self cannot act at all times; yet its activity is undeniable.⁶⁶

The Advaita view, that the self is of the nature of knowledge and Brahman, that the internal organ alone is active, and that the internal organ being active its activity is not found in deep sleep because it becomes inoperative at the time, is unreasonable. The soul's power of action is not manifested in the absence of its body, sense-organs, manas, and vital forces; yet its power of action cannot be denied, since the Śruti "Of the two beautiful birds in the same tree, the one eats its sweet fruit while the other merely looks on"; becomes meaningless. Hence the view that the insentient internal organ is active is not reasonable.⁶⁷ It may be argued that buddhi alone is active because it is not found to have the power of knowing itself and other entities in deep sleep because of its absence. This argument is wrong, Śrīpati urges, because a soul's power is overcome by God's insentient power of māyā called 'tamas'

in deep sleep. Its power of knowing itself and other entities is eclipsed by the supreme Lord's power of fettering it to bondage by contracting His power as the sun's rays are eclipsed by a cloud, or as the consuming power of a fire is eclipsed by a lunar gem, mantras, etc., or as coldness of water is eclipsed by the sun or by a fire.⁶⁸ So activity is an inherent attribute of the self with its other attributes. Further, if buddhi be active, the self cannot be the experiencer of the fruits of actions. If buddhi be active, it should be the experiencer of its actions. If it be the experiencer of its actions, there is no proof for the existence of the soul for the Sāṃkhya.⁶⁹ But he admits that the soul is an experiencer of the fruits of actions. So he should admit that the self is an active agent. In the world an active agent is found to act with the help of an instrument. If buddhi be an active agent, it should have an instrument. But it is not found to have an instrument. So it is not active. If buddhi be active without an instrument, then the Sāṃkhya admits that an entity without an instrument is active. So the self can be active without buddhi, which is its instrument. Further, if buddhi be active, it should also meditate. Meditation is a means of liberation, according to the Sāṃkhya, which is in the form "I am different from prakṛti". But buddhi is a modification of prakṛti, and cannot meditate in the aforesaid manner. Trance, the result of meditation, is the state in which the self merges in the supreme Lord. It is a state of superecstasy beyond ignorance, knowledge, and the world of difference, in which the Lord is revealed to the self, in which the body, sense-organs, internal organs, vital forces, and their functions cease, and which is replete with supreme bliss. In trance buddhi is modified into the form of the Lord.⁷⁰ Buddhi cannot be the agent of trance. So the self is an active agent. If it is not an active agent, it cannot acquire merits and demerits, and cannot meditate and have trance. Then it cannot attain liberation, which is attainable through faith, devotion, meditation, and trance. Buddhi cannot attain liberation. If it attained liberation, the Śrutis—"That thou art", and "The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman" would be meaningless. Liberation is the state of the self's becoming identical in nature with Brahman. In the state of liberation buddhi is destroyed because it is insentient. If buddhi attained liberation, self-destruction would become the nature of liberation.⁷¹ The self acts with the sense-organs when it desires to do so, and it does not act, when it does not desire to do so, as a carpenter acts with an instrument when he desires to act, and he does not act when he does not desire to do so. If insentient buddhi were active, it would always be active, because it is devoid of any desire for enjoyment, which might regulate its action at times. So buddhi is not an active agent. Nor is prakṛti active, since desire is an attribute of a conscious entity. The conscious self alone is active, like a carpenter, and acts with its internal organs and external sense-organs in waking state when it desires to do so. It performs secular and scriptural actions, and experiences pleasures and pains. In deep sleep it experiences deep joy abiding in the Lord's power of binding called 'tamas' because the body and sense-organs are inoperative at the time. So it is proved that a conscious individual self alone is active.⁷² But the self's activity is controlled by the will of God. It acts in accordance with its merits and demerits for experiencing their fruits in the form of happiness and misery. It is not conscious of its merits and demerits and cannot command their fruits despite its free activity. God alone is conscious of its merits and demerits, impels them to act accordingly, and associates its free actions with the fruits of its merits and demerits. Its

freedom of will is subject to the divine will and limited by its merits and demerits acquired by it in the past by its free actions. If its actions were completely controlled by God, then the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be meaningless. If an individual self can perform enjoined actions and abstain from committing prohibited actions by its free will, then only is it morally responsible for its voluntary actions. Hence it is free to perform enjoined actions and commit prohibited actions. But the Śruti declares God to be all-pervasive, both inside and outside all beings, and their Supreme Self and Inner Controller. The 'Bhagavad Gītā' says, "God resides in the hearts of all creatures, and impels them to act." It is an individual self that acts, but its actions are controlled by God Who is different from it.⁷³ It is impelled but not compelled by God. If it is not free to do right actions or wrong actions, the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions become useless, and if its freedom of volition and action is not limited by God, its merits and demerits become useless. But both are necessary. Hence the self is free to will and act, and its freedom of volition and action is limited by God's will. He favours those souls which are favourably disposed towards Him, and induces them to act for the attainment of Him. He punishes those souls which are hostile to Him, and incline them towards those actions, which cause them sentient pleasures, and which are unfavourable to the attainment of Him.⁷⁴

A soul experiences waking cognitions of external objects through the action of the external sense-organs and the internal organs with the gross body. God associates it with a gross body and the sense-organs by His power of binding, and makes its perception of external objects possible. It experiences dream-cognitions through its subtle body produced by the manas vitiated by sleep. They are contradicted by waking perceptions, which are not contradicted. Dreams are created by God, and so are true during dream state. The impressions of dreams persist in the waking state, and so dreams are remembered. Again, dreams also are due to the revival of the residual impressions of waking perceptions. Further, some dreams forecast future events, good or evil, which turn out to be true. So they are not absolutely false. A soul is not the creator of its dreams, because it cannot create the dreams which forebode its misfortune, and because it does not know its merits and demerits which are worn out by the experience of joys and sorrows in the state of dream. So dreams are created by God in accordance with its merits and demerits for its experience of their fruits.⁷⁵

In dreamless sleep a soul experiences unconsciousness and a trace of bliss with its causal body of nescience. In waking state and dream it has the conceit of 'I' in the body and the sense-organs while in dreamless sleep it has no such conceit because it becomes completely unconscious of them. In deep sleep it sleeps in the heart in a region (purītat) full of tamas, which is a collocation of sattva, rajas, and tamas, and which is a part of God's power of consciousness, with its causal body.⁷⁶ It has no experience of waking cognitions or dream-cognitions, but it is bound by God's power of binding. Though it sleeps near the abode of God in the heart in deep sleep, it cannot experience Him, because it is fettered by His power of binding, and because it cannot know itself for the same reason. God creates deep sleep, by overcoming it endowed with a fragment of nescience with His power of cosmic nescience, and makes it experience a particle of His bliss in order to stop its waking cognitions and dream-cognitions and give it respite by making it enter a place near His abode in the heart.

Hence it does not experience God in deep sleep as a liberated soul does. Deep sleep is different from the state of release. A bound soul falls into deep sleep and awakes from it and remembers it. A released soul achieves liberation in the forms of residence in the abode of God, proximity to Him, and similarity of nature or form to Him, and becomes omniscient and omnipotent like Him. A bound soul, on the other hand, cannot have any knowledge, enjoyment and suffering in dreamless sleep because of the inactivity of the internal and external sense-organs, takes rest near God in the heart, and awakes again in order to experience the fruits of its merits and demerits.⁷⁷

Deep sleep is a state of unconsciousness like swoon. In this state there is no conceit of 'I' in the body and the sense-organs while in swoon such conceit does not completely vanish. In swoon though there is no knowledge of external objects, there is the experience of internal pain, and therefore there is some conceit of 'I' in the body and the sense-organs. Swoon is different from waking state, because there is no knowledge of external objects in it. It is different from dream, because there is no knowledge of internal cognitions in it. It is different from waking state, dream, and deep sleep, because it is caused by a blow and the like. It is different from death wherein there is the cessation of the relation of vital forces with the body. In death the body is dead because vital forces cease to function while in swoon they operate feebly. God is the cause of a soul's waking state, dream, and dreamless sleep, and so its experience of these three states depends upon Him.⁷⁸

BONDAGE AND LIBERATION.—Bondage consists in a soul's false conceit of 'I' and 'mine' in the manas, body, the sense-organs, and the vital forces. Liberation consists in its attainment of the nature of God, which is the result of the destruction of His power of *māyā* in the form of its bonds, due to the acquisition of the knowledge of itself and of Him in consequence of the ripening of its merits and demerits acquired in many births.⁷⁹ God is the cause of a soul's bondage in that He veils its knowledge by His power of *māyā* in the form of its bonds. He is the cause of its liberation in that He frees it from His power of *māyā* in the form of its bonds, and manifests its knowledge of itself as a spirit and of God. A soul cannot bind or liberate itself. It cannot be released from bondage without the grace of God or descent of His power. There are different degrees of descent of His power. (Cp. Abhinavagupta). A competent spiritual teacher infuses God's power into a disciple at the time of initiation. The inscrutable secrets of the nature of God, a soul, and its bonds are revealed to a person owing to the descent of His power in him. An aspirant awakens the dormant divine power called serpent power (*kuṇḍalinī*) in the *mūlādhāra* at the bottom of the *suṣūmā* in the spinal cord, makes it ascend through it and pierce five centres,—*svādhiṣṭhāna*, *maṇipura*, *anāhata*, *viśuddha*, and *ājñācakra*, and unite with Śiva in the *sahasrāra*. Thus Śrīpati, an exponent of Vīra Śaivism, includes *kuṇḍalinīyoga* in spiritual discipline, like the *Pratyabhijñā* school of Śaivism. A soul can destroy its natural individuality by rigorous spiritual discipline, achieve identity with God, and be released.⁸⁰

Śrīpati distinguishes between embodied release and disembodied release. All souls, which have acquired the knowledge of God, do not necessarily achieve embodied release. Those souls, which meditate on God with a form, and which have a desire for unalloyed happiness in the abode of God, assume auspicious spiritual bodies, and attain liberation in

the forms of residence in His abode, proximity to Him, and similarity in nature or form to Him. Those souls which have acquired the virtues of sense-control, mind-control, endurance, abstention from sentient pleasures, detachment, and a strong desire for emancipation, on which God has bestowed His grace, and which meditate on formless God in the hearts, are merged in Him in trance, experience infinite bliss, and achieve embodied release. They retain their bodies until their merits and demerits, which have matured and begun to bear fruits, are worn out, and their bodies fall off. They achieve disembodied release after death of their bodies.⁸¹ Those souls which go to the abode of God with spiritual bodies can achieve disembodied liberation by meditating on formless God. Those souls which worship God by performing their prescribed duties attain heaven. Those souls which worship God invested with a form achieve liberation in the forms of *sālokya*, *sāmīpya*, and *sārūpya* as described above with celestial bodies. Those souls which worship formless God achieve liberation in the form of mergence in Him. Those souls which have achieved embodied release destroy their subtle bodies here on earth while they are alive, and acquire identity with God. Their subtle bodies are destroyed because all their merits and demerits except those, which have begun to bear fruits in this life, are destroyed. When they are destroyed, their bodies perish, and they achieve disembodied release.⁸² Thus Śrīpati recognizes gradual release and immediate release, embodied release and disembodied release, and four kinds of release : coresidence, proximity, similarity, and inseparable union. It should be noted that the intuitive knowledge of Brahman in the state of embodied release does not sublate the knowledge of the world, as Śaṅkara wrongly holds. The world exists at the time, and is not negated by the knowledge of God. A soul that has achieved embodied release experiences the supreme bliss of God in the state of trance, and loses the knowledge of itself and the world because it is merged in Him and becomes free of all mental modes. When it wakes from trance, it regains the knowledge of itself and the world. So the world is not a false appearance but real, and not sublated by the knowledge of Brahman.⁸³

Śrīpati credits Bādarāyaṇa with the view that liberation is the attainment of the nature of God after the complete destruction of a soul's natural individuality and of the possibility of its rebirth.⁸⁴ Śaṅkara rejects the use of works for the attainment of liberation. The 'Pāsupatasūtra' does not regard the performance of the Vedic works appropriate to one's castes and stages of life as necessary for the attainment of release. But Śrīpati holds that the performance of the Vedic duties pertaining to one's castes and spheres of life without any desire for fruits, and offered to God, though not necessary for the emergence of the knowledge of God, is conducive to the achievement of emancipation, since it purifies the mind, and since it is not repugnant to the emergence of the knowledge of God. It is an indirect means to release.⁸⁵ All should perform prescribed duties till death without any desire for their fruits, inasmuch as they purify the mind. When the mind is purified, devotion to God arises. Undivided devotion produces the knowledge of God, which destroys nescience. So the performance of duties should not be given up at any stage of life. A yogin, who has acquired the knowledge of God, performs his obligatory and occasional duties, and who offers them to Him, is not affected by merits and demerits. He does not acquire these unseen potencies of actions, which produce happiness and misery. A yogin who has acquired the saving knowledge should perform actions for the good of mankind.

The prescribed works unmotivated by any desire for fruits should never be discarded.⁸⁶ The merits and demerits produced by works are consumed by the true knowledge of God. Śrīpati admits that all duties,—prudential duties for the acquisition of desired objects, obligatory duties, and occasional duties,—duly performed and offered to God indirectly bring about the intuitive knowledge of God.⁸⁷ The householder should perform sacrifices, obligatory and occasional duties, for they are accessory to the acquisition of the true knowledge of God, and, consequently, to the attainment of release. The students, the persons retired to forests, and the monks should perform their specific duties in order to achieve release.⁸⁸ All persons in different stages of life should cultivate the virtues of sense-control, mind-control, endurance, abstention from sense-pleasures, discrimination of the eternal from the noneternal, detachment and a strong desire for emancipation, for they are the internal means to the attainment of it, and directly generate the intuitive knowledge of God. All contrary desires and their potencies are exterminated by meditation on God through His grace when the mind is purified by the performance of the prescribed duties and by the cultivation of the inner virtues, which are accessory to the knowledge of Him.⁸⁹ All specific duties should be performed by those who have acquired the true knowledge of God and by those who have not yet acquired it.⁹⁰ The performance of works and the knowledge of God both are the prerequisites for the attainment of liberation, since both are accessory to it, and all persons in different stages of life should resort to the combination of works and knowledge.⁹¹ All should perform their specific duties, worship God, concentrate their minds on God, meditate on Him, bow to Him, hear of Him, and chant His name and glory with devotion throughout their lives. Hearing and reflection do not completely destroy the conceit of a caste and a stage of life. It is attenuated by them. Meditation on God tends to destroy it completely. It is the direct means to the attainment of the intuitive knowledge of God. An aspirant should practise silence, childlike simplicity, and wisdom after acquiring the knowledge of God.⁹²

The persons in distress and sickness should practise good conduct, mutter God's name repeatedly, observe fasts on proper occasions, go on pilgrimage to holy places, perform charity, undergo penances, worship God, listen to instructions, reflect on them, and investigate His nature. They also are eligible for acquiring the knowledge of God. All are eligible for acquiring it whether they perform their respective duties pertaining to their stages of life or whether they do not do so only if they have a strong desire for release, since faith, devotion, and meditation are the principal means to the attainment of God.⁹³

The ascetics should perform their specific duties till they die. Those who lapse from asceticism should atone for their sins, and then they become eligible for acquiring the knowledge of God. The sins of lapse are expiated by the performance of the 'cāndrāyaṇa', bathing in earth, pilgrimage, fasting, muttering God's name, and the like.⁹⁴ Thus Śrīpati considers the performance of duties, devotion, and knowledge of God to be the means of attaining liberation. (Cp. Nimbārka and Madhva).

- ¹ VSMRS., pp. 131-32.
- ² Gopinath Kaviraja Commemoration Volume, p. 137 ; VSMRS., pp. 135-36 ; DHIP., Vol. V, pp. 50-54 ; PO., pp. 204-15 ; CHI., Vol. IV, 1956, pp. 104-06.
- ³ CHI., Vol. IV, pp. 106-07.
- ⁴ ŚRBS., Vol. I, pp. 1-3 ; i, 1, 4, & 30 ; ii, 1, 14 & 22 ; ii, 3, 40. DHIP., Vol. V, 1955, pp. 42-64, 173-90.
- ⁵ ŚRBS., i, 1, 4, p. 45. ⁶ Ibid, p. 45. ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Ibid, i, 1, 4, p. 51. ⁹ Ibid, p. 52.
- ¹⁰ Ibid, pp. 52-53.
- ¹¹ Ibid, i, 1, 2, p. 33.
- ¹² Ibid, pp. 32-33.
- ¹³ Ibid, p. 30. ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Ibid, p. 31. ¹⁶ Ibid, i, 1, 4.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, i, 1, 2, p. 31.
- ¹⁸ Ibid. ¹⁹ Ibid, i, 1, 4, p. 48.
- ²⁰ Ibid, p. 47.
- ²¹ Ibid, pp. 47-48.
- ²² Ibid, i, 1, 1, p. 5.
- ²³ BS., ii, 2, 27-28.
- ²⁴ Ibid, ii, 2, 28 ; iii, 2, 6.
- ²⁵ Ibid, ii, 2, 39.
- ²⁶ ŚRBS., ii, 1, 32.
- ²⁷ Ibid, ii, 1, 14.
- ²⁸ Ibid, i, 1, 1, p. 4.
- ²⁹ NS., iv, 1, 19-21. HIP., Vol. I, p. 677.
- ³⁰ ŚRBS., i, 1, 1, p. 4.
- ³¹ Ibid, i, 1, 1 ; HIP., Vol. II, pp. 463-73.
- ³² ŚRBS., ii, 3, 40. ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ Ibid, ii, 3, 43.
- ³⁵ Ibid, ii, 3, 44.
- ³⁶ Ibid, ii, 3, 46. Ibid, ii, 3, 45.
- ³⁷ Ibid, ii, 3, 46. ³⁸ Ibid, ii, 1, 23.
- ³⁹ Ibid, ii, 3, 40. ⁴⁰ Ibid.
- ⁴¹ Ibid, ii, 1, 22. ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Ibid. ⁴⁴ Ibid. ⁴⁵ Ibid.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid, ii, 3, 42.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid, ii, 3, 47.
- ⁴⁸ ii, 3, 48. ⁴⁹ Ibid.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid, ii, 3, 49.
- ⁵¹ Ibid, ii, 3, 50.
- ⁵² Ibid, iv, 4, 1. Ibid, iv, 4, 15.
- ⁵³ Ibid, iv, 4, 2-4.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid, iv, 4, 44.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid, iv, 4, 1-4.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid, ii, 2, 40.
- ⁵⁷ BS., ii, 3, 18. ⁵⁸ ŚRBS., ii, 3, 18 & 21.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid, ii, 3, 28, p. 266 ; iv, 4, 15.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid, ii, 3, 17. ⁶¹ Ibid.
- ⁶² Ibid, ii, 3, 27. ⁶³ Ibid, ii, 3, 29.
- ⁶⁴ RBS., ii, 3, 32 ; ŚRBS., ii, 3, 30.
- ⁶⁵ ŚRBS., ii, 3, 31.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid, ii, 3, 34.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid, ii, 3, 34.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid, ii, 3, 35.
- ⁶⁹ HIP., Vol. II, pp. 40-41.
- ⁷⁰ ŚRBS., ii, 3, 36.
- ⁷¹ Ibid. ⁷² Ibid, ii, 3, 37.
- ⁷³ Ibid, ii, 3, 38.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid, ii, 3, 39.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid, ii, 2, 28-29 ; iii, 2, 6.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid, iii, 2, 7.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid, iii, 2, 7 & 9.
- ⁷⁸ Ibid, iii, 2, 5 & 10.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid, iii, 2, 4.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid, iii, 2, 5. Cp. LY., pp. 17-19 ; ŚM., pp. 29-35.
- ⁸¹ Ibid, iii, 4, 52.
- ⁸² Ibid, iii, 4, 11.
- ⁸³ Ibid, ii, 2, 28 ; iv, 4, 1 & 4.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid, iii, 4, 1.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid, iii, 4, 12. Ibid, iii, 4, 9.
- ⁸⁶ Cp. BG., xii, 11-12 ; xviii, 2, 9 & 11 ; vi, 1 ; iii, 20.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid, iii, 4, 12-14, 16 & 26.
- ⁸⁸ Ibid, iii, 4, 26.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid, iii, 4, 27.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid, iii, 4, 32.
- ⁹¹ Ibid, iii, 4, 33. Cp. Bhāskara.
- ⁹² Ibid, iii, 4, 33-35 & 47.
- ⁹³ Ibid, iii, 4, 39. Ibid, iii, 4, 37-38.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid, iii, 4, 37-38, 40 & 42.

APPENDIX

REFERENCES

CHAPTER I

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CHAPTER II

1. भागव्यवस्था यन्निष्ठा तस्याहंभावभागिनः । व्यापित्वमनुसंधानं तज्जडस्य न युज्यते ॥ APS., 26.
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39. गुरुरूपायः SS., ii, 6. यद्वा गुरुः परा शक्तिरीश्वरानुग्रहात्मिका । VSSV., ii, 6, śl. 26.
40. दीक्षाशब्द इह प्रोक्तो दानक्षपणलक्षणः । योविपस्यो ज्ञाहेतुश्च । SS., iii, 28-09.
42. द्विष्टस्यानेकवत्त्वात् सिद्धास्यान्यानपेक्षणात् । पारतन्याद्ययोगाच्च तेन कर्तापि कल्पितः IPK., i, 16.

43. न चेदन्ताकृतानन्तः विश्वरूपो महेश्वरः । स्यादेकश्चिदपुर्जनस्मृत्यपोहनशक्तिमान् । IPK. i, 23.
प्राग्वार्थोऽप्रकाशः स्यात् प्रकाशात्मतया विना । न च प्रकाशो भिन्नः स्यादात्मार्थस्य प्रकाशता । Ibid, i, 33.
प्रकाशात्मा प्रकाशयोऽर्थो नाप्रकाशश्च सिध्यति । Ibid, i, 34. चिदात्मैव हि देवोऽन्तःस्थितमिच्छावशाद्ब्रह्मिः ।
योगीव निरुपादानमर्थजातं प्रकाशयेत् । Ibid, i, 38.
44. परेशशक्तिरात्मेव भासते नत्विदन्तया । Ibid, i, 51. अहंप्रत्ययमर्शो यः प्रकाशात्मापि वाग्वपुः । Ibid, i, 53.
45. तदेवं व्यवहारेऽपि प्रभुर्देहादिमाविशन् । भान्तमेवान्तरर्थौघमिच्छया भासयेद्ब्रह्मिः । IPK., i, 59.
देशकालक्रमजुषामर्थानां स्वसमापिनाम् । सकृदाभाससाध्योऽसावन्यथा कः समन्वयः । Ibid, 66.
46. चिन्मयत्वेऽभासानामन्तरेण स्थितिः सदा । मायया भासमानानां बाह्यत्वाद्ब्रह्मिः । Ibid, i, 84.
तदेवकयेन विना न स्यात् संविदां लोकपद्धतिः । प्रकाशैक्यात्तदेकत्वं मातैकः स इति स्थितम् । Ibid, i, 87.
47. अस्माकं सर्वेसत्यता । SD., vi, 7.
53. अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् । विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः । SD., ii, 9. VPD., i, 1.
HIP., Vol. I, pp. 863-64.
54. असत्या यदि पश्यन्ती पश्यन्ती ब्रह्म चित्रता । SD., ii, 24.
57. पश्यन्तं सा किमात्मानं पश्यन्ती जडमेव वा । जडे जडत्वमेवास्याः, पश्यती ह्यनवस्थता । SD., ii, 56.
58. यो हि पश्यति पश्यन्तीं स देवः परमो मतः । SD., ii, 64.
59. यथा सर्वपदार्थानां भगवद्विरूपना । तद्वागिन्द्रियस्यापि न पुनः सा परा दशा ॥ SD., ii, 88.
60. शिवस्य तादृगात्मत्वमुत्पद्येतात्र योगिवत् । इच्छया सर्वभावत्वमनेकात्मत्वमेव च । नात्र स्वात्मविकारेण
जनयेद्भावमण्डलम् । SD., iii, 34-35.
62. नास्त्ये सत्यवृद्धित्वखण्डनात्रास्ति काचन । SD., iii, 71. व्यवहारो न वस्तुगः । स्वरूपं वस्तुगं विद्धि
व्यवहारो न जातुचित् । SD., iii, 77.
63. न हि शिवो घटादिरूपः, अपितु घटादिः शिवरूप । ततश्चिद्रूपस्य देशकालस्वभावभेदाभावान्न भेदः ।
SDV., iii, 96.
64. ध्यानमनस्तमितं पुनरेष हि भगवान् विचित्ररूपाणि । सृजति तदेव ध्यानं संकल्पालिखितसत्यरूपत्वम् । PS., 77.
भुवनावलीं समस्तां तत्त्वक्रमकल्पनामथाक्षगणम् । अन्तर्बोधे परिवर्तयति यत्सोऽस्य जप उदितः ॥ PS., 78.
सर्वभावाः शिवाकारा अन्तर्भूताः शिवानले । सोऽहं शिवः सुतृप्तोऽस्मि होम इत्युदितः परः । SD., vii, 90-91.
शिवोऽस्मि साधनाविष्टः शिवोऽहं याजकोऽप्यहम् । शिव एवानया स्थित्या सत्यया याग उत्तमः ।
SD., vii, 96-97.
65. मत्स्वरूपानुभवरूपां परां काष्ठामधिरूढा भवितरेव विज्ञानम् । RKBG., ix, 24.
भक्तिरद्वयचिन्मात्रस्वरूपब्रह्मतत्त्वभावनया आत्मन एवोपासनम् । Ibid, ix, 27.
66. यस्मिन्नर्थे सदात्यागः स योगः परयोगिनः । SD., vii, 81.
भावितेऽभाविते वापि शिवत्वे शिवतैव मे । सर्वदा पितृमात्रादितौल्यदार्ढ्येन योगिता ॥ Ibid, vii, 82.
67. ज्ञानमन्नम् । SS., ii, 9., अनात्मन्यात्मताज्ञप्तिरन्नं ग्रस्यत इत्यतः । VSSV., ii, 9, §1. 56.
68. शुद्धतत्त्वसंधानाद्वाऽपशुशक्तिः । SS., i, 16.
शुद्धं तत्त्वं परं वस्तु यत्तत्परशिवात्मकम् । तत्संधानं प्रपञ्चस्य तन्मयत्वेन भावनम् ॥ VSSV., i, 16, §1., 82-83.
वितर्क आत्मज्ञानम् । SS., i, 17.
वितर्कः प्रोक्तसंधानध्वस्तबन्धस्य योगिनः । विश्वात्मा शिव एवाहमस्मीत्यर्थविचिन्तनम् । VSSV., i, 17, §1. 85.

69. शिवतुल्यो जायते । SS., iii, 25. तुर्यपरिशीलनप्रकर्षात् प्राप्ततुर्यातीतपदः, स्वच्छन्दचिदानन्दधनेन शिवेन भगवता तुल्यः जायते । KSSV., iii, 25.
70. शुद्धविद्योदया-च्चक्रेगत्वासिद्धिः । SS., i, 21. जगत् सर्वमहमेवेति या मतिः । सा शुद्धा निर्मला विद्या । VSSV., i, 21, śl., 99-100.
71. गर्भे त्रित्तनिकासोऽविशिष्टविद्या स्वप्नः । SS., ii, 4.
सैवान्विशिष्टा विद्येति किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वस्वरूपिणी । अशुद्धविद्या सा स्वप्नो विकल्पप्रत्ययात्मकः ॥ VSSV., ii, 4, śl., 18.
72. स्वशक्तिप्रचयोऽस्य निश्चयम् । SS., iii, 30. तद्विमुक्तस्तु केवली । SS., iii, 34. मुखदुःखाभ्यां विशेषेण मुक्तः सस्कारमात्रेणापि अन्तरसंस्पृष्टः केवली केवलं चिन्मात्रप्रमातृरूपं यस्य । KSSV., iii, 34.
73. हृदये चित्तसंघट्टाद् दृश्यस्वापदर्शनम् । शुद्धतत्त्वसंधानाद्वाऽप्रशुशक्तिः । SS., i, 15-16.
हृदयं तद्विजानीयाद्विश्वस्यायतनं महत् ॥ इत्युक्त्यनीत्या हृदयं विश्वविश्रान्तिभित्तिभूः ।
खसंगित् तत्र संघट्टश्चित्तस्य चलतः सतः ॥ तदैकात्म्यपरामर्शजागरुक्स्वभावता ।
खाङ्गरूपेषु भावेषु प्रमाता कथ्यते पतिः ॥ खाङ्गकल्पतया तस्य यथान्वत् प्रथनं भवेत् ॥ VSSV., i, 15, śl., 77-79, 80-81.
74. पौरुषज्ञानं ज्ञानमुदितं सत् अन्यनिरपेक्षमेव मोक्षकारणम् । तच्च ज्ञानमात्रस्वभावम्, अख्यात्यभाव एव हि पूर्णाख्यातिः, सैव च प्रकाशानन्दधनस्यात्मनस्तात्त्विकं स्वरूपं, तत्प्रथनमेव मोक्षः । TAV., i, 24, p. 57.
75. चैतन्यमात्मा । SS., i, 1. ज्ञानं बन्धः । SS., i, 2. द्वैतप्रथा तदज्ञानं तुच्छत्वाद् बन्ध उच्यते । TA., i, 30.
अपूर्ण ज्ञानमपणत्वाच्च तदेव अपूर्णमन्यता-शुभाशुभ-वासना-शरीर-भुवनाकार-स्वभाव-विविध संकुचित-ज्ञान-रूपतया मलत्रयामा बन्ध इति उच्यते । TAV., i, 30, p. 61.
76. तत्र दीक्षादिना पौल्लमज्ञानं ध्वंसि यद्यपि । तथापि तच्छरीरान्ते तज्ज्ञानं व्यज्यते स्फुटम् । TA., i, 43.
दीक्षया गलितेऽप्यन्तरज्ञाने पौल्लमात्मनि । धीगतस्यानिवृत्तत्वाद्विकल्पोऽपि हि संभवेत् ॥ TA., i, 48.
बौद्धाज्ञाननिवृत्तौ तु विकल्पोऽभूलनाद् ध्रुवम् । तदैव मोक्ष इत्युक्तं धात्रा श्रीमन्निशाटने ॥ TA., i, 50.
77. बन्धमोक्षौ न भिदयेते सर्वत्रैव शिवत्वतः ॥ विज्ञानमीदृक् सर्वस्य कस्मान्न स्याद्विमोहिता ॥ सैवैषा च संसारो बन्धमोक्षावतः स्थितौ ॥ प्रतीतिमात्रमेवात्र तावता बन्धमोक्षता । तथा तथा शिवावस्था स्वेच्छातः स तदात्मकः । तदात्मत्वे नास्ति बन्धस्तदभावान्न मोक्षणम् । SD., iii, 68-69 ; 70 & 72.
78. अज्ञानग्रन्थिभिदा स्वशक्त्यभिव्यक्तता मोक्षः । भिन्नाज्ञानग्रन्थिः पराकृतभ्रान्तिः । प्रक्षीणपुण्यपापो विग्रहयोगेऽप्यसौ मुक्तः ॥ PS., 60-61.
79. इह तावदात्मज्ञानं मोक्षः । अतो यदेवात्मनो लक्षणं तदेव मोक्षस्य । TAV., i, 31.
यत्तु ज्ञेयसत्त्वस्य पूर्णपूर्णप्रथात्मकम् । तदुत्तरोत्तरं ज्ञानं तत्तत् संसारशान्तिदम् । TA., i, 32.
बद्धोऽविद्यया जीवो मुक्तिस्तस्य हि तत्क्षये । SpPR., p. 5.
80. मोक्षो हि नाम नैवान्यः स्वरूपप्रथनं हि सः । स्वरूपं चात्मनः संविन्नान्यत्तत्र तु याः पुनः ॥ TA., i, 156-57.
81. आत्मा संवित्प्रकाशस्थितिरनवयवा संविदित्यात्तशक्तिव्रातं तस्य स्वरूपं स च निज-महसश्छादनाद्बद्धरूपः । TA., i, 330.
86. सर्वं शिवात्मकम् । SD., iii, 61 ; iii, 20. यथा सर्वपदार्थानां भगवच्छिवरूपता । Ibid, ii, 88.
तस्मात्समग्राकारेषु सर्वाणि प्रतिपत्तिषु । विज्ञेयं शिवरूपत्वं स्वशक्त्यावेशनात्मकम् । Ibid, iii, 17.

87. आत्मैव सर्वभावेषु स्फुरन्निवृत्तचिद्विभुः । अनिरुद्धेच्छाप्रसरः प्रसरद्-दृक्क्रियः शिवः ॥ *SD.* i, 2.
भावानां प्रतिविम्बत्वे आत्मनोऽपि न युक्तता । प्रतिविम्बेऽवसत्यत्वादभूतेऽवगोचरात् । *Ibid.* v, 33-34.
त्रिदात्मैव हि देवोऽन्तःस्थितमिच्छावशाद्बहिः । योगीव निरुन्नादानमर्थं ज्ञातं प्रकाशयेत् ॥ *IPK.*, i, 38.
स्वामिनश्चात्मसांस्थस्य भावजातस्य भासनम् । अस्त्येव न विना तस्मादिच्छाप्रसरः प्रवर्तते ॥ *Ibid.* i, 41.
चिन्मयत्वेऽवभासानामन्तरेव स्थितिः सदा । मायया भासमानानां बाह्यत्वाद्बहिरप्यसौ ॥ *Ibid.* i, 84.
आभासरूप एव जडचेतनपदार्थः । *SSVM.*, iii, 1, 1. तत्तद्रूपतया ज्ञानं बहिरन्तः प्रकाशते ।
ज्ञानादूने नार्थसत्ता ज्ञानरूपं ततो जगत् । *TA.*, iii, 30. ज्ञानं न भवतो भिन्नं ज्ञेयं ज्ञानात् पृथङ् न हि ।
अतो न त्वितरत् किञ्चित् तस्माद् भेदो न वास्तवः । *Ibid.* iii, 2.
89. अतोऽसौ परमेशानः स्वात्मव्योमन्यनर्गलः । इयतः सृष्टिसंहाराङ्गम्वरस्य प्रदर्शकः ॥ *TA.*, iii, 3.
निर्मले मुकुरे यद्वा भान्ति भूमिजलादयः । अमिश्रास्तद्वदेकस्मिंश्चिन्नाथे विश्ववृत्तयः ॥ *Ibid.* iii, 4.
भावानां यत् प्रतीधाति वपुर्मायात्मकं हि तत् । तेषामेवास्ति सद्ब्रह्ममयं त्वप्रतिधातकम् ॥
तदेवमुभयाकारमवभासं प्रकाशयन् । विभाति वरदो विम्बप्रतिविम्बदृशाखिले । *Ibid.* iii, 10.
संविदात्मनि विश्वोऽयं भाववर्गः प्रपञ्चवान् । प्रतिविम्बतया भाति यस्य विश्वेश्वरो हि सः । *Ibid.* iii, 268.
अतएवान्तरं किञ्चिद्दीप्तं भवतु स्फुटम् । यत्रास्य विच्छिन्ना भानं संकल्पस्वप्रदर्शने ।
अतो निमित्तं देवस्य शक्तयः सन्तु तादृशे ॥ *Ibid.* iii, 64.
इत्थं विश्वमिदं नाथे भैरवीय-चिदम्बरे । प्रतिविम्बमलं स्वच्छे न खल्वन्यप्रसादतः ॥ *Ibid.* iii, 65.
यः प्रकाशः स सर्वस्य प्रकाशत्वं प्रयच्छति । न च तद्व्यतिरेक्यस्ति विश्वं सद्वावभासते । *Ibid.*, iii 2.
प्रतिधात्यप्रतीधात्यात्मकम् आभासमात्रसारमेव एतत्, न तु तात्त्विकम् । *Ibid.* iii, 11.
93. चिदिच्छाशक्तिसम्बद्धः स्पन्द आत्मबलेरितः । *SpPD.*, p. 37. विमर्शः स्पन्दः । *PPR.*, p. 2.
शिव एकः स्पन्दवान् स्वप्रतिष्ठितः । *SpS.*, 1. इह परमेश्वरस्य एकैव परामर्शशक्तिः किञ्चिच्चलत्ताभास-
रूपतया स्पन्द इति, स्फुरत्ता इति, ऊर्मिः इति, बलम् इति, उद्योगः इति, परा-इत्याद्यनन्तसंज्ञाभिः आगमेषु
उद्घोष्यते । *SpS.*, p. 5.

CHAPTER III

1. आक्षपादा नैयायिकास्तेषां मते देवो दर्शनाधिष्ठायकः शिवो महेश्वरः । *LV.*, 13, p. 11. वैशेषिकाणां
नैयायिकैः सार्द्धं शिवदेवताऽभ्युपगमे भेदो नास्ति. तत्त्वेषु भेदो विद्यते । *Ibid.* p, 60. कणादस्य पुरः
शिवेनोलूकरूपेण मतमेतत् प्रकाशितम् । पशुपतिभक्तत्वेन पाशुपतं प्रोच्यते । देवविषयो भेदो वैशेषिकाणां
नैयायिकैः समं नास्ति । *TRD.*, p. 266. *SDSm.*, ch. vi. *HIP.*, Vol. II, 1952, pp. 731-33.
Criticism, *SBS.*, ii, 2, 37-40.
3. प्रमितिः संवित् संचिन्तनं संबोधो विद्याभिव्यक्तिः । प्रमाता पुरुषः । प्रमेयाः कार्यकारणादयः पञ्च पदार्थाः ।
प्रमापयिता भगवान् । *PAB.*, i, p. 7.
4. क्रीडावानेव स भगवान् विद्याकलापशुसंज्ञकं कार्यमुत्पादयन् अनुगृह्णाति तिरोभावयति चेत्यतो देवः ।
Ibid. ii, 2. कार्यं स एव कारणं परम् । *Ibid.* ii, 21.
5. स्वेच्छयैवाशेषकार्योत्पत्त्यादिकारणस्वभावः क्रीडा, तद्धर्मत्वं देवत्वम् । *RT.*, p. 11. परिपूर्णगरितृप्त-
त्वाच्छिवः । *PAB.*, V, 47.

6. कर्मकामिनश्च महेश्वरमपेक्षते, न तु भगवानीश्वरः कर्म पुरुषं वापेक्षते । अतो न कमपेक्ष ईश्वरः । Ibid, ii, 6.
7. पुरुषश्चेतनो भोक्ता क्षेत्रज्ञः पुद्गलो जनः । अणुर्वेदोऽमृतः साक्षी जीवात्मा परिभूः परः ॥ Ibid, v, 3.
9. सति विभुत्वे स्ववृत्त्या कार्यकारणयोः सर्वगतत्वेऽपि स्ववृत्त्यसंकरः । नित्यं कार्यम् । कारणेश्वरनित्यत्वात् पतिनित्यत्वम् । Ibid, ii, 5. भव इति विद्याकलापशूनां ग्रहणम् । अत्रोत्पादकानुग्राहकतिरोभावकधर्मि कारणम्, उत्पाद्वानुग्राह्यतिरोभाव्यधर्मि कार्यमित्येतत् कार्यकारणयोर्लक्षणम् । Ibid, ii, 42 & 44.
10. तत्र पाशा नाम कार्यकारणाख्याः कलाः । अस्वातन्त्र्यमनैश्वर्यं बन्धः । पश्यनाच्च पाशनाच्च पशवः । Ibid, i, 1. विद्यानां धर्मार्थकामकैवल्यतत्साधनपराणाम् ईशानः । Ibid, v, 42.
11. कार्यकारणाञ्जना निरञ्जनाश्च पशवः । अनैश्वर्यं बन्धः । कारणशक्तिसन्निरोधलक्षणमस्वातन्त्र्यमनैश्वर्यं बन्धोऽनादिः । Ibid, i, 1.
12. आत्मेश्वरयोगो योगोः प्रत्येतव्यः । Ibid, i, 20.
20. सदा रुद्रमनुस्मरेत् । PSS., v, 34. सिद्धयोगी न लिप्यते कर्मणा पातकेन वा । Ibid, v, 20. एवमोङ्कारमिति ध्येयमुक्तम् । PAB., v, 28. ह्यत्वा दोषाणां हेतुजालस्य मूलम् । PSS., v, 35. कृत्स्नस्य तपसो लक्षणमात्म-प्रत्यक्षं वेदितव्यम् । PAB., iii, 19.
22. लभते रुद्रसायुज्यम् । PSS., v, 33. अप्रमादी गच्छेद् दुःखानामन्तम् ईशप्रसादात् । Ibid, v, 40. अन्यत्र कैवल्यादिफलको योगः इह तु पारमैश्वर्यदुःखान्तफलकः । SDS., vi, 14. दूरदर्शनश्रवणमननविज्ञानानि चास्य प्रवर्तन्ते । सर्वज्ञता । मनोजवित्वम् । कामरूपित्वम् । विकरणः । धर्मित्वम् । PSS., i, 21-26. तत्त्वव्याप्तसदोदितसिद्धिज्ञानं सर्वज्ञत्वम् । SDS., vi, 6. सर्वेषामेव रूपाणां युगपदेवाधिष्ठाता भवति । PAB., i, 24. विकरण इति कैवल्यम् । Ibid, i, 25. अत्र गुणधर्मेणायं धर्मो भवति । अस्य सिद्धस्य प्रभुत्वं विभुत्वं गुणधर्मित्वं च व्याख्यातम् । Ibid, i, 26. निरतिशयमपराधीनत्वमवश्यत्वम् । सत्त्वान्तरानभिभाव्यज्ञान-सम्बन्धित्वमनावेशत्वम् । समस्तभयातिक्रान्तत्वमभयत्वम् । कायेन्द्रियवैकल्यफलेनात्यन्तासम्बन्धित्वमजरत्वम् । प्राणादियोगजदुःखासंस्पर्शित्वमरत्वम् । GKV., p. 10.
24. उपायफलं लाभः ज्ञानतपोदेवनित्यत्वस्थितिशुद्धिभेदात् पञ्चविधः । SDS., vi, 2. गुरुभक्तिः प्रसादश्च मतेर्द्वन्द्वजयस्तथा । धर्मश्चैवाप्रमादश्च बलं पञ्चविधं स्मृतम् । Ibid, vi, 4. अज्ञानमधर्मश्च विषयाभ्यासः स्थितेरलाभश्च । अनैश्वर्यं च मला विज्ञेयाः पञ्च पञ्चार्थे ॥ प्रथमो विद्यालाभस्तपसो लाभोऽथ देवनित्यत्वम् । योगो गुणप्रवृत्तिर्लाभाः पञ्चेह विज्ञेयाः । वासो ध्यानमरिक्वलकरणनिरोधस्तथा स्मृतिश्चैव । प्रसाद इति चोपाया विज्ञेयाः पञ्च पञ्चार्थे ॥ PAB., v, 30.

CHAPTER IV

2. शैवागमेषु मुख्यं पतिपशुपाशा इति क्रमात् त्रितयम् । तत्र पतिः शिव उक्तः पशवो ह्यणवोऽर्थपञ्चकं पाशः । TP., i, 5.
3. चिद्धन एको व्यापी नित्यः सततोदितः प्रभुः शान्तः । जयति जगदेकबीजं सर्वानुग्राहकः शम्भुः ॥ ज्ञानक्रियास्वभावं तत् तेजः शम्भवं जयति ॥ तामेकां चिद्रूपामाद्यां सर्वात्मनास्मि नतः । सोऽनादिमुक्त एको विज्ञेयः पञ्चमन्त्रतनुः ॥ पञ्चविधं तत् कृत्यं सृष्टिः स्थितिसंहृती तिरोभावः । तद्वदनुग्रहकरणं प्रोक्तं सततोदितस्य ॥ Ibid, i, 3, 1-3, 6-7.

4. शक्तिशिवो वस्वैक्यं मणिप्रभावद् यतो युवतम् । SR., TD., i, 3, p. 18.
- यानुभूतिरजामेयानन्तात्मानन्दविग्रहा । महदादिजगन्मायाचित्रभित्ति नमामि ताम् ॥ TD., i, 3, p. 15.
5. सर्वज्ञः सर्वकर्तृत्वात् साधनांगफलैः सह । MT., i, 5, 13. तच्चास्यावृत्तिशून्यत्वान्न व्यञ्जकमपेक्षते । Ibid, i, 5, 14. नाध्यक्षं नापि तल्लैङ्गं न शाब्दमपि शांकरम् । ज्ञानमाभाति विमलं सर्वदा सर्ववस्तुषु । Ibid, i, 5, 16.
6. तेन विभुस्तद्युक्तयै कुरुते तनुकरणभुवननिष्पत्तिम् । कर्त्रा विना न कार्यं न तथोपादानकरणाभ्याम् ॥ TP., ii, 17.
8. शुद्धानि पंचतत्त्वान्याद्यन्तेषु स्मरन्ति शिवतत्त्वम् । शक्तिसदाशिवतत्त्वे ईश्वरविद्याख्यतत्त्वे च ॥ पुंसो ज्ञकर्तृ तार्थं मायातस्तत्त्वपंचकं भवति । कालो नियतिश्च तथा कला च विद्या च रागश्च ॥ Ibid, ii, 1-2.
9. व्यापकमेकं नित्यं कारणमखिलस्य तत्त्वजातस्य । ज्ञानक्रियास्वभावं शिवतत्त्वं जगदाहुराचार्याः ॥ Ibid ii, 5.
10. चिदचिदनुग्रहेतोरस्य सिसृक्षो यं आद्य उन्मेषः । तच्छक्तिगतत्वमभिहितमभिभागात्तमस्यैव ॥ Ibid, ii, 7. पत्युः शक्तिः परा सूक्ष्मा जाग्रतो द्योतनक्षमा ॥ तया प्रभुः प्रबुद्धात्मा स्वतन्त्रः स सदाशिवः ॥ मातंगे । TD., ii, 7, p. 79.
11. ज्ञानक्रियाख्यशक्तयोस्तुत्कर्षनिकर्षयोरभावेन । यः प्रसरस्तं प्राहुः सदाशिवख्यं बुधास्तत्त्वम् ॥ TP., ii, 8. ज्ञानक्रियाख्ये न्यक्तुल्ये शक्तीच्छोद्रेकमश्रुते । यदा सदाशिवख्यस्तु तदासौ शिव उच्यते ॥ TD., ii, 8, SH.
12. न्यग्भवति यत्र शक्तिर्ज्ञानाख्योद्विक्ततां क्रियां भजते । ईश्वरतत्त्वं तदिह प्रोक्तं सर्वार्थकर्तु सदा ॥ TP., ii, 9. ज्ञानेच्छे न्यक्समे शक्ती क्रियाधिक्यं यदाश्रुते । तदासावीश्वराव्यां तु लभते परमेश्वरः ॥ TD., ii, SH.
13. न्यग्भवति कर्तृशक्तिर्ज्ञानाख्योद्विक्तमश्रुते यत्र । तत् तत्त्वं विद्याख्यं प्रकाशकं ज्ञानरूपत्वं तु ॥ TP., ii, 10. उद्विच्यते ज्ञानशक्तिः क्रियेच्छे न्यक्समे यदा । तदासौ शुद्धविद्याख्यः सर्वविद्यानिधिः शिवः ॥ TD., ii, 10.
14. तत्त्वं वस्तुत एकं शिवसंज्ञं चित्रशक्तिशतरंगचितम् । शक्तिव्यापृतिमेदात् तस्यैते कल्पिता भेदाः ॥ TP., ii, 13.
15. ईशः कर्ता कारकश्च शुद्धविद्या प्रकाशिका । एभिरीशोऽनुगुह्याति क्लृप्तैर्भेदैश्चराचरम् ॥ TD., ii, 14.
17. चिदनुग्रहस्त्वयं किल यन्मोक्षः शिवसगानतारूपः । सोऽनादित्वात्कर्मण इह भोगमृते न याति संसिद्धिम् । TP., ii, 16.
18. शक्तय इहास्य करणं मायोपादानमिष्यते सूक्ष्मा । एका नित्या व्यापिन्यनादिनिधना शिवा सोक्ता ॥ TP., iii, 1.
19. साधारणी च पुंसां कारणमपि चैयमखिलभुवनानाम् । निखिलजनकर्मखचिता स्वभावतो मोहसञ्जननी ॥ TP., iii, 2. माया विमोहनी प्रोक्ता विषयास्वादभोगतः । यत्र तत्र स्थितस्यास्य स्वकर्ममलहेतुतः ॥ किरण, TD., iii, 2.
20. नानाविधशक्तिमयी सा सृजति कालतत्त्वमेवादी । TP., iii, 4.
21. नियतिनियमनरूपा मायातः साध्यनन्तरं भवति । नियमयति येन निखिलं तेनेयं नियतिरुद्विष्टा ॥ Ibid, iii, 5.
22. मायातस्तदनु कलामलं नृणामेकस्तु कलयित्वा । व्यञ्जयति कर्तृशक्तिं कलेति तेनेह कथिता सा ॥ TP., iii, 6.
23. बुद्धिर्यदास्य भोग्या सुखादिरूपा तदा भवेत् करणम् । विद्यायं करणं स्याद् विषयग्रहणे पुनर्बुद्धिः ॥ Ibid, iii, 10.
25. तत्त्वेरेभिः कलितो भोक्तृत्वदशां यदा पशुर्नीतः । पुरुषाख्यतां तदायं लभते तत्त्वेषु गणनां च । Ibid, iii, 12.
26. पुरुषस्य हि भोगार्थं किलैव तस्मात् प्रसूयतेऽव्यक्तम् । अनभिव्यक्तगुणत्वादव्यपदेशं तदव्यक्तम् ॥ Ibid, iv, 1.
27. अव्यक्ताद् गुणतत्त्वं प्रख्याव्यापारनियमरूपमिह । सत्त्वं रजस्तमोऽपि च सुखदुःखं मोह इति च । भवति गुणत्रयतो धीर्विषयाध्यवसायरुपिणी चेति । Ibid, iv, 2-3.

28. मायायाः परतोऽङ्गं शुद्धः शक्तौ निजीयते सकलः । सर्वात्मनि सापि शिवे तिष्ठत्यविभागमापन्ना ॥
माया पुरुषः शिव इत्येतत् त्रितयं महार्थसंहारे । अवशिष्यते पुनस्तत् प्रनर्तते पूर्ववत् सृष्टौ ॥ Ibid, v, 6-7.
29. तदनुग्राहकं तत्त्वं कलाख्यां तैजसं हरः । मायां विशोभ्य कुरुते प्रवृत्त्याङ्गं परं हितम् । तेन प्रदीपकत्वेन तदा
स्वच्छचित्तेरणोः । प्रकाशयत्येकदेशं विदार्य तिमिरं घनम् ॥ MT., i, 10, 4-5.
- पशवस्त्रिविधा ज्ञेया विज्ञानप्रलयाकलाः सकलाः । मलयुक्तस्तत्राद्यो मलकर्मयुतो द्वितीयश्च ॥ TP., v, 8.
34. चैतन्यं दृक्क्रियारूपं तदस्त्यात्मनि सर्वदा । सर्वतश्च यतो मुक्तौ श्रूयते सर्वतोमुखम् । सदप्याभासमानत्वात्तन्निरुद्धं
प्रतीयते । वश्योऽनावृतवीर्यस्य सोऽत एवाविमोक्षणात् । MT., i, 2, 5-6.
35. तत् पारतन्त्र्यं बद्धत्वं तस्मिन्नित्ये चिदादिवत् । मुक्तिसाधनसन्दोहो व्यर्थोऽलमनयाधिया ॥ Ibid, i, 7, 4.
35. गताधिकारनीहारवीर्यस्य सत एधते । पशोरनुग्रहोऽन्यस्य तादर्थ्यादस्ति कर्मणः ॥ बोद्धृत्वपरिणामित्वधर्मयोस्तु-
वर्तनम् । मलस्य साधिकारस्य निवृत्तेस्तत्परिच्युतौ ॥ MT., i, 21-22.
37. तदाधाराणि कार्याणि शक्तिरूपाणि संहृतौ । विवृतौ व्यक्तिरूपाणि व्याप्रियन्तेऽर्थसिद्धये ॥ MT., i, 9, 13
38. तस्मान्निग्रामिका जन्यशक्तिः कारकस्वतुनः । सान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां रुद्धितो वावसीयते ॥ MT., i, 9, 19.
39. तद्व्यक्तिर्जननं नाम तत्कारकसमाश्रयात् । तेन तन्तुगताकारं पटाकारावरोधकम् । MT., i, 9, 20.
नासतः क्रियते व्यक्तिः कलादेश्प्रथितस्तथा ॥ MT., i, 9, 21.
40. सा माया वस्तुरुपा परमार्थभूता विश्वमूलत्वादीश्वरवत् । TD., i, 8 ; p. 62.
41. माया वस्तुरुपा शिवरूपा तत्कार्यं च जगच्छिवरूपम् । शिवाद् भिन्नस्य कस्यचिदसम्भवाद् । TD., i, 18 ;
pp. 71-72.
42. परिपक्वमला ये तानुत्सादनहेतुशक्तिपातेन । योजयति परे तत्त्वे स दीक्षयाचार्यमूर्तिस्थः ॥ TP., i, 15,
बद्धाञ्छेदान् विनियुङ्क्ते भोगमुक्तये पुंसः । तत्कर्मणामनुगमादित्येवं कीर्तिताः पशवः ॥ TP., i, 16.
द्विविधा हि परमेश्वरस्य शक्तिः, बन्धकरा मोक्षिका चेति । TD., i, 15, p. 54.
43. एको ह्यनेकशक्तिर्दृक्क्रिययोश्छादकोमलः पुंसाम् । TP., i, 17.
44. पाशानुग्राहित्वात् पुरुषतिरोधायिका विभौः शक्तिः । पाशत्वेनाभिहिता पाशाश्च चतुर्विधास्त्वेवम् ॥
TP., i, 19.

CHAPTER V

1. न वयमत्यन्ताभेदवादिनः । ŚKBS., ii, 1, 22. ब्रह्मणः कदाचिदपि न निर्विशेषत्वम् । Ibid, i, 1, 2.
2. वयं न च भेदामेदवादिनः । Ibid, ii, 1, 22.
3. शक्तिः शक्तिमद्रूपाद् व्यतिक्रमं न वाञ्छति । तादात्म्यमनयोनित्यं वह्निदाहिक्ययोरपि । Ibid, i, 2, 1; BPD., 3.
4. चिदात्मैव हि देवोऽन्तःस्थितमिच्छावशाद्ब्रह्मिः । योगीव निरुपादानम् अर्थजातं प्रकाशयेत् । IPK., i, 38 ;
ŚKBS., ii, 2, 38 ; i, 2, 9.
5. भेदाभेदकल्पं विशिष्टाद्वैतं साधयामः । ŚKBS., ii, 1, 22.
6. चिदचित्प्रपञ्चरूपशक्तिविशिष्टत्वं स्वाभाविकमेव ब्रह्मणः । Ibid, i, 1, 2. चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकः परमेश्वरः ।
Ibid, 4, 27.
7. किन्तु शरीर-शरीरिणोरिव गुणगुणिनोरिव च विशिष्टाद्वैतवादिनः । Ibid, ii, 1, 22.
8. जीवशरीरतया जीवविशिष्टस्य ब्रह्मणोऽंशो जीवः । Ibid, ii, 3, 45.

9. सूक्ष्म-चिदचिद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्म कारणं स्थूलचिदचिद्विशिष्टं तत् कार्यम् । Ibid, i, 1, 2.
10. न वयं भेदवादिनः । Ibid, ii, 1, 22.
- सृष्टिकाले भगवतः शरीरं चिदचित् स्मृतम् । अन्तर्यामिण एतेन विशिष्टाद्वैतमेव यत् ॥
तदेकदेशि विज्ञेयमित्युक्तं तै विचक्षणैः । शैवोऽप्येतेन विध्वस्तो यतश्चोर एव हि ॥ ŚAM., 63.
शैवस्तावद्विशिष्टाद्वैतमगीकृत्य रामनुजमतचोरः । ŚAMP., 63, p. 38.
15. ज्ञानस्थितिलयतिरोभावानुग्रहरूपं कृत्यम् । Ibid, i, 1, 2, p. 9.
16. चिदचित्-प्रपञ्चशक्तिविशिष्टत्वं ब्रह्मणः, न कदाचित् निर्विशेषत्वम् । Ibid.
17. अपरिच्छिन्नशक्तिविशिष्टत्वमनन्तशक्तित्वम् । Ibid.
18. स्थूलसूक्ष्म-चिदचित्प्रपञ्च-विशिष्टः परमेश्वरः एव कार्यकारणरूपः । Ibid, i, 1, 5, p. 27.
19. सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्-विशिष्टं ब्रह्म कारणम्, स्थूलचिदचिद्-विशिष्टं ब्रह्म कार्यं भवति । Ibid, p. 14.
20. अतएव वेदानाम् अपौरुषेयत्वम् ईश्वरकार्यत्वं च । Ibid, i, 1, 3, p. 16.
21. सर्ववेदकर्तृत्वम् ईश्वरस्य सिद्धम् । Ibid, p. 18.
22. अतः सर्वातीतः परमेश्वर इति सर्वोत्कृष्टत्वं ब्रह्मण एव । Ibid, iii, 2, 31..
23. अतः परब्रह्म सर्वोत्कृष्टतयैव सर्वनमस्कारविषयोऽवगम्यते । Ibid, iv, 1, 5.
24. हेयगुणराहित्येन कल्याणगुणसाहित्येन चोभयलिङ्गं ब्रह्म । Ibid, iii, 2, 17.
26. आकाशशरीरं ब्रह्म आकाशः प्रकाशश्चिदम्बरमुच्यते । Ibid, i, 1, 2, p. 11.
27. ब्रह्मणः प्रपञ्चरूपत्वं न निषिध्यते, किन्तु एतावन्मात्रं न भवति । Ibid, iii, 2, 21.
28. चिदचिदात्मकत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणस्तद्धर्मप्रतिषेधात् चिदचिद्-विशिष्टमपि ब्रह्म निर्दोषं निखिल-मङ्गल-गुणास्पदं च ।
Ibid, iii, 2, 29.
30. सकल-चिदचिदाकार-परमशक्ति-विलास-समरसात्मनः सर्वदोष-वासना-कलङ्क-रहितात् परमात्मनः किञ्चिदपि
वस्त्वन्तरं नास्ति । Ibid, 2, 30.
34. नामरूपयोरन्तराले तत्कार्यस्पर्शरहित एव वर्तते । Ibid, iii, 2, 14.
35. निरवयवं कल्याणगुणास्पदं च ब्रह्म इत्युभयलिङ्गमिति । Ibid, iii, 2, 15.
38. सुखदुःखभोगहेतुभ्यो जीवशरीरभ्यो ब्रह्मरूपस्यास्ति हि वंशेष्यम्, इच्छागृहीतत्वादस्य तेषां कर्ममूलत्वाच्च ।
Ibid, i, 2, 8.
42. तुरीयं च तुरीयातीतं च शिवस्थानम् । उत्तरगीता । Ibid.
45. परप्रकृतिरूपा परमशक्तिर्हि चिदम्बरमुच्यते । परप्रकृतित्वं चिदाकाशस्य । Ibid i, 1, 2. शक्ति-
शक्तिमतोरभेदः । Ibid, i, 2, 7. सकल-चिदचित्-प्रपञ्च-महाविभूतिरूपा महासच्चिदानन्दसत्ता देशकालादि-
परिच्छेदशून्या परमशक्तिः परब्रह्मणः शिवस्य स्वरूपं च गुणश्च भवति । Ibid, i, 2, 1.
46. अचिदवस्तुरूपा माया । अतो न निमित्तमात्रमीश्वरः । Ibid, ii, 3, 37. अतो निमित्तादनन्यमुपादानम् ।
Ibid, 1, 4, 24. न केवलं मायायाः जगदुत्पत्तिः, महेश्वराच्च, किन्तु मायिनः परमेश्वरात् । Ibid, i, 4, 27.
47. प्रणवपर्यायेणोमाशब्देन परप्रकृतिरूपा पराशक्तिरुच्यते । Ibid, iv, 4, 22.
49. तस्मादीश्वर एव दहराकाशोऽपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणक इति । Ibid, i, 3, 13.
53. जगदुपादान-निमित्तभूतस्यापि परमेश्वरस्य निर्विकारत्वम् । मायादि-प्रपञ्च-शक्तिमतः शिवस्यैवोपादानत्वमव-
गम्यते । Ibid, ii, 2, 38.
54. यथा निमित्तस्य प्रकृतित्वेऽपि न विकारादिस्पर्शः तथा परिणामिणः सम्भवात् । Ibid, i, 4, 27.

55. नामरूपविभागरहित-सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकः कारणावस्थः परमेश्वरः संविभक्तनामरूप-चिदचिद्वस्तु-शरीरको भवेयमिति संकल्पमकरोत् । Ibid, i, 4, 27.
56. सच्चिद्रूपेण शिवेन यदि न व्याप्तं जगत्, तदा सत्ता-स्फूर्तिभ्यां विनाकृतं कथमस्ति स्फुरति । Ibid, ii, 1, 17.
57. संकोचावस्था प्रलयः विकाशावस्था सृष्टिः । Ibid, ii, 1, 18.
58. परमकारणात् परब्रह्मणः शिवात् अभिन्नमेव जगत् कार्यम् । Ibid.
59. न वयं ब्रह्मप्रपञ्चयोरत्यन्तमेव भेदवादिनः, न वात्यन्ताभेदवादिनः न वा भेदाभेदवादिनः वस्तुविरोधात् । Ibid, ii, 1, 20.
60. किन्तु शरीर-शरीरिणोरिव गुणगुणिनोरिव च विशिष्टाद्वैतवादिनः । Ibid, ii, 1, 22.
62. अतः परिपूर्णस्य तस्यैव कार्यत्वं कारणत्वं च सम्भवति । Ibid, ii, 1, 27.
63. विचित्रनामशक्तिशवलमाया-परमशक्ति-विशिष्टः परमेश्वरः स्वशक्तिशकलेन प्रपञ्चाकारः स्वतः प्रपञ्चातीतश्च भवति । Ibid, ii, 1, 31.
64. कर्मप्रवाहसिद्धोऽयं संसारः । Ibid, ii, 1, 35.
68. अतः संसारे किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वं मुक्तौ सर्वज्ञत्वमिति ज्ञातैवात्मा । Ibid, ii, 3, 19.
70. जीवः स्वेच्छया प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ति-हेतुं करोति स्वकर्मपाकवशेन, जीवकृतप्रयत्नं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिहेतुमवेक्ष्य तदनुमति-दानेन परः प्रवर्तयति । Ibid, ii, 3, 41.
71. जीवात्मा परमेश्वरांशो मूर्त्येकदेश एव । Ibid, ii, 3, 42.
72. तस्माज् जीवो ब्रह्मणोऽशभूत एव तत्स्वरूपं प्रतिपद्यते । Ibid.
73. जीवशरीरतया जीवविशिष्टस्य ब्रह्मणोऽशो जीवः । Ibid, ii, 3, 45.
74. तद्विशिष्टतया स्वरूपभेदश्च सिद्धः । Ibid, ii, 3, 46.
77. जीवस्यानाद्यपचारप्रवाहेन पराभिध्यानात् परमेश्वर-संकल्पात् तस्य सत्यसंकल्पत्वादिकं तिरोहितम् । Ibid, iii, 2, 4.
78. परमेश्वर-संकल्पादस्य बन्धमोक्षो भवतः । Ibid, iii, 2, 5.
79. अनाद्यज्ञानवासनावष्टम्भ-विजृम्भित-विचित्रकर्मफल-भोगानुगुण-बहुशरीर-प्रवेश-निःसीमतापसहिष्णुत्वं हि जीव-त्वम् । Ibid, i, 1, 1, p. 7.
80. अस्य सर्वोत्कृष्टस्य व्याप्तिदृष्ट्या सर्वेषां प्रतीकानामुपास्यत्वम् । Ibid, iv, 1, 5.
82. स्वात्मतया नैरन्तर्येण ब्रह्मणि भाविते हि तद्रूपमुपासकेषु प्रकाशते । Ibid, iv, 1, 12.
84. उमासहितं परं ब्रह्म सर्वात्मकं मुक्तिसाधकम् । अतः परब्रह्मणः स्वरूपधर्माणामलोप एव । Ibid, iii, 3, 39.
85. ब्रह्मप्राप्तस्य जीवस्य मलतिरोहितं ब्रह्मसदृशगुणं स्वरूपं पूर्वं सदेव मलावरणापगमाद् आविर्भवति । Ibid, iv, 4, 1.
87. मुक्त आत्मा सादृश्यात् ब्रह्मस्वरूपाविभागेन स्वरूपमनुभवति । Ibid, iv, 4, 4.
88. भोगमात्रसाम्यं मुक्तस्य ब्रह्मणश्चेति समीचीनमिति । Ibid, iv, 4, 21.
89. अतो ज्ञानस्वरूपं स्वयंप्रकाशमपहतपाप्मत्वादियोगात् कल्याणगुणविशिष्टं च ब्रह्मसदृशं मुक्तस्वरूपं युक्तम् । Ibid, iv, 4, 7.
90. मुक्तेन ब्रह्माकारं हि दृश्यते विश्वमेतत् । Ibid, iv, 4, 14.
92. स एक एव निरङ्कुशप्रकाशः सर्वसाक्षी, पशुपाशयोर्न स्वरूपसत्ता निषिध्यते, किन्तु नामरूपविभागाहंस्थूलत्वम् । Ibid, i, 2, 9.

94. तत् स्वहृन्पृथगवस्थान-सूक्ष्ममायापुरुषः पर एव स्वयमुपादानमपीत्युच्यते । Ibid.
95. मृद्द्रव्यमेव व्यवहारसिद्धयर्थं जायमानावस्थान्तरं तु मृदो द्रव्यान्तरम् । Ibid, ii, 1, 16. कार्यस्य कारणे सत्त्वाच्च कारणाद् अनन्यदेव कार्यम् । Ibid, ii, 1, 17.

CHAPTER VI

5. तस्मात् स्वरूप-व्यवर्तक-तटस्थ-लक्षणत्रयेण सर्ववेदान्तानां ब्रह्मप्रतिपादकत्वं युक्तम् । ŚRBS., i, 1, 4, p. 45.
6. सृष्टि-स्थिति-संहाराविर्भावातिरोधानानि पञ्चकृत्यान्वयवादाः । Ibid.
7. परशिवस्य ब्रह्मण एव सर्वदेवतामयत्वेन च तदुपासनस्यैव मोक्षोपदेशत्वदर्शनात् । Ibid.
8. निर्गुणया निराश्रया च सगिद् अनुभवसिद्धेति तुच्छम् । Ibid, p. 51.
9. तत्-त्वं-पदयोः सविशेषजीवपरत्व-ब्रह्म-व्यपदेशात् । Ibid, p. 52.
11. माया परशिवशक्तिः । Ibid, i, 1, 2, p. 33.
13. भक्तानुहार्थं दिव्यमंगलविग्रहधरस्य महेश्वरस्य मूर्तामूर्तप्रपञ्चकल्पनेऽदोषः । Ibid, p. 30.
14. जगदुपादान-परमेश्वरशक्तेस्तु तदेकदेशवृत्तित्वम् । तस्मादभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानकारणत्वम् न त्वेककारणत्वम् । Ibid.
15. आत्मप्रत्ययविषयतया अपरोक्षत्वेन प्रत्यगात्म-प्रसिद्धे रित्युक्तिविरोधात् । Ibid, p. 31.
16. नाहंप्रत्ययविषयो ब्रह्मेति चेत्, जीवब्रह्मभेदानङ्गीकारात् ब्रह्मणः व्यवहारिकदृश्यत्वानङ्गीकारे निरधिष्ठान-ब्रह्मप्रसङ्गः । Ibid, i, 1, 4.
17. शक्तिसंकोचतया सृष्टेः प्राक् परमेश्वरस्य निर्गुणत्वात् । सगुणश्रुतीनां सृष्टयुन्मुख-परमेश्वर-शक्ति-विकास-कालपरत्वम् । Ibid, i, 1, 2, p. 31.
18. सेश्वरद्वैतभाने तु सर्वं शिवमयं जगत् । Ibid.
22. न स्वप्नवत् प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वम् अर्थसिद्धिक्रियासिद्धि-दर्शनात् । Ibid, i, 1, 1, p. 5.
23. नाभाव उपलब्धेः । वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवात् । BS., ii, 2, 27-28.
27. शक्तिशक्तिमतोरभेदः । मृद्वटादिवात् कार्यकारणयोरभिन्नत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । ŚRBS., ii, 1, ...
28. ब्रह्मसत्त्वे प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमप्रमाणदर्शनात् । Ibid, i, 1, 1, p. 4.
30. पृथिव्यादिभूतचतुष्टयसंयोगेनैव चेतनाचेतनसृष्टिः स्वतो भविष्यतीति यदुक्तं तदयुक्तम् । Ibid.
32. जीवब्रह्मणोर्भेदाभेद एवाङ्गीकर्तव्यः । जीवो ब्रह्मणः अंश एव, न त्वितरे । Ibid, ii, 3, 40.
33. न च भेदाभेदयोर्विरोध इति वाच्यम् । वयं श्रुतिप्रमाणवादिनः । Ibid.
34. प्रकाशादिवाज् जीवः परमात्मनोऽंशः । Ibid, ii, 3, 43.
35. विशेषणविशेष्ययो रंशांशित्वेऽपि स्वभाववैलक्षण्यं दृश्यते । एवं जीवपरयोः विशेषण-विशेष्यकृतं स्वभाव-वैलक्षण्यम् आश्रित्य भेदनिर्देशाः प्रवर्तन्ते । अभेदनिर्देशस्तु पृथक्सिद्ध्यनर्ह-विशेषणानां विशेष्यपर्यन्तत्वमाश्रित्य मुख्यत्वेनोपपद्यते । Ibid.
37. जीवानामन्योन्यभेदानुत्वेन प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नत्वाच्च भोगव्यतिकरो न भवति । Ibid, ii, 3, 46.
40. नानात्वव्यपदेशस्तावत् सष्टृत्व-सृज्यत्व-नियन्तृत्वनियाम्यत्व सर्वज्ञत्वाज्ञत्व-स्वाधीनत्व-पराधीनत्व-शुद्धत्वा-शुद्धत्व-कल्याणगुणाकरत्व-तद्विपरीतत्व-पतित्व-शेषत्वादिभिर्दृश्यते । Ibid, ii, 3, 40.
41. उभयव्यपदेशोपपत्तये जीवोऽयं ब्रह्मणोऽंश इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । Ibid.

78. प

79. अनाद्य

